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SECTION A

KENTUCKY GENERAL ASSEMBLY UPDATE
New Kentucky Legislative Enactments
I. Introduction. The materials included in this summary were accumulated as of March 30,
2004 and based upon bills introduced in the Kentucky 2004 General Session. There are,
however, two voting days and veto periods still open as of the date of this publication. The bills
summarized here include issues of particular importance to financial institutions doing business
in Kentucky. Detailed infonnation will be provided to financial institutions next month in a
booklet produced by the Kentucky Bankers Association entitled 2004 Session in Summary.
Most of the bills summarized are included with, these materials. Bills not included may be
obtained through the LRC Website atw'ww.lrc.state.ky.us or by contacting Debra Stamper at
502-582-2453 or dstamper@kyballks.cOlTI .
II. Scanning Credit Card Infonnation. (HB7-Delivered to the Governor on March 23).
Prohibits the fraudulent use of any electronic devices that store or retrieves data or identification
infonnation from debit and credit cards and makes such fraudulent use a felony.
III. Employer References. (HB48-Delivered to the Governor on March 26). Provides
immunity from civil liability to employers who give references requested by employer, previous
employee or prospective employer so long as infonnation given is not known to be false (or
given without regard to whether it is true or not), so long as it is not given with the intent to
mislead or so long as it is not given for prohibited discriminatory purposes.
IV. Bank Branching Reciprocity. (RB319-signed by the Governor on March 22). Places
restrictions on out-of-state banks seeking to branch into Kentucky, by providing that if the laws
of the home state of the out-of-state bank would place more restrictive tenns or conditions on
Kentucky banks seeking to acquire or merge with a bank in that state, then the interstate merger
or branching of the out-of-state bank into Kentucky would be allowed only under substantially
the same tenns and conditions.
V. Licensing of Rome Inspectors. (SB34-This has not been delivered to the Governor, so
it may not pass). Establishes licensing requirements, continuing education and minimal
experience requirements for home inspectors. It also establishes a procedure for complaints
against a home inspector. Create a Board ofRome Inspectors for oversight purposes.
VI. Release of Motor Vehicle Liens. (SB181-Delivered to the Governor on March 22).
Requires that a secured party deliver an authenticated tennination statement in compliance with
KRS 355.9-513 and 186A.195, when the security interest in the motor vehicle has been
discharged.
VII. Certificates of Deposit. (SB225-Delivered to the Governor on March 26). Requires
automatically renewing certificates of deposit to be renewed at the best available rate of interest
(as posted at the issuing financial institution) at that time for similarly issued CD's. Requires
notice of the same to be included in any notice that the financial institution sends out regarding
the upcoming renewal. Violation is an unfair trade practice.
Debra Stamper
Kentucky Bankers Association
A-I
VIII. Corporate License Tax. (ITW). Elimination of the corporate license tax is included in the
Governor's tax reform package which has been attached to the budget and which is in conference
at the date ofpublication.
IX. Predatory Lending. Elimination of the restriction against financing single premium
insurance products on high cost loans is still under consideration at the date ofpublication.
We will keep you posted on changes and representatives of the Kentucky Bankers Association
will be happy to speak to your officers or directors about this issue, upon request.
Debra Stamper
Kentucky Bankers Association
A- 2
AN ACT relating to consumer protection.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
SECTION 1. A NEW SECTION OF KRS 434.550 TO 434.730 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) No person shall use a scanning device to access. read. obtain. memorize. or store.
temporarily or permanently, information encoded on the magnetic strip or stripe
ofa payment card with the intent to defraud the authorized user. the issuer ofthe
authorized user's payment card. or a merchant.
(2) No person shall use a reencoder to place information encoded on the magnetic
strip or stripe of a payment card onto the magnetic strip or stripe of a different
card with the intent to defraud the authorized user. the issuer of the authorized
user's payment card. or a merchant.
Section 2. KRS 434.560 is amended to read as follows:
As used in KRS 434.550 to 434.730, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Automated banking device" means any machine which when properly activated by
a credit card, debit card or personal identification code will perform any of the
following services:
(a) Dispense money as a debit to the cardholder's savings or checking account; or
(b) Print the cardholder's savings or checking account balances on a statement; or
(c) Transfer funds between a cardholder's savings and checking account; or
(d) Accept payments on a cardholder's loan; or
(e) Dispense cash advances on an open end credit or a revolving charge
agreement; or
(f) Accept deposits to a customer's savings or checking account; or
(g) Receive inquiries of verification of checks and dispense information which
verifies that funds are available to cover said checks; or
(h) Cause money to be transferred electronically from a cardholder's account to an
Page 10f4
HB000710.100-31
A- 3
GA
account held by any business, firm, retail merchant, corporation, or any other
organizationiH
(2) "Cardholder" means the person or organization named on the face of a credit or
debit card to whom or for whose benefit the credit or debit card is issued by an
issueriH
(3) "Credit card" means any instrument or device, whether known as a credit card,
credit plate, credit number or by any other name, issued by an issuer for the use of
the cardholder in obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value on
creditiH
(4) "Debit card" means any instrument or device, known by any name, issued with or
without fee by an issuer for the use of the cardholder in obtaining money, goods,
services and anything else of value, payment of which is made against funds
previously deposited by cardholderiH
(5) "E.F.T. system" means an electronic funds transfer system whereby funds are
transferred electronically from a cardholder's account to any other accountiH
(6) "Expired credit card" means a credit card which is no longer valid because the tenn
shown on it has expirediH
(7) "Expired debit card" means a debit card which is no longer valid because the tenn
shown on it has expirediH
(8) "Issuer" means the business organization or financial institution which issues a
credit or debit card or its duly authorized agentiH
(9) "Merchant" means an owner or operator ofany retail mercantile establishment
or any agent. employee. lessee. consignee. officer. director. franchisee. or
independent contractor of such owner or operator. "Merchant" also means a
person who receives from an authorized user ofa payment card. or someone the
person believes to be an authorized user. a payment card or information from a
payment card. or what the person believes to be a payment card or information
Page 2 of4
HB000710.100-31
A- 4
GA
from a payment card, as the instrument for obtaining, purchasing, or receiving
goods, services, money, or anything else ofvalue from the person;
(10) "Participating party" means a business organization or financial institution, or any
duly authorized agent of such business organization or financial institution, which is
obligated by contract to acquire from a person, business organization or financial
institution providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, a sales slip,
sales draft or other instrument evidencing a credit or debit card transaction and from
whom the issuer is obligated by contract to acquire or participate in such sales slip,
sales draft or other instrumentiH
(11) "Payment card" means a credit card, charge card, debit card, or any other card
that is issued to an authorized card user and that allows the user to obtain.
purchase. or receive goods. services. money, or anything else of value from a
merchant;
(12)ffl-9» "Presentation or presents" as used herein shall be construed to define those
actions taken by a cardholder or any person to introduce a credit or debit card into
an automated banking device or merely displaying or showing a credit or debit card
to the issuer, a person or organization providing money, goods, services, or anything
else ofvalue, or any other entity with intent to defraudiH
(13)ftH-H "Receives" or "receiving" means acquiring possession or control of a credit or
debit cardiH
(14)~ "Reencoder" means an electronic device that places encoded information
from the magnetic strip or stripe of a payment card onto the magnetic strip or
stripe ofa different payment card;
(15) "Revoked credit card" means a credit card which is no longer valid because
permission to use it has been suspended or terminated by the issueriH
(16)ffHj} "Revoked debit card" means a debit card which is no longer valid because
permission to use it has been suspended or terminated by the issuer; and
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(17) "Scanning device" means a scanner, reader, or any other electronic device that is
used to access. read. scan. obtain, memorize. or store. temporarily or
permanentlv. information encoded on the magnetic strip or stripe of a payment
card.
Section 3. KRS 434.730 is amended to read as follows:
(1) A person who has violated KRS 434.590 shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
(2) A person who has violated KRS 434.600 shall be guilty of a Class D felony.
(3) A person who has violated the provisions ofsubsection (1) ofSection 1 ofthis Act
shall be guilty ofa Class D felony for the first offense and a Class C felony for
each subsequent offense.
(4) A person who has violated the provisions ofsubsection (2) ofSection 1 ofthis Act
shall be guilty ofa Class D felony for the first offense and a Class C felony for
each subsequent offense.
HB000710.100-31
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AN ACT relating to civil actions.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
SECTION 1. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 411 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) An employer who provides information about the job performance. professional
conduct. or evaluation ofa former or current employee to a prospective emplover
ofthat employee. at the request ofthat employee or prospective employer. shall be
immune from civil liability arising out ofthe disclosure unless the plaintiffin the
civil action proves:
(a) That the employer disclosed the information knowing that it was false. with
reckless disregard of whether it was true or false. or with intent to mislead
the prospective employer; or
(b) That the disclosure of the information by the employer constitutes an
unlawful discriminatory practice under KRS Chapter 344.
(2) This section does not create a new cause of action or substantive legal right
against an employer.
(3) This section does not limit an employer's immunity from civil liability or defenses
established in another section of the Kentucky Revised Statutes or available at
common law.
HB00481 0.1 00-41
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AN ACT relating to establishing bank branches.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
Section 1. KRS 287.920 is amended to read as follows:
(1) As used in this section, unless the context requires otherwise:
(a) "Interstate merger transaction" means the merger or consolidation of banks
with different home states, and the conversion of branches of any bank
involved in the merger or consolidation into branches of the resulting bank;
and
(b) "Resulting bank" means a bank that has resulted from an interstate merger
transaction under this section.
(2) A Kentucky state bank may establish, maintain, and operate one (1) or more
branches in a state other than Kentucky in accordance with an interstate merger
transaction in which the Kentucky state bank is the resulting bank, or if the other
state permits, by acquisition of a branch or branches in the other state. Not later than
the date on which the required application for the interstate merger transaction or
branch acquisition is filed with the responsible federal bank supervisory agency, the
applicant shall file an application on a form prescribed by the commissioner and pay
the fee prescribed by KRS 287.480. The applicant shall also comply with the
applicable provisions of KRS 287.180(2) and the commissioner shall base his or her
approval or disapproval in the same manner as prescribed in KRS 287.180(2).
(3) An out-of-state state bank may establish, maintain, and operate one (1) or more
branches in Kentucky in accordance with an interstate merger transaction in which
the out-of-state state bank is the resulting bank in accordance with the
requirements ofKentuc/w laws and administrative regulations. [fthe laws ofthe
home state of the out-or-state bank place more restrictive terms or requirements
on Kentucky state banks seeking to acquire and merge with a bank in that state,
the interstate merger of the out-or-state bank may be allowed only under
Page 10f3
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substantiallv the same terms and conditions as applicable to Kentucky state banks
in that state. Not later than the date on which the required application for the
interstate merger transaction is filed with the responsible federal bank supervisory
agency, the applicant shall file an application on a form prescribed by the
commissioner, pay the fee prescribed by KRS 287.480, and agree in writing to
comply with the laws of this state applicable to its operation of branches in
Kentucky. The applicant shall also comply with the applicable provisions of KRS
287.180(2) and the commissioner shall base his or her approval or disapproval in
the same manner as prescribed in KRS 287.180(2).
(4) No interstate merger transaction under subsection (2) or (3) of this section shall be
approved if the transaction would result in a bank holding company having control
of banks or branches in this state holding more than fifteen percent (15%) of the
total deposits and member accounts in the offices of all federally insured depository
institutions in this state as reported in the most recent June 30 quarterly report made
by the institutions to their respective supervisory authorities which are available at
the time of the transaction.
(5) An individual or bank holding company that controls two (2) or more banks may,
from time to time, combine any or all of the commonly controlled banks in this
Commonwealth into and with anyone (1) of the banks, and thereafter the surviving
bank shall continue to operate its principal office and may operate the other
authorized offices of the banks so combined as branches of the surviving bank.
(6) A branch of an out-of-state state bank may conduct any activities that are authorized
under the laws of this state for state banks. Additionally, the branch of an out-of-
state state bank is authorized to conduct any activities relating to the administration
of trusts that are authorized under the laws of its home state, if the activities are
conducted in conformity with the laws of its home state.
(7) A branch of a Kentucky state bank located in a host state may conduct any activities
HB031910.100-1205
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that are:
(a) Authorized under the laws of the host state for banks chartered by the host
state; or
(b) Authorized for branches of national banks located in the host state, but whose
principal location is in a state other than the host state.
HB031910.100-1205
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AN ACT relating to home inspectors.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
SECTION 1. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
As used in Sections 1 to 20 ofthis Act, unless otherwise provided:
(1) "Applicant" means an individual who applies for a license as a home inspector.
(2) "Board" means the Kentucky Board ofHome Inspectors established in Section 3
ofthis Act.
(3) "Client" means an individual who contracts with a licensed home inspector to
obtain a home inspection and subsequent written home inspection report.
(4) "Department" means the Kentucky Department of Housing, Buildings, and
Construction.
(5) "Home inspection" means a visual analysis for the purpose of providing a
professional opinion by a licensed home inspector, of the condition o( a
residential dwelling and the dwelling's attached garages and carports, any
reasonable accessible installed components, and the operation of the dwelling's
systems, including any controls normally operated by the owner of the dwelling,
for systems and components in the standards ofpractice established by the board.
Home inspection shall not include a code compliance inspection, or an inspection
required under the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety
Standards Act 0(1974, 42 U.S.C. secs. 5401 et seq., as amended, and rules and
regulations issued thereunder, or KRS 227.600 regarding manufactured homes.
(6) "Home inspection report" means a written report prepared by a licensed home
inspector for compensation and issued after a home· inspection. The report shall
include the following:
(a) A report on any system or component inspected that, in the professional
opinion ofthe inspector, is significantly deficient;
Page 1 of26
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(b) The inspector's recommendation to repair or monitor deficiencies reported
under paragraph (a) ofthis subsection;
(c) A list of anv svstems or components that were designated for inspection in
the standards ofpractice adopted bv the board but that were not inspected;
and
(d) The reason a svstem or component listed under paragraph (c) of this
subsection was not inspected.
(7) "Licensee" means a person who performs home inspections and who is licensed
under Sections 1 to 20 ofthis Act as a home inspector.
(8) "Residential dwelling" means a structure consisting of at least one (1) but not
more than four (4) units, each designed for occupaney bv a single familv,
whether the units are occupied or unoccupied.
SECTION 2. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
Sections 1 to 20 ofthis Act shall applv to an individual who conducts home inspections
for compensation, but shall not applv to the following:
(1) An individual who is acting within the scope ofthe individual's emplovment as:
(a) A code enforcement official for the state or a political subdivision of the
state; or
(b) A representative ofa state or local housing ageney or an individual acting
under the authority ofthe United States Department ofHousing and Urban
Development,·
(2) An individual who is acting within the scope of the individual's license as a
licensed:
(a) Architect under KRS Chapter 323,·
(b) Professional engineer under KRS Chapter 322,·
(c) Plumbing contractor or journeyman plumber under KRS Chapter 318;
SB003420.100-414
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(d) Electrician, master electrician, or electrical contractor under KRS Chapter
227A;
(e) Liquefied petroleum gas dealers under KRS Chapter 234,· or
(0 Master heating, ventilation, and air conditioning contractor, journeyman
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning mechanic, or an apprentice
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning mechanic under this chapter,·
(3) An individual licensed under KRS Chapter 324 as a real estate broker, broker-
salesperson, or salesperson and is acting within the scope of the individual's
license;
(4) An individual who is licensed under KRS Chapter 324A as a real estate appraiser
and is acting within the scope ofthe individual's license;
(5) An individual who holds a license under KRS Chapter 304 as an insurance
adjuster and is acting within the scope ofthe individual's license;
(6) An individual who holds a permit, certificate, or license to:
(a) Use and applY pesticides,· or
(b) Make diagnostic inspections and reports for wood destroying pests and
fungi under KRS Chapter 217B and is acting within the scope of the
individual's certificate or license;
(7) An individual who holds a license from a political subdivision as a tradesperson
or home builder and is acting within the scope ofthe individual's license;
(8) An individual who holds a current and valid license, certificate, or permit under
KRS 227.550 to 227.660 and is acting within the scope ofthe individual's license,
certificate, or permit as a:
(a) Manufactured home retailer;
(b) Manufactured home certified retailer; or
(c) Manufactured home certified installer; or
(9) Employees of the Department of Housing, Buildings and Construction or the
Page 3 of26
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State Fire Marshall's Office acting in their official capacities as inspectors of
buildings and manufactured housing.
SECTION 3. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) There is created a board to be known as the Kentuc/ev Board ofHome Inspectors.
(2) The board shall be composed often (10) members appointed by the Governor.
(a) Five (5) ofthe members shall:
1. Have been actively engaged in performing home inspections in
Kentucky for at least five (5) years immediately before the member's
appointment to the board. or have completed one hundred (100) fee
paid inspections per year over the last five (5) years;
2. Be licensed by the board as a home inspector; and
3. Be appointed as follows:
a. One (1) person shall be a member of the American Society of
Home Inspectors;
b. One (1) person shall be a member of the Kentucky Real Estate
Inspectors Association;
c. One (1) person shall be a member ofthe National Association of
Home Inspectors; and
d. Two (2) persons shall be either at-large licensed home inspectors
or owners or managers of a home inspection company actively
performing home inspections within the Commonwealth of
Kentucky. The company and its owner or manager shall have
been actively engaged in the home inspection profession in
Kentucky for a minimum of five (5) years. The company shall
employ or contract with multiple licensed home inspectors in
good standing with the Kentucky Board ofHome Inspectors.
Page 4 of26
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These five (5) members shall be selected from a list of fifteen (15) names
submitted to the Governor. and compiled by a selection committee composed
of six (6) members. two (2) each from the American Society of Home
Inspectors. the Kentucky Real Estate Inspectors Association. and the
National Association ofHome Inspectors respectively.
(b) The other five (5) board members shall be qualified as follows:
1. One (1) person shall be a home builder who has been actively engaged
in home building in Kentucky for at least five (5) years immediately
before the member's appointment to the board. This member shall be
selected from a list ofthree (3) names submitted to the Governor from
the Home Builders Association ofKentucky;
2. One (1) person shall be a licensed real estate salesperson or broker
under KRS Chapter 324 who has been actively engaged in selling.
trading. exchanging. optioning. leasing. renting. managing. or listing
residential real estate in Kentucky for at least five (5) years
immediately before the member's appointment to the board. This
member shall be selected from a list of three (3) names submitted to
the Governor from the Kentucky Association ofRealtors;
3. One (1) person shall represent the public at-large and shall not be
associated with the home inspection. home building. or real estate
business other than as a consumer. This member shall be appointed
by the Governor. but shall not be selected from a submitted list of
SB003420.100-414
names;
4. One (1) person shall be a licensed manufactured home retailer.
certified retailer. or certified installer who has been actively engaged
in such an occupation for at least five (5) years immediately before the
member's appointment to the board. This member shall be selected
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from a list of three (3) names submitted to the Governor from the
Kentucky Manufactured Housing Institute; and
5. The Executive Director of the Office of Housing. Buildings. and
Construction. or his or her designee shall be a member ofthe board.
(3) A board member required to have a license in accordance with subparagraph 3.
ofparagraph (a) ofsubsection (2) ofthis section. shall obtain the requisite license
in accordance with Section 7 of this Act. on or before July 1. 2006. If a board
member does not obtain the requisite license on or before July 1. 2006. the board
member shall be considered to have resigned from the board on July 1.2006. and
the Governor shall fill the vacaney in accordance with this section. If a board
member resigns for failure to obtain a home inspectors license. the actions ofthe
board member and board before July 1. 2006. shall be valid and viable.
(4) The members ofthe board shall be residents ofKentucky.
(5) The initial terms ofoffice for the nine (9) members appointed to the board by the
Governor are as follows:
(a) Three (3) members for a term ofthree (3) years;
(b) Three (3) members for a term oftwo (2) years; and
(c) Three (3) members for a term ofone (1) year.
Thereafter. all members shall serve a term ofthree (3) years.
(6) The initial terms begin July 15. 2004.
(7) The Governor may remove a board member at any time for incompetence. neglect
ofdutv. or unprofessional conduct.
(8) Ifa vacancy occurs in the membership of the board. the Governor shall appoint
an individual to serve for the remainder of the unexpired term who has like
qualifications required ofthe member who created the vacancy.
(9) A member shall not serve on the board for more than six (6) consecutive years.
(10) Each year the board shall elect a member as chairperson and a member as vice
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chairperson.
(11) The chairperson and vice chairperson shall serve in their respective capacities for
no more than one (1) year consecutively and until a successor is elected.
(12) The chairperson shall preside at all meetings at which the chairperson is present.
The vice chairperson shall preside at meetings in the absence ofthe chairperson
and shall perform other duties as the chairperson directs.
(13) If the chairperson and vice chairperson are absent from a meeting of the board
when a quorum exists. the members who are present may elect a presiding officer
who shall serve as acting chairperson until the conclusion ofthe meeting or until
the arrival ofthe chairperson or vice chairperson.
(14) The board shall meet at least quarterly each calendar year upon the call of the
chairperson or the written request ofa majority ofthe members ofthe board.
(15) The chairperson shall establish the date. time. and place for each meeting.
(16) A majority ofthe current members ofthe board constitutes a quorum.
(17) The affirmative vote of a majority of the members appointed to the board is
necessary for the board to take official action.
(18) Each member of the board is entitled to a minimum salary of thirty-five dollars
($35) per diem. Each member of the board is entitled to reimbursement for
traveling expenses and other expenses actually incurred in connection with the
member's duties as established under KRS 45.101.
SECTION 4. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
The board shall:
(1) Through the promulgation ofadministrative regulations:
(a) Determine the requirements for and prescribe the form of licenses.
applications. and other documents that are required by Sections 1 to 20 of
this Act; and
8B003420.100-414
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(b) Require that a home inspection report include a statement that the home
inspection report does not address environmental hazards. which shall be
listed with specificity bv the boardi
(2) Grant. deny, suspend. and revoke approval ofexaminations and courses ofstudv
regarding home inspectionsi
(3) Issue. deny. suspend. and revoke licenses in accordance with Sections 1 to 20 of
this Acti
(4) Investigate complaints concerning licensees. or persons the board has reason to
believe should be licensees. including complaints concerning failure to comply
with Sections 1 to 20 ofthis Act or administrative regulations promulgated under
Sections 1 to 20 of this Act. and. when appropriate. take action in accordance
with Sections 15 and 16 ofthis Act.·
(5) Bring actions in the name ofthe state in an appropriate court in order to enforce
compliance with Sections 1 to 20 of this Act or the administrative regulations
promulgated under Sections 1 to 20 ofthis Acti
(6) Establish fees in an amount not to exceed two hundred and fifty dollars ($250)
annuallYi
(7) Inspect the records of a licensee in accordance with administrative regulations
promulgated by the boardi
(8) Conduct or designate a member or other representative to conduct public
hearings on any matter for which a hearing is required under Sections 15 and 16
ofthis Act and exercise all powers granted under KRS Chapter 13Bi
(9) Adopt a seal containing the words "Kentucky Board ofHome Inspectors" and.
through the board's secretary. certify copies and authenticate all acts of the
boardi
(10) Use counsel. consultants. and other persons. enter into contracts. and authorize
expenditures that are reasonably necessary or appropriate to administer and
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enforce Sections 1 to 20 of this Act and administrative regulations promulgated
thereunder;
(11) Establish continuing education requirements for licensed home inspectors in
accordance with Sections 12 and 13 ofthis Act;
(12) Maintain the board's office, files, records, and property in the city ofFrankfort;
(13) Require all fee-paid home inspections to be conducted in accordance with the
standards ofpractice of:
(a) The American Society ofHome Inspectors;
(b) The National Association ofHome Inspectors,· or
(c) Any other approved standards ofpractice that are equal to the standards of
practice ofthe organizations in paragraphs (a) and (b) ofthis subsection.
The board may establish standards of practice for home inspectors licensed in
Kentucky at a later date, which will supersede any other standards of practice
previously adopted by the board.
(14) Exercise all other powers specifically conferred on the board under Sections 1 to
20 ofthis Act; and
(15) Promulgate administrative regulations to carry out the effective administration
and the requirements ofSections 1 to 20 ofthis Act.
SECTION 5. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
The department shall provide the board with:
(1) Clerical or other assistants, including investigators, necessary for the proper
performance ofthe board's duties,·
(2) A place to hold board meetings and hearings; and
(3) Office equipment and office space for board records, staff, and other effects
necessary to carry out the requirements ofSections 1 to 20 ofthis Act.
SECTION 6. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
SB003420.100-414
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READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) There is established in the State Treasury a revolving fund for the use by the
board.
(2) All fees and other money received by the board in accordance with Sections 4. 7.
8. 12. and 13 of this Act shall be deposited in the revolving fund established in
subsection (1) ofthis section.
(3) No part ofthis revolving fund shall revert to the general fund.
(4) The compensation ofboard members and all ofthe board's expenses incurred by
the board shall be paid from this revolving fund. except the assistance set forth in
Section 5 ofthis Act.
SECTION 7. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) An individual shall not advertise or claim to be a licensed home inspector and
shall not conduct a home inspection for compensation without first obtaining a
license as a home inspector.
(2) The board shall deny a license to any applicant who fails to:
(a) Furnish evidence satisfactory to the board. showing that the individual:
1. Is at least eighteen (18) years orage.·
2. Has graduated from high school or earned a Kentucky or other state's
general educational development (GED) diploma; and
3. Meets other criteria established by the board.
(b) Verifv the information submitted on the application form;
(c) Complete a board approved training program or course of study involving
the performance ofhome inspections. and pass an examination prescribed
or aoproved by the board;
(d) Submit to the board a certificate ofinsurance that is acceptable to the board
and that:
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1. Is issued by an insurance company or other legal entity authorized to
transact insurance business in Kentucky;
2. Provides for general liability coverage ofat least two-hundred and fifty
thousand dollars ($250,000);
3. Lists the state as an additional insured;
4. States that cancellation and nonrenewal ofthe underlying poliey is not
effective until the board receives at least ten (10) days prior written
notice ofthe cancellation or nonrenewal; and
5. Contains any other terms and conditions established by the board.
(e) Pay a licensing fee established in Section 4 ofthis Act.
(3) A person applYing for a license as a home inspector shall apply on a written or
electronic form prescribed and provided by the board.
SECTION 8. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) The licensing requirements for a home inspector may be waived for a person
moving to Kentucky from another jurisdiction, and the person may be granted a
license as a home inspector ifthe person meets the following requirements:
(a) The other jurisdiction grants the same privileges to licensees ofKentucky as
Kentucky grants to licensees ofthat other jurisdiction;
(b) The person is licensed in the other jurisdiction;
(c) The licensing requirements of the other jurisdiction are substantially
similar to the requirements ofSections 1 to 20 ofthis Act; and
(d) The person states that he or she has studied, is familiar with, and will abide
by Sections 1 to 20 of this Act and the administrative regulations
promulgated by the board.
(2) A person seeking a license as a home inspector under this section shall:
(a) Apply on a form prescribed and provided by the board; and
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(b) Pay the applicable licensing fee established bv the board.
SECTION 9. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) A nonresident whom the board determines meets the requirements ofSections 1
to 20 of this Act and who files the written consent described in subsection (2) of
this section may be licensed as a home inspector in Kentucky.
(2) A nonresident applicant shall file with the board a written consent stating that, if
licensed:
(a) The applicant agrees to the commencement ofany action arising out ofthe
conduct of the applicant's business in Kentucky in the county in which the
events giving rise to the cause ofaction occurred;
(b) The applicant:
1. Agrees to provide to the board the name and address of an agent to
receive service ofprocess in Kentucky,· or
2. Consents to the board acting as the applicant's agent for the purpose
ofreceiving service ofprocess if:
a. An agent's name and address have not been filed with the board;
!!!
b. The agent's name and address on file with the board are
incorrect; and
(c) The applicant agrees that service of process in accordance with the
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure is proper service and subjects the
applicant to the jurisdiction ofKentucky courts.
SECTION 10. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
All licenses issued by the board shall remain the property ofthe board.
SECTION 11. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
SB003420.100-414
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READ AS FOLLOWS:
A licensee shall notify the board within thirty (30) days ofanv change of:
(1) Name.·
(2) Name under which the licensee conducts business.· or
(3) Business address.
SECTION 12. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) The initial license for a home inspector issued in accordance with Sections 1 to
20 of this Act. shall expire on the last day of the licensee's birth month in the
following year. The board may reduce the license fee on a pro rata basis for
initial licenses issued for less than twelve (12) months.
(2) Renewed licenses shall expire on the last day of the licensee's birth month of
each even numbered year after the date ofissuance ofthe renewed license.
(3) An individual who applies to renew a license as a licensed home inspector shall:
(a) Furnish evidence showing successful completion of the continuing
education requirements ofthis section;
(b) Pay the renewal fee established bv the board.· and
(c) Show proof of general liability insurance in the amount required by
subsection (2)(d) ofSection 7 ofthis Act.
(4) Renewal notices shall be sent to each licensee at least sixty (60) days prior to the
expiration of the license. The notice shall inform the licensee of the need to
renew and the requirement of payment of the renewal fee. If this notice of
expiration is not sent by the board. the licensee is not subject to a sanction for
failure to renew if, once notice is received from the board. the license is renewed
within forty-five (45) days ofthe receipt ofthe notice.
(5) Renewal fees shall be paid with a draft. a money order. a cashier's check. a
certified or other personal check. or if payment is made in person. the payment
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may be made in cash. ]fthe board receives an uncertified personal check for the
renewal fee and if the check does not clear the bank. the board may refuse to
renew the license.
(6) Before the end ofeach license period. each licensee shall complete the continuing
education required by the board. This requirement shall not exceed thirty (30)
hours per two (2) year license cycle. This requirement shall be effective beginning
January 1. 2005.
(7) The board may. through the promulgation ofadministrative regulations:
(a) Establish an inactive license for licensees who are not actively engaging in
the home inspection business but wish to maintain their license;
(b) Reduce license and renewal fees for inactive licenses; and
(c) Waive the insurance requirements established in Section (7) ofthis Act for
inactive licenses.
SECTION 13. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
The board shall promulgate administrative regulations concerning the continuing
education required for the renewal ofa home inspector license and shall:
(1) Establish procedures for approving organizations that provide continuing
education; and
(2) Prescribe the content. duration. and organization of continuing education
courses that contribute to the competence ofhome inspectors.
SECTION 14. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) As used in this section. "political subdivision" means any city. county, or I
consolidated local government.
(2) No ageney or political subdivision ofthe state. other than the board. shall impose
the following on individuals licensed under Sections 1 to 20 ofthis Act:
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(a) A registration or licensing requirement; or
(b) A license fee to obtain any local license. except that this prohibition shall
not prevent any local government from imposing an occupational license
tax on any person operating as a home inspector within the jurisdiction of
the local government.
SECTION 15. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
The board shall take disciplinary actions against or impose sanctions on a licensee for
failing to comply with any provision of Sections 1 to 20 of this Act or any
administrative regulations promulgated to carry out Sections 1 to 20 ofthis Act.
SECTION 16. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) The procedures set forth in KRS Chapter 13B shall govern the board's conduct of
disciplinary hearings.
(2) The board may summarily suspend a license for up to ninety (90) days before a
final adjudication or during an appeal ofthe board's determination. if the board
finds that the licensee would represent a clear and immediate danger to the
public's health. safety. or property if allowed to perform home inspections. The
summary suspension may be renewed upon a hearing before the board for up to
ninety (90) days.
(3) Ifthe board:
(a) Determines that an individual is not licensed under Sections 1 to 20 ofthis
Act and is engaged in or believed to be engaged in activities for which a
license is required under Sections 1 to 20 of this Act. the board shall issue
an order to that individual requiring the individual to show cause why the
individual should not be ordered to cease and desist from the activities. The
show cause order shall set forth a date. time. and place for a hearing at
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which the individual shall appear and show cause why the individual
should not be subject to licensing under Sections 1 to 20 ofthis Acti
Cb) Afler a hearing. determines that the activities in which the individual is
engaged are subject to licensing under Sections 1 to 20 of this Act. the
board may issue a cease and desist order that identifies the individual and
describes activities that are the subject ofthe order.
(4) A cease and desist order issued under this section shall be enforceable in a
Circuit Court ofthe Commonwealth.
SECTION 17. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) An individual is guiltv of a Class B misdemeanor under KRS 534.040 if the
individual:
(a) Performs or offers to perform home inspections for compensation without
being licensed as a home inspector and without being exempt from
licensingi
(b) Presents as the individual's own the license ofanotheri
(c) Intentionally gives false or materially misleading information to the board
or to a board member in connection with a licensing matteri
Cd) Impersonates another licenseei or
(e) Uses an expired. suspended. revoked. or an otherwise restricted license.
(2) When entering a judgment for a violation. the court shall add to any penaltv
imposed. the amount ofany fee or other compensation earned by the individual
in the commission ofthe violation.
(3) Each transaction involving unauthorized activities as described in this section.
shall constitute a separate violation.
(4) In all actions for the collection of a fee or other compensation for performing
home inspections. the party seeking reliefshall allege and prove that. at the time
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that the cause of action arose, the party seeking relief was not in violation of
Section 7 ofthis Act.
(5) The general counsel for the Department ofHousing, Buildings and Construction
shall act as the legal adviser for the board and provide any legal assistance
necessary to carry out this section.
SECTION 18. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) An action for damages, whether brought in contract or tort, or on any other
basis, based on professional services that were rendered or that should have been
rendered by a licensed home inspector shall not be brought, commenced, or
maintained unless the action is filed within one (1) year of the time that· the
claimant knew or should have known ofa deficient inspection and damages and
injuries resulting therefrom.
(2) Nothing in this section creates any duty to a third party that is not available
under common law.
SECTION 19. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) An individual who performs home inspections after the effective date ofthis Act,
does not violate Sections 2 and 7 of this Act , and shall not be disciplined or
sanctioned for failure to have a home inspector's license if the person obtains a
home inspector's license not later than July 1, 2006.
(2) Notwithstanding the requirements ofSection 7 ofthis Act, the board may issue to
an individual, upon the individual's application and payment of fees, a home
inspector license ifthe individual:
(a) Meets the requirements ofSection 7 ofthis Act, excluding paragraph (2)(c)
ofSection 7 ofthis Act; or
(b) Has been engaged in the practice of home inspections for at least one (1)
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year prior to enactment ofSections 1 to 20 of this Act and documents the
performance of at least twenty-five (25) home inspections performed for
compensation in the previous twelve (12) months or at least one hundred
(100) home inspections performed for compensation in the individual's
career.
(3) The board may consider and accept the successful completion of equivalent
licensing requirements in another state or local jurisdiction instead ofone (1) or
more of the requirements ofSection 7 of this Act. if those requirements meet or
exceed the requirements ofSection 7 ofthis Act.
(4) This section shall expire January 1. 2007.
SECTION 20. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 198B IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
Home inspectors are prohibited from indicating in writing in the initial home
inspection report. that any condition is not in compliance with any building code
enforced under KRS Chapter 198B.
SECTION 21. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 21 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
As used in Sections 21 to 27 ofthis Act. unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Action" means any civil lawsuit or action in contract or tort for damages or
indemnity brought against a home inspector to assert a claim. whether by
complaint. counterclaim. or cross-claim. for damages or the loss ofuse ofreal or
personal property caused by a deficient home inspection or home inspection
report regarding the inspection of a home. "Action" does not include any civil
action in tort alleging personal injury or wrongful death to a person or persons
resulting from a deficient home inspection or home inspection report.·
(2) "Claimant" means a client who asserts a claim against a home inspector
concerning a deficient home inspection or home inspection report regarding the
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inspection ofa home;
(3) "Home" means a structure consisting ofat least one (1) but not more than four
(4) units, each designed for occupancy by a single family, whether the units are
occupied or unoccupied;
(4) "Home inspector" means a person licensed in accordance with Sections 1 to 27
ofthis Act; and
(5) "Serve" or "service" means personal service or delivery by certified mail to the
last known address ofthe addressee.
SECTION 22. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 411 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
Sections 21 to 27 ofthis Act shall:
(1) ApplY to any claim that arises before, on, or after July 15, 2004, as the result ofa
deficient home inspection or home inspection report regarding the inspection ofa
home, except a claim for personal injury or wrongful death, if the claim is the
subject ofan action commenced on or after July 15, 2004,·
(2) Prevail over any conflicting law otherwise applicable to the claim or cause of
action;
(3) Not bar or limit any claim or defense otherwise available except as otherwise
provided in Sections 21 to 27 ofthis Act; and
(4) Not create a new theory upon which liability may be based.
SECTION 23. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 411 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
In a claim to recover damages resulting from a deficient home inspection or home
inspection report regarding the inspection ofa home, a home inspector is liable for his
or her acts or omissions or the acts or omissions ofhis or her agents or employees and
is not liable for any damages caused by:
(1) The acts or omissions of a person other than the home inspector or his or her
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agent or employee; or
(2) Any construction defect disclosed to a claimant before his or her purchase ofthe
home, if the disclosure was provided in writing and in language that is
understandable and was signed by the claimant.
SECTION 24. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 411 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) In every deficient home inspection or home inspection report action brought
against a home inspector, the claimant shall serve written notice ofclaim on the
home inspector. The notice of claim shall state that the claimant asserts a
deficient home inspection or home inspection report claim against the home
inspector and shall describe the claim in reasonable detail sufficient to determine
the general nature ofthe deficieney.
(2) Within twenty-one (21) days after service of the notice of claim, the home
inspector shall serve a written response on the claimant by registered mail or
personal service. The written response shall:
(a) Propose to inspect the residence that is the subject of the claim and to
complete the inspection within a specified time frame. The proposal shall
include the statement that the home inspector shall, based on the inspection,
offer to remedy the defect, compromise by payment, or dispute the claim;
(b) Offer to compromise and settle the claim by monetary payment without
inspection; or
(c) State that the home inspector disputes the claim.
(3) (a) If the home inspector disputes the claim or does not respond to the
claimant's notice of claim within the time stated in subsection (2) of this
section, then the claimant may bring an action against the home inspector
for the claim described in the notice ofclaim without further notice.
(b) If the claimant rejects the inspection proposal or the settlement offer made
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by the home inspector pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. then the
claimant shall serve written notice of the claimant's rejection on the home
inspector. After service of the rejection. the claimant may bring an action
against the home inspector for the deficient home inspection or home
inspection report claim described in the notice of claim. If the home
inspector has not received from the claimant. within thirty (30) days after
the claimant's receipt of the home inspector's response. either an
acceptance or a rejection ofthe inspection proposal or settlement offer. then
at any time thereafter the home inspector may terminate the proposal or
offer by serving written notice to the claimant. and the claimant may
thereafter bring an action against the home inspector for the deficient home
inspection or home inspection report claim described in the notice ofclaim.
(4) (a) If the claimant elects to allow the home inspector to inspect in accordance
with the home inspector's proposal pursuant to subsection (2)(a) of this
section. then the claimant shall provide the home inspector reasonable
access to the claimant's home during normal working hours to inspect the
premises.
(b) Within fourteen (14) days following completion ofthe inspection. the home
inspector shall serve on the claimant:
1. A written offer to remedy the defect at no cost to the claimant.
including a report of the scope of the inspection. the findings and
results ofthe inspection. a description ofthe remedy necessary to cure
the defect described in the claim. and a timetable for the completion of
this remedy;
2. A written offer to compromise and settle the claim by monetary
payment pursuant to subsection (2)(b) ofthis section.· or
3. A written statement that the home inspector will not proceed further to
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remedy the defect.
The claimant shall have the right to accept or reject the proposed remedy, or
the monetary offer to settle the claim.
(c) If the home inspector does not proceed further to remedy the defect within
the agreed timetable, or if the home inspector fails to comply with the
provisions ofparagraph (b) ofthis subsection, then the claimant may bring
an action against the home inspector for the claim described in the notice of
claim without further notice.
(d) If the claimant rejects the offer made by the home inspector pursuant to
paragraph (b)1. or 2. of this subsection to either remedy the defect or to
compromise and settle the claim by monetary payment, then the claimant
shall serve written notice ofthe claimant's rejection on the home inspector.
After service of the rejection notice, the claimant may bring an action
against the home inspector for the deficient home inspection or home
inspection report claim described in the notice of claim. If the home
inspector has not received from the claimant, within thirty (30) days after
the claimant's receipt of the home inspector's response, either an
acceptance or a rejection of the offer made pursuant to paragraph (b)l. or
2. of this subsection, then at any time thereafter the home inspector may
terminate the offer by serving written notice to the claimant.
(5) (a) Any claimant accepting the offer ofa home inspector to remedy the defect
pursuant to subsection (4)(b)1. of this section shall do so by serving the
home inspector with a written notice ofacceptance within a reasonable time
period after receipt of the offer, and no later than thirty (30) days after
receipt of the offer. The claimant shall provide the home inspector
reasonable access to the claimant's home during normal working hours to
perform and complete the remedy by the timetable stated in the offer.
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(b) The claimant and home inspector may. by written mutual agreement. alter
the extent ofremedy or the timetable. including but not limited to repair of
additional defects.
(6) Ifa claimant files a complaint. counterclaim. or cross-claim prior to meeting the
requirements ofthis section. then the court may issue an order holding the action
in abeyance until the parties comply with this section.
(7) Nothing in this section may be construed to prevent a claimant from commencing
an action on the deficient home inspection or home inspection report claim
described in the notice ofclaim ifthe home inspector fails to perform the remedy
agreed upon or fails to perform by the timetable agreed upon pursuant to
subsection (2)(a) or (5) ofthis section.
(8) The service ofan amended notice ofclaim shall relate back to the original notice
ofclaim for purposes oftolling statutes oflimitations and repose.
SECTION 25. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 411 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) The home inspector shall upon entering into a contract for the inspection of a
building or residence. provide notice to each client. ofthe home inspector's right
to offer to cure a deficient home inspection or home inspection report before a
client may commence litigation against the home inspector. The notice shall be
conspicuous and may be included as part ofthe underlying contract signed by the
client.
(2) The notice required by this section shall be in substantially the following form:
"CHAPTER 411 OF THE KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES CONTAIN
IMPORTANT REQUIREMENTS YOU MUST FOLLOW BEFORE YOU MAY
FILE A LAWSUIT FOR DEFECTIVE CONSTRUCTION AGAINST THE
HOME INSPECTOR OF YOUR RESIDENCE. YOU MUST DELIVER TO
YOUR HOME INSPECTOR A WRITTEN NOTICE OF ANY CONDITIONS
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YOU ALLEGE THAT YOUR HOME INSPECTOR FAILED TO INCLUDE IN
THE HOME INSPECTION REPORT AND PROVIDE YOUR HOME
INSPECTOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE AN OFFER TO REPAIR OR
PAY FOR THE DEFECTS. YOU ARE NOT OBLIGATED TO ACCEPT ANY
OFFER MADE BY THE HOME INSPECTOR. THERE ARE STRICT
DEADLINES AND PROCEDURES UNDER STATE LAW. AND FAILURE TO
FOLLOW THEM MAYAFFECT YOUR ABILITY TO FILE A LAWSUIT. "
(3) Sections 21 to 27 of this Act shall not preclude or bar any action ifnotice is not
given to the client as required by this section.
SECTION 26. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 411 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) Nothing in Sections 21 to 27 ofthis Act shall be construed to hinder or otherwise
affect the employment, ageney, or contractual relationship between and among
homeowners and home inspectors during the process of inspection, and nothing
in Sections 21 to 27 ofthis Act precludes the termination ofthose relationships as
allowed under other law.
(2) Noncompliance by the client with Section 24 of this Act shall not operate as an
affirmative defense in an action against a home inspector by the client for
emergeney repairs.
SECTION 27. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 411 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
Ifa written notice ofc/aim is served under Section 24 of this Act, then the statute of
limitation for the underlying action is tolled until seventv-five (75) days after the
expiration ofthe time frame agreed to by the parties under subsection (2) ofSection 24
of this Act, or the date established for inspection pursuant to paragraph (a) of
subsection (2) ofSection 24 ofthis Act, or the expiration of the time frame contained
in paragraph (b) ofsubsection (4) ofSection 24 ofthis Act, whichever occurs later.
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Section 28. KRS 198B.030 is amended to read as follows:
(1) There is hereby created the Kentucky department of housing, buildings and
construction within the cabinet for public protection and regulation. The governor
shall appoint a commissioner to head the department by July 1, 1978. The
commissioner shall receive for his services such compensation as the governor shall
determine.
(2) The commissioner may employ sufficient staff to carry out the functions of his
office. Neither the commissioner nor any member of his staff shall be employed,
either directly or indirectly, in any aspect of the building industry as regulated by
this chapter while employed by the department of housing, buildings and
construction.
(3) The department shall serve as staff for the board of housing, buildings and
construction as established by this chapter, and shall perform all budgeting,
procurement, and other administrative activities necessary to the functioning of this
body. The board shall prescribe the duties of the commissioner in addition to those
duties otherwise delegated to him by the governor or prescribed for him by law.
(4) The department may enter into contracts with the federal government, other
agencies of state government or with its subdivisions, or with private profit or
nonprofit organizations in order to effect the purposes of this chapter.
(5) Subject to the direction of the board of housing, buildings and construction, the
commissioner shall cooperate with the agencies of the United States and with the
governing bodies and housing authorities of counties, cities, and with not for profit
organizations and area development districts in relation to matters set forth in this
chapter, and in any reasonable manner that may be necessary for the state to qualify
for, and to receive grants or aid from such agencies. To these ends and subject to the
direction of the board, the commissioner shall have the power to comply with each
condition and execute such agreements as may be necessary, convenient, or
SB003420.100-414
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desirable.
(6) Nothing in this chapter shall preclude any other agency, board, or officer of the state
from being designated as the directing or allocating agency, board, or officer for the
distribution of federal grants and aid, or the performance of other duties to the
extent necessary to qualify for and to receive grants and aid for programs under the
administration of the department.
(7) The commissioner is authorized to receive, for and on behalf of the state, the
department, and the board of housing, buildings and construction, from the United
States and agencies thereof, and from any and all other sources, grants and aid and
gifts made for the purpose of providing, or to assist in providing, any of the
programs authorized by this chapter, including expenses of administration. All such
funds shall be paid into the state treasury and credited to a trust and agency fund to
be used by the department in carrying out the provisions of this chapter. No part of
this fund shall revert to the general fund of the Commonwealth.
(8) The Kentucky Board ofHome Inspectors established in Section 3 ofthis Act shall
be attached to the department for administrative purposes.
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AN ACT relating to security interests.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
Section 1. KRS 186.045 is amended to read as follows:
(1) A perfected security interest in a motor vehicle that has been satisfied by payment in
full shall be deemed to have been discharged if one (1) or both of the following
events has occurred:
(a) The funds to pay in full and discharge the security interest have been provided
to the secured party in the form of a cashier's check, certified check, or wire
transfer; or
(b) The debt has been paid to a secured party who is no longer in existence or has
failed to file the necessary docume~ts to discharge the lien.
(2) If payment in full has been made under subsection (1)(a) of this section, the
discharge of the lien shall be made not later than ten (10) days from the receipt of
the payment.
(3) When a security interest has been paid in full and a termination statement or
discharge has not been filed, the debtor may petition the Circuit Court in the county
of the debtor's residence to order the discharge of the security interest. The debtor
shall present written evidence to the Circuit Court that the security interest has been
paid in full. If the evidence presented to the Circuit Court proves to the court's
satisfaction that the security interest has been paid in full, the court shall order the
county clerk to note the termination on the title and to remove the lien from the
Automated Vehicle Information System (AVIS). A copy of the court's order shall
immediately be sent to the county clerk in the county where the security interest was
originally filed and the county clerk shall discharge the security interest and remove
the lien information from AVIS in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(4) Whenever a security interest has been discharged, other than by proceedings under
Part 6 of Article 9 of KRS Chapter 355 or similar proceedings, the secured party
SB018110.100-1870
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shall deliver an authenticated£a} termination statement in the manner required by
KRS 355.9-513 and 186A.195 to the county clerk of the county in which the title
lien statement was submitted. The secured party shall also deliver a copy of the
termination statement to the debtor or the debtor's transferee. For failure to file the
termination statement within the allowable time, the secured party shall be subject
to the penalty provided in KRS 186.990(1). Except as provided in subsection (3) of
this section, within five (5) days after the receipt of such documents, the county
clerk shall note the filing in the index, in language prescribed by the cabinet, that
the termination statement has been filed. Upon presentation of the owner's title
showing a security interest to the county clerk where the termination statement was
submitted, and with the copy of the termination statement submitted by the secured
party, the clerk shall discharge the security interest by noting on the title that the
termination statement has been filed and place the seal of the county clerk thereon.
The clerk shall return the owner's title to the owner. The county clerk shall then file
the termination statement in the place from which the title lien statement was
removed. Termination statements shall be retained in the clerk's files for a period of
two (2) years subsequent to the date of filing a statement, at which time they may be
destroyed. The fee for these services are included in the provisions of KRS
186A.190.
(5) Upon presentation of an owner's title showing a security interest to the county clerk
of a county where the termination statement was not delivered, the county clerk
shall access the automated system to determine whether a record of termination of
the security interest has been entered into the automated system by the county clerk
where the termination statement was delivered by the secured party as provided in
KRS 186A.210. If a record of termination has been entered into the automated
system, the county clerk of the county where the termination statement was not
delivered, shall note the discharge of the security interest on the certificate of title
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by noting that the termination statement has been delivered, the county where it was
delivered, and placing the seal of the county clerk thereon and may rely on the
automated system to do so. If a record of termination has not been entered into the
automated system, the county clerk of the county other than where the termination
statement was delivered shall not make any notation upon the certificate of title that
the security interest has been discharged or that a termination statement has been
delivered to the county where the title lien statement was submitted.
(6) Whenever any secured party repossesses a vehicle titled in Kentucky, for which a
security interest is in existence at the time of repossession, and disposes of the
vehicle pursuant to the provisions of KRS Chapter 355, he shall present, within
fifteen (15) days after such disposition, an affidavit in a form prescribed by the
department and a termination statement or proof that a termination statement has
been filed. The new owner shall pay all applicable fees for titling and transferring
the vehicle to the county clerk. Upon receipt of such documents, the county clerk
who issued the lien shall then omit from the title he makes application for any
information relating to the security interest under which the vehicle was repossessed
or any security interest subordinate thereto. However, any security interest, as
shown by such title which is superior to the one under which the vehicle was
repossessed, shall be shown on the title issued by the clerk unless the prior secured
party has discharged the security interest in the clerk's office or proof of termination
is submitted, if the prior security interest was discharged in another clerk's office.
(7) Whenever any vehicle brought into Kentucky is required to be titled and the vehicle
is then subject to a security interest in another state as shown by the out-of-state
documents presented to the clerk, the county clerk is prohibited from processing the
application for title on the vehicle unless the owner obtains from the secured party a
financing statement or title lien statement and presents same to the clerk along with
the fees required in KRS 186A.190. The clerk shall note the out-of-state security
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interest on the certificate of title. This provision does not apply to vehicles required
to be registered in Kentucky under forced registration provisions under KRS
186.145.
(8) The fees provided for in this section are in addition to any state fee provided for by
law.
(9) Any person violating any prOVISIon of this section or any person refusing to
surrender a certificate of title registration and ownership or transfer certificate upon
request of any person entitled thereto, is subject to the penalties provided in
subsection (1) ofKRS 186.990.
(10) The county clerk is prohibited from noting any security interest on a certificate of
title on any vehicle subject to the provisions of KRS Chapter 186A if a certificate of
title therefor is presented to him which has all the spaces provided thereon for
noting security interests fully exhausted. The owner is responsible for ensuring that
a discharge is noted on the certificate of title for each security interest and then a
duplicate title as provided for in KRS 186A.180 shall be obtained from the clerk by
the owner of the vehicle.
(11) Security interests in vehicles sold to or owned by residents of other states shall be
perfected in the state of the nonresident and repossession of the vehicle shall be
taken pursuant to the laws of that state, unless:
(a) The vehicle is principally operated in Kentucky;
(b) The vehicle is properly titled in Kentucky under KRS Chapter 186A; and
(c) The security interest is authorized to be noted on the certificate of title by the
county clerk under KRS Chapter 186A.
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AN ACT relating to certificates of deposit.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
SECTION 1. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 367 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) As used in this section, "financial institution" means a bank, trust company,
savings and loan association, or credit union authorized by law to do business in
this state.
(2) (a) A financial institution that issues a certificate of deposit that is subject to
automatic renewal at maturity shall, upon automatic renewal, renew the
certificate ofdeposit for a like term at the best available rate of interest as
posted at the issuing financial institution for similarly issued certificates of
like term.
(b) Any notice sent by the financial institution to the holder ofa certificate of
deposit subject to automatic renewal prior to maturity which notifies the
holder of the holder's options upon renewal shall disclose that if the
certificate ofdeposit automatically renews it will be renewed for a like term
at the best available rate of interest as posted at the issuing financial
institution for similarly issued certificates oflike term.
(3) (a) Any violation of this section shall be an unfair, false, misleading, and
deceptive act or practice in the conduct oftrade or commerce in violation of
KRS 367.170.
(b) All ofthe remedies, powers, and duties provided for the Attorney General in
KRS 367.190 to 367.300, and all of the penalties provided in KRS 367.990.
pertaining to acts declared unlawful by KRS 367.170, shall apply to acts and
practices declared unlawful in this section.
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Case Law Update
I. Lawyers At Real Estate Closings - Countrywide Home Loans. Inc.. et al. v. Kentucky Bar
Association, 113 S.W.3d. 105 (Ky., 8/21/03).
A. Kentucky Bar Association's ("KBA") U-58 is vacated and reaffirming that KBA's "U-31
accurately described the unauthorized practice of law parameters for real estate closings."
B. In U-58, the Kentucky Bar Association generally took the position that the
performance of a real estate closing by a lay closing agent is the unauthorized practice of law.
C. In U-31, the KBA generally permitted laypersons to conduct real estate closings so
long as they avoided giving legal advice.
D. . Kentucky Supreme Court actually permitted discovery on the issue and 16 depositions
were taken and over 1000 pages of exhibits tendered.
E. A "closing" was understood by the Kentucky Supreme Court to be "the final steps of
the transaction whereat the consideration is paid, mortgage is secured, deed is delivered or placed
in escrow, etc." The Kentucky Supreme Court noted that it was comfortable with this ministerial view
"because most of the closing documents are prepared by the lender and legal issues are almost
always resolved prior to the closing."
F. The Kentucky Supreme Court believed that "safeguards [are] in place to protect the
public" in lay closings in the form of (1) the economic incentives on the closing parties to provide
quallity in order to earn repeat business and avoid lawsuits; and (2) the general requirement of title
insurance underwriters that closing agents obtain E&O insurance; and (3) the existence of title
insurance for the owners; and (4) civil actions for damages for improper service.
G. "Although we recognize that persons with the financial wherewithal to do so may wish
to retain independent counsel for a real estate closing, we also recognize that for us to require
parties to have independent counsel would substantially increase the transactional costs associated
with a home purchase and thus run contrary to the public interest."
H. Certain aspects of the residential real estate transaction were recognized as
constituting the practice of law: (1) "the title commitment letter" and (2) preparation of deed and
mortgages."
II. Taxation -liinois Tool Works And Its Progeny:
A. Background Generally.
1. Historically, as part of their license tax liability calculations, companies paying
taxes in Kentucky must include the amount of stock owned in subsidiary companies. In addition,
prior to 1976, Kentucky law required corporations domiciled, or headquartered, within the state to
pay license tax on the holding corporation, including stock owned in any subsidiaries. In 1976, the
Kentucky legislature recognized this as double taxation and enacted KRS 136.071, which provided
Kentucky domiciled companies with a deduction in this calculation. This deduction has been viewed
by business development organizations as a valuable economic development tool for Kentucky,
designed to encourage businesses to headquarter here and expand.
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B. The Illinois Tool Works Decision.
1. On December 5, 2002, the Franklin Circuit Court in Illinois Tool Works v.
Kentucky Revenue Cabinet declared the corporate license tax deduction available to in-state holding
corporations unconstitutional -- essentially reinstating this double taxation for Kentucky companies.
The ruling claimed Kentucky tax law provided in-state corporations with preferential treatment.
2. The Circuit Court ordered refunds to be paid to out-of-state holding
companies that had not previously been eligible for the deduction. It also ruled that the tax benefits
will no longer be available to any company, foreign or domestic, beginning in the 2004 tax year.
C. Impact Of The Decision Generally And Upon Banking In Particular.
1. Major chambers of commerce, trade associations, and business development
organizations are concerned about the impact of the decision. They have argued that within the
year, Kentucky will see its most profitable businesses moving assets to other states such as Ohio,
where holding companies are not subject to franchise tax; Tennessee, where parent companies are
given a deduction for subsidiaries; and Indiana, which does not even have a corporate license tax.
They argue that if physical facilities follow, hundreds of thousands of job will be lost. They argue
that legislation addressing the decision is necessary to prevent double taxation of holding
companies in order to encourage Kentucky-based companies to stay in the state and to encourage
out-of-state companies to relocate here.
2. Impacts On Bank Holding Companies.
a. The banking industry generally contends that the ruling would result in
a particularly hard hit for Kentucky financial institutions because of their unique tax structure,
designed through the Bank Franchise Tax-a tax that was to be paid 'in lieu of other taxes.'
b. The Bank Franchise Tax tpkes into account surplus; capital stock paid
in; undivided profit and capital reserve; net unrealized holding gains or losses on available for sale
securities; cumulative foreign currency translation adjustments and equity related to investment in
subsidiaries (net capital). The Bank Franchise Tax was designed after the banking industry and the
Kentucky Revenue Cabinet negotiated in 1996 to develop a new 'tax neutral' structure, in lieu of all
other corporate taxes, for the banking industry as a whole. The assumption of the banking industry,
and as stated in the statute, was that the general corporate license tax (imposed by 136.071) would
not apply to banks.
c. The Illinois Tool decision is perceived to result in essentially a double
tax on banks because of the way bank stock is held. Most banks are operated in a holding company
structure, and the holding company often has no assets or operational purpose other than to hold
the stock of the subsidiary bank. If you remove the bank subsidiary deduction, the license tax on the
bank holding company becomes just a tax on the bank stock. But, because the bank is already
taxed, this is considered inequitable and not in spirit with the assurances made when the bank
franchise tax was passed.
D. The Governor's Veto Of Legislation To Address The Decision.
1. A proposal to address this problem was developed by the business
community with assistance from state revenue officials. The proposal allowed in-state holding
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companies to keep most of the deduction (90 percent), with the remainder used to cover the cost of
extending that same level of deduction to out of state corporations with operations in Kentucky. The
proposal was intended to address the Franklin Circuit Court's objection to the inconsistent treatment
of in-state and out-of-state corporations while having no adverse impact on state revenues.
2. The proposal included as part of House Bill 390 during the 2003 legislative
session. Although HB 390 was passed, on April 3, 2003, Governor Patton vetoed the provisions
relating to the Illinois Tool amendment. The veto occurred after the General Assembly had
adjourned, leaving no opportunity for the veto to be overridden.
E. The Challenge To The Governor's Veto - Citizens National Corp. v. Mayton, Franklin
Circuit Court, No. 03-CI-917.
1. In 1993, Citizens National Corporation, Humana, Inc., Kindred Healthcare,
Inc., LG&E Energy Corp., and Yum! Brands, filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of
Governor Patton's line-item veto of the Illinois Tool.
2. The lawsuit is currently pending.
III. Forged Endorsements - John Hancock Financial Services, Inc. v. Old Kent Bank, 346 F.3d
727 (6th Cir. 10/10/03).
1. Clients of securities firm, John Hancock Financial Services, Inc. ("John Hancock"),
delivered to their broker at John Hancock, Patrick Sherman, checks payable to the order of the
securities firm. Broker endorsed the check with a stamp that read: "Sherman and Associates
Financial Services". Broker had opened a checking account in that name at Old Kent Bank, and
the bank permitted the deposit. Over 7 years, this occurred on approximately 71 checks totaling in
excess of $800,000. Broker hid the fraud by generating false statements for his clients.
2. Applying Michigan law, the Sixth Circuit held that an indorsement by a wrongdoer that
is "completely different from the [named] payee's]" is not "the making of a forged signature on an
instrument" within the meaning of UCC §3-406 so as to allow the depositary bank to argue the
comparative fault provisions of UCC §3-406.
3. The fault allocation rules of Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code relating
to negotiable instruments displace common law rules of negligence thereby preventing the
depositary bank from relying upon the general comparative fault provisions of the Michigan Tort
Reform Act.
4. Payee's claims for checks deposited more than 3 years before the parties' statute of
limitations tolling agreement were barred by the applicable Michigan statute of limitations.
5. Except as barred by the statute of limitations, depositary bank was liable for
conversion under UCC §3-420 for $404,217.44 plus interest.
IV. Truth In Lending Act •• Household Credit Services v. Pfennig, U.S. Supreme Court, Docket
No. 02-857.
1. U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review a decision of the Sixth Circuit
concerning the proper method for disclosing an "over-limit" fee in a open-end credit card account.
Expressing the opinion that the charge fell within the statutory definition of "finance charge", the
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Sixth Circuit declined to follow a provision of Regulation Z which excluded from the definition of
"finance charg~" those "[c]harges for actual unanticipated late payment, for exceeding a credit limit,
or for delinquency, default, or a similar occurrence."
2. This case has the potential for being an important decision on the extent to which
Court should defer to the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Z as the proper application of the
statutory provisions of the federal Truth In Lending Act.
V. Guaranty Agreements (KRS 371.065) - Wheeler & Clevenger Oil Co. v. Washburn, 2001-
SC-0271 (2/19/04) (to be published).
1. President of HICO Transport, Inc. signed a credit application submitted to Wheeler &
Clevenger Oil Co. as a personal guarantor in two places. Credit application was for a line of credit
to purchase fuel and other merchandise. Guaranty language did not contain a maximum
indebtedness or a termination date. When oil company brought suit, guarantor defended on the
ground that the guaranty violated KRS 371.065.
2. Trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of guarantor.
3. Kentucky Supreme Court reversed.
a. Because of the title of the 1990 act amending KRS 371.065, Court first ruled
that KRS 371.065 applies to "all guaranties" not just "guaranties of commercial paper."
b. Although the statute applies, there is no need for a maximum indebtedness or
termination date if the guaranty is either "written on" or "expressly refer[s] to, the instrument or
instruments being guaranteed."
c. In this case, the exception applies because "the guaranty agreement is found
on the document being guaranteed."
d. Purpose of the statute "is a consumer-protection provision designed to protect
the guarantor by reducing the risk of a guarantor agreeing to guarantee an unknown obligation."
VI. Punitive Damages - Phelps v. Louisville Water Co., Ky., 103 S.W.3d 46 (4/24/03).
1. Suit by the estates of two motorists who were killed when their car crashed into a
flatbed trailer parked at construction site of Louisville Water Company. Jury awarded $176,361 in
compensatory damages (55% allocated to the water company) and $2,000,000 in punitive damages
against the water company.
2. Supreme Court states that it is "required to conduct a de novo review of the trial
court's determination that the award was not so grossly excessive as to violate due process." Court
also applied the "result of passion and prejudice" analysis under traditional Kentucky common law.
3. Court upheld the punitive damages award.
VII. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act - Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 350 F.3d 558 (6th
Cir. 10/9/03).
1. Son of debtor sued creditor that had taken a security interest in his mother's motor
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vehicle and the repo agent for alleged damages incurred when the vehicle was repossessed.
2. Although the son was not the "consumer" in the transaction because he was not
liable for the debt, he still had standing to allege violations of (a) 15 U.S.C. §1692d which prohibits a
debt collector from using "any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or
abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt" and (b) 15 U.S.C. §1692e which
prohibits a debt collector from using "any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in
connection with the collection of any debt."
3. The son could allege a civil action for relief because 15 U.S.C. §1692k(a) imposes
liability upon "a debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect
to any person is liable to such person ...."
4. However, neither Huntington Bank nor the repo agent were a "debt collector."
a. Huntington Bank was not because it fell within the exception of 15 U.S.C.
§1692a(6)(F)(ii) and also (F)(iii) because it was the original creditor on the loan.
B. The repo agent was not because it, as the enforcer of a security interest, is
generally is not a debt collector under an express provision of 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). However, the
enforcer of a security interest has potential liability under 15 U.S.C. §1692f(6) if there is no present
right to possession of the collateral through an enforceable security interest. Since the son did not
allege a violation of §1692f(6), the son had no claim against the repo agent.
VIII. Statutes Of Limitation -- Barnes v. Community Trust Bank, Ky.App., 121 S.W.3d 520
(11/7/03).
1. An action to recover for a breach of a motor vehicle retail installment sales contract
under KRS Chapter190 is governed by the 4-year statute of limitations in KRS 355.2-725 and not
the 15-year contract statute of limitations under KRS 413.090.
IX. Bank "Tying" - Highland Capital. Inc. v. Franklin National Bank, 350 F.3d 558 (6th Cir.
11/25/03).
1. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant, Frank National Bank, violated the "anti-tying"
provisions of the federal Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §1972, by alleging that the bank
conditioned approval of a $610,000 loan to refinance a real estate loan on the borrower's purchase
of 69,400 shares of the stock of the bank's holding company.
2. Although there was no document imposing this condition, borrower claimed that
alleged irregularities in processing the loan, the lack of solid information about the creditworthiness
of the borrower, and other evidence that the loan would not have been made in the normal course of
banking practice, was circumstantial evidence of an improper "tying". Bank presented affidavits
expressly denying that the stock purchase was a condition for making the loan.
3. The plaintiff in a bank tying lawsuit "must prove that the purchase of the tied product
or service was a mandatory condition or requirement of obtaining a loan from the lender." The
plaintiff does not need to prove "force or coercion" by the bank.
4. In this case, the plaintiffs circumstantial evidence reached only the level of
"speculation and conjecture" aid not establish a genuine issue that the loan was conditioned upon
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X. Arbitration:
1. Wilderv. Absorption Corp., Ky., 107 S.W.2d 181 (2003)
a. Dispute between manufacturer of specialty pet car products headquartered in
Washington and its sale representatives located in Boone County, Kentucky having the states of
Michigan, Indiana, Ohio and Kentucky as their territory.
a. Provision in arbitration agreement requiring arbitration in Washington was so
inconvenient and unreasonable as to be unenforceable. Parties ordered to submit to arbitration in
Kentucky.
2. Larry A. Judd, et al. v. Paul J. Sinnott, et aI., Kentucky Supreme Court, 2002-SC-939-
D (case pending).
a. Whether fraud in the inducement generally is a basis to avoid an arbitration
agreement or whether fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause specifically is required.
XI. Personal Liability For "Trust Fund" Taxes - Bell v. United States, 33 SCR 3 at p. 29 (6th
Cir. 1/7/04).
1. Chief shareholder and principal officer of company was personally responsible under
§6672 of the Internal Revenue Code for failing to deliver employee withholding taxes to the IRS
despite lender's refusal to approve using funds in a loan lock-box arrangement to pay previously
accrued and delinquent payroll trust taxes.
2. Corporate officer could not claim that lender's refusal prevented his actions from
being "willful."
3. Corporation's decision to enter into loan agreement with lenderwas voluntary and not
a justification. Corporate officer's options were to "have shut down the company, suspended
operations, filed for bankruptcy, applied for a bridge loan form another lender, or simply violated the
contract with Bank One instead of failing to fulfill his tax debt."
XII. Doing Businss And Practicing Law In The Internet Age.
1. Issue: "Is it ethical not to meet face-to-face with your client if you communicate by
e-mail or telephone instead?"
a. "There is no per se requirement that an attorney actually be in the physical
presence of his client to provide competent legal services... The attorney may ethically use
electronic forms of communication in working with clients so long as all necessary information is
transmitted between the attorney and the client ... [and] the content and caliber of those services
otherwise comport with the duties of competence and communication." Virginia Legal Ethics
Opinion 1791 (March 2004).
2. "Cybersquatting" - Lucas Nursery and Landscaping, Inc. v. Gross, 359 F.3d 806
6th Cir. 03/05/04).
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a. Customer of nursery did not violate that Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1 )(A) (2000) ("the ACPA"), by registering the domain name
"Iucasnursery.com" and creating a web site on which she detailed her complaints against Lucas
Nursery and Landscaping, Inc.for its allegedly bad service in landscaping her front yard.
b. Pursuant to the ACPA, a cybersquatter is potentially liable to the owner of
a protected mark if that person:
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from the mark ... ; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that --
(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive ... ,is identical or
confusingly similar to that mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark ... , is identical or confusingly
. similar to or dilutive of that mark; or
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section
706 of Title18 or section 220506 of Title 36.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
c. Customer did not violate the ACPA because she was not acting in "bad
faith" but was merely attempting to publicize her dissatisfaction. Determination of "bad faith"
under the ACPA is a facts and circumstances test applying a number of judicially established
factors.
XIII. Covenants Not To Compete - United Rentals (North America), Inc. v. Keizer, 355 F.3d 399
(6th Cir. 1/7/04).
1. Under Michigan law, when new employer did not have a physical office in the Target
Area, former employee did not violate provision of non-compete agreement which restricted him
from "anywhere in the Target Area (as herein defined), directly or indirectly, acting individually or as
the owner, shareholder, partner, or employee of any entity ... [which] engage[s] in the operation of
any equipment sale, rental or leasing business."
2. Fact that new employer sold to customers located in the Target Area was not
sufficient to establish a violation.
3. Court contrasted language of the agreement with one in which the employee agreed
not to "solicit or take orders for or sell or deliver any such merchandise" in the prohibited area.
4. An important factor was that the agreement was drafted by the employer and,
therefore, would be construed against the employer.
5. Court also affirmed dismissal of claims of violation of confidentiality obligations were
the former employer presented no evidence of a real misappropriation of confidential information.
Fact that new employer briefly saw former employer's customer list was not sufficient when the new
employer did not use and instead discarded the list.
6. Practice pointer: define in as many ways as possible what constituted an
impermissible competing activity.
XIV. Settlement Agreements.
1. Frear v. P.T.A. Industries, Inc., Ky., 103 S.W.3d 99 (4/24/03).
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a. Dispute over terms of parties' oral agreement to settle. When it came time to
draft a formal settlement agreement, the parties reached an impasse over release and
indemnification terms.
b. Court relied upon lawyer's confirming letter as accurately stating the
agreement to provide a release. Since the lawyer's letter did not mention any indemnity obligation,
none was required in order to obtain settlement payment. .
2. Hidrofiltros v. Rexair, Inc., 355 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 11/6/04).
a. A provision in a settlement agreement that provided that the federal District
Court retained "exclusive" jurisdiction over the parties "for purposes of enforcing the settlement
agreement" did not preclude a settling party from bring an action in Portugal against a corporate
affiliate of the settling parties concerning an alleged violation of Portugese trademark law.
b. The Portugese lawsuit was not to recover damages from any settling party or
to force compliance with the settlement agreement despite the assertion that the settlement
agreement was intended to establish the Michigan District Court as the exclusive venue for future
trademark disputes.
c. The Court explained that "had the parties' intended to place additional
restrictions upon Rexair's right to pursue legal remedies, they certainly could have drafted their
settlement agreement accordingly."
xv. Family And Medical Leave Act:
1. Cavin v. Honda Of America Mfg., Inc., 346 F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 10/10/03). Enforcing a
FMLA regulation at 29 C.F.R. §825.302(d) which provides that an employer cannot deny FMLA
leave for failure to comply with an internal notice requirement so long as the employee "gives timely
verbal or other notice" which complies with the FMLA's requirements.
2. Arban v. West Publishing Corp., 345 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 9/24/03). Affirmingjuryverdict
in favor of employee alleging denial of FMLA reinstatement rights and retaliatory discharge for
exercising FMLA rights. Employee's relief can include "front pay" if the employee does not seek
reinstatement because he or she has found alternative work during the period of litigation. District
Court abused its discretion in denying statutory liquidated damages to the employee when the jury
found the employer violated the FMLA by making a pretext discharge.
XVI. Recovery Of Attorneys' Fees -- Tomeo v. Rubarts, et aI., 2002-CA-002464 (Ky.App.
12/5/03) (unpublished).
1. When a creditor is faced with counterclaim raised by debtors attempting to avoid
collection of a debt, is the cost of successfully defending the debtors' counterclaim recoverable
under an attorneys' fee provision allowing recovery of fees "incurred by [the creditor] for the
enforcement of this note or the lien securing this note"?
2. In a recent unpublished opinion, the Kentucky Court of Appeals said "yes" but only
after applying a four-factor test established in a 1988 District of Columbia decision, Kudon v. F.M.E.
Corp., 547 A.2d 976 (D.C.App. 1988).
3. It appears that the Court of Appeals would not have had to apply this test if the
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attorneys' fee provision had been drafted more broadly. Keep this in mind when drafting attorneys'
fees provisions in your contracts.
XVII. Lending To Competitors Of Loan Customers -- Read & Lundy. Inc. v. The Washington
Trust Co., 2004 WL 41714 (R.I. 1/9/04).
1. Lender loans money to CSI, a competitor of R&L. CSI is owned by a former
employee of R&L and that employee's accountant. Former employee had previously attempted to
buy R&L, and Lender had been involved in attempted funding of the purchase.
2. R&L sued Lender alleging that Lender was improperly aiding CSI and improperly
using information about R&L that the Lender obtained in connection with the unsuccessful purchase
attempt. R&L alleged breach of contract, improper interference with contractual relations, civil
conspiracy and violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
3. Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed ruling in favor of the Lender. On the issue of
breach of contract, the Supreme Court wrote that "there was no evidence that the parties ever
considered what would happen to plaintiffs' financial information after they provided it to the bank,
much less that the parties mutually agreed it would not be used by the bank beyond consideration of
Bibeau's loan application." The Court held that absent an agreement, nothing prohibited the Bank's
use of information supplied by plaintiffs to consider CSI's loan application.
4. In contrast, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Steelvest. Inc. v. Scansteel Service
Center. Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 486 (1991), reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of a
lender that lent money to establish a business that competed with another loan customer of the
bank. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that genuine issues of material fact existed on the
competitor's claim that the lender "improperly used and relied upon certain information concerning
[customer #1] obtained from [an owner of customer #1] when it proceeded to finance [customer #2]."
5. Practice Pointers:
a. Include provisions in your bank's loan application and loan documents relating
to permissible uses of information supplied to the bank by a business loan applicant or a loan
customer. Make sure it is consistent with your GLBA privacy notices..
b. Do not use information supplied by or concerning a customer for any purpose
other than dealing with that customer unless you have the customer's agreement to do so.
XVIII. Major Trends And Issues In Other Jurisdictions.
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ANTITRUST
1. IJn;ted States Y Visa) II S A (2d Cir. Nos. 02-6074, -6076, -6078). On October 7,
1998, Justice Department filed antitrust suit against Visa and Mastercard challenging the "rules" of
both networks prohibiting their respective member banks from offering credit cards that compete
with those two. The rules allegedly have the effect of eliminating real competition between Visa
and Mastercard and hampering competition or potential competition from other networks. On
October 9, 2001, court held that uduality'l rules, by which thousands ofbanks can and do issue both
Visa and Master Card, are not anticompetitive, but the prohibition against Visa and/or Master Card
member banks also issuing American Express and/or Discover cards is an antitrust violation (163 F.
Supp. 2d 322). In a final order issued in late November, 2001, the court made some modest
changes without affecting the bottom line. The district court issued a stay of its order pending
appeal. On Sqltember 17, 2003, the Second Circuit affirmed largely for the reasons set forth in the
District Court opinion, which the appeals court held to be not unreasonable and supported by the
evidence. A petition for rehearing en bane was denied on January 9, 2004. The stay of the final
district court order remains in effec~ by order of the Second Circuit issued February 2, pending the
filing ofa cert. petition in the Supreme Court .
ARBITRATION
2. Mandel V Household Bank (Nevada) (Cal. App. 4th, No. 0029531). On January 7,
2003, in a case in which ABA appeared as amicus curiae, court upheld the enforceability of an
arbitration clause adde<l by statement stuffer to a credit card agreement against a variety of
challenges. The one provision of the contract the court did not approve was a prohibition ofclass
action arbitrations. That, according to the cowt, was unconscionable. One week later, in Discover
Bank V SJlperior Court of I DS Angeles County (Baehr, Rera) party jn Interest) (Cal. App. 2d, No.
B161305), a different appellate division of the state court of appeals specifically and by name
disagreed with the Mandel decision and enforced the arbitration clause as writte~ including its
prohibition against class action arbitrations. On February 11, 2003, the Ninth Circuit, dealing with
the same issue, sided with the Mandel court (ring v AT&T, 319 F. 3d 1126, pet for cert. filed
April 16, No. 02-1521; celt. denied Oct. 6, 2003). The California Supreme Court has granted
review in both state cases. Proceedings in Mandel are stayed pending the outcome of Roehr;
Plaintiff's opening brief in Boehr was filed May 9, 2003. On August 13, ABA and two co-sponsors
filed amici brief in Boehr contending that the Federal Arbitration Act requires that arbitration
clauses be enforced as written, preempting any state law or court decision to the contraJ.y.
CONSUMER PROTECTION
3. Household Credit Servjces y Pfennig (8. Ct No. 02-857). For 30 years,
Regulation Z has instructed that "overlimit fees" on credit card accounts were "other charges"
and had to be disclosed as such; they were not trfmance charges" and did not figure in the
calculation of an APR. On April 11, 2002, a panel of the Sixth Circuit held that overlimit fees~
under the right circumstances, are charges incident to the extension of credit and, therefore, are
B - 12
3
finance charges within the plain meaning of the Truth in Lending Act, the Federal Reservefs
long-standing regulation to the contrary notwithstanding. :MBNA, successor in interest to
Household, filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en bane. On April 24, 2002, ABA and
four co-sponsors and the Federal Reserve filed amici briefs supporting that petition, arguing that
the panel had been operating under a serious factual misunderstanding of how the credit card
system actually works, without the benefit of any evidence on that subject. The petition for panel
rehearing was denied and an amended decision was issued on July 2 t 2002 (295 F.3d 522). The
Petition for Rehearing en bane was denied in early September. Petition for Writ of Certiorari
filed December 2, 2002. Supporting amici brief filed by ABA and co..sponsors on February 4.
On May 30, the Solicitor General filed a brief setting forth the view of the United States that
certiorari should be granted. The Court granted certiorari on the last day of the tenn, June 27.
ABA and various co-sponsors filed amici brief on August 18 arguing that unifonn treatment of
disclosure for over-limit fees as "other charges" was the only practical way to convey useful and
understandable infonnation to consumers as the Troth in Lending Act intended. Oral argument
held February 23.
4. Koons BuiCk pontiac GMC v Nigh (S. Ct. No. 03-377). In FebruaryJ 2000~ a used
vehicle transaction went horribly awry, resulting in litigation by the buyerlbonower against the
vehicle dealer/lender for violation of the Truth in Lending Act and numerous other claims. A jUlY
awarded the plaintiff over $24t OOO in damages under the Truth in Lending Act. On appeal, the
lender argued that there is a statutory cap on damages--twice the finance charge, but not to exceed
$1,000 (15 U.S.C. § 164O(a)(2)(A). Nevertheless, on February 4, 2003t the Fourth Circuit
aflinned, holding that since the 1995 amendments to the statute, that $1,000 cap applied only to
certain consumer lease arrangements. Prior circuit precedent had held the cap applicable to
transactions of the sort at issue here as Went and there is no evidence. of an actual Congressional
intent that the cap would no longer apply. Notwithstanding tha~ Congress did what it did in 1995,
and the court gave effect to the new uplain language ofthe statute" (4th eir. No. 01-2201). Petition
for writ ofcertiorari filed September 4, 2003. On October 14, ABA and two co-sponsors filed amici
briefin support ofthe petition. The Court granted certiorari, on January 20, 2004.
5. Chexy Chase Ega v Wells (S. Ct. No. 03-918). In a credit card agreement, a bank
then located in Mmyland included a "choice of law" provision making the agreement governed by
the laws of Maryland (specifically a provision having to do with the method ofdisclosing changes
in terms to customers) and applicable federal law. Upon the bank's relocation to Virginia, it
changed the tenns of the agreement and made disclosures of those changes, though perhaps not in
the fonn required by Maryland. Trial court dismissed a subsequent suit by consumers holding that
the Maryland law was preempted by Home Owners Loan Act and OTS regulations. The Court of
Appeals reversed on September 23, 2003. While the court agreed that the state law itself was
preempted~it held that the parties to the contract had agreed, by means of the reference to Maryland
law, to be bound by it notwithstanding federal preemption (Md. Ct. App., No. 41 t September Tenn,
2002). Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed December 23, 2003. On January 29, ABA and
Consumer Bankers Association filed amici brief supporting the Petition, contending that if the
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Maryland court's reasoning is followed, virtually all "choice of law" clauses could be read to waive
the defense of federal preemption.
6. McIntosh V Irwin lInip" BaDk & T"1St Co (1st Cir. No. 02-8022). On May 13,
2003, U.S. District Court for Massachusetts held, among. other things~ that borrowers seeking
rescission of a loan for alleged Truth in Lending Act violations could proceed with their case as a
class action (215 F.R.D. 26), and lender appealed. On September 23, Massachusetts Bankers
Association, ABA and two other co-sponsors filed a motion for leave to participate in the appeal as
amici curiae because of the immense practical consequences of allowing class-wide rescission. On
October 9, however, the First Circuit refused to entertain an interlocutory appeal of the class
certification order.
7. Wells Fargo Bank, N A V Boutris (9th Cir. Nos. 03-16194, 16197, 16461).
California law prohibits charging interest on residential flISt mortgages more than one day prior to
the recording of a mortgage deed, even though the borrowed funds may have long since been
disbursed. On January 27, 2003, national bank sued to enjoin investigation and enforcement ofthe
statute by the state's Department ofCorporations. The complaint alleged that only the Comptroller
of the Currency may exercise visitorial powers over national banks and their separately
incorporated nonbank subsidiaries, and that the prohibition in the law was preempted by the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, from which California had
not nopted out." On May 9t 2003, court granted summary judgment to Wells Fargo, holding that
the Comptroller has exclusive "visitorial" powers over national banks and their nonbank operating
subsidiaries, and that the per diem statute was indeed preempted by DIDMCA (252 F. Supp.2d
l06SXSee also National Cit¥ Bank of Indiana y Boums (E. D. Cal. No. 8-03-0655 GEB JFM [May
7, 2003] and 2003 WL 21536818 [July 2, 2003]). Department of Corporations appealed and final
briefs were filed January 16, 2004. .
Two "clones" ofthis case are currently pending in district courts elsewhere:
Wachovia Bank N A V Burke (D. Conn. No. 3:03 CV 0738 (JCH]) was filed in April,
2003, challenging Connecticut1s requirement that a state-chartered nonbank mortgage subsidiary of
a national bank to be licensed. under rules applicable to other mortgage lenders. Wachovia filed a
motion for summary judgment in the case and that motion drew an opposing amici curiae brief on
behalf of the attorneys general of 35 states that was filed August 26, 2003. ABA and other co-
sponsors filed an amici briefsupporting Wachovia on September 25.
WachoYia Bank, N A I Y Watters, (D. Mich. Civil Action No. 5:03CVOIOS) was' filed
against the Commissioner of the Michigan Office of Financial and Insurance Services during the
summer of 2003. A motion for summary judgment has been filed in this case as we14 and
supporting amici briefs were filed by Conswner Mortgage Coalition, ABA and others on January
30,2004.
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8. National Home Equit)r Mortgage AssociatioD v Office of Thrift Supervision
(D.D.C. Civil Action No. 1:02CV02506). OTS rules (67 Fed. Reg. 60542, September 26t 2002,
effective July. 1, 2003) changed the agency's prior views on AMTPA preemption. Previously, there
was an apparent understanding that the AMTPA preemption clause was self-executing; now it
appears that preemption occurs only upon promulgation of implementing OTS rules that
specifically state that they are preemptive. On December 20, 2002, a lawsuit was filed challenging
the validity of those roles. On July 14, 2003, the court granted summary judgment to the agency,
holding that AMTPA itselfdid not clearly preempt all state laws touching on the area, that OTS had
substantial authority to choose which of its regulations applicable to federal thrifts would preempt
state law with respect to state-chartered lenders (and which would not) and that OTS did not abuse
its discretion in making the choices it did.
On April 24, 2003, the New Jersey Appellate Division held that AMTPA does not preempt
the state1s Prepayment Law, Market Rate Consumer Loan Act or Consumer Fraud Act. (Glnkowsky
v Equity One) Inc) N.J. App. Div. No. A-3202-01T3). Motion for reconsideration was denied June
17. The defendant sought certification from the New Jersey Supreme Court. ABA and co-sponsors
filed a brief supporting certification on August 1, 2003. Court granted the certification and oral
argument was held February 3, 2004.
9. Bank One V Wilens (C.D. Cal. No. SACV 03-01258 JVS (ANx». California law
requires that certain disclosures be made in connection with a bank's offering of "convenience
checks" to customers. Wilens filed suit against the bank in state court to enforce this obligation
even though she had and alleged no personal harm arising from the charged noncompliance.
California law permits such a suit as a ·'private attorney general" acting on behalf of the general '
public. Bank One, in tum, tiled suit in federal court to enjoin any such state court litigation on the
grounds that it would constitute in essence an enforcement action, and that is a matter left by federal
law exclusively to the Comptroller of the Currency under the "visitorial powers" provision of the
National Bank Act In October, 2003, the court issued a tentative order denying the defendanfs
motion to dismiss the bankts complaint as barred by the Anti-Injunction Act and granting the bank's
motion for summary judgment (See also, Bank One V WiJens, 2003 WL 21703629 (C.D. Cal.,
July 8, 2(03»)
* 10. Rjley y FJe.et National Bank (D. Mass. No. 03-10123 NG]). On January 23, 2003, a
class action suit was filed by Social Security recipients claiming that it was a violation of the anti-
alienation provisio~s of the Social Security Act for a bank, exercising its general contractual right
of setotI: to take funds from the bank accounts of the plaintiffs in satisfaction of overdue loan
payments when the source ofthe funds in the accounts were only monthly Social Security benefits.
• In a similar case~ MjJJer v B811k of America, (Cal. Super.., San Francisco County. No.
301917) a state judge, specifically disregarding the controlling Ninth Circuit precedent, Lopez v.
WaMu, 302 F. 3d 900, instructed a jury that Social Security benefits could not be taken by $etoffto
cover overdrafts and associated fees. On February 25, 2004, the jury found the bank in violation of
the state's unfair business practices act for doing so and awarded $75 million in damages plus
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$1,000 for each of an estimated 1.1 million class members. On April 1, the plaintiff is scheduled to
file a motion for an injunction against any continuation of Bank of Americats practices in this
respect. The Bank will file its reply April 30, and a hearing is set for May 12.
11. Smith v Cb'}'SJer Financial Co J I elf C (D. N.J. Civil Action No. 00-6003). Auto
dealers originate and technically make loans to customers, then immediately assign such loans to
captive finance company. Finance company sets a "buy rate," the lowest interest rate at which it
will take a dealer-originated loan. The dealer is free to originate loans at a higher mte than that,
with the dealer and finance company then splitting the difference. African-American borrowers
alleged disparate treabnent by a dealer in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in that
African-Americans ended up paying disproportionately greater discretionary finance charges and
higher rates than otherwise identically situated white borrowers. Finance company, though it did
not originate or make the loans, was also named as a defendant. ABA and three co-sponsors :filed an
amici brief on April 17, 2001, arguing, among other things, that assignees of dealer paper are
specifically excluded from the definition of tlcreditor" in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in the
absence oflmowledge ofdiscrimination. See also Tones V Ford Motor Credit CO.lJ 2002 WL 88431
(S.D.N.Y., January 22, 2002) (allegation that Ford t'authorized subjective markups" having a
disparate impact was sufficient to state a claim under ECOA).
12. Schwartz v Visa Internatjonal (Alameda Co. [Cal.] Super. Ct. No. 822404-4). On
April 7, 2003, a state court ordered Visa and Mastercard to amend their respective mles and
regulations to assure "full and effective disclosure" of currency conversion fees charged to
customers who incur debts denominated in something other than U.S. dollars, ~ to make
restitution to customers charged such a fee since February, 1996. Similar cases have been .filed in
state courts in eight other states. Visa and Mastercard currency conversion fees are also challenged
on antitrust grounds in a case before the Southern District of New York where the court, in July,
2003, denied a motion to dismiss the complaint. American Express is defendant in a series of
similar cases in the Southern District ofFlorida.
13. DQJartment oflqaJ Affairs v I.ehman Commercial paper (Broward Co. (FL] eir.
Ct. No. 0310116). In June, 2003, state Attorney General filed suit alleging that First Alliance
Mortgage Co. engaged in predatory lending practices through unfair and deceptive trade practices
and through fraud in violation of state law. According to the complaint, First Alliance could not
have done so but for financing provided by Lehman Commercial which actually knew or should
have known of First Alliance's practices. The complaint seeks an injunction against Lehman
Commercial's engaging in financing activities for any mortgage or consumer lender in Florida, and
for actual damages to consumers, punitive damages, civil penalties, costs and attorneys fees.
14. People of the State of New York v First Horizon Home I DaD Corp (S.Ct ·ofN.Y.
[Albany County] Index No. ----). On or about January 20. 2004, Attorney General ofNew York
released a Complaint against an operating subsidiary ofa national bank for alleged violations ofthe
state's General Business Law. The Complaint alleges that mortgage borrowers carried out the
tenns oftheir 25-year mortgage, but that the defendant (who had acquired the loan from the original
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lender) refused to release the lien and required additional payments. It seems the original lender
had miscalculated the monthly P&I payment by about $16 in favor of. the borrower, and the
acquiring lender wished to recover the 25 years accwnulated shortfall. The lenders efforts are said
to violate the GBL, which makes it unlawful for.8 creditor to assert a claim that it knows does not
exist, and makes it unlawful to commit deceptive acts and practices.
A week before the complaint was released, the Comptroller of the Currency published a final
rule in the Federal Register in which he claimed that the National Bank Act granted him exclusive
visitorial powers over national banks and their nonbank operating subsidiaries, so as to preclude
state authorities from enforcing state laws against them (69 Fed Reg. 1895 [January 13, 2004]).
The state Attorney GeneralJs action here is admittedly a test case designed to challenge the validity
of the Comptroller's role in a concrete setting (and in a state court rather than a federal court). The
fact that the lender and the borrower have now long since resolved the dispute between them extra-
judicially seems to be ofno consequence.
15. Ma)'or of the City of New York v COline;] of the City of New York (Supreme
Court, County of New York, Index No. 400583/03). City Council enacted Local Law 36
prohibiting city from doing business with "predatory lenders" over the Mayor's veto and the Mayor
sued, claiming that the action was a legislative infringement upon his executive powers under the
city charter. American Financial Services Association intervened alleging that the ordinance was
preempted by federal and state law. On January 26, 2004, court held that the ordinance was
preempted. While the court acknowledged that the city had every right to select the parties with
which it chose to contract, that is not what the Council did here. Instead, it promulgated a detailed
code of conduct for lenders. That is the prerogative of the federal and state govenunents, not the
city's.
CREDIT UNIONS
16. American Bankers Associatjon y Nationa] Credit 'Inion Administratjon (0. Utah,
No. 2:03cv00621 JTG). On July 15, 2003, AB~ Utah Bankers Association and four member
banks sued the regulator of federal credit unions for its approval of a six-county area ofnorthem
Utah, containing 1.4 million people and two distinct Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, as a
"local well defined community" and authorizing three federal credit unions to serve that
"community." The bankers contend that it is an abuse of discretion, in light of the actual facts, to
find that the area in question is a single community in which the residents interact and share
common interests. The three credit unions in question and three credit union trade groups moved to
intervene as parties in the case and the defendant agency has tiled an answer to the complaint On
February 11, court refused to allow plaintiffs to conduct even limited discovery, concluding that
review was limited to the administrative record-which had not yet been filed. ABA brief on the
merits ofthe case is due May 3.
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PRNACY
17. Bank of America y City of Daly City (9th Cir. Nos. 03-16682, 16689). The City of
Daly City, Contra Costa County and San. Mateo County, near San Francisco, enacted ordinances
that constrained all financial institutions with business locations in the City or in the unincorporated
areas of the counties from sharing infonnation about their customers among their affiliates. On
September 10, 2002, two national banks and their affiliates filed suit contending that the ordinances
were preempted by federal laws, including the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the National Bank Act
and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and that the ordinances were unconstitutional insofar as they
purported to have extraterritorial application. After discovery, the plaintiffs filed a renewed motion
for summary judgment; Comptroller of the Currency, ABA, California and Oregon Bankers
Associations and other co-sponsors filed supporting amici brief: On July 29, 2003, court granted
summary judgment in part to the banks, concluding that the ordinances were preempted by the
federal Fair Credit Reporting Act to the extent that the local law impacted the ability ofthe banks to
share information among affiliates. Local law was not preempted to the extent that it affected
infonnation sharing with a third party. The court did not officially address the banks' alternative
claims about preemption of local law by the National Bank: Act or by Gramm-Leacb-Bliley (N.D.
Cal. No. C-02-4343..cW). The banks filed a notice of appeal on September 9, 2003, raising the
Gramrn-Leach-Bliley Act issue anew> and submitted their opening briefon December 23, 2003.
18. Federal Trade CommissioD y Majnstream Marketing SeryjcCi Inc (10th eir. No.
03-1429). Association representing telemarketers filed suit on January 29, 2003» challenging FTCs
creation ofa national "do not calln list, contending that it violates First and Fifth Amendment rights,
is in excess of statutory authority and is arbitrary and capricious. A companion case was filed the
same day by the Direct Marketing Association in federal district court in Oklahoma City (llS..
Secnrit¥ y FTC) WD. Okla. No. 03-122-W). On September 23, 2003, the Oklahoma federal court
held that the FTC lacked the statutory authority to adopt, implement and enforce the do not call
rule. That outcome was changed by legislation that was introduced t passed by both houses of
Congress and signed by the President in six days. On September 25, however) the Colorado federal
court held the do not call rule unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment in that the rule
exempted charities, politicians and some others while binding commercial callers. According to the
court, this is a content-based restriction on speech. Since charities and politicians are every bit as
irritating and intrusive as commercial callers, the role cannot be justified as serving consumers'
"privacy interests." (0. Colo. No. 03-N-184). Importantly, both courts upheld other aspects of the
do not call rule such as the prohibition against "predictive dialingl ' that results in more than 3%
"abandoned calls."
The Federal Communications Commission adopted a role complementary to the Fre's so
as to cover certain industries (such as our own) not subject to FTC jurisdiction. On July 28, 2003s a
Petition for Review ofthat role was filed. American Te1eservices Association y FCC (10th Crr. No.
03-9571). On September 26, the court denied a request for a stay of that rule, holding that the
telemarketers had not demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits to warrant a
stay. On September 29, the circuit Justice (Breyer) declined, on behalf of the Supreme Court, to
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disturb that holding. Thus the FCC rule went into effect as scheduled on October 1, 2003, though
the FfC rule on which it was premised in the first place did not. The Colorado federal court said,
also on September 29, that the FTC would be in contempt if it shared its do not call list with the
FCC. The FfC appealed that to the Tenth Circuit on September 30. On October 7, the Tenth Circuit
issued a stay of the district coures pennanent injunction, holding that the balance of banns tipped
ever so slightly in favor of the FTC and that the FTC had shown a sufficient likelihood of success
on the merits to warrant the stay (345 F. 3d 850). The FTC announced that it would begin
enforcement immediately. On February 17, 2004, the court issued an opinion in four consolidated
cases upholding the constitutionality and statutory authority for the list as a narrowly tailored
method of pursuing the important governmental interests of protecting its citizens' privacy in their
own homes and at their own instigation.. The fact that the list did not bar charitable or political calls
does not change the result. f'Underinclusivenessn is a First Amendment problem only if it results in
an effort that is so insignificant as to be hardly worth the effort-clearly not the case here.
19. New York State Bar As.c;ociation v Federal Trade CommjMiOD (D.D.C. No.
t :02cvOO810). Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires ttfinancial institutions" to disclose privacy
policies to their clients and establishes civil sanctions of up to $10,000 per violation for failure to
do so. By FI'Cs definition, ttfinancial institution" is one that provides services to clients that are
"financial activities." Arguably~ that would include attorneys engaged in tax planning, estate
planning, real estate closings and bankroptcy, although there is little doubt that Congress had no
such thing in mind when it enacted the law. Bar association' sought an exemption from FTCs
privacy roles for such attorneys or at least an interpretation of the law or regulations to the effect
that it did not apply to attorneys. FfC refused to provide any guidance on the subject one way or
the other. On April 29, 2002, the association filed suit claiming that the agency's unwillingness to
grant an exemption was arbitrary and capricious. The American Bar Association filed essentially
the same lawsuit in the same court in September, 2002. The two cases were consolidated. The
court denied a motion to dismiss the complaints on August lIt 2003t finding that "it does not
appear that Congress intended for the privacy provisions of the GLBA to apply to attorneys." On
December 27, 2002', a comparable case was filed in North Carolina (North Carolina Bar
AssociatjoD y Federal Trade Commission [E.D. N.C. No. 5:02cv941]).
20. National Coalitjon of Pra¥et Inc V Carter (S.D. Ind. No. IP02..0536C-B/S).
Various charitable organizations are challenging the constitutionality of the Indiana Telephone
Privacy Act of 2001, which creates a "do not call't lis~ on First Amendment growds in a
noncommercial speech context. While the statute, by its own terms, exempts charitable
organizations, it does so only to the extent that the organizations use only actual employees or
volWlteers to make the phone callSt not third party solicitors. Plaintiffs filed motion for summary
judgment September 10, 2002..
21.. American CouDcjl orIfiCe Insurers V Vennont Department ofBanking (Washington
County [VT] Superior Ct No. 56-1-02 Wncv). In November, 2001, state regulator of banking,
insurance, secmities and healthcare administration promulgated regulations, effective February 15,
2002) that purports to govern the disclosure ofnonpublic personal financial and health information
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about individuals by Vennont licensees subject to the Commissioner's jurisdiction to non affiliated
third parties. On January 30, 2002,. five insurance trade associations filed suit contending that there
is no state law that grants power to the Commissioner to issue regulations governing this subject
matter, at least as to the insurance businesst and that therefore the regulations are in excess ofher
statutory authority. On February 12, 2004, trial court denied the trade associationsl motion for
summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the Commissioner. The generality and
expansive nature ofthe rulemaking authority granted to the Commissioner by statute was sufficient
to justify this particular rule even though no specific mention ofauthority to adopt rules in this area
is made in the statute.
• 22. Natjonwide MUhlal Insurance Co V 'Martjno (W.Va. S. Ct. of App. No. 31270).
Plaintiff sought information about the defendant from the defendant's insurance company in
connection with the filing of a personal injury lawsuit The insurance company resisted the request
for infonnation, contending that the privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and
comparable state insurance regulations prohibited the company's dissemination of nonpublic
personal information about its customers. The plaintiff then sued the insurance company for bad
faith. The Circuit Court of Harrison County certified the legal issues raised by the insurance
company's position to the state Supreme Court of Appeals for resolution. On April 10, 2003, the
high com1 accepted that certification. The insurance company filed its opening briefMay 12; West
Virginia Bankers Association and ABA filed a supporting amici curiae brief the same day. On
March 15, 2004, the court found that GLBA and state insurance regulations both contained an
exception for judicial proceedings and that exception was broad enough to cover requests for
infonnation ofthe sort at issue here, even though, at the relevant time, no suit had been filed and the
insurance company was not and was not expected to be a named party to any such suit. The court
did conclude that it was not a blanket exception, and that trial judges should be generous in granting
protective orders to assure that privacy interests were safeguarded and only absolutely essential
nonpublic personal infonnation be disclosed even injudicial proceedings.
PRODUCTS & SERVICES
* 23. MassacbJlsetts Bankers Association v Bowler (0. Mass. No. 03 CV 11522 JLT). In
February, 2003~ the First Circuit dismissed a Petition for Review filed by the Massachusetts
Insumnce Commissioner challenging a detennination by the Comptroller of the Currency that
various provisions of the Commonwealthts insurance statutes were preempted with respect to
national banks by the Granun-Leach-Bliley Act The court held that there was no justiciable
controversy presented by that Petition since the Comptroller's determination did not have and was
not intended to have the force and effect of law. That decision, of course~ left unresolved the
question ofwhether the provisions of the statute at issue applied to the banks or not. On August 13,
2003, Massachusetts Bankers Association and eight individual institutions filed suit against the
insurance commissioner for a declaratory judgment to the effect that those same provisions of the
statute were indeed preempted by the federal law. ABA and four cosponsors filed an amici briefon
March 19 supporting the MBAts motion for swnmaryjudgment. Oral argument is set for April 27.
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24. Fidelity National Information Solutions v Sinclajr (E.D. Pa. No. 02-6928).
Pennsylvania law, 63 P.S. §§ 457.1~ et seq., requires appraisals in non-federally related transactions,
and requires that such appraisals be perfonned by Pennsylvania board..certified appraisers. Fidelity
National provides, and sells to lenders, a comparatively inexpensive, largely automated
"evaluation" of the value of properties that are to serve as security for mortgages. On August 26,
Fidelity filed suit to enjoin enforcement of the Pennsylvania law, alleging that federal law and
regulation specifically allows the use of something less than a full-blown appraisal under certain
circumstances (e.g. mortgage loans of less than $250,000), and that that federal law preempts
contrary state law. In September, 2002, the Pennsylvania Bankers Association> on behalf of its
members who would be deprived of a valuable product by virtue of the Board1s enforcement
actions, joined the case as a named plaintiff. On February 19, 2003, ABA joined suit as a plaintiff
on behalf of its non-Pennsylvania members to allege that Pennsylvania law constituted an undue
burden on interstate commerce as well. The defendants filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings on April 16, 2003. ABA and the other plaintiffs filed a responsive briefon July 29.
25. American laud Title Associatjon v Radjan LTfOUP (Cal. Super., Orange Countyt
Case No. ). Under California state law, it is illegal to sell title insurance in the state
without being licensed, and any insurer which transacts any class of· insurance other than title
insurance anywhere in the United States is ineligible for a title insurance license. Radian Group is a
private mortgage insurer that sellst among other things, a "lien protection program" to residential
mortgage lenders. The lien protection program is said to accomplish essentially the same goals as
traditional title insurance~ but is sufficiently different in its structure so as to fall outside the
definition of "title insurance.tt Being unimpressed by the fine points, the trade association for title
insurers filed suit in late November, 2001, contending that Radian was engaged in the wilicensed
and illegal sale of title insurance in California. On June 20, 2002, the California Department of
Insurance. in a separate proceeding, concluded that the lien protection program was, indeed, title
insurance, and issued a cease and desist order to Radian. Several other state insurance
commissioners have reached the same conclusion. On April 15, 2003, however, the California
Insurance Commissioner rejected his Department's conclusions and, while leaving the ban
temporarily in place~ called for the taking of additional evidence and legal argument On July 22,
the Commissioner released his decision after the consideration of the additional materials, and
elected to affinn the original Department decision. Radian is expected to appeal.
TRUST
26. Tittle V Enron (S.D. Tex. No. H-Ol-3913). Among the myriad of issues to be
litigated in this massive consolidated Enron case is the question of any responsibility for the fiasco
that directed trustees might have. These are the financial institutions that held the Enron employees'
savings plans while the value of those plans, largely invested in Enron stock, plummetedt and
during a "lockout peri~" during which employees were not pennitted any transactions within their
respective plans. The trustees have moved to dismiss complaints as to them on the grounds that
their status, duties. responsibilities and liabilities as directed trustees were specifically recognized
and governed by ERISA. and that they lacked the legal and contractual capacity to conduct
B - 21
12
themselves in any fashion other than the way they did in this case. On August 30, 2002, the
Secretary of Labor filed an amicus brief opposing the motions to dismiss, seeking to impose upon
directed trustees a higher duty than has previously been recognized for them. In October, ABA filed
amicus brief addressing only the Secretary's arguments, pointing out that they were unsupported by
statutory language and contradicted by legislative history. On September 30, 2003, the court
refused to dismiss out the trustees, adopting the Secretary ofLabots view ofthe case.
l\.1ISCELLANEOUS
27. Federal Deposit Insurance CQrporation V Ernst & young (7th Cir. No. 03- ---->.
When Superior Bank, FSB, an insured institution, failed, FDIC was appointed receiver. It
proceeded to file a complaint in its corporate capacity against the bank1s auditor for gross
negligence, fraud and accounting malpractice for having blessed a variety of accounting methods
that had enabled Superior to exaggerate its financial condition. On April 15, the court dismissed the
suit holding that FDIC lacked standing to sue in its corporate capacity. Had the agency filed the suit
in its capacity as receiver, it would have been bound by a mandatory arbitration clause in the
contract between E&Y and Superior Bank (in whose sboes FDIC as receiver would stand) (N.D. TIL
No. 02 C 7914). Notice ofappeal filed July 28, 2003.
28. CommnnityBank & TOld v I Jnjted Statee; (Ct. Fed. CI. No. 01-571 C). On October
3, 2001, Texas state-chartered bank filed suit on its own behalf and as representative of all
depository institutions required to maintain reserves with Federal Reserve Banks since 1980. It
seeks to compel the government to pay interest to the depository institutions on those reserves.
Failme to do so is said to constitute wrongful conversion of the plaintiffs' property, Wljust
enrichment to the government, deprivation ofproperty without due process and unlawful taking of
property for public use without just compensation in violation ofthe Fifth Amendment.
* 29. KjtsoD l! Bank of Edwanlsvjlle (Ill. App. 5th Dist No. 5-04-0199). In a series of
commercial promissory notes, bank specified a particular interest rate and disclosed that the interest
would be calculated on a 365/360 basis. Borrower filed suit claiming that the 365/360 method
resulted in an actual interest rate that was .138% above the stated rate and the discrepancy was a
violation ofthe TIlinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act Trial court certified
the case as a class action and denied the bank's motion for judgment on the pleadings. On
application by the b~ the court certified questions to the Appellate Court for an interlocutory
appeal. On March 25, ABA and lliinois Bankers Association filed a brief urging the Appellate
Court to exercise its discretion in favor of granting the interlocutory appeal based upon the
importance of the case to the industry at large. Most commercial loans calculate interest on the
365/360 basis and hundreds of thousands of such loans disclose that method of calculation in
language identical to that used in the notes at issue here.
30. Pioneer Comme;mjaJ Fundjng V American Financial Mortgage Corp (S. Ct Pa. No.
279 EAL 2002). American Financial was indebted to CoreStates Bank by reason of a series of
ov~. When a wire transfer of funds arrived in the American Financial deposit account at
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CoreStates. the bank applied it to offset the debt. Pioneer~ which had a series of dealings with
American Financial, claimed that the wire-transferred funds actually belonged to i~ instead, and
that the funds had been wired to the American Financial account in error. They should have been
wired to Pioneer's acCOWlt in another bank" CoreStates declined to reverse the offset and Pioneer
sued. A jury awarded actual, consequential and punitive damages against the bank and the bank
appealed. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affinned on most issues) but vacated the punitive
damages award and remanded for a new trial on that issue alone (797 A. 2d 269). The bank sought
allowance from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to appeal and that was granted on December 2~
2003. On January 26~ 2004, ABA and Pennsylvania Bankers Association filed amici brief urging
reversal based upon the bank's perfectly correct adherence throughout the transaction to Article 4A
ofthe Dec. Oral argument scheduled for Aprill3.
CALENDAR
April!3
Apri119
April 27
April 30
May 3
May 12
Oral argument in Pioneer v American Financial.
Opening Briefs due in Koons V Nigh
Oral argument in MaRS Bankers v Bowler
Briefs due in MjlJer v Bank of America
Briefdue in ABA V blCIJA.
Oral argument in Miller V Bank of America
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Civil Litigation Resulting From the Erpenbeck Fraud:
Mitchellv. Peoples Bank ofNorthern Kentucky
What Were the Issues and Arguments?
by
John K. Bush
Greenebaum Doll & McDonald PLLC1
March 26, 2004
Erpenbeck's Fraud
The Commissioner ofthe Kentucky Department ofFinancial Institutions called it perhaps
the biggest bank fraud ever committed in Kentucky. What may have been the biggest was also
among the most audacious: At hundreds ofnew home sale closings, the seller-builder's
representative received from the closing agent the check intended to repay the seller-builder's
construction loan for the property. Then, instead ofdelivering the loan payoffcheck to the
construction lender as promised (and thereby obtaining a release of the construction lien), the
seller-builder deposited the check into the seller-builder's own bank account. Millions ofdollars
in construction loan payoffchecks were accepted for deposit into the seller-builder's account,
despite the fact that in most instances the payee on the check was the construction lender, not the
seller-builder.
From 2000 through the beginning of2002, hundreds ofNorthern Kentucky homeowners
were victims ofthis fraud. The seller-builders were companies owned or controlled in whole or
in part by A. William Erpenbeck, Jr., then one of the largest residential builders in the greater
Cincinnati metropolitan area. In the spring of2002, the Erpenbeck empire collapsed, and the
IMr. Bush is a member of Greenebaum Doll & McDonald PLLC and practices in its Louisville office. He
is one of the attorneys who represented Peoples Bank of Northem Kentucky and its directors in the Mitchell
litigation. Mr. Bush gratefully acknowledges the assistance ofAndrew M. Fleischman, Janet P. Jakubowicz,
Christie A. Moore and W. Plumer Wiseman in the preparation and review of this article, much of which is taken
from briefs fued in the case.
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defrauded homeowners learned that they each had an additional lien on his or her residence - a
first mortgage held by one ofthe Erpenbeck companies' lenders. Soon thereafter, the bank where
the Erpenbeck companies had deposited the majority ofthe construction lender payoffchecks -
Peoples Bank ofNorthem Kentucky ("Peoples Bank") - found itself faced with a multi-million
dollar class action lawsuit brought by the homeowners.2
The Claims in the Mitchell Litigation Summa;rized
Mitchell v. Peoples Bank ofNorthern Kentuclo/ was filed on May 9, 2002, in the Circuit
Court ofBoone County, Kentucky, on behalfofa class ofsome 210 homeowners who owned
properties for which lender payoffchecks had been diverted by Erpenbeck.4 Although Mitchell
was eventually settled without trial or ruling by the Court on any substantive questions of fault,
the case presented fascinating legal issues regarding whether and, if so, how to allocate liability
amongst the various parties.
2Peoples Bank and its directors also were named as defendants in other civil litigation, including class
actions brought by Erpenbeck's subcontractors, see Morris Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Peoples Bank ofNorthern
Kentucky, Case No. 2002-165-WOB (B.D. Ky.), certain Peoples Bank shareholders, see Eschenbach v. Peoples
Bancorporation ofNorthern Kentucky, Case No. 02-CI-1245 (Campbell County Circuit Court), and the so-called
"cash closing" purchasers (i.e., those who purchased homes from Erpenbeck by writing a check for the full amount
ofpurchase payable to an Erpenbeck entity, as opposed to one ofEtpenbeck's lenders), see Schulte v. Peoples Bank
ofNorthern Kentucky, Case No. 2002-258 (E.D. Ky.). The Morris Heating & Cooling and Eschenbach cases
remain pending and a settlement ofSchulte is pending for fmal court approval as of the date of this article. The
scope of this article is limited to the Mitchell case and does not address the issues presented in any other case
involving Peoples Bank and its directors.
3Case No. 02-CI-00691 (Boone County Circuit Court).
4prior to the Mitchell suit, Peoples Bank had filed its own action against the Erpenbeck companies, closing
agents, title companies and construction lenders. See Peoples Bank ofNorthern Ky. v. Erpenbeck, Case No. 02-CI-
1210 (Campbell County Circuit Court). Peoples Bank dismissed this complaint without prejudice soon after the
Mitchell complaint was filed, then refited it in Boone County Circuit Court, where Mitchell was pending. See
Peoples Bank ofNorthern Kentucky v. Erpenbeck, Case No. 02-CI-719 (Boone County Circuit Court).
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Ofcourse, Erpenbeck and his companies were culpable, but beyond that, who among the
other parties to the transactions (each ofwhom also claimed to be innocent victims of
Erpenbeck's fraud) was liable for the homeowners' losses? The plaintiffs chose to sue only
Peoples Bank and its directors, and the complaint sought damages on claims offraud, negligence
and unlawful conversion. Yet, as explained below, despite the homeowners' undoubtedly
aggrieved status, there were significant legal obstacles that stood in the way oftheir success on
the claims they chose to bring against the People Bank defendants.
For their part, the Peoples Bank defendants denied any liability on the claims brought by
the homeowners. Also, the Peoples Bank defendants brought their own claims against more than
sixty (60) third parties, including Erpenbeck and his various companies, as well as the myriad of
closing agents, title insurance companies and construction lenders involved in the closings at
issue. The Peoples Bank defendants sought contribution, indemnity and a declaratory judgment
against all third parties, in addition to damages for fraud and conversion against the Erpenbeck
entities and negligence against the closing agents. The Peoples Bank defendants' defenses to the
complaint and their third-party claims, of course, had their own set of fonnidable challenges to
overcome -- not the least ofwhich was the one stubborn fact that the plaintiffs and non-
Erpenbeck third-party defendants had in their favor: Peoples Bank had accepted for deposit into
Erpenbeck's account tens ofmillions ofdollars in checks that on their face were clearly not made
payable to Erpenbeck.
e-a
The Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Arguments
The plaintiffs argued that, given Peoples Bank's obvious error in accepting for deposit the
checks that were not payable to the account holder, they should be entitled to recovery as a matter
of law against Peoples Bank and its directors. Without taking any discovery, the plaintiffs
moved for summary judgment on their conversion claim. In support of their motion, the
plaintiffs pointed to the portion of section 3-420(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"),
codified at Kentucky Revised Statute ("KRS") 355.3-420(1), which provides:
The law applicable to conversion ofpersonal property applies to instruments. An
instrument is also converted if it is taken by transfer, other than a negotiation, from a
person not entitled to enforce the instrument or a bank makes or obtains payment with
respect to the instrument for a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or receive
payment.
J\ccording to the plaintiffs, the Peoples Bank defendants had effectively admitted liability for
conversion by acknowledging in their pleadings that "the checks were not proper for deposit to
the Erpenbeck Company'.s account." In addition to reliance on this "admission", the plaintiffs
argued that the case law was "clear that a conversion occurs if a bank, such as Peoples [Bank],
deposits a check with a forged endorsement." The plaintiffs further contended that the Peoples
Bank defendants had no defense to the conversion claim because, as a matter of law, Peoples
Bank had not acted in a commercially reasonable fashion by accepting for deposit the diverted
checks.
C-4
The Peoples Bank Defendants' Summary Judgment Arguments
The Peoples Bank defendants not only opposed the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion,
but in fact argued that they were entitled to summary judgment themselves on the conversion
claim. The crux oftheir argument was that the plaintiff-homeowners did not have standing to
bring a conversion claim.
According to the Peoples Bank defendants, the plaintiffs neither possessed nor owned the
property that was allegedly converted (i.e., the payoffchecks) at the time ofthe alleged
conversion. The plaintiffs therefore could not establish the first element of a common law
conversion claim. This element is that the plaintiffs were, in fact, at the time of the alleged
conversion, in possession or the owner of the property that was allegedly converted.s
The plaintiff-homeowners could not establish that they were in possession ofthe payoff
checks at the time ofthe "conversion", the Peoples Bank defendants contended, because the
payoffchecks were in the possession ofthe Erpenbeck companies when they were deposited at
Peoples Bank. Nor were the plaintiffs the owners of the checks at the time oftheir deposit, the
Peoples Bank defendants argued. They contended that the plaintiffhomeowner no longer had
title to funds brought to the closing once that money went into the closing agent's escrow and
title to the real property passed to the purchaser. In support, the Peoples Bank defendants quoted
one court's explanation that "[t]he buyers cannot logically be the owners ofboth the purchased
[real] property and the portion ofthe money in [the closing agent's] escrow" and that "[i]t simply
SSee, e.g., Greater Lakes Higher Educ. v. Austin Bank, 837 F. Supp. 892, 897 (N.D. llt 1993) (UA party
pleading an action in conversion [of a check] ... must alleged that it had title to or possession of the check.");
Haynes, Kentucky Jurisprudence, Torts § 6-3 (1987) (plaintiff must "establish an interest in the thing converted,
i. e., that he was in possession of the chattel or was entitled to possession of the chattel at the time the conversion
occurred").
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does not make sense to say the buyers had title to the escrowed funds while recognizing that the
buyers also had title to the real property.u6
The Peoples Bank defendants supported their argument with reference to a portion of
KRS 355.3-420(1) not quoted by the plaintiffs: "An action for conversion ofan instrument may
not be brought by: (a) The issuer or acceptor of the instrument; or (b) A payee or indorsee who
did not receive delivery of the instrument either directly or through delivery to an agent or a co-
payee." (emphasis added). According to the Peoples Bank defendants, this provision made clear
by negative inference that only a payee or indorsee who did receive delivery ofthe instrument
prior to its alleged c~nversion has the right to sue for conversion.
The purpose ofKRS 355.3-420(1), the Peoples Bank defendants argued, is to limit claims
ofconversion against the depositary bank to the "true owner" of a check - i.e., the payee or
indorsee who received the check before it was converted.' fudeed, the Peoples Bank defendants
noted, the statute explicitly provides that even the party who wrote the check - the "issuer ...... of
the instrument", also known as the drawer (here, the closing agent) - does not have the right to
sue for conversion.8 Thus, if the drawer could not bring a conversion claim, then it stood to
reason, according to the Peoples Bank defendants, that the plaintiffpurchasers - whose names
6Stuart v. Clarke, 619 A.2d 1199, 1200-01 (D.C. Ct. App. 1993).
70strom-Martin, Inc., v. First National Bank o/Chillicothe, 202 B.R. 267 (C.D. Ill. 1996). For example, in
Tennessee Pipe Fabricators, Inc. v. Lively, 985 F.2d 561, 1993 WL 5915 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished opinion), the
United States Court ofAppeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the president and twenty-five percent owner of a co-
payee on checks that were deposited without all co-payees' endorsements did not have the right to sue the
depositary bank for conversion of the checks. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the president "was not a payee on any
of the checks, and he had no right to, or title in, them" and therefore "he had no standing to bring an action for their
wrongful deposit and the attendant conversion of funds." Id., 1993 WL 5915, at **2.
8See KRS 355.3-420(a)(I).
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appeared nowhere on the checks or in the indorsements and who were effectively the issuers of
the checks through their closing agent in any event - clearly could not do so either.9
The Peoples Bank defendants maintained that the plaintiffs' cited authority was
inapposite because those cases involved conversion claims brought by a payee or a drawer under
a DeC provision that had been superceded byuee § 3-420 and that, unlike uec § 3-420, had
been interpreted by some courts to allow a drawer to sue for conversion. to The plaintiff
purchasers in Mitchell were neither payees nor drawers on the payoffchecks in question. Thus,
according to the Peoples Bank defendants, the cases cited by the plaintiffs provided no support
for the plaintiffs' recovery.
9According to the Peoples Bank defendants' argument, the fact that the payoff checks were issued from
closing agents' escrow accounts into which the plaintiffpurchasers and their lenders had deposited funds did not
alter the fact that the plaintiffs had no claim for alleged conversion of those checks. As an example, the Peoples
Bank defendants cited Lewis v. Telephone Employees Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537 (9th Cir. 1996), in which the court
held that purchasers of cashiers checks did not have a claim for conversion of those checks. In Lewis, the United
States Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the purchaser of a cashier's check "is not a party to the
cashier's check itself unless named as payee or unless the purchaser adds his own signature or indorsement to the
instmment." Id. at 1552 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, the appellate court concluded that even
though the purchasers had purchased the cashier's checks in question, they had no property right in those checks
because they were not a payee or an indorsee. The Ninth Circuit cited numerous courts from other jurisdictions
holding "that remitters [i.e., purchasers] of cashier's checks do not have standing to bring a conversion claim" [d.;
see also, e.g., C.A.L.,Inc. v. Worth, 813 S.W.2d 12, 15 (Mo. Ct App. 1991) ("[T]he remitter, who has purchased a
cashier's check, is not the owner of the check and is not the proper party to sue for conversion."). Similarly, the
Peoples Bank defendants argued, even though the plaintiffpurchasers and their lenders could be deemed to have
"purchased" the payoff checks (like the remitters purchased the cashier's checks) by depositing funds into escrow,
the plaintiffs (like the remitters) had no conversion claim based on the checks because they were neither payees nor
indorsees on the checks.
lOSee First Nat'l Bank ofLouisville v. Progressive Cas. Ins., Ky., 517 S.W.2d 226 (1975) (the plaintiff was
the named payee; thiefwas the converter);_Chilson v. Capital Bank, 701 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1985) (the plaintiff was the
maker of a note); Humberto Decorators, Inc. v. Plaza Nat'l Bank, 734 A.2d 618 (N. J. 1981) (the plaintiff was the
named payee); u.s. v. Citizens Union Nat'l Bank, 40 F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Ky 1941);_Owensboro Nat'l Bank v.
Crisp, 608 S.W.2d 51 (1980) (the plaintiff was the drawer); Mid-Atlantic Tennis Courts, Inc. v. Citizens Bank and
Trust Co. ofMd. , 658 F. Supp.140 (D. Md. 1987) (the plaintiffwas the named payee); Bullitt County Bankv.
Publishers Printing Co., Ky., 684 S.W. 2d 289 (1984) (the plaintiff was the drawer); Lewis v. Telephone Employees
Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537 (9tb Cir. 1996) (the plaintiff was the drawer). The plaintiffs cited only one case
involving a fraudulently endorsed cashiers check in which the plaintiff was not the drawer or payee, see Kelly v.
Central Bank and Trust Co. ofDenver, 794 P.2d 1037,1042 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989), but that case was decided prior
to the 1996 amendments to the uec, codified in KRS 355.3..420, that established that only a payee to whom the
check was delivered has standing to sue for its conversion.
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Nevertheless, the Peoples Bank defendants concluded their argument with the somewhat
paradoxical point that the denial of the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and the granting of
the Peoples Bank defendants' summary judgment motion would not mean that the plaintiffs will
be left with no immediate relief: To the contrary, the Peoples Bank defendants argued, the
reasons they offered for denying summary judgment to the plaintiffs and granting it to the
Peoples Bank defendants also led to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were entitled to immediate
release of the construction liens on their property. That was because, in the Peoples Bank
defendants' view, the record was undisputed that the closing agents had constructively delivered
the payoff funds to the construction lenders at closing, and therefore, those lenders had the
obligation under KRS 382.365 to release their liens within thirty days of satisfaction thereof.
That statute provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] holder of a lien on real property ... shall release
the lien in the county clerk's office where the lien is recorded within thirty (30) days from the
date of satisfaction."11
The Peoples Bank defendants contended that constructive delivery was established in
either oftwo ways. First, constructive delivery to the construction lender occurred when the
closing agent transferred title to the plaintiffpurchaser. Under the law ofescrows, an escrow
agent (here, the closing agent) acted as the agent for the depositor of the money until the
condition for transfer of that money is satisfied.12 Once the condition is satisfied, the escrow
11KR.S 382.365(1).
12Equisource Realty Corp. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 854 S.W.2d 691, 697 (Tex.App. 1993).
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agent took offhis hat as agent for the depositor, putting on his hat as agent for the recipient of the
money.13
In the context ofthe real estate closings at issue, the closing agent acted as the agent for
the mortgagee (i.e., the construction lender), who was the payee ofa payoffcheck delivered into
escrow once all of the closing conditions are satisfied. 14 According to the Peoples Bank
defendants, the condition for transfer of the money - i.e., transfer of title to the real estate - was
satisfied at closing. Therefore, the payoffproceeds were constructively delivered to the
construction lender through the closing agent's receipt of that money.
The second argument advanced by the Peoples Bank defendants for constructive delivery
was that such delivery was effected when the closing agent delivered the payoffcheck to
Erpenbeck's representative at the closing. For example, one ofthe construction lenders had
stated in its pleadings that ''the Closing Agents delivered the payoffchecks to Erpenbeck or the
Erpenbeck Companies' agents or employees as express or implied agents for the First Lenders
13Mott v..Lombard, 655 A.2d 362, 364 (Me. 1995).
14Drusco v. Bank One ofColumbus, 705 N.E.2d 717, 722 (Ohio App. 1997) (holding that "placing the
deposit in the possession of the [closing agent] for the use of [the payee] constituted constructive possession on [the
payee's] behalf, as [the closing agent] had no authority to do otherwise than deliver the check to [the payee]" upon
the happening of a condition.). As one court explained,
a constructive delivery of an instrument held in escrow occurs when all the conditions of the escrow have
been met Thereafter the escrow holder ceases to be the agent for both parties and becomes the agent for
each party in respect to the things placed in escrow to which each party has become completely entitled.
Mott, 655 A.2d at 364 (citing 28 Am.Jur.2dEscrow § 28); see also Toddv. Vestermark, 302 P.2d 347,377 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1956) ("The escrow holder is agent for both parties at all times prior to perfonnance of conditions of the
escrow, but when that even transpires ... the nature of this dual agency changes to an agency not for both but for
each of the parties to said transaction in respect to those things placed in scrow to which each has thus become
completely entitled"); Burford v. Bridwell, 185 P.2d 216,218 (Okl. 1947) ("Generally the depositary is the agent or
trustee ofboth parties until perfonnance of the condition, but thereafter he holds the instrument as agent for the
party entitled thereto.").
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[i.e., the construction lenders]."ls The Peoples Bank defendants argued that there was evidence
that the construction lenders in fact recognized Erpenbeck's representative as their agent for
acceptance ofpayoff checks by virtue of their having not objected to Erpenbeck's representative
serving in that capacity in other closings. Notwithstanding that Erpenbeck's representative was a
wrongdoer, that did not preclude a finding that Erpenbeck's representative was an agent of the
construction lenders, the Peoples Bank defendants argued. Indeed, they cited to case law in
which a wrongdoer such as an embezzler or thief has been deemed to be the agent of a principal
who is the payee on a check, resulting in a ruling that the check was delivered to the payee when
it was obtained by the wrongdoer. 16
The Peoples Bank defendants concluded that because there was constructive delivery of
the payoff funds to the construction lenders, those lenders had an obligation under KRS
382.365(1) to immediately release the liens. To accomplish the release of the liens, the Peoples
Bank defendants requested the Court to declare, as part of its summary judgment ruling, that
there was constructive delivery of the payoff funds to the construction lenders and therefore
immediate release of the liens was required.
ISAnswer and Counterclaim ofPNC Bank, N.A.1f 1, served May 31, 2002, in Peoples Bank ofNorthern
Ky. v. Erpenbeck, Case No. 02-CI-719.
16See, e.g., Humberto Decorators, Inc. v. Plaza Nat'l Bank, 434 A.2d 618,620 (N.J.Super. 1981) (holding
that a payee could bring an action for conversion under the Uniform Commercial Code because the payee received
constructive delivery of the check when the drawer gave a third party (thief) the check for delivery to the payee and
the payee expected that the third party would deliver the check).
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The Plaintiffs' Other Claims and the Peoples Bank Defendants' Responses
Although no party moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' fraqd and negligence
claims against the Peoples Bank defendants, the plaintiffs' likelihood of succe~son those claims
was addressed in the briefing of a motion made by the plaintiffs in response to! a foreclosure
action commenced by one ofthe construction lenders. 17
Fraud
The plaintiffs based their fraud claim on allegations that the plaintiff class "reasonably
relied on Defendant Peoples [Bank]'s representations that it would follow banking laws and
traditions when it received checks and/or drafts" and that "[d]efendant Peoples [Bank]
intentionally and recklessly disregarded its representations and duties by failing to deliver the
proceeds of the check and drafts to the entities identified as the payee and by intentionally and/or
recklessly failing to follow the restricted endorsements contained on the checks and drafts."
The Peoples Bank defendants disputed that these allegations stated any cognizable fraud
claim and emphasized the named plaintiffs' deposition testimony which, according to the
Peoples Bank defendants, precluded as a matter of law any finding of fraud. The Peoples Bank
defendants argued that they could not have committed any fraud because the named plaintiffs, by
their own admission, had never had any contact with Peoples Bank and knew ofno class member
who had had any contact with Peoples Bank either. For example, when the husband ofa married
couple who were the named plaintiffs was asked ifhe was aware ofany fraudulent statement or
17SeeClass Plaintiffs' Request and Motion for Emergency Protection Against Foreclosure Actions (ftIed
June 13, 2002).
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communication made by Peoples Bank to him or his wife, he replied, ''Not aware 04 no.,,18
Similarly, his wife testified that she wa~ not aware ofany false statement ever made to her or her
husband by anyone at Peoples Bank. 19 In fact, the named plaintiffs admitted that they had never
done any banking at Peoples Bank, that no one representing Peoples Bank attended their closing,
that Peoples Bank was never discussed at the closing, that they were not aware at their closing
that any Erpenbeck company had an account at Peoples Bank, and that they have never had a
conversation with anyone at Peoples Bank about the issues relating to the closing on their
property.20 Based on this record, the Peoples Bank defendants argued that it is uncontroverted by
the named members ofPlaintiffs' class, that Peoples Bank made no fraudulent statement to them
about anything at any time.21
Negligence
The plaintiffs also argued that the Peoples Bank defendants were negligent based on
Peoples Bank's acceptance ofthe payoffchecks for deposit that were not payable to the account
owner. The Peoples Bank defendants did not dispute that these deposits had occurred, but argued
18Deposition of Charles Mitchell, June 3, 2002 ("C. Mitchell Depo."), at 11.
19See Deposition of Sherry Mitchell, June 3, 2002 ("S. Mitchell Depo."), at 26-27.
20See C. Mitchell Depo. at 10-11; S. Mitchell Depo. at 17-18, 26-27.
2IThe Peoples Bank defendants also argued that the named plaintiffs' testimony conf1.I111.ed that no
fraudulent statements were made by the Peoples Bank directors either. The named plaintiffs admitted that they had
never met any of the directors, see S. Mitchell Depo. at 63; C. Mitchell Depo. at 49, and acknowledged that the
directors had been sued simply because they were directors of Peoples Bank, see S. Mitchell Depo at 64; C.
Mitchell Depo. at 49.
C - 12
that the plaintiffs had no negligence claim because the Peoples Bank defendants owed them no
duty ofcare.22
Negligence is generally defined as a lack ofdue diligence or care.23 Under Kentucky law,
in order to succeed on a claim ofnegligence, a plaintiffmust establish (1) a duty owed to the
plaintiff; (2) a breach ofthat duty; and (3) a causal connection between the breach of the duty and
the injury allegedly suffered by the plaintiff.24 The Peoples Bank defendants argued that where
there is no duty owed to the injured party, there can be no negligence action, as "negligence is the
antithesis ofdUty."2S
There is Kentucky authority that has taken a fairly broad view ofscope ofduty in
negligence cases. As the Kentucky Court ofAppeals observed in Seigle v. Jasper:
It is well established that "[t]he concept of liability for negligence expresses a universal
duty owed by all to all." Gas Service Co., Inc. v. City ofLondon, 687 S.W.2d 144, 148
(Ky. 1985). "The rule is that every person owes a duty to every other person to exercise
ordinary care in his activities to prevent foreseeable injury." Grayson Fraternal Order of
Eagles v. Claywell, 736 S.W.2d 328, 332 (Ky. 1987).26
In Seigle an attorney was held to have a duty to a non-client (the purchasers in a land deal) based
on a negligent title opinion.
22The Peoples Bank defendants also had an argument that the uec remedies were exclusive and
preempted any negligence claim. See Hancock Bank v. Ensenat, 2001 WL 1610059 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (holding
that a payee could only bring a vee conversion claim and was not permitted to assert claims for negligence against
depositary bank). uec Article 4 arguably displaces common law tort claims when it states that it governs "the
liability of a bank for action or non-action with respect to an item handled by it for purposes ofpresentment,
payment or collection."
23Haynes, Kentucky Jurisprudence, Torts, § 30-2 (1988).
24Lewis v. B&R Corporation, Ky. App., 56 S.W.3d 432, 437 (2001).
2sLouisvilie & N.R. Co. v. Seeley's Adm 'r., Ky., 202 S.W. 638, 640 (1918).
26Seigle v. Jasper, Ky. App. 867 S.W.2d476, 481(1993).
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The Peoples Bank defendants cited to cases holding that a ''bank owes no duty ofcare to
a noncllstomer with whom it has no relationship."27 Their rulings were based on the premise that
when there is no privity between the parties, a bank will owe the stranger no duty ofvigilance.28
As one example, the Peoples Bank defendants offered Bank Polska Kasa Opieki, S.A. v.
Pamrapo Savings Bank, S.L.A.,29 in which the eourt dismissed with prejudice a drawer's claim
for negligence against a depositary bank that had accepted a fraudulently indorsed check. In so
holding, the court found that the depositary bank could not be liable for negligence to the drawer
of the fraudulently endorsed check because "as a depositary bank, [the depositary bank] had no
direct dealings with [the drawer] and owed it no dUty.,,30 The Peoples Bank defendants
contended that if a depositary bank owes no duty to the drawer ofa check, whose name appears
on the check, then it follows that parties such as the plaintiffpurchasers, whose names appeared
nowhere on the payoffchecks at issue, were owed no duty by Peoples Bank, the depositary bank.
27Volpe v. Fleet Nat. Bank, 710 A.2d 661, 664 (R.I. 1998). See also Miller-Rogaska, Inc. v. Bank One,
Texas, N.A., 931 S.W.2d 655, 663 (Tex. App. 1996) (fmding that a bank was not negligent because it does not owe
a duty ofcare to a fraudulently endorsed check's payee because the payee was not a customer of the bank); Roy
Supply, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 46 Cal. Rptr.2d 309, 325 (Cal. App. 1995)(holding that a bank's duty of
care arises by contract between a bank and its customer); Pennsylvania National TurfClub, Inc. v. Bank ofWest
Jersey, 385 A.2d 932, 936 (N.J. Super. 1978)(ruling that "the drawee bank herein had no duty arising out of a
relationship to the holder of the check which could ripen into tort liability [because there was an] absence of
evidence of any agreement, undertaking or contact between plaintiff and defendant from which any special duty can
be derived.... ").
28First Nat. Bank ofWashington v. Whitman, 94 u.s. (4 Otto) 343, 344-45 (1876); Baltimore & O.R. Co.
v. First National Bank ofAlexandria, 47 S.E. 837 (Va. 1904).
29909 F. Supp. 948, 956 (D.N.J.1995).
30Id. {citing Western Union Tel. Co. v. Peoples Nat. Bank in Lakewood, 404 A.2d 1178 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 1979); Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust ofGreenfield, 184 N.E.2d 358, 364
(1962».
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The proofcited by the Peoples Bank defendants on this point included the named
plaintiffs' admissions that they had never been customers ofPeoples Bank,31 and there was no
evidence that any other class member had a customer relationship with Peoples Bank. The
Peoples Bank defendants further noted that Peoples Bank had no representative at the named
plaintiffs' closing, the named plaintiffs had never had any communications with anyone at
Peoples Bank regarding the closing, and there was no evidence that the other class members'
experiences were any different in this regard.32 According to the Peoples Bank defendants, the
absence ofproofofprivity or any relationship between the plaintiff class and Peoples Bank
established that Peoples Bank owed the plaintiff class no duty, and thus their negligence claim
would not succeed.
Possible Scenarios
IfMitchell had proceeded to trial and final adjudication, how might the final outcome
have looked? Two ofthe possible scenarios are discussed below.
Construction Lenders v. Peoples Bank v. Everyone Else
If the Peoples Bank defendants were correct that the plaintiff-purchaser's payment to the
closing agent ofthe home purchase price, or the closing agent's delivery ofthe construction loan
payoffcheck to Erpenbeck's agent, constituted constructive delivery to the construction lender,
then the lender would seemingly have been obligated to release the lien. But would the
construction lender (having released a lien for which payment had been stolen by Erpenbeck)
31 S. Mitchell Depo. at 26; C. Mitchell Depo. at 11.
32S. Mitchell Depo. at 10-11; S. Mitchell Depo. at 17-18 t 27.
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then be the one to bear all of the loss (assuming there were no assets available from Erpenbeck
and his companies to pay a judgment)?
As the payee on the check deposited into Erpenbeck's account, a construction lender
might have argued that it had a conversion claim against Peoples Bank, the depositary institution.
KRS 355.3-420 does allow a claim by a payee who received delivery "through delivery to an
agent." The construction lender could have argued that this condition was satisfied by virtue of
constructive delivery as discussed above, and could have relied upon authority cited by the
plaintiffs for the proposition that a payee with constructive delivery ofa check has standing to
sue the depositary bank for accepting the check for deposit with the payee's endorsement.33
The construction lender also might have argued for recovery against the Peoples Bank
defendants based on negligence. As with the plaintiffs' negligence claim discussed above, the
critical issue for the construction lender's negligence theory would have been whether Peoples
Bank, the depositary bank, owed any duty to the construction lender, which was a non-customer
ofthe depositary bank. There is authority that could be read to support either an affinnative or
negative answer to that question.34
In response to either a conversion or negligence claim brought by a construction lender,
the Peoples Bank would have sought contribution and apportionment against other third parties,
33See, e.g., Humberto Decorators, Inc. v. Plaza Nat'l Bank, 434 A.2d 618 (N.J. Super Ct. 1981).
34Compare Volpe v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 710 A.2d 661, 664 (R.I. 1998) (under Rhode Island law, a
depositary bank owes no duty of care to non-customer payee of a check whose indorsement was forged) with In re
McMullen Oil Co., 251 B.R. 558 (U.S. Dkt. C.D. Cal. 2000) (under California law, a depositary bank may in certain
circumstances owe a duty to a non-customer not to accept for deposit a check with an obviously missing
endorsement).
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including Erpenbeck and his companies (based on their fraud) and the closing agents (based on
negligence).35
35According to the Peoples Bank defendants, they would have been entitled to contribution and
apportionment even though conversion is an "intentional" tort. They cited Roman Catholic Diocese ofCovington v.
Sector, Ky. App., 966 S.W.2d 286 (1988), for the proposition that under KRS 411.182, apportionment may be
appropriate even as to intentional torts.
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Construction Lender v. Homeowner and Homeowner's Lender v. Everyone Else
Another scenario that could have occur had the Mitchell case not settled would have been
for many or all of the construction lenders to bring foreclosure actions naming the homeowner
and the homeowner's lender as defendants. This, in fact, did occur with respect to one property,
but the case was settled before the legal claims were litigated.36 Had such a foreclosure action
been played out in court, the homeowner and the homeowner's lender may have defeated it on
the ground that there was constructive delivery ofthe payoffcheck to the construction lender
(and therefore the construction lender had no valid lien on the property). It: however, it was
found that no constructive delivery occurred, then the construction lender would have proceeded
to foreclose on the property, in which case, the homeowner's lender would have made a claim on
the title insurance company, based on the title insurance policy purchased by the homeowner's
lender in conjuction with the closing, to pay offthe construction lender's lien. Assuming it paid
off the construction lien, the title insurance company then would have been subrogated to the
rights ofits insured (i.e., the homeowner's lender) and probably would have made a claim against
the closing agent for negligence and breach ofcontract based upon the closing agent's failure to
arrange for proper delivery of the original payoff check to the construction lender.
The closing agent (the drawer ofthe original payoffcheck) probably would have
responded by making a claim against the closing agent's bank (the drawee) under uec § 4-401
(KRS 355.4-401).37 Under 4-401, the drawee may not collect from the drawer for items that are
36See Guardian Savings Bank, FSB v. Erpenbeck & Kennedy Builder, LLC, Case No. 02-CI-319 (Boone
County Circuit Court).
37The closing agent might have attempted to bring claiIm directly against Peoples Bank. However, because
the closing agent was the drawer of the diverted payoff check, a conversion claim against Peoples Bank would have
been precluded by uee § 3-420 (KRS 355.3-420), which excludes standing for a drawer to claim conversion
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not properly payable from the drawer's account. Thus, the closing agent would seek to recover
from the drawee bank the amount of the diverted payoffcheck, which the closing agent would
claim had been improperly debited from the closing agent's account by the drawee bank and paid
to the depositary bank (peoples Bank).
In response to the closing agent's 4-401 claim, the drawee bank probably would have
raised a defense ofthe closing agent's negligence under vee § 3-406 (KRS 355.3-406), which
provides:
(a) A person whose failure to exercise ordinary care substantially contributes to an
alteration ofan instrument or in the making ofa forged signature on an instrument
is precluded from asserting the alteration or the forgery against a person who, in
good faith, pays the instrument or takes it for value or for collection.
(b) Under subsection (a), if the person asserting the preclusion fails to exercise
ordinary care in paying or taking the instrument and that failure substantially
contributes to loss, the loss is allocated between the person precluded and the
person asserting the preclusion according to the extent to which the failure ofeach
to exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss.
(c) Under subsection (a), the burden ofproving failure to exercise ordinary care is
on the person asserting the preclusion. Under subsection (b), the burden of
proving failure to exercise ordinary care is on the person precluded.
Based on this provision, the drawee bank would have probably argued that it paid the instrument
in good faith, that the closing agent's negligence substantially contributed to the making ofthe
"forged" signature on the diverted payoffcheck, and therefore the drawee bank should have no
liability.
against the depositary bank. Also, the drawer has no presentment warranty claim against the depositary bank under
3417. See Official Cmt. 2 to VCC 3-417 (stating that current version of 3-417 provides no warranty right to a
drawer, overruling Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 582 P.2d 920 (Cal. 1978». Any negligence claim
by the closing agent against Peoples Bank would have relied upon an expansive de:fmition of duty of care similar to
that espoused by the plaintiffs in the Mitchell case, assuming that the closing agent was not a customer of Peoples
Bank. Contributory negligence, of course, would have been raised as a defense by Peoples Bank to any negligence
claim brought by a closing agent.
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There is, however, some question as to whether 3-406 applies to situations where there is
a missing or restrictive indorsement (as was the case for the homeowners in Mitchell), which
could be argued is not a "forged" signature within the meaning of3-406. The courts are split on
this issue. Some cases have held that a 3-406 defense is not availably to the drawee bank where
there is missing or restrictive indorsement.38 Other authority seems to support the proposition
that 3-406 applies to situations involving a depositary bank·'s taking ofchecks with missing
endorsements.39
38See, e.g., Norman Goldstein Assocs., Inc. v. Bank ofNew York, 611 N.Y.S.2d 276, 278 (S. Ct., App.
Div., 2d Dept. 1994) ("In addition, we fmd that the trial court was correct in finding that the negligence defense
provided by UCC 3-406 is unavailable to BNY on the second and sixth causes of action. That statute requires that
there first exist a signature endorsing the check and that it be an unauthorized signature, whereas he the three checks
lacked any signature or endorsement whatsoever.")
39In Kuwait Airways Corp. v. American Security Bank, 890 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the court
specifically examined this question:
[The Drawer] further contends that section 3-406 does not apply where the
payee's indorsement is missing. However, where, as in this case, we assume
that the absence of any indorsement is a 'forged indorsement' within the
meaning ofsection 3-419(1)(c), we must apply a similar reading to the teon
'unauthorized signature in 3-406. Cf. Empire Moving & Warehouse Corp. v.
Hyde Park Bank & Trust Co., 43 Ill. App.3d 991,2 n1.Dec. 753, 757, 357
N.E.2d 1196, 1200 (1976)(applying section 3-406 where bank took checks
without required endorsements).
Id. at 463; accord Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 703 N.E.2d 217 (Mass. 1998).
The court in John Hancock Financial Services v. Old Kent Bank, 185 F.Supp. 771 (E.D. Mich. 2002),
howver, question the Kuwait court's interpretation of the phrase 'unauthorized signature' as used in 3-406 prior to
the 1993 amendment to the UCC. Although not specifically ruling that a bank may not use § 3-406 when it has
deposited in an account a check missing an indorsement, the John Hancock Financial Services court stated·that "the
1993 amendments to the UCC, as adopted in Michigan, indicate that the preclusion defense is not available in every
conversion case and that these provisions should be treated separately.... the amended version of [§ 3-406] limits
the preclusion defense to instances in which 'an alteration for the instrument' or 'making of a forged signature'
occurs." Id. at 777. Furthermore, the court stated,
Comment to 1 [§ 3-420] supports the argument that the preclusion defense is not available in
every conversion case. While concluding that both examples are conversion under [ § 3-420],
Comment 1 makes a distinction between payment on a check with a 'forged' indorsement and
payment on a check with a missing indorsement. This distinction supports that argument that
these are two separate examples ofconversion. Because [§ 3-406] only pertains to 'forged
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In addition to its potential 3-406 defense against the closing agent's (i.e., drawer's) claim,
the drawee bank. would probably have brought a claim ofbreach ofpresentment warranty against
the depositary bank (peoples Bank.) under uee 4-208 (KRS 355.4-208). Under 4-208, a
depositary bank. who presents the check for payment to the drawee bank. warrants to the drawee
that the depositary bank. is a person entitled to enforce the draft. The drawee bank. likely would
have argued that Peoples Bank was not a "person entitled to enforce" the payoffcheck, as
defined in 3-301, by virtue ofhaving acquired the check from Erpenbeck, and therefore Peoples
Bank is liable under its 4-208 warranty.
Liability under 4-208, however, is also limited by the defense under 4-208(c). This
provision states that "ifa drawee asserts a claim for breach ofwarranty based on an unauthorized
indorsement of the draft or an alteration ofthe draft, the warrantor may defend by proving that
... the drawer is precluded under Section 3-406 (Negligence Contributing to Forged Signature or
Alternation ofInstrument] or 4-406 [Customer's Duty to Discover and Report Unauthorized
Signature or Alteration] from asserting against the drawee the unauthorized indorsement or
alteration." (emphasis added) This section permits a depositary bank. to limit its liability by
showing that the drawee has a valid defense under 3-406. Thus, Peoples Bank, as the depositary
bank, would only be liable to the drawee bank to the extent that the drawee is liable to the drawer
(i.e., the closing agent) under 4-401 (after application ofthe 3-406 defense described above).
signatures' and 'altered instruments' it, logically, does not cover every act of conversion included
in [§ 3-420]. Therefore, the scope of these provisions are not 'coextensive.'
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Peoples Bank would have argued that because the closing agents, the drawers, were
negligent by entrusting the payoffchecks to Erpenbeck's representative for delivery and that
negligence was a substantial factor in the subsequent loss, the closing agents may not assert a
right against their drawee bank unless the closing agents could have proved that the drawee
banks were also negligent in paying the diverted payoffchecks. Peoples Bank would have
contended that the drawee banks themselves were not negligent, so the drawers were precluded
from making claims against the drawee banks because ofthe 3-406 defense. The upshot of
Peoples Bank's argument, if it had been accepted by the court, would have been that the closing
agents and title insurance companies would have borne much, and perhaps all, of the loss caused
by Erpenbeck's fraud.
How the Case Was Resolved
No~e ofthe claims discussed above were ruled upon by the court because ofa settlement
reached by the Peoples Bank defendants with the Mitchell homeowner-plaintiffs. The Peoples
Bank defendants paid approximately $16.8 million to secure releases ofthe construction liens,
and then negotiated settlements with dozens ofclosing agents, title insurance companies and
construction lenders for each to pay Peoples Bank a share of this amount based upon the number
ofclosings with which they were involved.
The Mitchell case presented quite exigent circumstances that called for relatively speedy
resolution: namely, some 210 homeowners who, through no fault of their own, had unreleased
first liens on their property held by construction lenders that prevented the homeowners from
selling or refmancing. Although the legal theories set forth above would have ultimately
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resolved the matter, the practicalities of the situation demanded a settlement that would provide
expeditious relief for the homeowners from the unreleased liens, but also equitably distribute the
loss among all of the parties involved.
C· 23

STATE PREDATORY LENDING
AND oee PREEMPTION
Caryn F. Price
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP
Louisville, Kentucky
Copyright 2004. Caryn F. Price. All Rights Reserved.
SECTIOND

STATE PREDATORY LENDING AND oee PREEMPTION
PREDATORY LENDING: WHAT IS IT? D-l
EXAMPLES OF PREDATORY LENDING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-l
RISKS TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH
PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-2
WHAT HAVE STATES DONE TO ADDRESS THE PERCEIVED
PROBLEM OF PREDATORY LENDING? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-4
STEPS THE OCC HAS TAKEN TO PREVENT PREDATORY
LENDING PRACTICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-8
EFFECT OF THE OCC'S PREEMPTION RULES ON STATE
PREDATORY LENDING LAWS ............................•.............. D-I0
REACTION AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS D-12
KENTUCKY'S HIGH-COST HOME LOAN ACT D-15
SECTIOND

STATE PREDATORY LENDING AND OCC PREEMPTION
April 2004
By:
Caryn F. Price
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP
Louisville, Kentucky
Predatory Lending: What is it?
A fundamental characteristic of predatory lending is the aggressive marketing of credit to
prospective borrowers who simply cannot afford the credit on the terms being offered.
Typically, such credit is underwritten predominantly on the basis of the liquidation value of the
collateral, without regard to the borrower's ability to service and repay the loan according to its
terms, absent resorting to the collateral.
Examples of Predatory Lending:
Equity stripping - Typically involves making loans with excessively high, up-front fees
that are fmanced and secured by the borrower's home, often with an excessively high
penalty upon prepayment of the loan, for the sole or primary objective of stripping the
borrower's home equity.
Loan flipping - Frequent refmancings that result in little or no economic benefit to the
borrower and are undertaken with the primary or sole objective ofgenerating additional
loan fees, prepayment penalties and fees from the fmancing ofcredit-related products.
Refinancings ofspecial subsidized mortgages - Special subsidized mortgages are often
originated under programs sponsored by governmental or nonprofit organizations and
generally contain below-market or other nonstandard terms beneficial to the borrower.
The refmancing of such loans generally entails the loss ofone or more of the beneficial
loan terms.
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Disadvantageous loan terms or structures - Using loan terms or structures, such as
negative amortization, to make it more difficult or impossible for borrowers to reduce or
repay their indebtedness.
Balloon payments - Balloon payments may be used to conceal the true burden of the
fmancing and to force borrowers into costly refmancing transactions or foreclosures.
Targeting ofinappropriate or excessively expensive credit products - The targeting of
inappropriate or excessively expensive credit products to older borrowers, to persons who
are not fmancially sophisticated or who may be otherwise vulnerable to abusive practices
and to persons who could qualify for mainstream credit products and terms.
Inadequate disclosure of the true costs, risks and appropriateness to the borrower of loan
transactions.
Single premium credit life insurance - The fmancing of single premium credit life
insurance purchased by the borrower to repay the lender in the event the borrower dies.
The use ofmandatory arbitration clauses - Mandatory arbitration clauses may serve to
insulate unfair and deceptive practices from effective review and relegate consumers to a
forum where they cannot obtain injunctive relief against wrongful practices, proceed on
behalfofa class, or obtain punitive damages.
Risks to Financial Institutions Associated with Predatory Lending Practices.
Safety and soundness concerns:
The departure from fundamental principles of loan underwriting increases the risk to the
bank that the loan will default and may also increase the bank's potential loss exposure upon
default.
Banks may run the risk of losing a source offunding for operations, thereby exposing
themselves to greater default risk and risk of loss. Access to the secondary market may be
effectively foreclosed. Major government sponsored entities active in the secondary market for
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mortgage loans have taken a number of affmnative steps to reduce the possibility that they will
purchase abusive loans, including a refusal to purchase loans
• in which the lender has not adequately detennined the borrower's ability to repay
the debt,
• which are subject to the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA),
• with points and fees in excess of 5% of the loan amount, except in cases where a
higher amount of fees was justified to prevent the loan from being unprofitable,
and
• in which a prepaid single premium credit insurance policy was included in the
amount fmanced.
Violations of the FTC Act. Predatory lending practices may be indicative of unfair or
deceptive practices that violate Section 5 of the FTC Act.
• Practices may be found to be deceptive if there is a representation, omission, act,
or practice that is likely to mislead, the act or practice would be likely to mislead
a reasonable consumer, and the representation, omission, act or practice is likely
to mislead in a material way.
• Practices may be found to be unfair if the practice causes substantial consumer
injury, such as monetary hann, the injury is not outweighed by benefits to the
consumer or to competition and the injury caused by the practice is one that
consumers could not reasonably have avoided.
Violations ofOther Laws. Predatory lending practices may also violate HOEPA or may
involve unlawful discrimination.
CRA Evaluations and Ratings May be Impacted. Abusive lending practices that evidence
illegal practices may adversely affect an institution's eRA performance.
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What have states done to address the perceived problem of predatory lending?
Nearly half of the states have passed legislations to curb abusive lending.
Kentucky's High-Cost Home Loan Statute. Effective June 24, 2003, Kentucky adopted a
new statute, KRS 360.100, which applies solely to "high-cost home loans," i.e.,
• a loan (other than an open end credit plan or reverse mortgage transaction) the
principal amount ofwhich is greater than $15,000 and not more than $200,000,
• made to a natural person for personal, family or household purposes,
• that is secured by a mortgage on residential real property or collateral which has a
mortgage on such property, which is or will be occupied by the borrower as his or
her principal dwelling, and
• which, at the time the loan is consummated, without regard to whether the loan
transaction is a "residential mortgage transaction" under 12 C.F.R. 226.2(a)(24),
is considered a "mortgage" under Section 152 of the Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(aa) and the regulations promulgated
thereunder, as each is amended from time to time.
The statute adopts thefederal thresholds to define "high-cost" loans - 8% for frrst lien
loans, and 10% for subordinate lien loans, over the yield on u.S. treasury securities of
comparable maturities, and $400 in points and fees, adjusted annually.
The statute provides broad coverage ofmortgage loans with connections to Kentucky -
The statute covers loans where: a lender agrees in Kentucky to lend to Kentucky residents
secured by real property in Kentucky; a borrower accepts an offer in Kentucky, or makes an
offer in Kentucky to borrow, including solicitations originating outside Kentucky, but received in
Kentucky by a Kentucky resident; and a borrower receives an oral or written offer, acceptance,
solicitation or communication to lend or borrow in Kentucky.
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The statute prohibits 16 abusive practices:
• prepayment penalties
• discretionary acceleration
• balloon payments
• negative amortization
• default interest rates
• limits advance payments
• limits refmance fees
• making of loans unless the lender reasonably believes that the borrower will be
able to make the scheduled payments to repay the loan based upon consideration
of income, obligations, employment and other fmancial resources
• direct payments to home improvement contractors
• single-premium credit insurance
• unfair arbitration
• limits late fees
• notice of right to cure
• recommendations 0 f default
• charges for payoff statements
• refinancings of below-market loans
Required Disclosures. Prior to a lender making a high-cost loan, the lender must provide
certain prescribed disclosures to the borrower. In addition, the lender must make available an
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educational video, approved by the KDFI, explaining the borrower's rights and responsibilities
under the statute.
Defensesfor goodfaith or inadvertent violations.
A lender who in good faith fails to comply with the statute will not be deemed to be in
violation if it makes appropriate restitution within 30 days and adjusts the loan so that it is in
compliance or is no longer a high-cost home loan.
Compliance failures resulting from unintentional and bona fide clerical calculations,
computer programming or printing errors may not result in a violation if the lender, within 60
days after discovery of the error, notifies the borrower, make appropriate restitution and adjusts
the terms ofthe loan in a manner beneficial to the borrower so that the loan is in compliance or is
no longer a high-cost home loan.
Other State Laws. Indiana recently passed the Indiana Home Protection Act. The
legislation identifies certain practices that are so inherently abusive that they are prohibited for
all loans. In addition, the legislation limits certain additional practices when they are used in a
"high-cost" home loan. A "high-cost" home loan is defmed in the Act as a home mortgage loan
that exceeds either
• the interest rate threshold established by federal law (8 points above the yield on
Treasury bills with comparable term for first liens; 10 points above for
subordinate liens), or
• points and fees that exceed 5 percent of the total loan amount for loans $40,000
and above, and 6 percent of the total loan amount for smaller loans.
Under the Home Protection Act, the following acts and practices are prohibited for all
home loans:
• fmanced single-premium credit life insurance and debt cancellation agreements;
• recommendation ofdefault;
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• debt acceleration at the sole discretion of the creditor;
• charging the consumer a fee to receive a balance due statement;
• deceptive acts;
• discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital
status or age.
Under the Home Protection Act, the following acts and practices are prohibited for "high-
cost" loans:
• fmancing of fees or charges;
• excessive prepayment penalties;
• fmancing of life or health insurance;
• loan flipping;
• balloon payments;
• negative amortization;
• increased interest rate after default;
• advance payments made from loan proceeds;
• lending without a referral for homeownership counseling;
• lending without due regard to repayment ability;
• certain predatory home-improvement contracts;
• modification or deferral fees;
• lending without full disclosure of the risks ofhigh-cost loans;
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• mandatory arbitration.
Steps the oee has taken to prevent predatory lending practices.
"We know that it's possible to deal effectively with predatory lending without putting
impediments in the way ofthose who provide access to legitimate subprime credit... We believe a
far more effective approach would be to focus on the abusive practitioners, bringing to bear our
formidable enforcement powers where we find abusive practices." Comptroller of the Currency
John D. Hawke, Jr., July 24, 2003
In 2003, the OCC issued two advisory letters containing guidelines to assist national bank
efforts to prevent predatory and abusive lending practices in connection with direct loan
originations and with broker and third-party originations.
Guidelines for National Banks to Guard Against Predatory and Abusive Lending
Practices (OCC Advisory Letter 2003-2).
• Advises national banks and their operating subsidiaries to take appropriate steps
to ensure that they do not become involved in predatory lending
• Advises national banks to adopt policies and procedures to ensure that an
appropriate determination has been made that a borrower has the capacity to make
scheduled payments to service and repay the loan. A loan that has been based on
the foreclosure value of the collateral, rather than on the borrower's ability to
repay the loan without resort to the collateral, is fundamentally a predatory loan
and is inconsistent with safe and sound banking practices.
• Advises national banks to adopt policies and procedures to specify whether and
under what circumstances they will make loans involving features that have been
associated with abusive lending practices, such as: frequent, sequential loan
refinancings; refmancings of special subsidized mortgages that contain terms
favorable to the borrower; balloon payments; prepayment penalties that are not
limited to the early years of the loan; interest rate increases upon default; the
fmancing ofpoints and fees; single premium credit life insurance; and mandatory
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arbitration clauses. Such policies should be adequate to avoid the risk that a
transaction could be deemed to involve unfair or deceptive practices.
• Advises national banks to adopt policies and procedures that reflect the degree of
care that is appropriate to the risk ofa transaction, including consideration ofhow
the loan meets the borrower's particular financial circumstances and needs.
• Encourages national banks to adopt procedures that provide for reporting of good
credit histories to the major credit reporting agencies.
• Advises national bank to perform loan documentation reviews to ensure that loans
comply with applicable laws and the bank's policies.
Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices in Brokered and Purchased Loans
(OCC Advisory Letter 2003-3). Advises national banks to take affirmative steps to address the
risk that they may acquire predatory loans through broker and loan purchase transactions,
including
• adopting clear procedures for entering into broker and third party originator
relationship's that delineate any unacceptable characteristics for loans the bank
will acquire
• performing appropriate due diligence before entering into a business arrangement
with a broker or third-party loan originator
• developing approved lists ofbrokers and originators with whom it will do
business
• requiring written agreements with third parties that require brokers to abide by
bank policies, applicable law and make best efforts to ensure that loans offered
are consistent with the borrower's needs, objectives and fmancial situation
• obtaining written agreements between the borrower and the broker to ensure that
the agreement clearly discloses the services the broker will provide and the fees to
be paid, contains a specific request by the borrower for the specified services at
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that fee and includes a signed and dated acknowledgement of receipt by the
borrower
• monitoring broker and third-party loan originators for compliance and taking
appropriate corrective action, including modification of loan tenns and
termination of the business arrangement with the third party
Effect of the OCC's preemption rules on state predatory lending laws.
an January 7, 2004, the acc released two fmal rules clarifying the scope of (i) the
preemption of state law available to national banks and their operating subsidiaries and (ii) the
acc's visitorial powers over national banks and their operating subsidiaries. In addition, the
acc adopted anti-predatory lending standards that apply to all consumer loans and not just
mortgages or high-cost home loans.
Preemption Final Rule. Generally, the rules provides that state laws do not apply to
national banks if they obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank's exercise of its federally
authorized lending, deposit-taking and other powers.
Types ofstate laws that are preempted:
• with respect to all lending: laws that address the licensing, registration, filings or
reports by creditors, requiring insurance for collateral or other credit
enhancements, loan-to-value ratios, tenns ofcredit, escrow and similar accounts,
security property, access to and use ofcredit reports, disclosure and advertising,
disbursements and repayments, interests rates on loans
• with respect to real estate lending: laws that address the amount that may be lent
upon security of real estate, processing, originating and servicing mortgages, due-
on-sale clauses, covenants to qualify leaseholds as security for real estate loans
• with respect to deposit-taking: laws that address abandoned and dormant
accounts, checking accounts, disclosure requirements, saving account orders of
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withdrawal, state licensing or registration requirements, special purpose savings
services and funds availability
• lists are not intended to be exhaustive and the acc may identify and address on a
case-by-case basis other types of state laws that are preempted
Types ofstate laws that are not preempted:
• laws on contracts, rights to collect debts, acquisition and transfer ofproperty,
taxation, zoning, crimes and torts
• any other law that the acc determines to only incidentally affect national banks'
lending, deposit-taking or other operations
Visitorial Powers Final Rule. The rule clarifies the extent to which state officials may
examine national banks and take actions to enforce their compliance with state or federal laws.
• Provides that ''unless otherwise provided by Federal law, the acc has exclusive
visitorial authority with respect to the content and conduct ofactivities authorized
for national banks under Federal law." This provision was added in order to
clarify that the acc's exclusive visitorial authority relates only to the banking
and related activities ofnational banks and their operating subsidiaries. States
still retain the ability to enforce non-banking related laws, such as fIre codes,
environmental laws, zoning ordinances, generally applicable criminal laws and
the like.
• Clarifies that the exception to the acc's exclusive visitorial powers for "visitorial
powers...vested in the courts ofjustice" refers to powers inherent in the judiciary
and does not grant state or other governmental authorities any right that they do
not otherwise possess to inspect, superintend, direct, regulate or compel
compliance by a national bank with any law regarding the content or conduct of
activities authorized for national banks under Federal law.
Anti-Predatory Lending Standards. As part of the fmal preemption rule, the acc
adopted anti-predatory lending standards that apply to all consumer loans and not just mortgages
or high-cost home loans.
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• Prevents a national bank from making a consumer loan (one for personal, family
or household purposes) based predominantly on the foreclosure or liquidation
value of the collateral without regard to the consumer's ability to repay the loan
according to its tenns
• Allows a national bank or operating subsidairy to use any reasonable method to
detennine whether the borrower has the ability to repay the loan without relying
on the collateral, including the borrower's current financial obligations,
employment status and credit history.
• Prohibits a lender from relying only on the liquidation value of the collateral
when the borrower and lender both understand "that it is likely or expected that"
the lender will tum to the collateral to repay the debt, as with reverse mortgages.
• Explicitly recognizes that national banks and their operating subsidiaries continue
to be subject to applicable federal law and may not engage in unfair or deceptive
practices as prohibited under Section 5 of the FTC Act.
• Provides codification of the acc's authority to target banks engaged in abusive
lending practices and makes a violation of such provisions a violation ofthe
banking laws, which could enhance the acc's enforcement capabilities.
Reaction and Recent Developments.
Response ofState Attorneys General. Immediately after promulgation of the fmal rules,
New York's Attorney General issued a press release describing the new rules as "shamefully bad
public policy" that represented "an unprecedented expansion ofthe acc's powers." On January
16, 2004, he filed a lawsuit in New York State Supreme Court against an operating subsidairy of
First Tennessee Bank, a national bank, alleging impropriety in its collection and foreclosure
practices.
acc Censured by House Financial Services Committee. On February 25, 2004, the
House Financial Services Committee voted to censure the acc for the' acc regulations.
Though the action has no legal force, the committee chastised the acc for issuing the new rule
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without congressional authorization and without clear plans to provide funds for personnel for
increased enforcement.
Statements ofComptroller Hawke to Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs. On April 7, 2004, in testifying before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, Comptroller Hawke expressed concern over the widespread misunderstanding
and mischaracterization of the rules. He emphasized that the ace's preemption regulation
• does not preempt state laws other than those listed,
• does not immunize national banks from complying with a host of state laws,
• does not preempt anti-discrimination laws,
• does not extend to activities authorized for fmancial subsidiaries ofnational
banks,
• does not impinge on the functional regulation framework set in place in the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
• does not allow national banks to charge higher rates of interest than they
previously could, and
• does not authorize any new national bank powers.
Federal court cites OCC preemption regulations infinding Ohio Retail Installment Sales
Act preempted The U.S. District Court, Northern District of Ohio found on March 4, 2004, that
the National Bank Act and corresponding federal regulations preempt the Ohio Retail Installment
Sales Act (Abel v. KeyBank USA, N.A., No. 03 CV 524 (D. Ohio 03/04/04)). The case
illustrates the level of deference courts are willing to give the acc preemption regulations as
well as OCC testimony at congressional hearings. The court applied the regulation to conduct
that occurred prior to the rule's effective date, consistent with the acc's position that the
regulation is consistent with existing law.
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Query the effect of the GCC's preemption rule on KRS 287.102. KRS 287.102 provides
state banks receiving a CAMEL rating of 1 or 2 at its most recent regulatory examination may
engage in any banking activity in which the bank could engage if it was operating as a national
bank in any state.
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KENTUCKY'S HIGH-COST HOME LOAN ACT
KRS 360.100
(1) The following definitions apply for the purposes of this section:
(a) "High-cost home loan" means a loan other than an open-end credit plan or a reverse mortgage
transaction in which:
1. The principal amount of the loan is greater than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) and
does not exceed two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000);
2. The borrower is a natural person;
3. The debt is incurred by the borrower primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes;
4. The loan is secured by a mortgage on residential real property or secured by collateral
which has a mortgage lien interest in residential real property, which is or will be occupied by the
borrower as the borrower's principal dwelling; and
5. Without regard to whether the loan transaction is or may be a "residential mortgage
transaction" as defined in 12 CFR 226.2(a)(24), as amended from time to time, the loan at the time
the loan is consummated is such that the loan is considered a "mortgage" under section 152 of the
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. Law 103-325, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa), as
the same may be amended from time to time, and regulations adopted pursuant thereto by the
Federal Reserve Board, including 12 CFR 226.32, as the same may be amended from time to time.
(b) "Lender" means any person who funds or negotiates the terms of a high-cost home loan or acts as
a mortgage broker or lender, finance company, or retail installment seller with respect to a high-cost home
loan. However, any person who purchases or is otherwise assigned a high-cost home loan shall be subject
to an action for violation of this section only if the violation for which the action or proceeding is brought is
apparent on the face of the disclosure or the underlying promissory note.
(2) A high-cost home loan shall be subject to the following limitations:
(a) A high-cost home loan may not contain a provision which permits the lender to charge or collect
prepayment fees or penalties more than thirty-six (36) months after the loan closing or which exceed three
percent (3%) of the amount prepaid during the first twelve (12) months, two percent (2%) of the amount
prepaid during the second twelve (12) months, or one percent (1%) of the amount prepaid during the third
twelve (12) months.
(b) A high-cost home loan may not contain a provision which permits the lender, in its sole discretion,
to accelerate the indebtedness. This provision does not apply when repayment of the loan has been
accelerated by default, pursuant to a due-on-sale provision, or pursuant to some other provision of the loan
documents unrelated to the payment schedule.
(c) A high-cost home loan may not contain a scheduled payment that is more than twice as large as
the average of earlier scheduled payments. This provision does not apply when the payment schedule is
adjusted to the seasonal or irregular income of the borrower.
(d) A high-cost home loan may not contain a payment schedule with regular periodic payments that
cause the principal balance to increase.
(e) A high-cost home loan may not contain a provision which increases the interest rate after default.
This provision does not apply to interest rate changes in a variable rate loan otherwise consistent with the
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provisions of the loan documents, provided the change in the interest rate is not triggered by the event of
default or the acceleration of the indebtedness.
(f) A high-cost home loan may not include terms under which more than two (2) periodic payments
required under the loan are consolidated and paid in advance from the loan proceeds provided to the
borrower.
(g) A lender· may not charge a borrower any fees to modify, renew, extend, or amend a high-cost
home loan or to defer any payment due under the terms of a high-cost home loan, unless the fees are less
than one-half (1/2) of any fees that would be charged for a refinance or unless the borrower is in default
and it is in the borrower's best interest.
(h) A lender may not make a high-cost home loan unless the borrower has been provided the
following notice or a substantially similar notice, in writing, not later than the time that notice provided by
12 CFR 226.31(c), as amended from time to time, is required:
NOTICE TO BORROWER
IF YOU OBTAIN THIS LOAN, THE LENDER WILL HAVE A MORTGAGE ON YOUR
HOME. YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME AND ANY MONEY YOU PUT INTO IT IF YOU DO NOT
MEET YOUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LOAN.
MORTGAGE LOAN RATES AND CLOSING COSTS AND FEES VARY BASED ON MANY
FACTORS, INCLUDING YOUR PARTICULAR CREDIT AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES,
YOUR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY, THE LOAN-TO-VALUE REQUESTED AND THE TYPE OF
PROPERTY THAT WILL SECURE YOUR LOAN. THE LOAN RATE AND FEES COULD ALSO
VARY BASED ON WHICH LENDER OR BROKER YOU SELECT. YOU SHOULD SHOP AROUND
AND COMPARE LOAN RATES AND FEES.
YOU SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER CONSULTING A QUALIFIED INDEPENDENT CREDIT
COUNSELOR OR OTHER EXPERIENCED FINANCIAL ADVISOR REGARDING THE RATE, FEES
AND PROVISIONS OF THIS MORTGAGE LOAN BEFORE YOU PROCEED. YOU SHOULD
CONTACT THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
FOR A LIST OF CREDIT COUNSELORS AVAILABLE IN YOUR AREA.
YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THIS LOAN AGREEMENT MERELY
BECAUSE YOU HAVE RECEIVED THESE DISCLOSURES OR HAVE SIGNED A LOAN
APPLICATION.
REMEMBER, PROPERTY TAXES AND HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE ARE YOUR
RESPONSIBILITY. NOT ALL LENDERS PROVIDE ESCROW SERVICES FOR THESE PAYMENTS.
YOU SHOULD ASK YOUR LENDER ABOUT THESE SERVICES.
ALSO, YOUR PAYMENTS ON EXISTING DEBTS CONTRIBUTE TO YOUR CREDIT
RATINGS. YOU SHOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY ADVICE TO IGNORE YOUR REGULAR
PAYMENTS TO YOUR EXISTING CREDITORS.
(i) A lender may not make a high-cost home loan unless the lender reasonably believes at the time the
loan is consummated that one (1) or more of the borrowers, when considered individually or collectively,
will be able to make the scheduled payments to repay the loan based upon a consideration of their current
and expected income, current obligations, current employment status, and other fmancial resources, other
than the borrower's equity in the dwelling which secures repayment of the loan. A borrower shall be
presumed to be able to make the scheduled payments to repay the loan if, at the time the loan is
consummated, the borrower's total monthly debts, including amoWlts owed under the loan, do not exceed
fifty percent (50%) of the borrower's monthly gross income as verified by the credit application, the
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borrower's financial statement, a credit report, financial infonnation provided to the lender by or on behalf
of the borrower, or any other reasonable means. No presumption of inability to make the scheduled
payments to repay the obligation shall arise solely from the fact that, at the time the loan is consummated,
the borrower's total monthly debts, including amounts owed under the loan, exceed fifty percent (50%) of
the borrower's monthly gross income.
G) If the proceeds of the high-cost home loan are used to refinance an existing high-cost home loan
held by the same lender as noteholder, the lender may not directly or indirectly finance:
1. Any prepayment fees or penalties payable by the borrower; or
2. Points and fees, excluding those provided for in 12 CFR 226.4(c)(7), which in the
aggregate are in excess of four percent (4%) of the total amount financed.
(k) A lender or mortgage loan broker may not, within one (1) year of the consummation of a high-cost
home loan, charge a borrower points and fees in connection with a high-cost home loan if the proceeds of
the high-cost home loan are used to refinance an existing high-cost home loan on which points were
charged. A lender may not, at any time, charge a borrower points and fees in addition to those allowed by
12 CFR 226.4(c)(7) if the proceeds of the high-cost home loan are used to refinance an existing high-cost
home loan, on which points were charged, held by the same lender as noteholder. However, points and fees
in accordance with this section may be charged on any proceeds of a high-cost home loan which are in
excess of the amount refinanced on the existing high-cost home loan.
(I) A lender may not pay a contractor under a home-improvement contract from the proceeds of a
high-cost home loan other than by an instrument payable to the borrower or jointly to the borrower and the
contractor, or at the election of the borrower, through a third-party escrow agent in accordance with terms
established in a written agreement signed by the borrower, the lender, and the contractor prior to the
disbursement.
(m) A lender shall not refinance, replace, or consolidate a zero interest rate or low interest rate loan
made by a governmental or nonprofit lender with a high-cost home loan. For purposes of this paragraph, a
low interest rate loan is defined as a loan that carries a current interest rate that is two (2) percentage points
or more below the current yield on United States Treasury securities with a comparable maturity.
(n) A lender shall not finance single premium credit life, credit accident, credit health, credit
disability, or credit loss of income insurance in connection with a high-cost home loan.
(0) A lender shall not make a high-cost home loan unless the lender has made available to the
borrower a videotape, or other similar audio-video media fonnat such as DVD or CD, approved by the
Department of Financial Institutions, which explains the borrower's rights and responsibilities with regard
to this section or high-cost home loans. A lender shall have available for viewing at least one (1) copy of
the video in the principal office and each branch office of the lender.
(p) A lender shall not make a high-cost home loan subject to a mandatory arbitration clause that is
oppressive, unfair, unconscionable, or substantially in derogation of the rights of consumers. Arbitration
clauses that comply with the standards set forth in the Statement of Principles of the National Consumer
Dispute Advisory Committee of the American Arbitration Association in effect on the effective date of this
Act shall be presumed not to violate this subsection.
(q) A lender shall not charge a late payment fee on a high-cost home loan except in accordance with
the following:
1. The late payment fee may not be in excess of five percent (5%) of the amount of the
payment past due or ten dollars ($10), whichever is greater;
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2. The late payment fee may only be assessed for a payment past due fifteen (15) days or
more; and
3. The late payment fee may only be charged once with respect to a single late payment.
(r) A lender may not charge a borrower a fee in excess often dollars ($10) or actual costs, whichever
is greater, per request for a written payoff calculation on a high-cost home loan for the first two (2) requests
by a borrower in a calendar year.
(s) A lender shall not initiate a foreclosure or other judicial process to terminate a borrower's interest
in residential real property subject to a high-cost home loan without first providing the borrower, at least
thirty (30) days prior to the initiation of any process, ~itten notice of default and of the borrower's right to
cure. The notice shall include a statement of the amount needed to be paid by the borrower in order to cure
the default and the date by which the payment is due to cure the default. If the amount needed to be paid
will change during the thirty (30) day notice period, the notice shall provide information sufficient to
enable a calculation of the daily change.
(t) A lender shall not recommend or encourage default on an existing loan or other debt in connection
with the closing of a high-cost home loan that refinances all or a portion of the existing loan or debt.
(3) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of subsection (2) of this section, the making ofa high-cost home loan
which violates any provisions of subsection (2) of this section is usurious, subject to the penalties of this chapter,
and unlawful as an unfair and deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce in violation of the provisions of
K.RS 367.170. The provisions of this section shall apply to any person who in bad faith attempts to avoid the
application of this section by:
(a) The structuring of a loan transaction as an open-end credit plan for the purpose and with the intent
of evading the provisions of this section when the loan would have been a high-cost home loan if the loan
had been structured as a closed-end loan; or
(b) Dividing any loan transaction into separate parts for the purpose and with the intent of evading the
provisions of this section; or
(c) Any other such subterfuge.
The Attorney General, the commissioner of the Department ofFinancial Institutions, or any party to a high-
cost home loan may enforce the provisions of this section. Any person seeking damages or penalties under the
provisions of this section may recover damages under either this chapter or KRS Chapter 367, but not both.
(4) A lender of a high-cost home loan who, when acting in good faith, fails to comply with subsection (2) of
this section, will not be deemed to have violated this section if the lender establishes that either:
(a) Within thirty (30) days of the loan closing the borrower is notified of the compliance failure,
appropriate restitution is made, and whatever adjustments are necessary are made, at the choice of the
borrower, to the loan to either:
1. Make the high-cost home loan satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) of this section;
or
2. Change the terms of the loan in a manner beneficial to the borrower so that the loan will
no longer be considered a high-cost home loan subject to the provisions of this section; or
(b) The compliance failure was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the
maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted to avoid such errors, and within sixty (60) days after the
discovery of the compliance failure, the borrower is notified of the compliance failure, appropriate
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restitution is made, and whatever adjustments are necessary are made to the loan to either, at the choice of
the borrower, make the high-cost home loan satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) of this section or
change the terms of the loan in a manner beneficial to the borrower so that the loan will no longer be
considered a high-cost home loan subject to the provisions of this section. Examples of a bona fide error
include clerical, calculation, computer malfunction and programming, and printing errors.
(c) For purposes of this subsection, "appropriate restitution" means the reimbursement by the lender
of any points, fees, interest, or other charges made by the lender and received from the borrower necessary
to put the borrower in the same position as he or she would have been had the loan, as adjusted in
accordance with paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection, been originally made.
(5) For purposes of this section, any extension of credit shall be deemed to have been made in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, and therefore subject to the provisions of this section, if the lender offers or agrees in
Kentucky to lend to a borrower, who is a resident of Kentucky, on real property located within the Commonwealth
of Kentucky, or if such borrower accepts or makes the offer in Kentucky to borrow, regardless of the situs of the
contract as specified therein. Any oral or written solicitation or communication to lend originating outside of
Kentucky, but forwarded to and received in Kentucky by a borrower who is a resident ofKentucky, shall be deemed
to be an offer or agreement to lend in Kentucky and, therefore, subject to this section. Any oral or written
solicitation or communication to borrow originating within Kentucky, from a borrower who is a resident of
Kentucky, but forwarded to and received by a lender outside of Kentucky, shall be deemed to be an acceptance or
offer to borrow in Kentucky. Any oral or written offer, acceptance, solicitation, or communication to lend or borrow,
made in Kentucky to, or received in Kentucky from, a borrower who is not a resident of Kentucky, shall be subject
to the provisions of this section, applicable federal law, law of the situs of the contract, or law of the residence of the
borrower, as the parties may elect. The provisions of this section shall be severable and if any phrase, clause,
sentence, or provision is declared to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of this section shall not be affected
thereby.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This outline reviews selected bankruptcy decisions during the past year, with a particular
emphasis on decisions of interest to lenders in Kentucky and elsewhere in the Sixth Circuit. The
decisions demonstrate continued development of the law on subjects including plan
confirmation, discharge, professional conduct and others. Selected non-bankruptcy cases which
are of interest to lenders are also included.
II. NEW BANKRUPTCY CASES
A. Plan Confirmation/Consummation/Chapter 11 Issues
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. California. ex rei. California Dept. ofToxic Substances Control,
350 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003)
Here, the Ninth Circuit addressed the extent to which state regulatory schemes can be
pre-empted by the bankruptcy court in the context of confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. ("PG&E") proposed a plan of reorganization which would break up PG&E
into four new corporations. The business of PG&E in its entirety had been regulated by the
California Public Utility Commission ("CPUC") but, under its plan of reorganization, only one
of the corporations would continue to be regulated by CPUC. The remaining three corporations
would be under the exclusive regulatory authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission. If the disaggregation of PG&E were not approved, it would remain under the
regulatory authority of CPUC. Various government entities objected to the proposed plan,
contending that the plan was prohibited by, and violated, several state regulatory statutes, a
position which did not appear to be contested. Among other conflicts between the plan and state
law, the debtor's disclosure statement identified the non-transferability of certain permits and
licenses, stating that
[f1or these permits or licenses for which otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law
precludes transfer or gives state or local officials discretion to deny the transfer or
reissuance, the [debtor] will rely on the protection of section 1123(a) to ensure
Many thanks to our associates Lee A. Webb, Brett R. Hensley and Kathryn V. Eberle for their excellent
research and drafting assistance, without which we would not have these materials.
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that all of the reorganized companies obtain the permits and licenses they need to
operate lawfully.
Id. at 936. The court was thus faced with the issue of a bankruptcy court's ability to confinn a
plan, despite its prohibition in part by state regulatory statutes, pursuant to that portion of Section
1123(a)(5) which states that "notwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, a
[reorganization] plan shall ... provide adequate means for the plan's implementation."
The bankruptcy court rejected PG&E's broad pre-emption argument. The district court
reversed, holding that Congress expressly intended to permit pre-emption of non-bankruptcy
laws as necessary to implement a reorganization plan. The Ninth Circuit then reversed the
district court, holding that the preemptive scope of a reorganization plan is set forth in § 1142(a),
and non-bankruptcy law is pre-empted by a reorganization plan only to the extent that such law
"relate[es] to financial condition."
In re Kmart Corporation, 359 F. 3d 866 (7th eire 2004)
Here, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the reversal of a bankruptcy court's order permitting
the debtor to pay selected pre-petition debts on the basis that they were owed to "critical
vendors." Kmart sought and obtained from the bankruptcy court an order permitting it to pay in
full the pre-petition claims of "critical vendors." The order left the identity of the vendors to be
paid in the discretion of Kmart. The order purported to rely on 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
One creditor appealed the critical vendor order and, approximately 14 months later, the
district court reversed the order. During that time, Kmart had paid over 2,300 vendors over
$300,000,000 in pre-petition claims. It did not pay the claims of approximately 2,000 other
vendors apparently not deemed "critical" or the pre-petition claims of approximately 43,000
other unsecured creditors. The debtor appealed to the Seventh Circuit and several of the vendors
who had received the payments intervened in the appeal. The appellants first argued that the
matter was moot, because the money had already been paid. The Seventh Circuit held otherwise,
noting that invalid preferential payments can always be recovered. The Court noted that the
beneficiaries of some bankruptcy orders have specific protection from later reversals, but that
concept is inapplicable to an order permitting the payment ofpre-petition claims. The Court also
noted that, even if detrimental reliance on the part of the recipients would permit them some
relief on equitable grounds, there was no detrimental reliance here as these vendors got both their
pre- and post-petition claims paid. (Had they extended new post-petition credit in reliance on the
receipt of the payment for pre-petition claims, and then did not get paid post-petition, the result
could be different).
One creditor also objected on the ground that it was not a party to the district court
appeal. The Court noted that the only appellee to that was Kmart, but also stated that only 65
creditors got notice on the original critical vendor motion. Thus, the Court concluded that if lack
of notice is an issue, it calls into question the original order to a greater extent than the
subsequent appeals.
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Turning to the merits of the critical vendor order, the Court noted that the power of the
bankruptcy court under § 105 is limited -- the power "to implement rather than override." The
Court held that the old "doctrine of necessity" is "just a fancy name for a power to depart from
the Code." The Court concluded that the only Code section that had the potential to permit the
preference of some vendors is § 363(b)(I) (the debtor-in-possession's ability to use property of
the estate other than in the ordinary course of business). The Court did not decide whether this
section permits the preferences at issue. Rather, it held that the order at issue would be deficient
even if § 363 did permit the concept. The Court noted that any order permitting the payment of
pre-petition claims would have to be based on proof that the disfavored creditors would be at
least as well off under that scheme as otherwise (i.e., it would allow the debtor to operate longer
and increase their chances of getting paid at the end), and evidence that "critical vendors" really
would terminate services to the debtor without the payments. The Court noted that the testimony
of the Kmart CEO on this point was insufficient as he cannot speak for the vendors themselves.
The Court expressed the view that most vendors are unlikely to end the relationship if they can
be assured of payment for the new trade, which the Court believed they could. In short, the
Court found that there was simply no record to support the preferential payments under § 363,
even if that section permits them.
In re AT» Corporation (AT» v. Advantage Packaging), 352 F. 3d 1062 (6th Cir. 2003)
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an Ohio bankruptcy court's order allowing
the claims of two creditors, despite their failure to file their claims before the bar date, because
their claims had been scheduled by the debtor as undisputed, non-contingent and liquidated. The
debtor appealed the order allowing the claims despite the creditors' failure to physically file
proofs of claim before the bar date set by the court. The two creditors at issue were listed as
holders of undisputed, non-contingent, liquidated claims in the debtor's schedules. Thus, the
debtor conceded that the creditors were not required by either 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a) or Fed. Bankr.
R. P. 3003 to execute and file proofs of claim. On the request of the debtor, the court later sent
an order establishing a bar date for claims, but the creditors did not file a claim. The debtor then
argued that, under § 105(a), the bankruptcy court had the power to, and in fact did by the bar date
order, require that the creditors file these claims. The bankruptcy court disagreed, concluding
that the bar date order did not serve to adequately notify creditors that they could no longer rely
on 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 3003 and allowed the claims. That court did not
reach the issue of the bankruptcy court's ability to contravene § 1111(a). The district court
affirmed, as did the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit noted that the bankruptcy court's powers
under § 105 are limited to actions "not inconsistent" with other provisions of the Code.
However, instead of deciding Whether § 105 permits the court to require the claims, it simply
held that the particular bar date order at issue did not give notice of an intent to override the other
prOVISIons.
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B. Discharge and Dischargeability
Monsanto Company v. Trantham (In re William Ferris Trantham). 2004 Fed. App. OOOlP (6th
eire BAP, 2004)
The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP") held that a pre-petition patent
infringement judgment against the debtor, which included treble damages, pre-judgment interest
and attorney fees, was non-dischargeable, based on the preclusive effect of the underlying
judgment.
Monsanto obtained its patent infringement judgment against Mr. Trantham in the U.S.
District Court. That court concluded that the infringement was willful, but there was no actual
intent to injure Monsanto -- Mr. Trantham simply did not want to pay license fees. Mr.
Trantham promptly filed a Chapter 7 proceeding. Monsanto filed a complaint to determine the
non-dischargeability of the debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (debt arising as a result of willful
and malicious injury by the debtor). Monsanto claimed that the collateral estoppel effect of the
district court's findings of willfulness, combined with the award of treble damages and attorney
fees, showed that an intentional tort had occurred and that the judgment was non-dischargeable
under § 523(a)(6). Mr. Trantham argued that the finding that there was no intent to injure
Monsanto had the opposite preclusive effect -- it precluded the required element of
maliciousness under § 523(a)(6). The bankruptcy court held that Monsanto did not meet its
burden under that statute.
The BAP concluded that the issue ofwillfulness was actually raised, litigated and determined
in the district court, as it was necessary to the outcome of the patent infringement action. The
BAP also held that the same findings in the district court supported a finding of malicious injury.
To find an injury" 'willful' under section 523 (a)(6), [the court] must determine either that (i)
the actor desired to cause the consequences of the act or (ii) the actor believed that the given
consequences of his act were substantially certain to result from the act." In re: Markowitz, 190
F. 3d 455 (6th Cir. 1999). The BAP found that, under the second prong, the debtor had committed
willful injury because "where Trantham's stated purpose in willfully infringing Monsanto's
patents was not to pay Monsanto for its technology, what else could Trantham believe would be
the consequences of his act but that Monsanto would be deprived of money to which it was
entitled?" He could gain only if Monsanto lost. The entire judgment for willful patent
infringement was held non-dischargeable.
Kontrick v. Rvan. 124 S. Ct. 906 (2004)
Here, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the time limits prescribed by Bankruptcy Rule
4004 concerning objections to discharge are not ')urisdictional." It also held that a debtor
forfeits its rights to rely on Rule 4004 if it does not raise the issue of the time limits before the
bankruptcy court reaches the merits of the underlying action.
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Dr. Andrew J. Kontrick filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on April 4, 1997. His
former partner and a major creditor, Dr. Robert A. Ryan, opposed the discharge. After obtaining
three time extensions, Ryan filed a complaint objecting to the discharge of any of Kontrick's
debts, based on alleged fraudulent transfers. On May 6, 1998, with court approval, but without
seeking or gaining an extension of time, Ryan filed an amended complaint and particularized for
the first time the debtor's fraudulent transfers. He specifically alleged that the debtor
fraudulently transferred money into a family account. The debtor answered the family account
claim, but did not raise the timeliness of the claim in his answer. Ultimately, the bankruptcy
court granted summary judgment to Ryan on the family account claim.
The debtor moved for reconsideration, claiming that the bankruptcy court lacked
jurisdiction because the complaint was untimely. The bankruptcy court denied the motion for
reconsideration and the district court upheld the bankruptcy court's decision. Both courts agreed
that the debtor had waived the right to challenge the amended complaint as impermissibly late.
The Seventh Circuit Court ofAppeals also affirmed on similar grounds.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the issue of whether Rule 4004 is
jurisdictional. The Court held that only Congress can determine a federal court's subject-matter
jurisdiction. In this case Congress did so by labeling objections to discharge as core proceedings
within the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. Further, Congress did not build any time constraints
into the statutory authorization. Rather, the time constraints are in the bankruptcy rules, which
do not create or withdraw jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the time limitations in the rules
are claim-processing deadlines that do not affect subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the
Court held that the time limit under Rule 4004 is not 'jurisdictional," without specifically
addressing whether the time deadline may be altered for equitable or other reasons. However,
the Court did find that a debtor may not raise the time limits contained in Rule 4004 after the
court had decided the merits of the underlying action. Any objection to the timeliness of the
complaint must have been raised in an answer or responsive pleading. The debtor failed to do
so, therefore forfeiting his right to raise it later.
In re Maughan, 340 F.3d 337 (6th eire 2003)
Here, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and
held that the deadlines for filing complaints objecting to discharge are not jurisdictional, but are
similar to statutes of limitations and are subject to the court's equitable powers.
The parties' relationship began when John Nardei purchased a coin business from Edwin
Maughan. Maughan convinced Nardei that he could increase his return on his investment by
trading the coins. Nardei gave Maughan his existing investment in gold coins plus additional
payments to buy more coins. It became clear that Nardei's investment was not being used to
purchase additional coins, but rather it was being used to buy jewelry for Maughan's retail
jewelry store. Nardei sued Maughan and obtained a judgment. Nardei filed for bankruptcy
protection.
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During the bankruptcy, the court set a deadline of October 19, 1998, as the deadline for
filing a complaint objecting to discharge. Nardei conducted a Rule 2004 exam of Maughan, but
Maughan did not bring all of the documents as requested. Nardei missed the deadline for filing
objections to discharge. On October 22, 1998, Nardei filed a motion for an extension of time to
file objections to discharge. The extension was granted and Nardei filed a complaint objecting to
discharge of the particular debt under § 523. Maughan appealed the bankruptcy court's decision
granting the extension. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed, holding that the deadline for
filing a complaint objecting to discharge was jurisdictional and not subject to the court's
equitable powers. The Sixth Circuit then reversed. Relying on its decision in In re Isaacman, 26
F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 1994), the Court held that the deadline is not jurisdictional. Rather, the rule is
a statute of limitation, or simply a deadline that is subject to the court's equitable powers.
In re Oyler, 300 H.R. 255 (HAP 6th Cir. 2003)
Here, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court's
decision discharging a debtor's student loan debt based on financial hardship.
The debtor, Michael Oyler, filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on September 9, 1999.
Oyler filed an adversary proceeding seeking to discharge approximately $38,000 in student loans
pursuant to § 523(a)(8). The student loans were obtained by Oyler to fund his education at a
theological seminary. Oyler was married and had three children. The family had an annual
income of less than $10,000. The bankruptcy court found that paying back the loans would
create an undue financial hardship and discharged the debt. The bankruptcy court considered
Oyler's current financial situation, the likelihood that the situation would continue, whether
Oyler exercised good faith, the ability of Oyler and his wife to obtain outside employment,
Oyler's lifestyle choice, and the use of the loans for the ministry.
In this appeal the loan servicer argued that the bankruptcy court erred by placing too
much weight on the fact that the loans were used for an education in the ministry (i.e., an
argument that the Debtor could seek another job). The court acknowledged that the Sixth Circuit
has adopted a three-prong analysis in determining whether undue hardship exists: (1) that the
debtor cannot maintain, based on current expenses and income, a minimal standard of living for
himself and his dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional circumstances are
present indicating that this situation is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment
period; and (3) that the debtor has made a good faith effort to repay the loans. The court held
that the bankruptcy court had properly considered all of the aforementioned factors in
discharging the debt.
In re Herdean (])emmitt & Owens Financial, Inc. v. Herdean), 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24849
(6th Cir. 2003) (Unpublished)
The Sixth Circuit affirmed a ruling by a Michigan bankruptcy court that a factoring debt
was dischargeable. The Sixth Circuit concluded that, while the bankruptcy court erred by
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holding that the creditor did not rely on the debtor's misrepresentations, the creditor's damages
did not result from that reliance.
The creditor was engaged in the practice of factoring and entered into a contract
permitting it to purchase Herdean's company's accounts receivable. As part of the agreement,
Herdean represented that he was aware of no deductions or setoffs that could reduce the amount
of these accounts receivable. When it became apparent that there were deductions and setoffs
that could be taken against these accounts receivable, the creditor and Herdean reached a new
"buy back" agreement that would allow the creditor to keep a larger portion of future receipts on
the Herdean accounts. Herdean also agreed to attempt to lower the deductions. However, the
deficiencies continued and the relationship ended.
In Herdean's later bankruptcy, the creditor sought a determination that the debt was not
dischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) as fraudulently obtained. The bankruptcy court found that
the creditor had not relied on the original representations and the debt was dischargeable. The
district court affirmed, as did the Sixth Circuit, but on different grounds. The Sixth Circuit found
that the creditor had relied on the debtor's original statements that no deductions existed.
However, the court found that the damages that the creditor sought arose after it was on notice of
debtor's fraud, as the damages were a result of its second contract to "buy back" the accounts
receivable. The creditor was deemed to have assumed the risk that the debtor might not be able
to prevent future deductions. The court concluded that no damages had resulted from the
debtor's misrepresentations. Therefore, the debt was held dischargeable.
c. Avoidance Actions
In re Bever, 300 H.R. 262 (HAP 6th Cir. 2003)
Here, the BAP for the Sixth Circuit affirmed an Ohio bankruptcy court's denial of a
creditor's motion to vacate the Chapter 7 trustee's sale of a residence back to the debtor.
The debtors filed their Chapter 7 case on February 7, 2001. On March 30, 2001, notice
was sent at the behest of the trustee of the need to file proofs of claim by July 2, 2001. The
schedules listed an $88,000 mortgage held by Old Kent Mortgage Company ("Old Kent") on
their residence, which they valued at $100,000. During the summer of 2001, Bank One
apparently acquired the mortgage from Old Kent',s successor. A second institution was listed in
the schedules as holding a second mortgage claim in the amount of approximately $20,000.
On September 18, 2001, the trustee filed an adversary proceeding against both
mortgagees seeking to avoid the asserted mortgages on the basis that only one witness was
present when the mortgages were executed. Summonses were served via certified mail. No one
responded. On January 10, 2002, the court entered default judgment avoiding the mortgages.
The trustee, after sending notice by regular U.S. mail on April 5, 2002, sold the property back to
the debtors for $15,000, a sum that paid all allowed claims in full.
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On September 9, 2002, fourteen months after the deadline for filing proofs of claim,
Bank One filed a proof of claim for $98,296.74. Bank One then filed a motion to vacate the sale.
Bank One's motion alleged that (1) the sale was not equitable; (2) service of the sale notice was
insufficient; and (3) the sale did not comply with due process. The bankruptcy court construed
the motion as one under FRCP 60(b) (applicable through Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
9024). The bankruptcy court held there was no support for a finding of excusable neglect under
Rule 60(b)(1) notwithstanding the mortgage assignment and that service of process had been
sufficient.
The BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. The court held that there w~s no
inequity in selling the residence for $15,000, because any windfall to the debtors was caused by
Bank One's failure to participate in the bankruptcy process and, since Bank One filed no timely
claim, the sale price was adequate to pay all allowed claims. Further, the Court held that service
of the sale notice was sufficient and did not need to meet the requirements of a sale free and clear
of liens. It concluded that, following the default judgment, Bank One did not have a lien on the
property. The BAP held that Bank One also lacked a property right sufficient to invoke the
protection of the Fifth Amendment or other rights associated with mortgagee status.
In re The V Companies, 292 H.R. 290 (HAP 6th eire 2003)
Here, the BAP for the Sixth Circuit upheld a bankruptcy court ruling granting derivative
standing to a creditor to pursue avoidance actions.
The jointly administered bankruptcy cases involved in this adversary proceeding were
originally filed under Chapter lIon January 7, 2000. The U.S. Trustee eventually moved for the
case to be converted to a Chapter 7. While that motion was pending, the Jefferson County Board
of Commissioners ("Board"), a creditor, sought leave to pursue certain avoidance actions against
defendants, including several insiders of the debtor companies. Leave was granted and the
action was filed. The case was later converted, and the Chapter 7 ·Trustee moved to be added as
a co-plaintiff.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the AP, arguing that the Board lacked standing
to pursue avoidance actions. The bankruptcy court denied the motion to dismiss but substituted
the trustee as the plaintiff. The defendants sought review.
The defendants argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Hartford Underwriters
Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 147 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2000) prevented non-trustees from
pursuing avoidance actions. In Hartford, the Supreme Court held that an administrative claimant
does not have independent standing to bring a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) and that entities
other than the trustee are not entitled to use § 506 (recovery from collateral of the reasonable and
necessary costs of preserving or disposing of it). The court held that Hartford was not
controlling because the Supreme Court specifically refused to extend its holding to the issue of
derivative standing. The court rejected the defendants' claim that Hartford overruled In re
Gibson Group, 66 F.3d 1436 (6th Cir. 1995), in which the Sixth Circuit held that a creditor could
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be granted leave to pursue avoidance actions under § 547 and § 548 if certain conditions were
met. The BAP held that Gibson remained good law and controlled this case. Under Gibson, a
bankiuptcy court may permit a single creditor in a Chapter 11 case to initiate an action to avoid a
preferential or fraudulent transfer instead of the debtor-in-possession if the creditor (1) has
alleged a colorable claim that would benefit the estate, if successful, based on a cost-benefit
analysis performed by the bankruptcy court; (2) has made a demand on the debtor-in-possession
to file the avoidance action; (3) the demand has been refused; and (4) the refusal is unjustified in
light of the statutory obligations and fiduciary duties of the debtor-in-possession in a Chapter 11
reorganization.
Based on Gibson, and a discussion of the reality that a trustee and debtor-in-possession
have the same powers, but frequently not the same interest to pursue avoidance actions, the BAP
concluded that the bankruptcy court properly granted the Board derivative standing to file the
adversary complaint against the defendants and affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss.
In re Hurtado, 342 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2003)
Here, the Sixth Circuit addressed whether the debtor's mother was an "initial transferee"
from whom the trustee could recover a fraudulent conveyance under 11 U.S.C. § 550. During a
time in which they had significant debts, Denise and John Rey Hurtado received two substantial
blocks of income. First, they received $83,247.93 in 1992 when they sold their house, and then
received $130,795.00 in 1995 when they settled a lawsuit. They transferred the money to
Barbara Hurtado (the mother of John Rey). She kept the funds and spent them at the direction of
the younger Hurtados. The money was used for their living expenses and the payment of certain
creditors. She kept the money separate from hers and never spent it on herself.·
The debtors filed a Chapter 7 proceeding on September 9, 1998 and were discharged on
December 15, 1998. The trustee filed a complaint to avoid the transfer, recover the funds and to
revoke the discharge (the debtors were eventually dismissed). The bankruptcy court granted
Barbara Hurtado's motion for summary judgment, finding that she did not have sufficient control
over the funds, was a mere conduit, and therefore could not be held liable. The district court
reversed, finding that Ms. Hurtado was liable as an initial transferee under 11 U.S.C. § 550. The
Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court noted that initial transferees are strictly liable for fraudulent
transfers they receive. However, an initial transferee must have dominion and control over the
funds. The Sixth Circuit found that Barbara Hurtado satisfied this test. She was given legal title
to the funds in order to insulate the debtors from creditors. Through this mechanism, the funds
could no longer be considered assets of the debtor. She could have done what she liked with the
funds; the fact that she did not was ofno import.
In re Lowe (Spradlin v. Inez Deposit Bank) 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26698 (6th Cir. 2003)
(Unpublished)
Here, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a residential mortgage made within 90 days of the
debtor filing for bankruptcy did not constitute a voidable preference under 11 U.S.C. § 547. The
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debtor refinanced and used the loan proceeds to purchase his ex-wife's interest in the residence
and to repay the balance owed to the mortgagee under a previous mortgage of the property. The
Sixth Circuit looked at whether the transfers to the ex-wife and to the prior mortgagee were on
account of antecedent debts and whether they increased the transferee's share of the bankruptcy
estate.
The borrower executed a new mortgage on June 30, 2000 and his right of rescission
expired July 5, 2000. The lender issued a check to the fonner wife on July 6, recorded its new
mortgage July 13, and paid off the original mortgage on July 14, 2000. The borrower then
promptly filed a Chapter 7 proceeding. The trustee sought to avoid the mortgage on the ground
that it secured an antecedent debt (i.e., the "transfer" occurred with the June 30, 2000 execution
of the mortgage but the mortgage was not perfected until July 13, 2000, outside the ten-day "safe
harbor" provision of § 547(e)(2)). The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to the
trustee, and the district court reversed, on the ground that it was an enabling (i.e., purchase
money) loan.
The Sixth Circuit affinned. It found that the transfer (i.e., the mortgage) was "made" at
the point at which it took effect, which was the date at which it became enforceable against the
debtor -- i.e., after the rescission right expired. Since the transfer was perfected in fewer than ten
days from that date, the transfer was deemed made as of that date. The court found that the debt
with relation to purchasing the ex-wife's interest was incurred on the date that the bank disbursed
the funds to her as the debtor had no duty to repay the loan until the funds were disbursed. Thus,
this debt was not antecedent.
With respect to repayment of the existing mortgage, the court concluded that the new
loan was simply substituted for the old one and, as such, was an antecedent debt. However, the
replacement mortgage did nothing to improve the bank's position because the previous loan was
secured by a mortgage on the residence. Thus, the court concluded that the mortgage transfer
still was not voidable under section 547(b).
In re Johnson (Johnson v. Medical Center at Bowling Green), 59 Fed. Appx. 768 (6th eire
2003) (Unpublished)
In this case, the court found that a wage garnishment did not constitute an avoidable
preference under Kentucky law because it was involuntary in nature. The Medical Center
received a default judgment against Mr. Johnson. An order of wage garnishment was issued on
the judgment, but Mr. Johnson later filed for bankruptcy protection. The garnishment occurred
within 180 days prior to the voluntary petition but outside the 90-day period prior to the petition.
The debtor challenged this garnishment as an impennissible preference under KRS § 378.060
and 378.070. The bankruptcy court ruled for the creditor, the district court affinned and the
Sixth Circuit did likewise. His insolvency during all relevant times was apparently not disputed.
Because Johnson was already insolvent at the time garnishment was instituted, he argued that a
presumption existed that he intended to create a wrongful preference. However, the court found
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that this presumption was sufficiently rebutted by the involuntary nature of the garnishment --
i.e., he did not intend that the transfer take place.
In re Burns (Suhar v. Burns) 322 F. 3d 421 (6th Cir. 2003)
Here, the Court ruled that a creditor whose mortgage lien had been avoided under 11
U.S.C. § 544 could not obtain a lien under 11 U.S.C. § 550, which provides certain protections to
entities from whom a trustee recovers property for the estate. The trustee avoided IMC's
mortgage on residential property on the ground that the execution of the mortgage was not
witnessed by two people, as required by Ohio law. IMC then sought a ruling that it was entitled
to a lien under various subsections of 11 U.S.C. § 550, which provide for certain good faith
transferors to have liens for the cost of improvements on property which the trustee recovers
from them -- on the theory that IMC or the entity which assigned the mortgage to it had paid off
a prior encumbrance. The bankruptcy court held that § 550 was not applicable at all because the
trustee had not recovered anything from the mortgagee. The Sixth Circuit BAP affirmed.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court stated, "avoidance and recovery are distinct
concepts and processes." The court found that "[t]he fact that avoidance and recovery are
distinct does not mean that avoidance cannot trigger recovery, but it does suggest that avoidance
need not always trigger recovery." It held that the remedy of recovery is only necessary where
avoidance is inadequate, unlike the situation in this case. The court concluded "that the language
of section 550, stating that the 'trustee may recover' property following avoidance 11 U.S.C. §
550 (emphasis added), is permissive rather than mandatory (the trustee 'must' recover) or
descriptive (the trustee 'thereby' recovers)." In the instant case "IMC's interest was preserved
by section 551 and returned to the estate under section 541. Recovery was not necessary because
the code itself provided for the interest's return to the estate." Where a creditor has a possessory
interest in the debtor's property, generally the trustee will have to pursue recovery since
avoidance would not bring the property into the estate's possession. However, when a creditor,
such as IMC, has a non-possessory interest, the trustee will not have to seek recovery generally.
The decision also discusses appeal time limitations issues in the context of amended
notices of appeal.
In re Tri-Citv Turf Club. Inc. (Spradlin v. Jarvis), 323 F. 3d 439 (6th Cir. 2003)
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding that a material
supplier's recovery of fabricated steel that it had provided to debtor was not a preferential
transfer. The court found that the debtor was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between
the material supplier and the general contractor working for the debtor. However, as a third-
party beneficiary, the debtor could only assert the rights available to its general contractor under
the contract. The contract between the general contractor and the supplier specified that the
general contractor was to make payment for the steel on delivery. However, following delivery,
the general contractor advised the supplier that payment would not be made and that the supplier
should reclaim. The court held the trustee failed to show that the general contractor, and thus the
E - 11
debtor, had any interest in the steel sufficient to establish that the steel would have been part of
the estate. Since the steel had never been part of the estate, its reclamation could not constitute a
preferential transfer.
In re Skeans. 2003 Hankr. LEXIS 693 (Hankr. E.D. Ky. 2003)
In this Chapter 7 proceeding, the court concluded that all-terrain vehicles ("ATVs") are
not motor vehicles, for purposes of a statutory requirement that a secured creditor's lien is
required to appear on the title of a motor vehicle.
The debtors gave the bank a security interest in two ATVs. The bank's liens were not
noted on either certificate of title, but the bank filed a UCC financing statement covering both
ATVs. The debtors filed their Chapter 7 petition on December 16, 2002. When the trustee
attempted to sell the ATVs, the bank objected, contending that it had a properly perfected
security interest in both ATVs, notwithstanding its failure to note the liens on the ATVs
certificates of title. The bank argued that the ATVs were excepted from the titling and lien
notation requirements set forth in the Kentucky Revised Statutes by virtue of being considered
"off-road vehicles."
The court considered the various titling and lien notation statutes (KRS 186.010 et seq.)
and ultimately decided that ATVs did not fit the definition of vehicle as set forth in KRS
186.010(8)(a). Because the ATVs were not vehicles the requirements of the titling statutes did
not apply, and the failure to note the liens on the certificates of title was not dispositive. The
court noted that the titling statutes were intended to regulate vehicles which travel over the
highways of the Commonwealth, and ATVs were not such vehicles. The court held that the
trustee could not sell the ATVs unless the sale price exceeded the amount of indebtedness
secured by the perfected lien in favor of the bank.
D. Exemptions/Property of the Estate
In re Adams. 302 H.R. 535 (HAP 6th eire 2003)
Here, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit held that the debtors'
retirement accounts were not necessarily excluded from their Ohio bankruptcy estate.
The debtors, Mr. And Mrs. Raymond Adams, each had an interest in a separate
retirement account. Both plans qualified as 26 U.S.C. § 403(b) tax-sheltered annuity pension
plans. Both had transfer restrictions that generally prevented the debtors from reaching the funds
until age 59'l2. The bankruptcy court held that both of the plans were excluded from the property
of the estate by § 541(c)(2) which provides that restrictions on the transfer of a beneficial interest
of the debtor in a trust which are enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy law are
enforceable in bankruptcy.
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The BAP reversed the bankruptcy court and remanded the action for further proceedings.
The BAP noted that the bankruptcy court failed to first determine whether a trust existed. The
debtors argued that any ERISA-qualified plan must be such a trust. The BAP rejected this
argument and held that there is nothing in either ERISA or the IRS Code that mandates such a
conclusion. The court noted that, while ERISA's trust requirements usually satisfy those of §
541(c)(2), ERISA exempts § 403(b) annuity plans from the ERISA trust requirements. Further,
the court noted that there is no statutory support in the Bankruptcy Code for the concept that, in
determining whether a trust was created, employee benefit plans are subject to less stringent
standards than other assets. The court found that it was not self-evident that these plans
constituted a trust. The court stated that there was no mention of a trust, there was no
appointment of a trustee, there were no formal grants in trust, and there was no direct
manifestation of any intent to create a trust in anyone.
Because the bankruptcy court decided that § 541(c)(2) issue in the context of overruling
the trustee's objection to the debtors' claims that the pension funds were exempt, having found
that the debtors failed to prove the funds were not property of the estate under § 541(c)(2), the
BAP remanded the matter to the bankruptcy court to consider remaining issues regarding
exemptions for the plans.
E. Jurisdiction
In Fe Hood, 319 F. 3d 755 (6th eire 2003)
In this case, the Sixth Circuit dealt with the abrogation of state sovereign immunity in the
context of the Bankruptcy Code. The court concluded that the Bankruptcy Clause granted
Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, which power Congress clearly
exercised in 11 U.S.C. § 106(a).
The debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, at which time she owed money on
student loans guaranteed by the Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation (TSAC). TSAC took
no action in the bankruptcy case, and Hood was granted a discharge. She later filed an adversary
proceeding requesting discharge of her educational loans on the grounds of undue hardship
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). TSAC moved to dismiss, asserting that the adversary
proceeding was barred by sovereign immunity. The bankruptcy court denied the motion to
dismiss, holding that 11 U.S.C. § 106 properly abrogated TSAC's sovereign immunity. The
BAP affirmed, and TSAC appealed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in a lengthy analysis of the
Bankruptcy Clause ofArticle I, Section 8 of the Constitution.
The court began its analysis by citing the conclusion of Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), that the Indian Commerce
Clause did not grant Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. "[T]he Eleventh
Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to
circumvent the constitutional imitations placed ufon federal jurisdiction." The Sixth Circuit
noted that five other circuits (3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th and 9t ) have concluded that, under Seminole Tribe,
Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity by relying on its Bankruptcy Clause
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powers. The Sixth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, based on an analysis of the grant by
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the power to establish "uniform" bankruptcy laws and
what the court deemed to be the intent of the framers that a constitutional uniformity requirement
gives the federal government exclusive jurisdiction of an issue and authorizes abrogation of state
sovereign immunity. Accordingly, TSAC was held not to be immune from suit under 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(8).
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral argument in March, 2004.
In re G.A.D., Inc. rEg/inion v. Lover) 340 F. 3d 331 (6th Cir. 2003)
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court had not abused its
discretion by denying a pro se litigant's motion to reconsider an order based upon FRCP 60(b)(I)
almost a year after the order was entered. Ms. Eglinton failed to meet the deadlines for a
response to a landlord's motion to dismiss her complaint against it, and a response to a motion to
remove her complaint to a related bankruptcy proceeding. The bankruptcy court dismissed her
claims. She then failed to file notice of appeal of the bankruptcy court's decision, but filed a
Rule 60(b) motion nearly a year later. The plaintiff claimed that the bankruptcy court lacked
jurisdiction to enter the order against her as her claim was not a core proceeding. However, the
court found that resolving this dispute would require examining the purported lease assignment
at issue and deciding if the transfer was valid as well as analyzing section 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code relating to executory contracts and unexpired leases. The court noted that, even if it had
decided the dispute was not a core proceeding, the untimeliness of her motion would defeat the
plaintiffs claims.
F. Attorneys
In re Airspecl Air, Inc., 288 B.R. 464 (BAP 6th Cir. 2003)
In this case, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit reversed an Ohio
bankruptcy court's reduction of the attorney fee due debtor's special counsel. The issue was
whether the prior approval of counsel's contingency fee agreement in an action against the
debtor's landlord was improvident under § 328.
Prior to 1993, Airspect Air, Inc. ("Airspect") entered into a long-term lease with the City
of Akron to operate a "fixed base operation" at the Akron-Fulton International Airport. Disputes
quickly arose regarding the terms of the lease and Airspect began withholding payments from the
City. In January 1993, Airspect became involved in litigation with the City over the terms of the
lease. In March, 1996, the debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition and the pending state court lease
dispute became an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court. The debtor's counsel in that
matter was approved as special counsel pursuant to a contingent fee arrangement under which
the fees started at 33%, if settled prior to trial. The lease at issue was subsequently deemed
rejected by operation of law, although ba~ptcy litigation continued concerning the City's
right to stay relief or not, given the value of leasehold improvements.
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Several years later, the litigation settled and the City paid Airspect $575,000 (based
largely on the value of the improvements) in exchange for Airspect vacating the premises. The
attorneys representing Airspect in the action against the states were to receive $189,750, or one-
third of the settlement. The debtor's sole shareholder objected. The bankruptcy court initially
held that the contingency agreement was invalid because the contingency had not been met and
awarded $37,050 as a "reasonable" fee under 11 U.S.C. § 330. The BAP reversed and remanded
the action to the bankruptcy court with instructions to review the fee application under § 328 and
award the contingent fee unless the initial approval was "improvident" in light of subsequent
events. On remand the bankruptcy court found that its approval of the fee agreement was
improvident, based on the rejection of the lease as an intervening factor. The BAP reversed
again, finding that the bankruptcy court's decision was clearly erroneous. In order to render a
decision improvident, the intervening factor must be one that would have affected the court's
decision in the first place. In this case the only intervening factor cited by the court was the
rejection of the lease by Airspect. That event was irrelevant to what the attorneys were doing in
pursuit of the lawsuit against the City. Airspect would have been entitled to damages whether
the lease was terminated or not. The decision contains a fairly detailed comparison of § 328 and
§ 330.
In re Big Rivers Electric Corporation, 355 F.3d 415 (6th eire 2004)
In this case the Sixth Circuit addressed the duties of disinterest and disclosure of an
examiner appointed to facilitate the reorganization of a Chapter 11 debtor. The court upheld the
lower court's decision requiring the examiner to disgorge nearly $1 million in fees paid to him
based on his failure to remain a disinterested party.
On September 26, 1996, Big Rivers Electric Corporation ("Big Rivers") filed the largest
Chapter 11 bankruptcy ever filed in Kentucky. The bankruptcy court decided an examiner
should be appointed and ordered the U.S. Trustee to select one. The order instructed the
Examiner to attempt to negotiate a global settlement. It did not specify the compensation. Big
Rivers had debt totaling $1.2 billion, of which approximately $1.1 billion was owed to the Rural
Utilities Service of the United States Department of Agriculture ("RUS"). Chase, Bank of New
York and Mapco (the "Banks") also had large unsecured claims.
In late 1996, the Examiner held meetings with the major secured and unsecured creditors
and discussed with them an arrangement under which they would pay him a percentage fee based
on the success he brought to the estate in the form of new value. The bankruptcy court later
entered an order providing for the Examiner's fees to be paid at an hourly rate.
Following additional communications between the Banks and the Examiner regarding his
fees, Big Rivers filed its proposed plan of reorganization. The Examiner then sought and
received the bankruptcy judge's approval, ex parte, to begin negotiating a percentage based fee
with the Banks, which he did. There were significant communications about the fee but the
discussions were not disclosed at that time.
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Later, he filed a request for payment of administrative expenses which explained that he
might seek $4.41 million in compensation based on new value he had brought into the estate.
While this disclosed his plan to seek a percentage-based fee, it did not disclose any agreement
with the Banks to have the fee paid directly by them. The bankruptcy court subsequently
confirmed a plan that included $147 million in new value for the creditors, in part because the
Examiner supported an auction of the assets, rather than the pre-petition deal the parties had
already struck.
The RUS and the U.S. Trustee later requested discovery into the Examiner's fee
arrangements. The extent of the negotiations with the individual creditors regarding
compensation, and the extent to which there actually was an agreement, were disputed. After the
Examiner filed his final fee application seeking $4.41 million in compensation, the U.S. Trustee
filed a motion to disgorge all of the Examiner's fees. The bankruptcy judge recused himself.
Another judge awarded the Examiner over $2.6 million, which covered his hourly compensation
plus an enhancement of four times that amount - to be paid by Big Rivers. The district court
affirmed the base compensation but reversed the enhancement. The district court remanded the
disgorgement issue to be considered by the bankruptcy court. The case was transferred to the
district court. After additional recusals, the case was assigned to Judge Avern Cohn of
Michigan. Judge Cohn granted the motion for disgorgement and ordered the Examiner to
disgorge all fees already paid to him, over $900,000.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, with an extensive discussion of the concept of
"disinterestedness." First, it held that the Examiner had violated his duty to remain disinterested.
It held that a single agreement with a creditor that linked the Examiner's compensation to the
amount recovered by the creditor qualifies as an interest because of the risk that the Examiner
will favor one creditor over another. It noted that whether an Examiner actually does anything
improper is irrelevant. The fact that he might disqualifies him. Second, the Court held that the
Examiner violated his disclosure obligations. Each time he filed interim fee applications he was
required to disclose all payments made or promised to him. He failed to disclose his agreements
or potential agreements with the creditors. Third, the court concluded that he violated his duty of
loyalty by his entering into an oral agreement with one of the Banks and by not fully disclosing
his actions to the Court and to the parties during his negotiations with the parties.
Having ,concluded that the Examiner violated his duties, the Court held that the
bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in ordering him to disgorge all fees paid to him.
The Court acknowledged that total disgorgement was a drastic sanction, but agreed that it was
appropriate, as "the price of disloyalty."
Laimie v. United States Trustee. 124 S. Ct. 1023 (2004)
Here, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of lower courts refusing to
award fees under § 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to an attorney who had not been formally
engaged in a Chapter 7 proceeding.
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Equipment Services, Inc. ("ESI") retained an attorney to prepare, file, and prosecute a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding on its behalf He did so, all the while representing ESI with
the approval of the court under § 327 of the Bankruptcy Code. Three months into the Chapter 11
proceeding, the United States Trustee filed a motion to convert the case to a Chapter 7
liquidation proceeding. The court granted the motion to convert and appointed a Chapter 7
trustee. This terminated ESI's status as a debtor-in-possession and the attorney's service under §
327. The attorney continued to provide services to ESI without the authorization of the trustee.
The attorney filed a fee application seeking compensation for the time he spent on ESI's behalf
after the conversion. The government objected arguing that the current version of § 330(a)(I)
makes no provision for the estate to compensate an attorney not authorized under § 327. The
court agreed and denied the attorney's fee application. He unsuccessfully sought reversal of the
decision at the district and court of appeals levels. Both courts concluded that the plain language
of § 330(a)(I) controlled and did not allow the attorney to recover. He then appealed to this
Court.
On appeal the attorney argued that the Court should look to the legislative history to
determine Congress' intent because the existing statutory language is ambiguous in light of its
predecessor. Before the 1994 amendment, § 330(a)(I) permitted an award to a "professional
person employed under section 327 ... or to the debtor's attorney." In contrast, the amendment
deleted the phrase "or to the debtor's attorney." He argued that the statutory language is facially
irreconcilable with other parts of the statute, thus making it ambiguous. Specifically, he argued
that § 330(a)(I)(A)'s reference to "attorney" is facially irreconcilable with section's first part
because, before the amendment, the lists were parallel. The Court rejected this argument. The
Court held that while the present statute is awkward and ungrammatical, that does not make it
ambiguous on the point at issue on this appeal. Subsection (A) allows compensation for services
rendered by four types of persons but, unless an applicant is in one the classes named in the first
part, the type of service is irrelevant. In addition, the Court held that the plain meaning of §
330(a)(I) does not lead to absurd results. Compensation remains available to attorneys through
various other methods.
In re Grieb Printing Company, Inc.! 297 H.R. 82 (Hankr. W.D. Ky. 2003)
Here, the court determined that an attorney had violated both ethical and statutory duties
as trustee by reason of his representation of an adverse party in a separate bankruptcy
proceeding. The court ordered that the attorney disgorge a portion of the compensation paid to
him and that he withdraw 'as trustee as well as counsel for both parties.
The debtor in this case filed its Chapter 7 petition on February 17, 1998. J. Baxter
Schilling was appointed Trustee, and then employed himself as the Trustee's attorney. In his
role as trustee, he filed a proof of claim on behalf of the Debtor company in the separate
bankruptcy of the Louisville Manufacturing Company, Inc. ("LMC Bankruptcy") in the amount
of$2,369.
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At approximately the same time, a principal of LMC contacted Mr. Schilling to represent
him with respect to a Rule 2004 Examination in the LMC bankruptcy. The attorney failed to
recall the Grieb estate, accepted representation of the LMC principal and ultimately was paid
approximately $11,000 by that client.
The LMC Bankruptcy Trustee and the U.S. Trustee challenged the representation. The
court determined that the attorney had a conflict of interest, however unintentional. The court
admonished the attorney for failing to have in place a formal method of reviewing current
representations to determine whether any new representation would present a conflict of interest.
The court noted that it had discretion in fashioning an appropriate sanction for the attorney's
conduct, and ordered the attorney to forfeit fees equal to the amount paid to him by the principal
in the LMC Bankruptcy. Finally, the court ordered the attorney to withdraw as trustee, as
counsel for the trustee, and as counsel for LMC's principal.
Schilling v. Smith. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16865 (W.D. Ky. 2003)
The United States District Court affirmed the bankruptcy court~s decision ordering the
trustee to disgorge all compensation paid to him.
Here, the trustee in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case hired himself as counsel for the purpose
of filing adversary proceedings. The trustee filed a complaint against the debtor objecting to
discharge and filed a complaint against the debtor's brother attempting to set aside a fraudulent
conveyance. The trustee then sought and was awarded interim attorney fees, in a reduced
amount. The trustee and the debtor subsequently entered into a settlement agreement that
resolved both adversary proceedings for payment to the estate of $50,000. One provision of the
settlement agreement required the debtor to support the trustee's request that the court reconsider
its previous order disallowing a portion of his fees. The trustee filed a second request for
attorney fees and, almost a year after the bar date, filed seven claims on behalf of unsecured
creditors. The bankruptcy court concluded that the trustee overreached and acted in his own self-
interest while preparing and tendering the settlement agreement. The court determined that he
used the settlement agreement to silence objections to his actions, to gamer support for his fees,
to eliminate the debtor as a potential beneficiary of the estate, and to attempt to recover
previously disallowed fees. Further, the bankruptcy court determined the trustee filed the late
claims for the purpose of distributing assets to non-filing claimants in breach of his duty to the
estate and the debtor as a party in interest. The bankruptcy court ordered that the trustee's fees
be reduced by 50% and later ordered the fees be disgorged in their entirety.
This court, on appeal, affirmed the decision and held that the trustee was not a
disinterested person as required by the bankruptcy code and affirmed the bankruptcy court's
order to disgorge fees.
G. Miscellaneous
Citizens Bank v. Alafabco. Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003)
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In this case the United Supreme Court held that certain debt-restructuring agreements
sufficiently involved interstate commerce to permit the invocation of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA).
In 1986 Citizens Bank ("Citizens") entered into a quasi-contractual relationship with
Alafabco, Inc. ("Alafabco") in which Citizens agreed to provide operating capital necessary for
Alafabco to secure and complete construction contracts. In 1998, Alafabco became delinquent in
repaying its existing obligations to Citizens. On two separate occasions the parties attempted to
resolve outstanding debts by executing renewal notes. Both renewal notes contained
functionally identical arbitration clauses. Following the second restructuring agreement,
Alafabco brought suit in an Alabama state circuit court alleging breach of contract and various
lender liability-type torts. The bank moved to compel arbitration, which the circuit court
ordered.
The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that the debt lacked sufficient
involvement with interstate commerce and thus the FAA did not apply. Specifically, that court
held that there was no showing that any part of the debt was actually attributable to interstate
transactions; that the funds comprising that debt originated out of state; or that the debt was
inseparable from any out-of-state projects.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. It held that the Alabama court misapplied the FAA's
reference to contracts evidencing transactions "involving commerce," which is broader than "in
commerce." The Supreme Court held that "involving commerce" was the functional equivalent
of "affecting commerce" and was to be interpreted so as to signal the broadest permissible
exercise of Congress' commerce clause power. The Court held that the restructuring agreements
were well within Congress' commerce clause based on three reasons: 1) Alafabco was engaged
in business all throughout the southeastern United States using substantial loans from Citizens;
2) the debt was secured by all of Alafabco's business assets, including its inventory of goods
assembled from out-of-state parts and raw materials; and 3) the general practice of commercial
lending greatly affects interstate commerce.
Barnes v. Community Trust Bank. Ky. ADD. 121 S.W. 3d 520 (2003)
Here, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment granted to
Community Trust Bank ("Community Trust") for a deficiency following the repossession and
sale of a 1992 Toyota pickup under a retail installment contract. The action was filed by
Community Trust five and a half years after it had repossessed and sold the truck.
The question raised on appeal was whether the statute of limitations set forth in KRS
355.2-725 (Kentucky's adoption of § 2-725 of the UCC) operated to bar Community Trust's
action. KRS 355.2-725 provided that any action for breach of a contract for the sale of goods
must be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued.
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Barnes argued that the statute barred Community Trust's action. Community Trust
countered and argued that 355.2-725 did not apply to the sale of a motor vehicle, but that instead
the 15-year statute applicable to written contracts applied. Community Trust relied on the
definition of goods set forth in KRS 371.210, which excludes motor vehicles. The Court
determined that 371.210 applied only to the sale of consumer goods and therefore did not apply
to motor vehicles. However, the court also noted that the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Retail
Installment Sales Act (KRS 190.090 et seq.) did not provide a remedy for an aggrieved seller or
seller's assignee.
The court determined that the vehicle was a "good" under the UCC and the four-year
statute of limitations applied and barred Community Trust's action.
In re Robinson (Robinson v. Champagne Landmark), 330 F. 3d 834 (6th Cir. 2003)
The Sixth Circuit denied a pro se petition for rehearing of the court's prior decision
affirming a bankruptcy court ruling that the debtor had not timely filed a proper motion to vacate
or modify an arbitration decision and, therefore, the claim based on such decision would be
allowed. The debtor claimed that since the creditor had filed an application to confirm the
arbitration in state court and that the debtor had answered and counterclaimed to vacate the
arbitration award, the court should deem that he did properly object to the award. However, the
record was inadequate and conflicting. The court stated that it was unable "to divine the
existence of actions that the record and briefs do not reflect and that counsel agree at oral
argument have not occurred." The court stated that even if a proper motion to vacate had been
filed, the court would nevertheless affirm allowance of the claim because no basis for vacating
the arbitration award had been shown.
In re Brookover, 352 F.3d 1083 (6th Cir. 2003)
Here, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the power to accept the voluntary
resignation of a standing Chapter 12 Trustee is vested solely in the United States Trustee
("UST") and does not require approval by the bankruptcy court.
This case involved three cases filed under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code. The
trustee for each case was Michael V. Demczyk ("Demczyk"). In October 2000, Demczyk
tendered his resignation as standing trustee to the United States Trustee ("UST"). The UST sent
a letter to Demczyk and the Court accepting his resignation. On November 28, 2000, tp.e
bankruptcy court issued an order in all three cases requiring court approval to effectuate
Demczyk's resignation. The UST filed a motion to reconsider; it was denied. The UST
appealed to the District Court; it affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision.
The question presented on appeal was who has the power to accept the voluntary
resignation of the Chapter 12 Trustee, the UST or the Court. The Court held that the authority to
accept the voluntary resignation of a bankruptcy trustee is vested entirely within the purview of
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the UST's congressionally conferred authority. Further, the Court held that the law does not
require the UST to submit the decision to the bankruptcy court for approval.
In re Fowler, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 67 (E.D. Ky. 2004)
Here, the bankruptcy court denied the debtor's husband's motion to recuse the
bankruptcy judge for being "biased and prejudiced" against him. The debtor was once married
to Frederick Damron. During their divorce, a state court awarded the debtor real property and a
vehicle. Damron appealed that order all the way to the United States Supreme Court where his
petition for a writ of certiorari was denied.
Damron then attempted to file claims concerning the property in this bankruptcy action,
and filed more than twenty motions attempting to stop the sale of the property in which he
continued to claim an interest notwithstanding the ruling in the divorce proceeding. The court
imposed sanctions of $1,000 plus attorney fees, but Damron continued to file motions. The
Trustee then filed a second motion for sanctions, at which time Damron filed a motion to recuse
the judge. The court discussed both the standards for recusal and a judge's duty not to recuse
~ased on irrational and unsupported allegations and accusations. The court denied the motion.
In re Behlke (Behlke v. Eisen) 358 F 3d 429 (6th eire 2004)
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision dismissing the voluntary
Chapter 7 petition for "substantial abuse" under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).
The debtors filed a "no asset" Chapter 7 proceeding. The trustee moved to dismiss on the
ground that granting a discharge would constitute a substantial abuse of the Code because the
debtors had disposable income that could be used to pay creditors. The stipulated facts in the
case showed that debtor husband made voluntary monthly contributions of $460 to his employer
sponsored 401(k) plan. The bankruptcy court noted that substantial abuse can be based on a lack
of honesty or a want of need. It included the 401(k) contributions in disposable income, found
an ability to pay from future income and concluded that the debtors were not needy. The debtors
appealed. The BAP and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
First, the Sixth Circuit held that dismissals under § 707(a) and (b) were reviewable under
an abuse of discretion standard as they are equitable determinations. With respect to the
propriety of the dismissal, the court followed prior Sixth Circuit precedent which held that the
most important factor to be considered in the "neediness" determination is the debtor's ability to
repay debts from future earnings, which alone could be sufficient to warrant dismissal. The
court rejected the debtors' argument that substantial abuse required evidence of unfair dealing or
bad faith. The court also rejected the debtors' argument that it was error to include the 401(k)
contributions in disposable income. The court noted that one way to determine ability to pay is
to consider whether the debtors could fund a Chapter 13 plan. The court held that the retirement
contribution was "disposable" because it was not necessary for "maintenance or support" of the
debtors or their dependents, and the bankruptcy court's finding that they could fund a Chapter 13
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plan -- with the anticipated retirement contributions -- would not be reversed as an abuse of
discretion.
III. BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION UPDATE
"Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention And Consumer Protection Act" (H.R. 975) (as of
March 25, 2004)
Passed by House in 2003. Not passed by Senate (abortion language dispute).
Senate passed non-controversial extension of Chapter 12 (family farmers), and
House has voted to combine it with main legislation.
House GOP attempting to move legislation to conference in the Senate, even
though Senate has not voted.
Legislation could go to Senate floor for vote or to conference.
IV. SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT
The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act was enacted December 19, 2003 and applies to
cases not final as of the enactment. Formerly known as the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C. App. 501 et seq.), the Act is designed to protect service members from
certain occurrences while they are on active military duty. Its principal features of interest to
lenders include:
Protection of service members from default judgments through use of
plaintiffs affidavits, posting of bonds, ability to obtain stays and ability to have such
judgments set aside;
Protection of service members through availability of stays in proceedings of
which they have notice and stays of execution;
Abatement of certain contractual fines and penalties;
Exclusion of military service periods for calculation of certain statutes of
limitation and redemption periods;
Forgiveness of interest in excess of 6%, on service members' notification of
lender;
Certain eviction protections;
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Protection from breaches of contracts including for purchase and lease of
vehicles;
Delay of foreclosure proceedings and permitted termination by the lessee of
real property leases and vehicle leases;
Protections that "may" be extended by a court to persons secondarily liable;
Protections against waiver (service members and persons secondarily liable
may waive certain rights but only effective if waiver is in writing and executed during or
after the military service); and
Protection from adverse insurance and credit decisions based on exercise of
rights under the act.
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Check Clearing in the 21st
Century Act
• Overview of the legislation
[]Signed on October 28,2003 with an effective
date of October 28, 2004
• Consideration of Legal Risk
..:.:.......
·::·.!It.~MI?:
Major Provisions: Substitute
Checks
• Substitute Check:
c Act establishes a new negotiable instrument
Act is silent about electronic exchange (would still
require an agreement)
• Substitute check is a paper reproduction of the
original check and can be processed just like the
original check
Must be MICR encoded and machine readable
r:~1 Must include an image of the front and back of the
original check
c Must meet industry standards for substitute checks
F - 1
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Scope
• Definitions
[Jsubstitute check (§3(16»
[J reconverting bank (§ 3(15»
Scope
• The term "substitute check" means a paper
reproduction of the original check that -
[] accurately represents all of the information on
the front and back of the original check;
f] bears a MICR line containing all the
information appearing on the MICR line of the
original check, except as provided under
generally applicable industry standards for
substitute checks to facilitate the processing
of substitute checks;
Scope
oconforms, in paper stock, dimension, and
otherwise, with generally applicable industry
standards for substitute checks; and
o is suitable for automated processing in the
same manner as the original check."
• Image statement will not qualify
• Copies in courier envelopes will not qualify
• No agreement needed to transfer a legally
equivalent substitute check
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Substitute Check Design
,t' [10000 if; 51JO.11
.··OOOOD' .1.BJ.····sO.O.·'
I
.DAtrFl.· .12,....2(J(J/
dS·.003St510
~".,~ .,.,
Rft.l'~"l.~.~.· •••~.d •••~
RirltnlQtll~ VA :J·~61
.lllllll Q~SI",III,
113N. ·E.lm$b~IQt.
Rldtn'Qtul*'f~lZ,.,Z,Z'
':05.000·38'11: as .G,.. ilta .~.~II· ~·oa2
.l\lmnn IDtJlNQJt
-":0 5 .OOO:i8 £i1:28(;lt.a .ti·2.Jt' .0 '~2
- •~ • "~-'<~~'P ~-- ~, ¥'- • 'pi tOO bOLLA.
Pl\'t~ro'fBEOO~OF d~""~,,,,, ,,,-,,,~ ~,,~<,,~ ~,~.
,..........
0..-.
Ot(')
~,..~
oo~
~w
~r-...o ..'0
~.~
~..,......
·bi. {Q
0·\('\o ..('J
0·(""';·r-*o
N
r-'l'
"'-t
*0510001133*
09118/200·1
1112003155102116
This is s, legal cOPJofyour
check, YoutnayuseilUle
satnewayyou \VOwd use th.e
original check.
~
c..:>
~
~
Substitute Check Desi n
........
Substitute Check Design
i
Substitute Check Design
. ~l~t~~){
·11'" '. ':;,fmlf:11MIHi..
Major Provisions: Reconverting
Bank
• The term "reconverting bank" means -
o the bank that creates a substitute check; or
[] if a substitute check is created by a nonbank,
the first bank that transfers or presents such
substitute check.
• If you agree to allow your depositors to create
substitute checks, you are still considered the
reconverting bank, because you will fall within the
second prong.
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Basic Principles
• No Agreement Between Banks Required:
(] A person may deposit, present. or send a substitute check for
collection or return as long as the reconverting warranties under
the Act are made. (§ 4(a».
• If certain conditions are met, the substitute check is
deemed to be the legal equivalent of the original check
for all purposes. (§ 4(b»
(] accurately represents all information on front and back of the
original check at the time the original check was truncated
f.l bears a legend on legal equivalence
• The Act cannot be modified by agreement (§ 14), except
for the part of the Act dealing with recredit procedures
between banks. (§ 8)
Major Provisions: What Law
Applies?
• Existing check law applies if:
L] Substitute check is legal equivalent of original
[J Existing law is not inconsistent with Check 21 (§ 13)
L! For example:
• UCC Articles 3 and 4:
UCC warranties
u Midnight deadline
Charge customer only if property payable
• Federal Reserve Board's Regulation CC
(ExPedited Funds Availability Act)
Check Clearing in the 21 st
Century Act
Check 21 Work Flow
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New Obligations, Warranties
and Indemnities
• Obligations of a Reconverting Bank
[] identify itself on substitute check and preserve
any previous reconverting bank identification
(§ 4(d»
o ensure that the substitute check bears all
previous endorsements (whether in electronic
form or otherwise) (§ 4(c»
Major Provisions: New
Obligations, Warranties ~nd
Indemnities
• All of the warranties, indemnities and recredit
rights created under C21 start at the
"reconverting" bank as opposed to the bank that
imaged the items (unless they are the same
entity) (§5, §4)
Cl If you are a reconverting bank, you witllikely need to
revise any agreements about electronic collection or
presentment so that C21liability falls appropriately
New Obligations, Warranties
and Indemnities
• New Substitute Check Warranties
CJ Reconverting and all subsequent banks warrant: The
substitute check meets all of the requirements of legal
equivalency (§ 5(1»
• accurately represents all of the information on the front and
back of the original check as of the time at which the original
check was truncated; and
• bears the legend: "This is a legal copy of your check. You
can use it the same way you would use the original check."
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New Obligations, Warranties
and Indemnities
• New Substitute Check Warranties
o Future Conditions: No depositary bank, drawee,
drawer or endorser will be asked to make payment
based on a check it has already been paid (no double
debit). (§ 5(2»
o Warranties "run with the check"
o Warranties run regardless of whether warrantee
receives the substitute check
New Obligations, Warranties
and Indemnities
• New Substitute Check Warranties: To whom are
they made? (§ 5)
o the transferee, any subsequent collecting or returning
bank, the depositary bank, the drawee, the drawer,
the payee, the depositor, and any endorser
o theory is to put customer in same position as if he or
she had received the original check
-I'··· ··.tlllliit'i
New Obligations, Warranties
and Indemnities
• New Indemnity (§ 6):
[J A reconverting bank and each bank that SUbsequently
transfers, presents or returns a substitute check and
receives consideration
indemnifies the transferee, any subsequent collecting
or returning ban~, the depositary bank, the drawee,
the drawer, the payee, the depositor, and any
endorser
to the extent of any loss incurred by any recipient of a
substitute check if that loss occurred due to the
receipt of a substitute check instead of the original.
F-S
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New Obligations, Warranties
and Indemnities
• New Indemnity: Limits
[] The amount of the indemnity (§ 6(b» depends
on whether there was a substitute check
warranty breach
• No warranties breach:
o the amount of any loss (up to the amount of the
substitute check) plus interest and expenses
• Warranty Breach:
fJ the amount of any loss (including costs and expenses)
proximately caused by the breach.
New Obligations, Warranties
and Indemnities
• New Indemnity: limits
[J Comparative negligence principles apply (§ 6 (c»
• but comparative negligence provision does not reduce the
rights of any party under the UCC or other applicable law
o Production of original check or copy sufficient to
determine whether a claim is valid (§ 6(d»
• liability is limited to losses incurred up to the time the original
check or copy was provided
• indemnifying party has the right to the return of any payment
made under the indemnity in excess of this liability
• production d the check or copy does not absolve the bank
from liability on a warranty
New Obligations, Warranties
and Indemnities
• Damages for breach of a substitute check
warranty or failure to comply with a requirement
of the Act (§ 10)
CJ Except as provided in section 6 (indemnity claim),
• the lesser of the amount of the loss suffered as a result of the
breach or failure or the amount of the substitute check, plus
• interest and expenses including attorney's fees
Comparative negligence principles apply
• but comparative negligence provision does not reduce the
rights of any party under the UCC or other applicable law
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New Obligations, Warranties
and Indemnities
• New expedited recredit right for consumers (§ 7)
(on top of UCC 4-401/4-406)
consumer may claim a recredit of a charge to the consumer's
account if the consumer asserts item is not properly payable or
there is a breach of C21 warranty, the substitute check was
provided to the consumer, and the original or better copy is
needed to resolve claim
u request must be made within a 40-day period from date bank
mails or delivers relevant statement or date substitute check is
made available to customer
recredit must be given if the bank does not provide the original
check, a substitute check or copy and demonstrate that the
substitute check was properiy charged to the account
_ .. :t···
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New Obligations, Warranties
and Indemnities
• New expedited recredit for consumers:
What must bank do?
oTiming of Recredit (§ 7(c))
• If claim is valid: no later than the end of the
business day following the business day on which
the bank determines the consumer's claim is valid
.If investigation takes longer than 10 days:
up to $2,500 recredit by the 10th business day after ctaim
remainder of claim by the 45th calendar day
C1 plus interest (in both cases) for interest-bearing account
• New Obligations, Warranties
and Indemnities
• New expedited recredit right for consumers
Avaitability (§ 7(d»
• recredited funds must be made available for withdrawal on
the next business day after the day of recredit
• Except that availability of a recredit made pending a
determination can be delayed until the 45th calendar day
following the business day on which the claim was submitted
for
new accounts (less than 30 days old)
[; repeated overdrafts (negative balance on 6 or more days
during past 6 months)
[1 prevention of fraud losses (reasonable grounds to believe claim
is fraudulent)
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New Obligations, Warranties
and Indemnities
• New expedited recredit right for
consumers
ciA bank may reverse a recredit if it (§ 7(e»:
• determines substitute check was properly payable
and
• notifies the consumer
New Obligations, Warranties
and Indemnities
• New expedited recredit right for banks (§ 8)
o Variable by agreement
o Similar rules to those of consumers except:
• claim is made against an indemnifying bank
• triggered by a consumer recredit claim
• longer period to submit claim (120 days after
transaction)
• if a copy of a substitute check is submitted as part
of claim, claimant must take steps to ensure that it
will not be mistaken as an actual live item
New Obligations, Warranties
and Indemnities
• New expedited recredit right for banks
Similar rules to those of consumers except:
• indemnifying bank must provide original check or sufficient
copy or recredit within 10 business days
• alternatively, indemnifying bank can indicate why it is not
required to produce check or recredit
• if the indemnifying bank produces the original check (or
sufficient copy), it is entitled to a repayment of the amount of
any recredit less any losses covered by the indemnity that
were incurred up until the time that the original (or copy) is
provided (example, losses caused by wrongful dishonor due
to paying a substitute check that was not property payable)
• claimant bank has refund obligation if it recovers from its
customer
F - 11
Major Provisions: Consumer
Notices
• Notices related to expedited recredit claims:
[] Claim found invalid
o Recredit given or reversed
• General notice
o Describing how substitute check is legal equivalent
and consumer recredit rights
[J Given to customers who get checks back
• Existing customers: first mailing after effective date
• New customers: at time relationship is initiated
[J Board to publish model language
Other Provisions
• Delays for emergency (§ 9)
• Statute of limitations (1 year) and notice of
daims (§ 11)
• Consumer awareness (§ 12)
• Regulations (§ 15)
[] Board of Governors authorized to promulgate
regulations that "implement, prevent circumvention or
evasion of, and facilitate compliance with the
provisions of the Act
[J Proposed regulations pubtished by Federal Reserve
12/22103 - comment period ended on 3/12104 -106
comment letters received by Fed
Other Provisions
• C21: The Board of Governors must study (§ 16)
among other things:
[J the appropriateness of the time periods and amount
limits applicable under EFAA and report to Congress
within 30 months from effective date of C21 Act
• EFAA: Already requires the Board of
Governors:
o to reduce the statutory schedules for any category of
checks where most of those checks would be
returned in a shorter period of time than provided in
the schedules.
F· 12
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Consideration of Legal Risk
• Fair degree of uncertainty as to how the Act will
work from a legal perspective
• Legal Risk Analysis - All Banks:
o Substitute check warranties and indemnity - completely
new
[.1 Expedited Recredit Right/Indemnity
• some drawers may demand original to obtain float
• loss of information on original item
• new fraud risk
• increased litigation costs
Consideration of Legal Risk
• What do banks need to do?
o Consumer Awareness Notices
• Allocate liability under electronic exchange agreements
• Renew quality control procedures
• Consider loss of information
• MICR repair
• comparative negligence
o Other Liability?
• Losses caused by failure to identify reconverting bank
• Losses due to a failure to show prior endorsements
Consideration of Legal Risk
• Unintended Consequences under UCC 3/4
[} multiple holders in due course
• unknowable number of copies that are "the check" and all
can be held by HOC
[,1 Price v. Neal
merger and suspension and discharge
• how do the traditional rules work?
o Standards of care
• Does good faith change?
• Does handling an item with ordinary care change?
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Check 21 - The Benefits
• Removes legal barriers to truncation
• Reduces dependence on physical
transportation
• Encourages (but does not authorize) check
"electronification"
• Retains customers' ability to receive canceled
checks
• Positions the banks to provide new and
improved services to customers
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FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 229
Regulation CC; Docket No. R-1176
Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks
AGENCY: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
SUMMARY: The Board of Govemors is publishing for comment proposed amendments
to Regulation CC that would add a new subpart D, with commentary, to implement the
recently-enacted Check Clearing for the 21 st Century Act. These proposed amendments
(1) would set forth the requirements of the Act that apply to banks, (2) provide a model
disclosure and model notices relating to substitute checks, and (3) set forth indorsement
requirements and truncating bank and reconverting bank identification requirements for
substitute checks. The proposed amendments also would clarify some existing provisions
of the rule and commentary.
DATES: Comments on the proposed rule must be received by March 12, 2004.
ADDRESSES: Comments should refer to docket number R-1176 and should be
addressed to Ms. Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. Comments may be mailed to 20th Street and Constitution Avenue,
N.W., Washington, D.C., 20551; faxed to the Office of the Secretary at 202/452-3819 or
202/452-3102; or mailed electronically to regs.comments@federalreserve.gov. Because
paper mail at the Board of Governors is subject to delay, please consider submitting your
comments by fax or e-mail. Members of the public may inspect comments in accordance
with the Board's Rules Regarding the Availability of Information (12 CFR part 261) in
Room MP-500 of the Martin Building on weekdays between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jack K. Walton, II, Assistant Director
(202/452-2660), or Joseph P. Baressi, Senior Financial Services Analyst (202/452-3959),
Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems; or Stephanie Martin,
Associate General Counsel (202/452-3198), or Adrianne G. Threatt, Counsel (202/452-
3554), Legal Division; for users of Telecommunication Devices for the Deaf (TDD) only,
contact 202/263-4869.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
I. The Needfor and General Provisions ofthe Check 21 Act.
Under current law, a bank that presents a check for payment must present the
original paper check unless the paying bank has agreed to accept presentment from the
collecting bank in some other form. 1 Sections 3-501(b)(2) and 4-110 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (V.C.C.) specifically authorize banks and other persons to agree to
alternative means of presentment, such as electronic presentment. However, to truncate
checks early in the collection process and engage in broad-based electronic presentment,
a collecting bank would need electronic presentment agreements with each bank to which
it presents checks. This has proven impracticable because of both the large number of
paying banks and the unwillingness of some paying banks to receive electronic
presentment.2 As a result of the difficulty in obtaining the agreements necessary to
present checks electronically in all cases, banks have not been able to take full advantage
of the efficiencies and potential cost savings of handling checks electronically.
The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (the Check 21 Act or the Act)
facilitates the broader use of electronic check processing without mandating that any
bank change its current check collection practices.3 The Check 21 Act accomplishes this
by authorizing the use of a new negotiable instrument called a substitute check. A
substitute check is a paper reproduction of an original check that contains an image of the
front and back of the original check and is suitable for automated processing in the same
manner as the original check. A bank that for consideration transfers, presents, or returns
a substitute check (or another paper or electronic representation of a substitute check)
warrants that (1) the substitute check contains an accurate image of the front and back of
the original check and a legend stating that it is the legal equivalent of the original check,
and (2) no depositary bank, drawee, drawer, or indorser will be asked to pay a check that
it already has paid. A substitute check for which a bank has made these warranties is the
legal equivalent of the original check for all purposes and all persons.
Allowing a substitute check that is subject to the substitute check warranties to be
the legal equivalent of an original check should facilitate the use of electronics in the
check collection process. For example, a depositary bank in California that receives a
check drawn on a bank in New York now must present the original paper check for
payment absent an agreement to the contrary, even if the California bank has agreenlents
1 See,~, § 3-501(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code.
2 Some paying banks and bank customers prefer to receive checks in paper fonn for
operational or other reasons.
3 Pub. L. No. 108-100, 117 Stat. 1177 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5018). The
Check 21 Act was enacted on October 28, 2003, and takes effect on October 28,2004.
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to collect checks electronically with other banks in the collection chain for that check.
Under the Check 21 Act, by contrast, the California bank could transfer check
infonnation electronically to a collecting bank in New York with which it had an
agreement to do so. The New York collecting bank then could create a substitute check
to present to the New York paying bank. The New York paying bank would be required
to accept a substitute check that met all the legal equivalence requirements. Thus, instead
of processing and transporting the original check across the country, the California bank
could collect the substitute check using only local New York transportation.
The Check 21 Act does not require any bank to use electronic check processing,
receive electronic presentment, or create substitute checks, nor would the Check 21 Act
make electronic check images or electronic check infonnation the legal equivalent of
original checks. However, after the effective date of the Check 21 Act, any bank or other 1"1
person that requires an original check must accept a legally equivalent substitute check in
satisfaction of that requirement. The characteristics of a substitute check are such that a .~
bank that receives a substitute check would be able to process that substitute check to the
same extent that it could process the original check. As a result, for the most part, banks
would not be required to change their check processjng eqJJlpment or practices because of
t!le Check 21 Act, and there would be no need for a bank to sort ori~inal checks and
substitute checks separately during the check collection process.4
.k Certain provisions of the Check 21 Act will affect all banks, even those that do
~ not choose to create substitute checks. For example, a bank that simply received a
substitute check created by another bank, or a paper or electronic representation of a
substitute check, would make the substitute check warranties when it delivered that item
for presentment, collection, or return or provided that item I to its customer. 111 1 Itl
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4 However, as described in more detail in the section-by-section analysis, a bankEust
place a "5" in position 44 of the MICR line of a qualified returned substitute che k, as
opposed to a "2" that is required in that position for a qualified returned original heck.
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would be the first bank to transfer the substitute check (\iN 'I J.. I· iii] I.UI2IPI~ A bank _ J, I?t.
that paid a warranty claim or provided an indemnity or expedited recredit for a SUbstitutet~rJlv
check that it received from another bank therefore could, in tum, bring a warranty, r II
indemnity, or interbank expedited recredit claim against the bank that transferred the
substitute check to it and thereby pass the associated loss back to the responsible party.6 . # V
II £1 111. til inra HIF ..I~jjei.li!I_i8IPIDIIIII .•_illlbn.1z; A
reconverting bank must identify itself as such on a substitute check and must preserve the
indorsements of parties that previously handled the check in any fonn. The reconverting
bank will be the first bank to provide the substitute check warranties and the first bank in
the chain of indemnifying banks, and thus ultimately should bear anrloss traceable to a
problem that existed as of the time the substitute check was created.
II. Overview ofNew Subpart D and Associated Amendments to Subpart A.
iI•••••••••·'tV'ould incorporate into Regulation CC the
requirements of the Check 21 Act that affect banks that create or receive substitute
checks or paper or electronic representations of substitute checks. Subpart D therefore
would contain provisions concerning requirements a substitute check must meet to be the
legal equivalent of an original check, reconverting bank duties, the warranties and
indemnity associated with substitute checks, expedited recredit procedures for consumers
and banks, liability for violations of subpart D, the interaction between subpart D and
existing federal and state laws, and the consumer awareness disclosure and other notices
regarding substitute checks.
The proposed amendments to implement the Check 21 Act also affect some
existing provisions of Regulation CC and its commentary. For example, the Board
proposes to amend the authority and scope section, § 229.1, to acknowledge the Check 21
Act as an authority source and to describe subpart D. The Board also proposes to
supplement some existing defined tenns in § 229.2 for which the Check 21 Act has
slightly different definitions and to define several new terms used in subpart D. _ .•
,.. - ...'
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5 A reconverting bank is (1) the bank that creates a substitute checks or (2) the first bank
that receives a substitute check created by a person that is not a bank and transfers either
that substitute check or a paper or electronic representation of that substitute check.
6 Banks may further allocate liability amongst themselves as part of their agreements to
handle checks electronically. A reconverting bank therefore could, by agreement, pass
back some or all of its loss associated with paying a warranty or indemnity to the bank
that sent the check to it electronically.
7 But see footnote 6.
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III. Other Amendments to Existing Provisions.
The Board also proposes revisions to several other provisions of Regulation CC
and its commentary. These changes generally either respond to enquiries that Board staff
has received or respond to changed circumstances affecting the relevant provision. For
example, the Board proposes amending the commentary to clarify that a returned check
notice need not be written, c••••IlliIiliIlil.Ilili1••••••••••••
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..~coM~~d~clo~resreq~redby
y which a paying bank may extend the return or
Section-by-Section Analysis
The section-by-section analysis discusses the proposed commentary to each
section in the course of discussing the proposed regulatory text.
I. Amendments to Implement the Check 21 Act.
A. Section 229.1 Authority and Scope.
The Board proposes to amend § 229.1 to include the Check 21 Act as an
additional source of authority and to describe briefly the scope of new subpart D with
respect to substitute checks.
B. Section 229.2 Definitions.
The Board proposes two types ofamendments to this section. First, the Board
proposes to amend some existing defined terms to account for differences between those
definitions and the definitions required by the Check 21 Act.8 Second, the Board
proposes to define new tenns used in subpart D.
1. Amendments to Existing Definitions.
The Board proposes to reword the existing introductory sentence and move into
that sentence the text ofexisting § 229.2{qq), which provides that terms not defined in
§ 229.2 have the meanings set forth in the V.C.C.
a. Account. The Check 21 Act defines the term account to mean any deposit
account at a bank and therefore is much broader than the existing definition in § 229.2(a),
which essentially is limited to accounts that permit frequent transfers and withdrawals.
The Board therefore proposes to amend the account definition. to state that the existing
definition applies except for purposes of subpart D. The Board proposes a new paragraph
defining the term account for purposes of subpart D and, in connection therewith,
8 Some terms are defined identically in existing Regulation CC and the Check 21 Act,
such that no amendments are necessary.
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subpart A, to mean any deposit, as defined at § 204.2(a)(1)(i) ofRegulation' D, at a bank.
The Board also proposes to amend the commentary to the account definition to
incorporate these changes and to highlight that many deposits that are not accounts for
purposes of subparts Band C would be accounts for purposes of subpart D.
b. Bank. The Check 21 Act defines bank to include all of the entities currently
defined as banks by § 229.2(e), plus the United States Treasury and the United States
Postal Service to the extent that those entities act as payors. The Board proposes to
amend the existing definition and its commentary to incorporate the broader definition of
bank for purposes of subpart D. For internal consistency, the Board proposes substituting
the phrase "paying bank" where the Check 21 Act used the term "payor."
c. Check. The Check 21 Act's definition of check is the same as the definition in
existing § 229.2(k) that applies to subpart C. The Board proposes to amend the subpart C
definition of check and its commentary to apply to both subparts C and D. The proposed
commentary to this definition states that a substitute check meeting the requirements of
§ 229.2(zz) is a check for purposes of all provisions of Regulation ce.
d. Forward collection. The term forward collection is defined in § 229.2(q) to
mean the process by which a bank sends a check on a cash basis to the paying bank for
payment. The Check 21 Act's definition is substantively the same as the existing
definition but includes a clause noting that sending a check to a collecting bank for
settlement can be a component of forward collection. The Board proposes to amend the
forward collection definition and commentary to include that clause.
e. Paying bank. The Check 21 Act's definition of paying bank essentially
parallels the definition in § 229.2(z) but adds the U.S. Treasury and the U.S. Postal
Service with respect to a check that is payable by one of those entities and is sent to that
entity for collection. The Board therefore proposes to amend § 229.2(z) and the
commentary thereto to incorporate the broader definition of paying bank in subpart D.
f. Qualified returned check. Although the·definition ofa qualified returned check
in § 229.2(bb) remains unchanged by the Check 21 Act, the Board proposes to amend the
commentary to that definition as it relates to the content of position 44 of the MICR line.
Currently, the commentary notes that a qualified returned check should have a "2" in
position 44. The proposed amendment would retain that requirement for original checks
but, in accordance with the generally applicable industry standard for substitute checks
(American National Standard Specifications for Image Replacement Documents, X9.90
(ANS X9.90)), would require a "5" in position 44 if the qualified returned check is a
substitute check.9 The "5" would ensure that the size of the image of the original check
would remain constant on subsequent substitute checks.
9 ANS X9.90 was in draft form on the date that the Board approved this proposed rule.
The Board expects that ANS X9.90 will be final on or before October 28, 2004.
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g. State. The Check 21 Act defines state to include all the entities that are
currently listed in § 229.2(ff), plus Guam, American Samoa, the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other territory of the United States.
The Board therefore proposes to supplement the existing definition of state by including
these additional entities as states for purposes of subpart D.
2. Proposed New Definitions.
a. Claimant Bank. The term claimant bank is used in section 8 of the Check 21
Act regarding expedited recredit claims by banks, although the statute does not define
that term. The Board proposes to define the term claimant bank in § 229.2(qq) to mean a
bank that submits a claim for recredit under §" 229.55 of Regulation CC, which
corresponds to section 8 of the statute.
b. Collecting bank, consumer, customer, and indemnifying bank. The Board
proposes to define the terms collecting bank, consumer, customer, and indemnifying bank
at § 229.2(rr), (ss), (tt), and (uu), respectively. The proposed definitions incorporate the
Check 21 Act definitions with only minor grammatical variations from the statutory
language. .
c. Magnetic ink character recognition (MICR) line. The Board proposes to
incorporate the Check 21 Act's definition of magnetic ink character recognition (MICR)
line in § 229.2(vv). The proposed commentary would note that American National
Standard Specifications for Placement and Location of MICR Printing, X9.13 (ANS
X9.13) is the governing standard for MICR Jines of original checks and substitute checks,
and that ANS X9.90 has some additional requirements regarding the content of the MICR
line ofa substitute check.
d. Original check. The Board proposes to define the tenn original check in
§ 229.2(ww) as the first paper check that is issued with respect to a particular payment
transaction. The proposed commentary to this new definition explains that the Board has
defined this tenn in order to distinguish the original check from a substitute check and
from other paper or electronic representations of a check.
e. Person. The Board proposes to incorporate the Check 21 Act's definition of
person in § 229.2(xx).
f. Reconverting bank. The Board proposes to define reconverting bank in
§ 229.2(yy) to be (1) the bank that creates a substitute check or (2) with respect to a
substitute check created by a person that is not a bank, the first bank that receives the
substitute check and that transfers, presents, or returns the substitute check Of, in lieu of
that substitute check, the first paper or electronic representation of that substitute check.
The proposed commentary to this definition provides further clarification as to when and
where creation of a substitute check occurs and explains that a bank need not accept a
substitute check that was created by a nonbank and that has not yet been handled by a
bank, unless the bank agrees to do so. Moreover, the proposed commentary provides
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examples of when a bank would be a reconverting bank under the definition and notes
that there could be multiple reconverting banks with respect to the same payment
transaction if a check moves from electronic form to substitute check fonn multiple times
throughout the collection and return process.
g. Substitute check. The Board proposes to incorporate the Check 21 Act's
definition of substitute check in § 229.2(zz).
The scope of the Check 21 Act and subpart D is limited to substitute checks. To
clarify the scope of the term and the subpart, the Board proposes extensive commentary
on the definition of substitute check. The proposed commentary provides guidance on
the meaning of a "paper reproduction ofan original check" and clarifies that, because a
substitute check by definition must be a piece of paper, an electronic check file or
electronic check image that has not been printed in accordance with the substitute check
definition and generally applicable industry standards is not a substitute check. The
commentary also explains what infonnation is required or permitted as part of the
original check images that are contained on a substitute check.
The Board particularly requests comment on the proposed commentary to the
substitute check definition that describes the various ways in which the MICR line of a
substitute check can vary from the MICR line of the original check. First, the
commentary notes that ANS X9.90 requires the content ofposition 44 of the MICR line
of a substitute check to vary from that of position 44 of the original check to ensure that
the check image remains constant if more than one substitute check is created to represent
the same original check.
Second, the commentary acknowledges that the original check could have an
encoding error in the amount field (including a failure to encode) and that a substitute
check that reproduces that error would meet the definition ofa substitute check.
However, the commentary notes that a reconverting bank that creates a substitute check
from an original check with a misencoded amount field or a bank that handles a substitute
check that perpetuates the amount encoding error may repair the MICR line to facilitate
the processing of the check without changing the item's status as a substitute check. This
approach would be consistent with the current industry practice of allowing a bank to
repair the MICR line of an original check when the bank detects an encoding error in the
amount field.
Third, the commentary notes that the MICR line of the original check could be
accurate in every respect but that check imaging equipment could (1) fail to read a
portion of the MICR line but note the presence ofMICR information with an asterisk,
(2) misread a digit in the MICR line, for example by reading an "8" as a "3," or
(3) intentionally read a space or a placeholder, such as a hyphen, to be a "0." These
errors collectively are referred to as MICR-read errors. To ensure that the items a bank
transfers in reliance on the Check 21 Act and subpart D meet the definition of a substitute
check, the commentary states that before a reconverting bank creates a substitute check it
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should correct all MICR-read errors. 10 The proposed commentary would clarify that an
item that perpetuated a MICR-read error would not be a substitute check as defined in
§ 229.2(zz). However, as discussed in connection with § 229.51(c) of the proposed rule
and the proposed commentary to that section, the Board proposes that, when such a
noncompliant item purports to be a substitute check, the substitute check warranties,
indemnity, and recredit rights would apply to that item as ifit were a substitute check,
even though it would not be the legal equivalent of the original check. The Board
proposes this approach in order to facilitate compliance with and prevent circumvention
and evasion of the Check 21 Act.
h. Sufficient copy and copy. The Board proposes that § 229.2(aaa) w~uld define
a sufficient copy to be a copy of an original check that accurately represents the
information on the front and back of the original check as of the time of truncation or
otherwise is sufficient to determine the validity ofa claim. This concept first appears in
section 6(d)(1) of the Check 21 Act regarding what a bank must produce to limit its
liability for an indemnity claim. The concept also appears in the Check 21 Act (with
minor variations) in sections 7(c)(I)(B) and 8(c)(I)(A) regarding what a bank must
produce to avoid making a recredit and in section 7(f)(1)(A) regarding the content of the
bank's notice regarding denial ofa consumer recredit claim. To streamline the regulation
and make the various sufficient copy criteria parallel throughout the rule, the rule defines
sufficient copy as it is defined in the indemnity section and uses that defined term in the
portions of the rule that correspond to the statutory provisions listed above. The Board
proposes to define a copy to be a paper reproduction of a check. I I. The proposed
commentary to these terms reiterates that an electronic check image that appears on a
computer screen but has not yet been printed does not constitute a copy or a sufficient
copy. The commentary also provides examples of what types of documents would
constitute a sufficient copy.
i. Transfer and consideration. The Board proposes to define transfer and
consideration at § 229.2(bbb) in a manner that supplements the V.C.C. definitions of
those terms in order to make the warranty, indemnity, and legal equivalence provisions
function as contemplated in the Check 21 Act.
The Check 21 Act warranties, which are a precondition for the legal equivalence
of a substitute check, and the indemnity, are given when a substitute check or
representation thereof is transferred, presented, or returned for consideration. Under the
existing V.C.C. definitions, a bank that pays a substitute check that it later provides to the
drawer or a bank that pays a check presented electronically and then creates a substitute
10 American National Standards Specifications for Electronic Exchange of Check and
Image Data, X9.37, (ANS X9.37), is being amended to address the identification and
repair of MICR-read errors that are indicated with asterisks. The Board expects this
amendment to be finalized prior to the effective date of the Check 21 Act.
II As explained in the analysis of § 229.58, when a bank is required to produce an
original check or a sufficient copy, the rule allows a bank to provide an electronic image
of that item if the recipient has agreed to receive that information electronically.
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check to give to the drawer would not be transferring the check to the drawer under the
V.C.C. and arguably would not receive consideration for the substitute check from the
drawer. However, the Check 21 Act explicitly provides that a drawer receives the
substitute check warranties if it receives a substitute check or a paper or electronic
representation of a substitute check. The Check 21 Act also provides that a drawer who
suffers a loss due to the receipt ofa substitute check instead of the original check receives
an indemnity. These provisions indicate that the substitute check received by the drawer
in the examples provided above is intended to be the legal equivalent of the original
check and subject to the warranties and indemnity.
Therefore, for the limited purpose of making the warranty, indemnity, and legal
equivalence sections work as intended, the proposed rule would expand the tenn transfer
to include delivery ofa substitute check (or a paper or electronic representation of a
substitute check) by a bank to a person that is not a bank. The proposed rule also would
expand the term consideration to include the bank's charging, having the right to charge,
or otherwise receiving value for a substitute check (or a paper or electronic representation
of the substitute check) that the bank transfers. However, the proposed rule would
explicitly exclude from the definition of consideration the transfer of a substitute check
solely in response to a claim related to that substitute check. 12 The proposed commentary
to the transfer and consideration definitions provides examples of the situations the
expansion is designed to capture.
j. Truncate. The Board proposes to incorporate the Check 21 Act's definition of
truncate in § 229.2(ccc). The proposed commentary highlights that removal ofa
substitute check is not truncation because truncation refers only to original checks.
k. Truncating bank. The Board proposes to define in § 229.2(ddd) the term
truncating bank, which is not used in the Check 21 Act but is used in § 229.51 and
appendix D of the proposed rule. The Board proposes to define truncating bank (in a
manner that parallels the definition of reconverting bank) to be the bank that truncates the
original check or, if a person other than a bank truncates the check, the first bank that
transfers, presents, or returns the check in a form other than the original check. The
proposed commentary to this section provides an example of when a bank would be a
truncating bank.
12 A bank should be able to produce a substitute check that does not contain the legal
equivalence legend as a "sufficient copy" in response to an indemnity or recredit claim.
However, if this were considered a transfer for consideration, the bank would be making
the substitute check warranties and thus could not in good faith provide a substitute check
without a legend, because by doing so it automatically would have breached the legal
equivalence legend component of the legal equivalence warranty.
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c. Section 229.30 Paying Bank's Responsibility for Return of Checks, and
Section 229.31 Returning Bank's Responsibility for Return of Checks.
The Board proposes to revise existing sentences in §§ 229.30(a)(2)(iii) and
229.31(a)(2)(iii) relating to the proper MICR-line encoding of a qualified returned check.
These amendments would specify that a qualified returned substitute check must contain
a "5" in position 44 of the MICR line, whereas a qualified returned original check must
contain a "2" in that position. As discussed above with respect to the definition of a
qualified returned check and the definition of substitute check, a substitute check must
contain a different number to ensure that the image of the original check remains a
constant size. The Board proposes to move the specific references to ANS X9.13 from
the regulation text to the commentary of these two paragraphs and specify that this
standard applies to original checks. The commentary to each paragraph also would
specify that ANS X9.90 is the standard that applies to substitute checks.
D. Indorsement Standards: Sections 229.35(a) and 229.38(d) and Appendix D.
In the current processing environment, banks generally print or "spray"
indorsements on original checks when the checks are processed through the banks'
automated check sorters. A substitute check will contain previous indorsements
physically applied to the original check by preserving the image of the back of the
original check. In addition, the reconverting bank will print, or "overlay," on the back of
the substitute check any previous indorsements that were applied to the original check
electronically and the reconverting bank's own indorsement. Banks handling checks
downstream from reconverting banks generally will process a mix of original checks and
substitute checks through their sorters and spray indorsements on both.
ANS X9.90 presumes that banks that receive paper checks, including substitute
checks, will continue to spray indorsements on those checks in the same locations that
they do today. ANS X9.90 also presumes that indorsements physically applied to a check
before it is reconverted will be preserved through the accurate image of the back of the
check that a substitute check must contain. However, the locations that ANS X9.90
specifies for previously applied electronic indorsements that a reconverting bank
physically overlays on substitute checks and for the reconverting bank's own
indorsement differ from the indorsement locations specified in current appendix D. In
particular, the current appendix requires the depositary bank indorsement to be placed on
the back of the check between 3 inches from the leading edge and 1.5 inches from the
trailing edge, whereas ANS X9.90 requires a depositary bank's previously applied
electronic indorsement to be overlaid by the reconverting bank on the back of a substitute
check between 1.95 and 2.55 inches from the leading edge. 13 The current appendix
requires a subsequent collecting bank indorsement to be placed on the back of the check
between the leading edge and 3.0 inches from the leading edge~ whereas ANS X9.90
13 When looking at a check from the front, the leading edge is the right edge of the check
and the trailing edge is the left edge of the check.
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requires a subsequent collecting bank's previously applied electronic indorsement to be
overlaid by the reconverting bank on the back of a substitute check very close to the
trailing edge.
The Board believes that, in light of technical constraints, existing check sorting
equipment will not be able to modify in real time the location of the indorsements that the
equipment sprays onto a check based on whether the check is an original check or a
substitute check. The Board therefore proposes that the appendix's current location
specifications would apply to indorsements printed on original checks and indorsements
printed on existing substitute checks. Banks that do not create substitute checks generally
would comply with the amended appendix D requirements by indorsing original checks
and existing substitute checks exactly as they indorse original checks today. However,
the Board proposes to amend appendix D to include new indorsement locations with
which a reconverting bank must comply when it creates a substitute check. These
locations would conform to ANS X9.90's location specifications for indorsements
applied to a substitute check by a reconverting bank.
The Board also notes that ANS X9.90 provides that an image of an original check
will be reduced in size when placed on a substitute check. Images of business-sized
checks will be reduced to about 65 percent of their original size and images of personal-
sized checks will be reduced to about 80 percent of their original size. Because of this
size reduction, the location of an indorsement, particularly a depositary bank
indorsement, sprayed on an original paper check likely will change when a reconverting
bank creates a substitute check that contains that indorsement within the image of the
original paper check. The Check 21 Act places ultimate liability on the reconverting
bank for certain losses related to substitute checks. The Board believes that the
reconverting bank also should bear the liability under § 229.38(d)(I) (which allocates
liability for losses due to illegible indorsements) for any loss that results due to the shift
in the placement of the indorsement. The Board proposes to amend that section and its
commentary to explain this reconverting bank liability.
Appendix D currently requires depositary bank indorsements to be printed in dark
purple or black ink and requires all other indorsements to be printed in an ink color other
than purple. The Board does not believe that the use ofdiffering ink colors significantly
aids returning banks' ability to identify the depositary bank indorsement. However, the
Board does believe that it is important for all indorsements to be printed in dark ink so
that they can be easily read and imaged. The Board further believes that all indorsements
that a reconverting bank prints onto a substitute check at the time that the substitute check
is created will be printed in a single ink color, likely black. The Board therefore proposes
to require all indorsements, including the depositary bank indorsement, to be printed in
black ink.
Current appendix D requires a depositary bank to include its name and location in
its indorsement. However, ANS X9.37 does not include this data in an electronic
depositary bank indorsement record, and as a result this data will not be included when a
reconverting bank overlays a depositary bank indorsement onto a substitute check.
F - 26
- 13 -
Nevertheless, a depositary bank that sprays its indorsement onto a check may wish to
include this infonnation in its indorsement to limit the number of locations at which it
must accept returned checks. The Board therefore proposes to pennit but not require the
inclusion of the depositary bank's name and location in its indorsement.
Appendix D currently does not contain any content requirements for returning
bank indorsements and implicitly pennits the indorsements to be placed on the front of
the check. Under ANS X9.90, however, a returning bank that also is a reconverting bank
with respect to a substitute check must be identified as such on the back of the check.
The Board therefore proposes to amend appendix D to require returning bank indorsers to
comply with the same indorsement requirements as collecting banks. Specifically, the
Board proposes to require that a subsequent collecting bank or returning bank
indorsement be applied to the back ofa check and include only (1) the bank's nine-digit
routing number, and, if the returning bank is a reconverting bank with respect to the
check, an asterisk at each end of the number to identify the bank as a reconverting bank,
(2) the indorsement date, and (3) an optional trace or sequence number. The Board
requests comment on what benefits, if any, there would be in providing returning banks
with the flexibility to indorse on the front of checks and to include additional infonnation
in their indorsements.
The Board notes that Regulation CC does not require paying banks to indorse
checks. To facilitate compliance with section 4 of the Check 21 Act, however, a paying
bank that also is a reconverting bank with respect to a substitute check should be
identified as such on the check in a manner that a subsequent reconverting bank can
preserve. 14 The Board therefore proposes to amend appendix D to require a paying bank
that is also a reconverting bank with respect to a substitute check to identify itself as such
by placing on the back of the check its nine-digit routing number (without arrows) and an
asterisk at each end of the number. This identification would not constitute an
indorsement.
Finally, for purposes of clarity, the Board proposes other technical amendments to
appendix D.
The Board requests comment on all aspects of the proposed indorsement and
identification standards discussed above.
14 If the paying bank were a reconverting bank and did not identify itself as such on the
back of the check, then the only place the paying bank would be identified as a
reconverting bank would be the routing number of the paying bank, surrounded by
asterisks, on the front of the check (according to ANS X9.90). If the substitute check
were subsequently converted to electronic form and reconverted to paper, the
identification of the paying bank as a reconverting bank on the front of the check would
be lost, because its routing number would be replaced with the identification of the
subsequent reconverting bank. This would place the subsequent reconverting bank in
violation of the Check 21 Act's requirement "to preserve any previous reconverting bank
identifications" (see section 4(d) of the Check 21 Act).
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E. Section 229.51 General Provisions Governing Substitute Checks.
1. Legal Equivalence and Agreement.
Section 4(b) of the Check 21 Act provides that a substitute check is the legal
equivalent of the original check for all purposes and all persons if the check contains an
accurate image of the front and back of the original check and bears a specified "legal
equivalence" legend. Although section 4(b) does not mention warranties as a
precondition of legal equivalence, section 4(a) provides that any person may deposit,
present, collect, or return a substitute check without the agreement of the recipient so
long as a bank has made the substitute check warranties with respect to that check.
Section 4(a) clearly intends that persons are required to accept a substitute check without
agreement only if a bank has provided the substitute check warranties. The Board
therefore believes that section 4(a) in effect requires a bank warranty as another
prerequisite of legal equivalence. Section 229.51(a) of the proposed rule would make this
requirement explicit by providing that a substitute check for which a bank has provided
the substitute check warranties is the legal equivalent of the original check ofor all
purposes and all persons if it meets the accuracy and legend requirements.
The proposed commentary to § 229.51(a) reiterates that a substitute check created
by a person other than a bank can be transferred only by agreement unless and until a
bank makes the substitute check warranties with respect to that check. The proposed
commentary clarifies that a substitute check created by a person who is not a bank
therefore cannot be the legal equivalent of the original check absent a bank's agreement
to make the substitute check warranties. The commentary also provides clarification
about what information on the check must be accurately represented as a prerequisite for
legal equivalence. Finally, the commentary to § 229.52(b)(2) states that the legal
equivalence legend must use the language specified in that section.
2. Reconverting Bank Duties.
Proposed § 229.51(b)(I)-(2) contains the reconverting bank duties described in
sections 4(c) and 4(d) of the Check 21 Act regarding indorsements and identifications. In
addition, § 229.5 1(b)(3) requires a reconverting bank to identify the bank that truncated
the original check. The Board proposes to impose this requirement by regulation because
ANS X9.90 requires identification of the truncating bank and because it is likely that
banks in the collection and return chain would want to identify the truncating bank if
there were a problem with a substitute check because the truncating bank would be in the
best position to provide the original check or additional information about the original
check. The proposed regulation requires the reconverting bank and truncating bank
identifications to be applied in accordance with generally applicable industry standards
and with appendix D of Regulation ce.
The proposed commentary to § 229.51 provides that, although a reconverting
bank is responsible for preserving all previously-applied indorsements, it is not
responsible for obtaining indorsements that should have been applied but were not. The
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proposed commentary also notes that some previously applied indorsements will be
preserved because they will be shown on a substitute check's image of the back of the
original check, whereas the reconverting bank must physically apply to the back of the
substitute check any previous indorsements that were applied electronically. The
proposed commentary also notes that, under appendix D, the reconverting bank
indorsement and identification are set off with asterisks and the truncating bank
identification is set off with brackets. The proposed commentary also makes clear that
preservation of a previous reconverting bank's indorsement (or identification, if the
reconverting is the paying bank) set offby asterisks on the back of the check also satisfies
the requirement of preserving the previous reconverting bank's identification.
3. Legal Status of an Item That Purports to Be a Substitute Check but Is Not.
As described in the discussion above concerning the definition of a substitute
check, a reproduction of an original check that does not have the same MICR line as the
original check would not be a substitute check. However, the Board believes that a bank
that transfers such an item as if that item were a substitute check should not be allowed to
evade the requirements of the Check 21 Act and subpart D simply because the item it
created failed to meet the substitute check definition. 15 To protect recipients of such
items and to provide incentives for reconverting banks to ensure that they only transfer
items that comply with subpart D, the proposed rule provides that the recipient of an item
that purports to be but is not a substitute check has warranty and indemnity rights, and,
where applicable, recredit and consumer awareness disclosure rights under subpart D as
though the item were a substitute check. The Board requests comment on whether an
item that fails to meet any of the other the substitute check requirements in § 229.2(zz)
also should be treated as though it were a substitute check for those limited purposes.
4. Applicable Law.
Proposed § 229.52(c) incorporates the Check 21 Act's provision stating that a
substitute check that meets the legal equivalence requirements is subject to any existing
federal or state law as though it were the original check, to the extent that such provision
is not inconsistent with the Check 21 Act. The proposed commentary to this section
clarifies that a law is not inconsistent with the Check 21 Act merely because it allows for
the recovery of additional damages.
F. Section 229.52 Substitute Check Warranties.
Proposed § 229.52 of the rule implements section 5 of the Check 21 Act, which
contains new warranties relating to substitute checks. For purposes of clarity, the
proposed rule is organized differently than the Check 21 Act.
15 An item could purport to be a substitute check, for example, if it contained the legal
equivalence legend or if a person provided the item when applicable law required
production of the original check.
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1. Content and Provision of the Substitute Check Warranties.
Proposed § 229.52(a) sets forth the content of the substitute check warranties and
identifies the banks that provide, and the events that trigger provision of, those
warranties. The warranties are (1) that the substitute check meets the requirements for
legal equivalence (i.e., that the substitute check accurately represents the information on
the front and back of the original check and bears the legal equivalence legend) and
(2) that no depositary bank, drawee, drawer, or indorser will be asked to make payment
based on a check that it already has paid.
In describing the second warranty, the Check 21 Act provides that none of the
named parties will receive "presentment or return" ofan item such that it will be asked to
make a duplicative payment. However, one such recipient, the drawer, typically would
.not receive presentment or return of a check but rather would have its account charged
for the check. The proposed rule therefore states that the named parties will not receive
presentment or return of, or otherwise be charged for, a duplicative item.
The Check 21 Act states that each of the two warranties is made when a bank
transfers, presents, or returns a "substitute check" for consideration. However, the list of
warranty recipients, which includes persons that received some other paper or electronic
form of the substitute check, indicates that banks continue to provide the warranties even
if they transfer and receive consideration for something that is not, but that was derived
from, a substitute check. Section 229.52(a) of the proposed rule therefore provides
specifically that a bank makes the warranties when it transfers, presents, or returns for
consideration the substitute check or any paper or electronic representation of a substitute
check.
The Board notes that the Check 21 Act and the proposed rule state that the
warranty against duplicative presentment or return applies such that the depositary bank,
drawee, drawer, or indorser will not receive presentment or return "of the substitute
check, the original check, or a copy or other paper or electronic version of the substitute
check or original check" such that that person "will be asked to make a payment based on
a check" it already has paid. This language could be read to exclude a situation where a
second charge results from an ACH debit that was created using information from an
original check or substitute check. 16 However, such an ACH debit arguably could be
considered "an electronic version" of a substitute check or original check to which the
duplicative payment warranty would apply. The Board specifically requests comment on
whether using information from a check to create an ACH debit entry should be a
payment request covered by this warranty.
The proposed commentary to § 229.52(a) clarifies that the reconverting bank is
the first bank to provide the substitute check warranties. That discussion also notes that,
16 Such "check conversions" are covered under the Board's Regulation E and rules of the
National ACH Association as electronic fund transfers rather than check transactions and
are not, to the Board's knowledge, treated as check transactions for any other purpose.
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when a bank is a reconverting bank because it by agreement receives a substitute check
that a nonbank created, the reconverting bank starts the warranty chain for that substitute
check even if the reconverting bank transfers an electronic representation of that
substitute check instead of the actual substitute check that it received. The proposed
commentary also clarifies that a bank that by agreement transfers an electronic version of
an original check prior to the creation of the first substitute check does not make the
substitute check warranties, but that parties to the agreement can allocate amongst
themselves liabilities associated with the substitute check warranties. Moreover, the
proposed commentary discusses the mechanics of each of the two warranties, including
how they apply when multiple substitute checks are created with respect to the same
payment transaction.
2. Warranty Recipients.
Section 5 of the Check 21 Act provides that warranties are provided to "the
transferee, any subsequent collecting or returning bank, the drawee, the drawer, the
payee, the depositor, and any endorser (regardless of whether the warrantee receives the
substitute check or another paper or electronic form of the substitute check or original
check) ...." Although § 229.52(b) of the proposed rule lists all these persons as
warrantees, it does so in a slightly different manner than the statute. The warranties are
intended to flow forward to all persons, including the paying bank, that received a
substitute check or any paper or electronic representation of a substitute check, but not
backward to persons that handled only the original check or some representation of the
original check that was not derived from a substitute check. The rule therefore states that
the warranties are provided to the recipient and any subsequent recipientt including all of
the parties specifically listed in the statute, regardless of whether the recipient received
the substitute check or another paper or electronic representation of the substitute check.
The proposed commentary to § 229.52(b) provides additional discussion about the flow
of the warranties.
G. Section 229.53 Substitute Check Indemnity.
1. Scope of Indemnity.
Section 6 of the Check 21 Act specifies the scope and amount of the substitute
check indemnity, and the proposed rule incorporates this section largely unchanged. The
proposed rule states that a bank that transfers, presents, or returns a substitute check or a
paper or electronic representation ofa substitute check for which it receives consideration
shall indemnify the recipient and any subsequent recipient (including a collecting or
returning bank, the depositary bank, the drawer, the drawee, the payee, the depositor, and
any indorser) for any loss incurred by any recipient of a substitute check if that loss
occurred due to the receipt of a substitute check instead of the original check. As with
the proposed rule's language regarding the scope of the warranties, discussed in detail in
the analysis of § 229.52, the proposed language regarding the scope of the substitute
check indemnity clarifies that the indemnity flows to subsequent, not prior, parties that
receive a substitute check or a representation of a substitute check.
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The proposed commentary regarding the scope of the indemnity highlights that
the indemnity applies only if the first indemnified party incurred a loss due to receipt of
the substitute check instead of the original check. However, a bank that paid an
indemnity (other than the first reconverting bank) would in tum be eligible to make an
indemnity claim even if that bank only received a representation of a substitute check.
Thus, the indemnity covers losses suffered directly due to the receipt ofa substitute check
instead of the original check and losses incurred by providing an indemnity to another
person. The proposed commentary provides several examples to illustrate the scope of
the indemnity.
2. Indemnity Amount.
The proposed rule incorporates the statutory language regarding the indemnity
amount with minor clarifications. The rule provides that the amount of the indemnity is
(1) the amount of any loss (including interest, costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and other
expenses of representation) caused by the breach of a substitute check warranty, or (2) in
the absence of a breach ofa substitute check warranty, the amount of the loss, up to the
amount of the substitute check, plus interest and expenses (including costs and reasonable
attorney's fees and other expenses of representation). The proposed rule supplements the
statutory language by specifically stating that interest would be included in the damages
proximately caused by a breach of a substitute check warranty.
The proposed rule also incorporates statutory provisions regarding reduction of
the indemnity amount. Section 229.53(b)(2) of the proposed rule states that the
indemnity amount described in the preceding paragraph will be reduced in proportion to
the amount of negligence or bad faith of the party making the indemnity claim, but that
nothing in that comparative negligence section reduces any person's rights under the
V.C.C. or other applicable law. Section 229.53(b)(3) of the proposed rule provides that
an indemnifying bank will be liable only for losses incurred up to the time that it
produces the original check or a sufficient copy of the original check, although
production of that item does not absolve the indemnifying bank from liability for
breaching a substitute check warranty or a warranty established under any other law.
The proposed commentary to § 229.53(b) provides examples that illustrate the
amount of the indemnity under various sets of facts.
3. Subrogation ofRights.
Section 229.53(c) of the proposed rule incorporates section 6(e) of the statute by
providing that an indemnifying bank shall be subrogated to the rights of the party it
indemnified to the extent of the indemnity provided and may attempt to recover from
another party based on a warranty or other claim. This section also provides that the
indemnified party has a duty to comply with reasonable requests for assistance made by
the indemnifying bank with respect to such a claim. The proposed commentary provides
an example of what would constitute a reasonable request for assistance. .
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H. Section 229.54 Expedited Recredit for Consumers.
Section 7 of the statute sets forth the circumstances giving rise to a consumer
expedited recredit claim, the time period and procedures for making such a claim, the
conditions for a recredit, the timing and availability of a recredit, a bank's ability to
reverse a recredit on a later determination that the consumer's claim was not valid, and
the notices a bank must provide in connection with recredit claims. Section 229.54 of the
proposed rule implements all of these provisions but reorganizes them for purposes of
clarity. The Board also proposes to supplement the statutory text in certain respects in
order to explicitly acknowledge certain actions that are implicit in the text of the statute.
1. Circumstances Giving Rise to a Claim.
Section 229.54(a) of the proposed rule provides that a consumer may make an
expedited recredit claim under that section for a recredit with respect to a substitute check
if the consumer asserts in good faith that (1) the bank holding the consumer's account
charged that account for a substitute check that was provided to the consumer (although
the consumer need not be in possession of the substitute check at the time he or she
submits a claim); (2) the substitute check was not properly charged to the consumer
account or the consumer has a warranty claim with respect to the substitute check;
(3) the consumer suffered a resulting loss; and (4) production of the original check or a
sufficient copy of the original check is necessary to determine whether or not the
substitute check in fact was improperly charged or whether the consumer's warranty
claim is valid. This section implements sections 7(a)(I) and 7(h) of the Check 21 Act
with some organizational changes.
The proposed commentary on the circumstances giving rise to a claim provides
additional detail concerning when a consumer would and would not meet the criteria for
bringing an expedited recredit claim under § 229.54. For example, the commentary
clarifies that a consumer who receives only an image statement that contains an image of
a substitute check cannot make a claim because he or she has not actually received a
substitute check, although such a consumer would have redress for an improper charge
associated with the substitute check under the V.C.C. and might have a claim for breach
of a substitute check warranty. The commentary also notes that the warranty giving rise
to a § 229.54 claim could be a substitute check warranty or any other warranty provided
to the consumer in connection with the substitute check. The commentary further notes
that recovery under § 229.54 is limited to the amount of the substitute check, plus interest
if the consumer has an interest-bearing account, although a consumer may be able to
recover additional amounts under other law, including §§ 229.52 and 229.53 of the
proposed rule.
2. Procedures for Making Claims.
a. Timing ole/aim. The Check 21 Act states that a consumer's expedited
recredit claim is due before the end of the 40-day period beginning on the later of the date
that the bank mailed or delivered to the consumer the periodic account statement that
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contains information about the transaction giving rise to the claim or the date on which
the bank made the substitute check available to the consumer. Section 229.54(b)(1)(i) of
the proposed rule implements this provision. The proposed rule clarifies that the 40-day
time period refers to calendar days and that a bank makes a substitute check "available"
by mailing or delivering it to the consumer.
The statute provides that the bank must extend the consumer's time for making a
claim by a reasonable period of time if the consumer cannot meet the 40-day deadline
due to extenuating circumstances, such as his or her extended travel or illness.
Section 229.54(b)(1)(ii) of the proposed rule includes the general provision regarding the
time extension but moves to the commentary the specific examples of what constitutes an
extenuating circumstance. This parallels the approach the Board took when
implementing the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (see 15 U.S.C. 1693(g) and 12 CFR
§ 205.6(b)(4».
b. Content ole/aim. Section 229.54(b)(2) of the proposed rule states that the
consumer's claim must include (1) a description of the consumer's claim, including the
reason why the consumer believes his or her account was improperly charged for the
substitute check or the nature of his or her warranty claim with respect to such check;
(2) a statement that the consumer suffered a loss and an estimate of the amount of that
loss; (3) the reason why production of the original check or a sufficient copy of the
original check is necessary to determine whether or not the charge to the consumer's
account was proper or the consumer's warranty claim is valid; and (4) sufficient
information to allow the bank to identify the substitute check and investigate the claim.
The proposed rule uses the defined term "sufficient copy," as opposed to the Check 21
Act's "better copy," of the original check. As defined, a sufficient copy by its nature
would be a better copy.
The proposed commentary to § 229.54(b)(2) discusses in more detail the reasons
why a charge to the consumer's account could be improper and why the original check or
a sufficient copy would be necessary to determine the validity of the consumer's recredit
claim. The proposed commentary also discusses what types of information a consumer
should provide to facilitate the bank's investigation of a claim.
c. Form and Submission ole/aim. Section 229.54(b)(3) of the proposed rule
incorporates the statutory provisions regarding the bank's ability to require a consumer to
submit an expedited recredit claim in writing and the bank's ability to accept a written
submission electronically. The proposed commentary to § 229.54(b)(3) clarifies that a
bank that requires a claim to be in writing must inform the claimant of that requirement
and also indicates that a communication, whether oral or written, that does not contain all
the required information does not constitute a "claim" under § 229.54.
Although the statute states that a bank may permit an electronic submission "if the
consumer has agreed to communicate with the bank in that manner," the proposed rule
omits the quoted language. The Board believes that a consumer's act of submitting a
claim electronically indicates the consumer's agreement to communicate electronically,
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such that the statute's agreement language is unnecessary. However, the proposed
commentary notes that a bank cannot require a consumer to submit a written claim
electronically.
The proposed rule also clarifies that a bank that requires the consumer's claim to
be in writing must compute the time period for acting on the claim from the date that the
consumer submitted the written claim, even if the consumer previously provided some
information relating to the claim in another fonn. l ? In addition, the statute measures time
from the "business day" (defined as any day, other than a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday) on which the bank received a claim. However, the Board proposes to
incorporate the term "banking day," as it has for other parts of Regulation CC. Banking
day means "that part of any business day on which an office of a bank is open to the
public for carrying on substantially all of its banking functions." The Board believes that
"banking day" is an appropriate tenn when referring to the time at which a bank must
begin measuring the time period for action. The Board requests comment on both of
these adjustments relating to time period calculations.
3. Action on Claims.
Section 7(c)(1) of the Check 21 Act requires a bank that receives a complete and
timely claim for which all the prerequisites are met to recredit the consumer's account for
the amount of the substitute check, plus interest if the consumer's account is an interest
bearing account, unless the bank has provided the original check or a sufficient copy to
the consumer and demonstrated to the consumer that the substitute check was properly
charged to his or her account. Section 7(c)(2) of the Check 21 Act requires the bank to
provide the recredit no later than the end of the business day following the business day
on which the bank determined that the consumer's claim was valid Of, if the bank has not
yet determined the validity of the claim, before the end of the lOth business day after the
business day on which the consumer recredited the claim. Section 7(c)(2) limits the
amount that the bank is required to provide on the loth day to the amount of the loss, up
to the lesser of the amount of the substitute check or $2,500, plus interest, and requires
the bank to provide the additional amount of the substitute check, if any, on the 45th
calendar day following the business day on which the consumer submitted the claim.
Section 7(e) of the Check 21 Act provides that a bank may reverse a recredit ifit
determines that the substitute check in question was properly charged to the consumer
account and if it notifies the consumer.
The proposed rule incorporates each of the Check 21 Act's substantive
requirements regarding action on a consumer's expedited recredit claim but reorganizes
those requirements in a way that the Board believes is more straightforward. The Board
requests comment on whether or not its proposed reorganization of the statutory
provisions regarding action on claims is an improvement over the statutory organization
and encourages commenters to provide specific organizational suggestions.
17 The commentary to this provision clarifies that a bank that requires expedited recredit
claims to be in writing must inform the consumer.
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Section 229.54(c)(I) of the proposed rule provides that one of the bank's options
for responding to a recredit claim is affirmatively to determine a consumer's claim to be
valid. Although the statute does not list this possible response explicitly, the bank's
ability to respond to a claim by determining that the claim is valid is implicit in the
"timing of the recredit" section of the statute (section 7(c)(2)(A», which requires the
bank to provide a recredit the day after it determines that the consumer's claim is valid.
The statute provides that if a bank detennines that the consumer's claim is not
valid, the bank must provide the consumer with the original check or a copy of the
original check sufficient to determine the validity of the claim and must demonstrate why
the substitute check was properly charged to the consumer account. Because the statute
provides that a warranty claim may be the basis ofa consumer's expedited recredit claim,
§ 229.54(c)(2), by reference to § 229.54(e)(2), of the proposed rule requires the bank
either to demonstrate that a charge was proper or to explain why the warranty claim is not
valid, as appropriate in light of the consumer's claim.
Section 7(c) of the statute states that a bank must recredit the amount of the
substitute check, plus interest if the account is an interest-bearing account. However,
recrediting the full amount of the check could create overcompensation in some cases,
such as where the consumer's allegation is that the bank charged the substitute check for
the wrong amount. Section 229.54(c) of the proposed rule therefore provides that a bank
must recredit the amount of the loss, up to the amount of the substitute check plus
interest.
If, after providing a recredit, a bank later determines that the consumer's claim is
not valid, § 229.54(c)(4) of the proposed rule would allow the bank to reverse both the
amount it previously recredited plus any interest that it has paid on that amount. The
statute does not explicitly address the reversal of interest when reversing a recredit, and
the Board specifically requests comment on whether the proposed approach is
appropriate.
The proposed commentary to § 229.54(c) clarifies that a bank that receives claims
for multiple substitute checks in the same communication must provide the expedited
recredit for each such check by the loth day after submission, unless the bank by that date
has determined whether or not the claims are valid. The commentary also clarifies that a
bank may, when appropriate, reverse any amount that it previously recredited, regardless
of whether such amount originally was provided after a determination that a claim was
valid or pending the bank's investigation of the claim. The Board requests comment on
whether additional commentary to § 229.54 would be useful and, if so, what specific
points should be covered.
4. Availability of recredit.
Section 7(d) of the statute provides that a bank can delay the availability of a
recredit if the account is a new account or has been repeatedly overdrawn in the last six
months, or if the bank has reasonable cause to suspect fraud. The proposed rule
F· 36
- 23 -
incorporates the statutory language with minor clarifications. The statute states that the
new account exception applies if "the claim is made" within 30 days of establishment of
the account, whereas the proposed rule provides that the exception applies if "the
consumer submits the claim" within 30 days. This change clarifies when a claim "is
made" in a manner that is consistent with the other time period calculations in the statute
and proposed rule. The rule also reorganizes the language in the exception for prevention
of fraud losses to parallel the existing exception for reasonable cause to doubt
collectibility in § 229.13.
The proposed commentary to § 229.54(d) clarifies that the availability ofrecredits
provided under § 229.54(c) is governed solely by § 229.54(d) and thus is not subject to
subpart B. The commentary also clarifies that the periods in § 229.54(d) are the
maximum periods that the bank may delay availability. In addition, the commentary
clarifies that the bank may delay availability of a recredit under § 229.54{d) only with
respect to the amount of the substitute check that the bank recredits under
§ 229.54(c)(3)(i) pending investigation of the consumer's claim.
5. Notices Relating to Consumer Expedited Recredit Claims.
Section 229.54(e) of the proposed rule describes the notices required by the
statute when a bank provides or reverses a recredit or denies a consumer's recredit claim.
The proposed rule provides that a bank that recredits a consumer account must, no later
than the business day after the banking day on which the bank provides the recredit,
notify the consumer of the amount of the recredit and the date on which the recredited
funds will be available for withdrawal.
The proposed rule requires a bank that determines that a consumer's claim is not
valid to notify the consumer no later than the business day after the banking day on which
the bank makes its detennination. The proposed rule provides that an invalid claim
notice must include an explanation of the basis for the bank's determination that the
substitute check was properly charged or the consumer's warranty claim is not valid, plus
the original check or a sufficient copy of the original check. The statute requires a bank
that denies a consumer's expedited recredit claim to notify the consumer that he or she
may request the infonnation or documents on which the bank relied in making its
determination. However, the proposed rule allows a bank that relies on information or
documents in addition to the original check or sufficient copy to provide such
information or documents with the notice or to indicate that the consumer may obtain
them on request.
The proposed rule provides that a bank that reverses an amount it previously
credited to a consumer account must notify the consumer no later than the business day
after the banking day on which the bank made the reversal. This notice must include the
infonnation required for an invalid claim notice, plus the amount of the reversal,
including both the amount of the recredit and the amount of paid interest, if any, being
reversed, and the date on which the bank made the reversal.
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The proposed commentary to § 229.54(e) clarifies that a bank may provide a
required notice by u.s. mail or by any other means through which the consumer has
agreed to receive account information. The commentary highlights that, if a bank is
required to provide an original check or sufficient copy as part of the notice, a bank that
provides a notice electronically satisfies that requirement by providing an electronic
image of the original check or sufficient copy, if the consumer has agreed to receive that
information electronically.
As discussed in the analysis of appendix C, the Board proposes model language
for each of the notices required by § 229.54(e).
I. Section 229.55 Expedited Recredit for Banks.
Section 8 of the Check 21 Act provides that a bank may make a claim against an
indemnifying bank if (1) the claimant bank or a bank that the claimant bank has
indemnified has received a claim for expedited recredit from a consumer or would have
been subject to such a claim if the consumer account had been charged for the substitute
check; (2) the claimant bank is obligated to provide a consumer expedited recredit with
respect to such substitute check or otherwise has suffered a resulting loss; and (3) the
production of the original check or a sufficient copy of the original check is necessary to
determine the validity of the charge to the consumer account or the validity of any
warranty claim connected with such substitute check. The content requirements for an
interbank expedited recredit claim essentially parallel those for a consumer expedited
recredit claim but also state that a bank that provides a copy of a substitute check with its
claim must take steps to ensure that such copy is not mistaken for a legally equivalent
substitute check or handled for forward collection or return. An indemnifying bank may
require the claim to be in writing and may permit the claimant bank to submit it
electronically.
A claimant bank must bring its claim under section 8 of the Check 21 Act within
120 days of the transaction that gave rise to the claim, and the indemnifying bank must
respond within 10 business days of receiving the claim by providing (1) a recredit, (2) the
original check or a sufficient copy, (3) or infonnation to the claimant bank as to why the
indemnifying bank is not obligated to do (1) or (2). If the claimant bank later receives or
reverses a recredit or otherwise receives compensation for the substitute check for which
the indemnifying bank previously provided a recredit, then the claimant bank must
reimburse the indemnifying banle An indemnifying bank that provides an original check
or sufficient copy also may be entitled to a refund under § 229.53 if it has provided a
recredit that exceeds the losses the claimant bank sustained up to the day that the
indemnifying bank provided the original check or sufficient copy.
The proposed rule implements section 8 of the statute with some minor
organizational and clarifying changes. The rule clarifies that bank action on a claim is
required by "the end of' the 10th business day after the relevant banking day, consistent
with the parallel consumer recredit provision. Moreover, the proposed rule clarifies that,
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when an indemnifying bank requires a claim to be in writing, the lO-day period
commences with the receipt of the written claim.
The proposed rule also clarifies both paragraphs of the Check 21 Act regarding
the indemnifying bank's right to a refund. Section 7(c)(3) of the statute states that the
"claimant bank must refund ... any amount previously advanced by the indemnifying
bank." Without further elaboration, this provision could be read to mean that a claimant
bank must give to the indemnifying bank more than the claimant bank recovered. 18 The
rule makes clear that a claimant bank that receives other compensation for the substitute
check does not have to refund to the indemnifying bank more than the claimant bank
previously recovered from the indemnifying bank. In addition, section 8(d) of the statute
provides that an indemnifying bank that produces the original check or a sufficient copy
has the right to a refund under the indemnity section. Section 229.55(e)(2) of the
proposed rule clarifies the statutory language by describing the amount to be refunded
under that provision.
The proposed commentary to § 229.55 elaborates on the rule text in several
respects. The commentary highlights that a bank could have a recredit claim either
because it is obligated to provide a recredit to a consumer or another bank or because it
has suffered a loss as result of catching a substitute check problem that, ifuncaught,
could have given rise to a consumer expedited recredit claim. The commentary provides
examples about the types of losses that could give rise to consumer claim and the
circumstances under which a bank could bring a valid claim. The commentary also
provides additional information relating to the procedures for making claims.
J. Section 229.56 Liability.
The Check 21 Act provides for delays in an emergency in section 9, the measure
of damages in section 10, and the statute of limitations and notice of claims in section 11.
Section 229.56 of the proposed rule incorporates each of those sections with minor
technical changes in a manner that parallels existing subpart C liability provisions in
§ 229.38.
Section 229.56 (a) of the proposed rule provides that the amount of damages
recoverable for a breach of a substitute check warranty or failure to comply with any
provision of subpart D generally is limited to the amount of the loss or the substitute
check, whichever is less, plus interest and expenses relating to the substitute check. This
section contains exceptions, however, noting that a person could recover more than the
generally applicable amount by bringing an indemnity claim or could recover less than
the generally applicable amount if the person's negligence or bad faith contributed to the
loss or if the person obtained a recredit under § 229.54 or § 229.55.
18 For example, if the claimant bank received a recredit for $150 and then received a
subsequent recovery for $100, the refund to the indemnifying bank should be the amount
of the recovery ($100) rather than the entire amount previously advanced ($150).
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Section 229.56(b) of the proposed rule states that delay by a bank beyond the time
periods described in subpart D is excused if such delay is attributable to one of the causes
specified in that paragraph.
Section 229.56(c) of the proposed rule specifies the courts in which a person may
bring an action to enforce subpart D and provides that such an action must be brought
within one year after the cause of action accrues. The statute provides that a cause of
action accrues as of the date the injured party first learns or reasonably should have
learned of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the cause of action. The proposed
rule clarifies that one of the facts and circumstances included in the concept of accrual is
the identity of the bank against which the action is to be brought. This clarification is
intended to make the date from which the statute of limitations is measured correspond to
the date from which timely notice of a claim is measured.
Section 229.56(d) generally provides that, unless a person gives notice of a
§ 229.56 claim to the warranting or indemnifying bank within 30 calendar days after the
person has reason to know ofboth the claim and the identity of the indemnifying or
warranting bank, the warranting or indemnifying bank is discharged from liability in an
action to enforce a claim under subpart D to the extent of any loss caused by the delay in
giving notice of the claim. However, this paragraph also states that a timely recredit
claim by a consumer under § 229.54 constitutes timely notice under this paragraph.
The proposed commentary to § 229.54 briefly elaborates on each of the four
paragraphs of that section in a manner that corresponds to the commentary for § 229.38.
K. Section 229.57 Consumer Awareness.
This section of the proposed rule implements section 12 of the Check 21 Act,
which requires a bank to provide a consumer awareness disclosure regarding substitute
checks and substitute check rights to each consumer "who receives original checks or
substitute checks." The Board believes that the quoted language, when read with the
statutory provisions governing distribution of notices, indicates that section 12
disclosures are intended only for (1) consumers who routinely receive paid checks with
their account statements and (2) other consumers who receive substitute checks only on a
case-by-case basis. The proposed rule reflects this interpretation.
The proposed rule specifically notes that, unless the bank already has provided the
disclosure, a case-by-case disclosure is required when (1) a consumer receives a
substitute check in response to his or her specific request for an original check or a copy
ofa check or (2) a check deposited by a consumer is returned unpaid to the consumer's
account in the form of a substitute check. The Check 21 Act requires that when a bank
provides a substitute check to a consumer in response to the consumer's request for a
check, the bank must provide the consumer disclosure at the time of the request. This
requirement may be impractical, however, as the bank may not know at the time of the
request whether it will provide the original check, a substitute check, or some other copy
of the check. Requiring the bank to provide the disclosure at the time of the request
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could prove unnecessarily burdensome to the bank and confusing to the consumer,
because the consumer would receive a disclosure describing rights that may not apply to
the item the consumer ultimately receives. The Board therefore has proposed two
alternative rule provisions regarding when a bank must provide the disclosure to a
consumer who requests a copy of a check. One alternative tracks the statute and requires
a bank to provide the disclosure at the time of the request, but the other alternative
requires provision of the disclosure at the time the bank provides the substitute check to
the consumer. The Board specifically requests comment on which of these alternatives is
preferable.
The proposed commentary to § 229.57 indicates that a bank may use the model
substitute check disclosure in appendix C and will be deemed to comply with the
disclosure content requirement(s) for which it uses the model disclosure. The
commentary also provides examples of when a bank must distribute the required
disclosure.
L. Section 229.58 Mode of Delivery.
The Check 21 Act discusses in several places the form in which a bank must
provide required infonnation. The proposed rule, by contrast, has a separate section
regarding mode of delivery that applies to the entire subpart. Section 229.58 provides
that a bank may provide any information required by subpart D by U.S. mail or by any
other means through which the recipient has agreed to receive account infonnation. This
section also specifically allows a bank that is required to provide an original check or a
sufficient copy to provi~e an electronic version of the relevant paper document if the
recipient has agreed to receive that information electronically. This latter provision
addresses the potential inconsistency between section 7(f)(2) as interpreted at
§ 229.54(e)(2), which requires a bank denying a consumer's recredit claim to provide the
original check or a sufficient copy (each of which is by definition a piece of paper), with
section 7(f)(4), which pennits a bank to provide the notices (which presumably means all
components of the notice) electronically.
M. Section 229.59 Relation to Other Law.
This section of the proposed rule implements section 13 of the Check 21 Act by
stating that the Check 21 Act and subpart D supersede any provision of federal or state
law, including the V.C.C., that is inconsistent with the Check 21 Act or subpart D, but
only to the extent of the inconsistency.
N. Section 229.60 Variation by Agreement.
Section 229.60 of the proposed rule implements section 14 of the Check 21 Act
by providing that any provision of § 229.55 (expedited recredit for banks) may be varied
by agreement of the banks involved, but that no other provision of subpart D may be
varied by agreement by any person or persons.
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o. Appendix C - Model Fonns.
Section 12(c) of the Check 21 Act requires the Board to publish model forms that
banks can use to satisfy the content requirements of the consumer awareness disclosure
required by that section. Section 229.57 of the proposed rule lists those content
requirements. The statute provides that a bank that uses the model form published by the
Board to comply with § 229.57 shall be treated as complying with that section if the form
accurately describes the bank's policies and practices.
The Board proposes to include the required model disclosure as model C-5A in
appendix C. The proposed model disclosure explains in very simple tenns what a
substitute check is, when the consumer expedited recredit right applies, and what a
consumer must do to exercise that right. The 'Board requests comment on whether the
proposed model disclosure is clear, accurate, and concise.
Although not required by statute to do so, the Board also proposes to publish in
appendix C models for the notices a bank must provide in response to a consumer's
expedited recredit claim under section 7(f) of the Check 21 Act and § 229.54(e) of the
proposed rule. Although there is no statutory safe harbor that applies to the proposed
model notices under § 229.54(e), the Board nevertheless believes that these model notices
may be helpful to banks in complying with the regulation. In light of the absence of a
statutory safe harbor, the Board specifically requests comment on whether providing
model language for the § 229.54(e) notices is useful.
The Board proposes technical amendments to the introductory paragraph and
table of contents of appendix C to reflect the inclusion of the new disclosure and notices.
The Board also proposes to amend the commentary to appendix C to clarify the
appropriate use of the new models.
II. Other Amendments to Regulation CC
The Board also is proposing at this time several amendments to existing
Regulation CC and its commentary that are unrelated to the Check 21 Act. The Board
requests comment on each of these proposed revisions and also welcomes comments
about any other areas of the existing rule and commentary that should be clarified.
A. Section 229.2 Definitions.
The Board proposes to amend the commentary to the definition of local paying
bank (§ 229.2(s» to provide additional detail regarding how to determine whether
deposits mailed to a central check processing facility are local or nonlocal.
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CHECK CLEARING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY ACT
OaoBn 1. 2003 -ordered to be pnnted
Mr OXLEY, from the committee of conference,
submItted the follOWIng
CONFERENCE REPORT
lTo accompany H R 1474]
The committee of conference on the msagreeull votes of the
two Houses on the. amendment of the Senate to the bill (H R
1474), to faalltate check truncatIon by authonzlDl' substitute
checks, to foeter IUDovatlon In the check collectIon system WIthout
mandatmg receipt of checks In eleetromc form, and to 1D1prove the
overall effiCIency of the Nauon's payments s~8tem, and for other
purposes, havmg met, after full and Cree conlerence, have .greed
to recommend and do recommend to their respectIve Houlel aa fol-
lows
That the House recede from Jts dIsagreement to the amend-
ment of the Senate and agree to the same WIth an amendment as
follows
In heu of the matter proposed to be Inserted by the Senate
amendment, 1Mert the folJowmg
SECTION 1. SHORT Tl'l'LB; TABU OF CONl'BNTS.
(a) SHORT Trru -TIns Act m4,l he cl.ted as the "ChecJc Clear·
"nc for the 21st Century Act" or tM Check 21 Act"
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS -The table of content. of thIS Act &.
Q$ follows·
&« 1 Short tItle, loWe 0( conIe,,"
Sec 2 Flluh~. pu'poa.
&c 3 Dc(uutUJM
Sec " G.llcrol prou"101lI 'OfJCTflU16 ."#nlltulc ch~cb
S« 5 Su6..,u~ c1a«. UHVnualw.
Sec 6 Inckm""l
Sec 1 Bx~Nd ncralu lor co,""",er.
&c 8 EiJ*l*d m:.redat proced"", (01' be'''M
Sec 9 D.14y. lA 011 cmc1pn.cy
&c 10 AI.,"re 0(domciIa
Sec J1 SIGl,dc 0(lur&U4l101lI Glul Mba 0(clo.",
&c 12 COIuumu tl&IItInllea
Sec 13 B(feet on OlM' low
29-006
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&c 14 VCUltIl&oll 6, CJlNClMlit
&c 15 R~bolU
Sec 16 Stud, GIld repot1 011 f&UUU lJUfJ&loballly
Sec 11 S"" ..l&ad nporlall6 of~ tmd r.uenuu for Il'GIuporhlll cAeei, beleweB
Fetkral RaetW 6cinb
&c 18 Buoluatum Cladre~ 61 eAr C01!&PtroUrr G.MTtJl
Sec 19 ~jJOa~ IUUICQ t/'faaellQ OM COl' red~'lOA
&c 20 Bffect... iJD.lc
SEC. J FINDINGS; PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINGS -The Co~s. flluJ.s as follows·
(1) In the Expedited Funds AVaUabul~'Act, enacted on Au·
gust 10, 1981, the C01&6l"eU cUrected the Board of GouerllOn of
the Federal Reserue System. to consider utabl18/ung regUlatlO1&B
requ&rU16 Federal reserue btmi. and dePOSIto,., lJlShtutwns to
prouuU for checi trullCatlo~ 11& order to "nlproue the checlc proc-
essuag system
(2) In tluJl same Act, t~ Congress-
(A) provuled~ Board ofGouemors of flu! Federal Re-
serue System With full authority to regulGte all aapeets of
1M PlJ1mellt B)'.um, mcludulg 1M receipt, payment, collec-
tIOn, fJIId dearlllC of cheels, and related functlOM of 1M
payment "ltem perlaJnnll to ch«Ju; and
(B) dJrected that the exercISe of such «uthonty by 1M
Boord Rlpeneded tilly State law, Incluthng the Um/oma.
CommerclDl Code, os In effect 11& any State
(3) CI&«lr. truncatIOn IS no le•• des&rCJble 11& 2003 for both
filllJJ&alll NnlICf CUltonaen and tM PIUJll.t:UJl aervace. IndlUll)',
to~ aMI., unproue e/lic&ency In checll collect&olU, tuad upe.
dlte fu.ntU IWtwolul&t] for customers than. at woa ouer 15 year.
~ wAcn eo".reu (int duected ~ BOtJrd to coMuUr e.tab-
lisJauw a.wa a process.
(6) PURPOSRS -The purpose. ofUu. Act are as follow.
(1) To flXJI.t4te check truncatIOn by authoru&n.g su.bstltute
checls
(2) To fMter lnnouallOlI III the check collectIOn syslenl with-
out rnancl4tlng nrcelpt ofchecks In electrollJC form
(3) To Improve tM oueraU efficiency of the NatiOn,~ pay-
ment. system
SEC. & DBFlNlTlONS.
For purposes of tJus Act, theLollow~ def",utwlU shaU apply.
(1) ACCDUNT.-TM tIlrm account IMaM a deposit account
atabani
(2) BANK.-The term "bank" means any person that 18 lo-
cated &1& a State and ell6aged III the 6usmes. of bcualtlng and
Includel-
(AJ ORy dePOSitOry Institution (as defined 1ft .ectW1&
19(bXIXAJ of the Federal Reserve Act);
(B) all.)' Feckral raeroe banle..
(C) any Federal home loon banA, or
(1)) to the utent It acts CI. ~ payor-
(lJ the Treasury of1M Urut,d States,
(u) the United StGtn Po,tal &rvIC~;
(Jill a State gouemment. or
(IU) a unit ofgenual local gOlJernnlent (aa dA!fUled
In section 602(24) of the Ezpedtted Funds Auodabll&tJ
Act}
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(3) BANKING TERMS -
(A) COLLBCI'ING BANK-TM term "collect"lg bani·'
mealU 4ny banA Mn.dltng a ch«1t. for collectIOn. ucept I1&c
payJ"4 bani
(B) DEPOSITARY BANK -TM term "tUpGSItcry bani"
meolU-
(,) 1M fir,t bani to whu:h a check " trtJn.~rred.
even "such bani IS also the po.ymg bani or tM poyer,.
or
ria) a bank to WhlCh a chec1c IS tran,ferr,d for _-
POSlt In an account at .uch. baM, even If the cluelc I.
phySIcally recalled Gll.d uulorsed first by cmotlattr 6GM
(C) PAYING BANK -The term -paYing baM- nMCIM-
(I) 1M 6anIc by wluch 0 CMcJc IS ~tJ"lc. u""••
the cMck IS pcyable at or through another baM end
IS sent to 1M other beanA for payment or coll«tUJII. or
(IV tM bcni at or thro".A whICh 4 cheei u pay-
able Gnd to winch the ch«Jc I' sent for payment or col-
lectIOn
(D) RBTuRNING BANK.-
(J) IN GBNERAL -The term -returnmg 64",- meGIU
a batik (ot1u!r t1uJn the payllll or depoSItory baM) hlJll-
dlU16 4 returned CMclc or notICe III u.eu ofreturn
(II) TREATMENT AS COLLBCTl NG BANK -No proUI-
.&On of thu Act shall be construed a. o(fecc.t&B the
treotnunt of a returlWll bank tJ$ a colkctl.'W IHJnA for
p~es of sectlOll 4-202(b) of tlac Um/orm COIIUMr·
CUll Code
(4) BOARD -ThB WIn -Boo.rd" means tIu Board of Gou-
ernors of the Fedi!ral Rucrve System
(5) BUSINESS DAY -The urm -blU'M" day" 1a4s the _anI.
meamRg as UI sectl.Oll 602(3) of the ExpedIted Funds Auod-
olullty Act.
(6) CHBCK -The term "chec.--
(A) means a draft, payable on cUmand and drawn on
or payable through or at an of{u:e of a baM. whBther or not
negotlCble. that IS h4ndled for forward collection or return,
Includu'''B Q subst"ut~ check onll a trauele,., checlc. tUld
(B) doe. not Include a noncam Item or an It,m payabk
III a mecUwn otMr than Umted States dollar,
(1) CONSUMER -The term ·con,umer" means an IncUUuluGl
who-
(A) with respect to CJ checlc handled for forward collec-
twn. drtl,WS the eheclc on. a consumer tJCcount, or
fB) w.th rupect to 4 checlc han.tlb!d for return. tUpo.,'.
the check mto, or cashes the chccJe tJ8GUl$t, a consumer ac-
count
(8) CONSUMER ACCOUNT -The term ·COlllumeT account-
Iuu tlu _me nwuung tJS In sedwn 602(10) of thd Expedited
Funds Availability Act
(9) CUSTOMBR -TM t~rm ·customer" me4ns Q ~rson hov-
1.116 an account With G hoM
(10) FORWARD COLLECTION-The tum "forward colkctlon"
naeons the transfer by a baM of a check to a coUect&1I6 bani
for .ttlement or tlu! POYf."8 bank for payment
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(11) INDEMNIFYING BANK -The term u"ntkmnl.!YI1&6 bank"
means a IJcIM tho.t IS prouub.,., 4ft mdemn1t1 unelir .ct&on 6
wIth respect to (l .ub,td"t. cMc1c
(12) MICR UNB.-TM ternl' -MICR line" and -magnetIC
1M chartJCter ncognltlOn. lIne" 1M41l 1M nunlbe1'8, whICh may
U&ducle the baM TOU"1I6 number, account nunaber, cleele num-
ber, chtclt. amount, and otMT .n(ormatlon.. that are pnnted Mar
the bottom of G chea III~t ..c In' In CICCorclance WIth gen-
erally 19Jplu:Gbk Industry sttmd4rds
(13) NONCASH lTEJI-TM term -noncash. Item" has the
san.., meanUlg as 1/& sectIOn 602(14) of 1M E~pedl.ted Funds
Aumlab&lay ACt
(14) PusON-The term -penon" means Q natural ~rson.
corporatIOn., u1W\Corporated com.pan~, portneralup, ,ouernm" ..'
unIt or lllJtrumcntallty, trust, or an~ olMr entIty or organlZo·
tlon
(15) RBcONVBRf'INO BANK -The term HreconlJertUlg banJz-
meaM-
(J\) the banl that crmtes (J ,ubstltute cheu; or
(B) if a substItute checle IS created b, a per,on olMr
than. G baM, the first bOM that trtmBfer. or presents Buell
,ullstuute cMcJc
(16) SVBSTITUfB CHBCK.-TM term ·substltute checJc"
meGIU a~r reproduce IOn of 1M 0r&B17l4l eMd that-
(A) conttJlll6 an un.a.ge of the front an.d baclc of the
O"6utal checJe;
(8) bear. a MICR h,~ t»nttunUJg all tM "nformatwn
ap~UIJl on the MICR luut i:a": 0t18U1Gl check, except as
prolJul«l under genertdly app Ie uid"ary ,tandards for
,"b.tltuU cMc1cs to faCdltBte the processuag of subst..tut.
check.,·
(C) conforms. In ptJ~r stock, ,lIIMIWDn, tlnd otlu!rwl$f!,
with geMraUy appltcahle J,ndU8try ,tal'Ulard. for sub,tltute
C~Cl&" and
(D) lB SUl.table for automated PI"IJU••"nI In the same
nlanncr os th.e Onglnal checlt.
(17) STATB -T~ ternl ·State- ha6 the ,anle m«Jnmg as In
sectIOn 3(0) oftM F«lerol DePfMlt Insurance Act
(18) TRUNCATE -The ~rn" ·truncate" means to remoue an
orlgUltll paper checJc from 1M check collectIon or return process
and send to II reclP~nt, In l~u of such Ol18lnal poper checJc. a
.ub.tl.tute eMu or, by 08r.ment. InformatIOn relatIng to the
ongJ,nal cMcIc (IncludIng data taleen from the MICR line of the
onglnal cMc1l or on el«troRte unt.Jg, of tM onglnal check),
whether Ullth or WIthout subsequent dcllwry of the onglnal
paper cMci
(19) UNIFORM COMJlERCIAL CODE -The term "Unlform
CommercIal COtUit means the Uniform Comnaercwl CotU In ef-
fect In (J State.
(20) OTHER TERMS -Unlen the contut require. otherw...
the terms not defined Ul tlus sectIOn shall ooue tlac same mean-
Ings 41 111 the UlUform Comnlercllli Code
SBC. 4. CBNBRAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING SVBS7'ITUl'll CHECItS.
(a) No AOREEMENT REqUlRBD.-A penon. may depOInt, pruent,
or .end for collectlOll or return Q substllute chec1l WIthout an agree-
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ment with lhe reclpl..nt. so long as a banJc has mack the &uarrtUI.t&e.
In sectIon 5 with respect to ,ueA 6ubstltute cMele.
(b) LEGAL EQUIVALBNCE.-A substitute checJc sJudI be the legal
equ,ualent of the onglnal checle for a.U purposes. 11ICludmg tmy pro·
vlSzon of lJ1&y Federal or State law. tJnd for aU pertlOlU if tM .ub...
Btl-tute cAeck-
(1) accurately represents aU of the u&{ormatlon on tile front
and back of tA. onglnal CMcJc as of the tllM tM 0"6'1141 checJc
wa truncated; and
(2) bears tM kgend 'ThIS 18 a legal copy 0( your cMci
You can use d the same way you would use tlae onga.nol cMd»
(c) ENDORSEJI BNTS --,A bani .1uJl ensun tluU fM sub.tltute
check for wlucA 1M bonA IS the reconverting bani Man all endorse-
ments applied by partIes tluJt preVIously IuJndlcd the checi (w1&etJaer
In electronu: form or In fM form of the Onglnal paper cl&ecJc or tI
subst.tute cMd) (or forwtUYl collectlon or return .
(d) IDBN7'lnCATlON OF RECONVERnNG BANK --A bani .JuJU
identIfy ,tself (IS Q, reconvert.ng bank on any sub.tltut. cJuclt for
whIch the bani U (I reconuerlu\Il bo.nk 80 as to pre_rue any pre-
VIOUS nconumuag btuaJ& ukntl{&catlons m conformance wltA .ell·
erally applJCGble IMrutry standards
(e) A,pPUCABLB LAw -A $ub.tltute check that IS tM lqtJ «lUlU-
alent of the ong.,uJ checJ& under subsecuon (b) sluJl be .ub.]eC' to
any proUJlIOr&, "acllUlJng any proVJSton nlahfl8. to tM protection of
cU6tomen. ofpart J29 oftitle 12 of tM Code of FedcrallW6ulatIOAI.
tM Umform ConuMraal Code. ond GIl)' otMr applJCGble l'etMral or
State ICJW as .,.ucA .ub".t"t, chec1c were the ong&.nol cMcl&~ to the
ment $ueh PI'OIJ&$UH& of low IS Iwt Ulcoruutent wIth tAu Act
SEC. I. SUBSTmIT.C~ "ARRANI'IBS.
Abcmll tIuJt transfers. presents. or I'2turns a sub.tltutc checA
and recelues consulerabon for the checlt. warTOnts, CJI a motter of
law. to the trans~ree. any subsequent collectU18 or ntuml."I btJnA,
th, dePOSI,tary bank, the drawee, the drawerl the payee. tM ckpoa·
tor, and any endorser (rrgardla, of whether the warrantee recaue.
the substItute eked or another paper or electromc form of the .ub-
stltute eMu or original check) tluJ.t-
(1) the su.bstltute cMclC meeu all the requirements for legtJl
eqUivalence under sectIOn 4(6)1 tlnd
(2) no depo.&.ttuy bani, drawee. drawer. or endorser wdl re-
ceUH! presentment or return of the substItute check. the orl6U14l
checi, or a copy or OIMr paper or electromc verBlon of the ,ub-
stltute check or ongl1l4l chtcJc such that the bOM, drawee,
drawer, or endorser wUl be a.s1ted to l7UJie a paym.nt based on
a check that the bank, draun~. drawer, or endorwr 1uu already
paul.
SBC. 6. INDBJlNrrr.
(a) INDEMNITY.-A reconuert'lI8 banA and each baM IMt .ub-
sequently transfers. yTe,ents, or retum., a substItute CMcJc IA any
e~ctron&C or peper form, and receives consIderation for such trruu-
fer, presentment. or return mall Indemnify the transferee, any .uh·
sequent collectIng or retunung bani. the tUpo,,,tary bani, 1M draw-
ee, tM drawer. the payee. the tkpoSltor, alld any endorwr, up to tM
anlount described III subsections (b) and (c). as appl&ea.blc. to the a;-
tent of any loss .lIccund by any rec.punt of CI sub,t"u" clled if
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(A) til. amount of any 10.8. up to the amount of tlu!
substitute c1ucJe; and
(8) Interest cuul aperuu (I,ncludJng cost, and TetJ80n·
able attorney's fees and othu apen,ses ofrepruentotwn)
(cJ COJIPARA~ JtlroUGBNCE -
(1) IN GBNBRAL -If tJ los. described In subsectIOn (a) n-
sults III whok or U& part flOm lJ&e rwwlr.gence or failure to act
In good ltJJ.th all the pert of an Uldemll1/ied party, then that
party', ua.demmfu:ct"on uruler tlus MctlOn shall be reduced an
proportIon to the amount of MgIwence or bod faIth ottnbutable
to thtat ptJrty
(2) BULB OF CONSTR UCTlON -NotJu.ng In tAlS .ubuetlDn re·
dru:es 1M nahts of tl consumer or any otlu!r person under the
Umform CommeT'CUll Code or other Gpplacabk proUWOIl ofFed-
eral or Stou lew.
(d) EFFECt 0' PRODUClNG ORIGINAL CHECK OB COpy-
(1) IN GENERAL -If the uadem,ufylng bcu&A produces the
orwuaal ch«Ic or a copy of tAe o"lUIGI CMe" (If&clwb1l6 41&
.mage or g ,uIntltut, cla«Je) thDJ aceurtJtely represent. aU of the
"nformatlOn. on tM front GIld bock of tM Onglnal check (lU of
the tl1M the ongantd checi w(U trullCtJ.ted) or J$ otherwue suff..-
c~nt to thtermllu wlutMr or not 4 claIm IS valid, tM Indem-
nIfyIng boM sholl-
(A) be IUlble under tIw sectlon only for losses covered
by the meUm,"'Y thot are Incurred up to tM hm~ tluzt the
or'l/lllOl cMcJc or copy IS pTOVukd to the uukmrn/ied party.
and
(8) have (J ngAt to the return of any funds It has pcud
ulUUT t.he uademlUty III ucess of those losses
(2) COORDINATION OF INDEMNITY WI17I IJiPUBD WAR ..
RANrY.-The productIOn of the ongl1UJ1 checl. (J sub,tltute
checi, or G COP7 under 1JG!06NIph (1) b, an uademnlfymg bank
sholl not absOlve the bQn4 from any "ability on (I warrant;, es·
tGbllShed under tJus Act or any other proUI'IOn. of law
(e) SUBROGA770N OF RIGH7S-
(1) IN GBNERAL.-Eadr. uadenllUfyuag bank shall be sub·
rogoted 10 tM nghts of any lndcmmfi«J. party to the extent of
the Indemmt;,
(2) RECOVERY UNDBR WARRANTY.--A bank that Indem1UMs
a port, un.der'lus section ma)' attempt to recover from another
ptJrty based on G IUClrrtUlty or other claam.
(3) DUlY 0' lNDEMNlFlED PARTY.-Each uuknllUf&ed party
.hall MW (I duty to comply wIth all nuo1'ltJbk reqlU.t. ·for as-
th.tJt loss occurred due to the receIpt of a .ubstltute checlc Instead of
the ongUJD.l cMcA.
(b) INDEMNITY AMOUNT -
(1) AMOUNT IN EVENT OF BREACH OF WARRANTY -The
amount of tM Indemnity under subs«tlOn (aJ shall be the
amolUlt of any 10" (uacludlng co.ts IJIId TelJSOnable attomq's
fee. end otJuT apensa ofrepraentotJOn) p~una.telyCCJU"d by
a 6~ ofa UHJITcJnty prouuled ulkkr :reetlDn 5
(2) AMOUNT IN ABSENCE 0' BREACH OF WARRANTY -In the
a.bsence of tJ breach of a warranty prouuled und~r sectlOR 5, the
amount of the Ulummty under subsection (aJ ,haU be tJu! sum
0(-
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.,stance from an IndemnifYing banJ& In connect.on with fJIly
clcum th, I.ndllmn'fYlng bank brl.ngs agalMt B UHUrantor or
other PJJrly relD.~d to 0 CMclt. thot form. the basIS for tM .n·
demmficabon
SBC. 'I. IaPBDI7'ED aCRBDn FOR CONSUJlBRS.
(a) RECREDIT ClAIMS-
(1) IN GENERAL -A COIl8umer m~1 mah (J cltum for upe-
cht,d recredlt from the bani that holds 1M account of tJac COli-
sumer wIth respect to d substttute check. If the consumer uftn.
III good fOJth tluJt-
(AJ tM bank charged the consumer#, account for a Bub-
.t,tute CMCJc tluJt wcu provukd to lite consumer,
(B) ••ther-
(J) the cMck was not properly charged to the con-
sumer'. account, or
(u) the consumer has a warranty cla&m WIth re-
spect to such substItute cMCIe,
(C) the consumer Buffered G Te8UU.ng lOBS. and
(D) tlu product.on of th, orJ8lnal cAecA or G ~ttu copy
of ,he oTII"ncl checJc IS 1UCeS$4TY to tktemalM the uolld1Jy
ofan~ chum ck,cr&bed .11 subJJGfYJBrt¥Jla (B)
(2) 4O·DAY PERlOD.-AIIY claim u~r paragraph (1) with
respect to tl consumer account may be lubmuted by CI C01&8umer
~fore the tlld of tlte 4O.day perIOd MgUlllmg 011 1M ltJter o{-
(AJ the dtJte on which the finoncUJl Ul6tltutWI& mGlu or
ckl,uen. by a metut8 agreed to by tM couumer, t~ perl·
odIC statement of account for such account wlucJa contoUII
mformallon con.cerlllllB ~he trru&sact lOll ClUIng rlBe to the
claIm, or
(B) tlu! date on wInch the $ubstltuU cJa«i u nacuU
Quallobl, to 1M C01l8umtr
(3) EXTENSION UNDER EXTENUA TING ClRCUIISTANC ES -If
the abilIty of 1M consunur to submit t~ claIm W&tJUI& the 40-
day penod under poragra.ph (2) u delayed due to extenuatIng
cU"Cumsta1JCe" ,ncluchng extended travel or 1M dine•• of the
consumer, the 4O-day penod shall be utended b~ CI recuolIGble
amount of tIme
(6) PROCEDURES FOR CLAlMS.-
(1) IN GENERAL -To male a clmM for on ex~t«lTeCrecUt
uruUr subsectIOn (a) with respect to a substitute chcci. the COII-
sunwr shall proulCU to tJae banJt that holds the account of such.
COn&Umer-
(A) a cUscrlptlOR of the claim, In.cludJng an upl4n4tWII
of-
(&) why t~ substltu~ check was not properly
charged to tM consumer', account; or
(u) t~ warrant1 clolm WIth respect to such cMclc.
(8) G .tatemtnt tluJt tlac C0118umer suffered CJ los. CI1&d
an e8tun4t~ of the amolUlt of the loss;
(C) the reason why productIOn. of the. onglnal checlJ or
a better copy of the original CMci IS n.ecessary to ck~rm.IM
tM Vtllul&t, of tM charge to the consumer', account or the
UlGrranty clcum, Gnd
(D) suf/iCUllt r.n{ormatwn to "dentlfy the _"b.t.tu"
cMcl and to r.nvcstwate the clal.m.
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(2) CLAIM IN WRITING -
(A) IN GENERAL -The btlnJc hold&n, the COMUIfleT ac-
count lluJt I' 1M lubjeCt of II cltJIm by the consumer ulUUr
,ubJedaoli (aJ mtJy, III tlw cUscretlOft of the bank. rcqUUl!
tNt coruum," to submit the InformatIOn requIred u1uler
IXJ1'OI!O.Ph (1) an writIng
(B) MBANS OF SUBMISSION -A banA th4t requves a
.ubmlS.&On of mlormatlon. UncUT .ubparagraph (A) may
~mut~ eo""umer to make the submlftl,Oft electro,ucally.
if 1M couumer Iuu agreed to commulUcote wr,th 1M banlc
III tluJt manner.
(c) &cBDlf' TO CONSUMU -
(1) CONDmONS lOR RECRBDlT -TM ba.M .hall recredl.t a
consumer a«Dunt III at:COrdance with paragraph (2) for the
amounl ofa .ubstl'ute cAeclt that was charged agaInst the con·
_"mer aceowat ,,-
(A) II conawnu submIts (I cltum to tM bcnl wIth n-
_~t to that .ub.tltuu cMck that 1Met. 1M reqwrement of
• .,6aechOft (6); and
(B) 1M banIc Iuu not-
(aJ prouwd to the consumer-
OJ 1M OngUlal ch«It; or
«1) a. copy of the on.fU'UIl cMcle (uacluduag an
UJlG6' or a sub,utule ch«Jc) that accurately rep-
1Y_lIts aU of the m/ormatlOll on tIN front end bad
of~ ongu&al cAeclt.. at of tJae tIme at whICh tM
ongUUJl cMcle wtU trullaJt«l. and
(Il) dltmonstrated to tM coMumer that tM sub-
.nlute cIa«It UJ(I,f pro~rly c1a4rg«l to tM consumer tJC·
coUllt
(2) TIllING 0' HeREDIT-
(A) IN GENERAL -The bani .htJU recred&t the con-
aumu·. tJeCOUnt for tM amount lkscnbed &II paragraph (1)
no later tluJII the end of tM bUSiness day ·followmg the
bcuII'IaI d41 on which 1M bani determ&M' tM consumer·s
doun I. IHJluL
lB) RBCRBDIT PENDING INVESTlGA110N -If the bank
Iuu lItH ~, dft,rmmed that tlu co1lSume,', clolm IS l1alul
befoIW the end of the 10th busilless day after the bUSlMSS
dD,y 0" wJuch. tM COMUmer submitted the claun, llu! bemk
.1uJU recreclJt the consumer'. account for-
(,) 1M laser of the amount of the substJ,tute cluck
t1uJt Well charged a.ftuMt the consumer account. or
II.sOO. together w&th allteral "the account IS CJI'& InUr·
ut·bl!tJTUl6 account. no later tMn 1M end of such 10th
bralllC•• doy, and
(uJ ~ remmllU18 aMOunt of the Bubstltute ~c.
tAat UHJI charged agtUl&Bt the coruumer account. If any.
together WIth. mt~rest if the account IS aft Interest-bear-
IA6 account. not la.tcr than the 45th aJendar day fol-
IoUl"" tM lnuuaess day on winch thI c01l8umer .ub·
mit- the cltwn
(d) AVAlLABlUI'Y 01' RBCRBDIT-
(1) Nar BUSINBSS DAY AVAILABIUTY.-Ezeept 4S profJuUd
,1& IJIU'd6raph. (2J. G banll that prouu1es a reerecLt to G conaumer
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account under subsectIon (e) shall make the recrecb.Ud lunda
aual.labk for WIthdrawal by the COMumer by llu! .tort of the
nut busuaess day after the ousmess day on whlCla the banJJ re-
credits the consumer's account und4!r lubsectlOn (c)
(2) SAFEGUAR D EXCEPTIONS -A bani may cklay aUG"-
abultY to a consumer of G recredlt provukd under $UbleetlOll
(c)(2)(B)(I) until tht 8tart of either thl! bUBUless day foilowU16
tlu! bUSIness day on wInch. tM banJc cktununa that tM COII-
sumer's clOJm ,s valid or tIN 45th calendar dlJ,y foUoulln.g the
bus,ne.. day on whICh the consumer .ubm.t. a cla'm for .w:h
recredlt In 4CCOrdance with .ubsectlOn (bJ, wh&eheuer 18 earlier.
In any of the followU16 CIrCumstances •
(A) NEW ACCOUNTS.-Tl&e claun IS made durUV tla« 30-
day perIOd ~1UUng Oil tM bUSIness dey the colUumcr ac-
count was estGbll$hid
(B) RBPEA TED OVERDRAFTS -Without regard to IhI
charge thot u tM subject of the claIm for wInch tM rccred&t
was made-
(.) on 6 or more bUSiness days dunng the fi.month
~nod endurg on tlae date on wluch th, COMum" ,ub..
mlts the cltum, the balance ,n th~ consunaer account
was ~at,ue or would AGue become MgGtlue If da,cb
or other cho.rga to t1&c account had been pGJd, or
(,") on 2 or more bUSl1U!SS days dunna .uch 6·
month perlod~ the balance ,n the COMumer tJCCOU1It UI(U
Mgatlwor would haue beconu! nega.llue III tIN amount
of $5,000 or nlore if checlu or other chtJrgc. to tAe ac·
count had been pcul
(e) PREVENTION OF FRAUD LOSSES -Tiu baM Juu rea-
sonable CBIUIf! to behew thot tJu daun IS flYJudulcnt, 6tUed
on (<<ts (otMr than. 1M fot:t that tM chee' In questlO" or
the consunler " of (I partICular c1a6s) that would co,", (I
well-grounded beluf In tM m,nd of a reasonable pe'601&
that the claim JS fraudulent.
(3) OVERDRAFT FEES -No bank tMI, In accordance WIth
palTJ8raph (2), delays the ClUQUabu"y of a recredct UMU .ub-
sectIOn (d to any consumer account nuJy Impose any ouertlra.ft
fee. WIth respect to drafts drown by tM consumer 011 .ucla. re-
credited tunount Mfore the end of the 5-doy penod beBzll1Ull6 011
tM date notICe of the tklay ,n the arJlulabu,ty of .u.ch amount
" sent by 1M boni to t1ae consumer
(e) REVER&L 0' RECRBDIT.-A bank 11I4y reuerse a reeredlt to
Q consumer account " thl 6411i-
(1) deternunes that a substItute cMclc for whICh the bani
recrecbted G consumer account urukr subsectloll (c) wtU III ftJCt
properly cJaarged to the consumer account; and
(2) not"~$ th, consumer In accordance With lubsectlon
(1)(3).
(fJ NOTICE TO CONSUMER -
(1) NOTICE IF CONSUMER CLAIM NOT VALID-If (J bt.mJt 1M-
termlnes that a subsutute cla«lc .ubJect to tlu! conJIume"'. cltum
was .n foct properl, charged to the consumer·. account. the
bank sJuJII ,eM to the consumer, no later tluJ", tM buana••,
followI1I6 the busuaus d4y on wInch the ballk make. G IXtu-
m,1UJt,ota- .
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(A) the or&81nal check or a copy of tM onganal cked
(lncludlna 41& ImtJge or a substitute cMcA) that-
(I) accurately represents all of the ..nformatlOn on
the front and bticlc of the orl/llntJl checJc (eu of the tune
the onglnol checlt. was truncated), or
(Il) 16 otMTWlse sufficient to cletunuM whether or
not the consumer's cltum IS ualul; and
(B) GIl up14rt4laon. of the basIS for til. determlnatwn. by
the bani tAai the substitute checll was properly charged, m-
cludmg (I statenunt that the cons~r may reqtust COple.
0( tiny In{ormo.tlon. or docllllUnt, on whIch, the bani relied
In mailng the cktermlll4t101I
(2) NOnCB OF RECRBDlT.-lf (I bank recrm"t, a cOnlumer
account under subsectiOn. (e), the bank .hall send to the con-
sUnw!r, '10 later than the bUSIness day foUowI1I6 lhe bUlUl.ess
day 011 wluch. the bon111U1Aes the recrecUt. a 1IDllce 0(-
(AJ the amount of the recredlt; and
(B) the clcJte the recredUed fuTUls lUlU be ovoUa.6k for
lIIJ.tladrawal
(3) NOTICE OF REVERSAL OF RECREDIT-In tJdduUJll, to the
notl~ reqUlnd undtr ptJrtJ6roph (1), "a baM FeW,... a re-
credited tunount under subsectaon. (e), the baM .holl send to tM
consumer, no later than eM busmess day /ollowln, the bUSIMSS
ooy on wInch tM baM rruerses the recrecUt. 4 notICe of-
(A) the amount of the rev,,.,al; and
(8) 1M date the reeredlt UHIS reversed.
(4) MODB OF DBUVERY --A notIce clacnbed III tlus sub-
section shall be delIvered by UlUted States mml or by ony ollutr
me4IU through, w~la 1M COMuntU 1uu agn«l to l'ft~lUe ce-
CO"'" U&(onnatlOfl
(g) OTHER ClAlJlS NOT AFncrBD.-Prou,dJ1I6 tl recr«bt In ~ ..
conlcincc Wltla. 1m. sectIOn .hall nol ohsolve tM bunk from babuuy
for a cltum made under any other law. such os G claim for wrongful
dishonor under the Uniform Commercual Code, or (ronl lwblltty for
addulOnal domCJ8u under sectlOll 6 or 10.
(h) CLARIFICATION CONCERNING CONSUMER POSSESSION-A
consunaer who WQII prouuJed 0 substitute checJc l1UJy make G clcum
for an expedIted reered" under llus sectIon. wIth regard to (J IroM-
action UlUOWIIII the substuute ch«Jt whether or not the CORlumer
I' In po••••W", of the sub.hl"te cluck
(1) SCOPE OF APPUCA DON -Thu sectIon sholl only apply to
customers who ore con,ume,..
SEC. ... BXPBDlTED BECREDD' PIlOCBDVUS FOR BANKS.
(oJ RECREDIT CLAIMS -
(1) IN GENERAL -A baM may moAt a. claim OIJcuMt an In..
<UlR1Ilfylllg ban, for expedited recrecbl for wluch that b4llll IS
Indemmfied 11-
(A) the cltUmtul.t bani (or 4 bad that the claunant
bani has lncUm1U{i«l) hat recewed a clcum for upedlt«l
recred&t from G coruumC!r ruuler .ecbon 7 wdh respect to G
substItute ch«Jr. or would laaue ~n subject to such a clcwn
1uul tM consume,'s tJt:Coulll been charged,
(8) tM clcumant INzni has suffered G resultIng 10•• or
... oblWated to ncredJt G colUumer account "ncUr sectlon 1
wuh respect to such substitute check, and
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(C) productwn of the original check, anotMr $Ub8tltute
clue}" or a better copy of the o"6lntJl checll u necell841Y to
ckterm&M the val,eLty of the cha,.., to the customer account
or GIl' warranty clcum connected with 8uel& ."6.',,,,"
checi
(2) 12tJ.DAY PBRlOD-Any clfJI.m untkr partJgraph (1) ma,
be submitted 6)' the claunont baM to an Indemru(~11&Iba.1ai be-
fore tlae end of the 120-00, begantung on the date of 1M lrau-
action thot gave nse to the clfUm
(6) PROCEDURES FOB CUJMS -
(1) IN GENERAL -To maie a claim under .ubuctlon (II) for
an oped&ted recrecL,t relating to a &ubstuuu cAccJe, tM doIm·
ant banlc shall .nd to tM lruUmnify,,"6 hank-
(A) a deSCT&ptloll of-
(&) the cltJun, lncludlllS an upltJ1UJt&On of wAy tlae
substItute check cannot be properly charged to tM eo"·
surner account, or
(u) the warranty claun,
(8) (1 .totement th4t the c14unallt bank has 8uffered G
loss or,s oblz.gaud to recredu the COM~"'. account ul'U.kr
section 7, together with 011 atlmale of the amount of tM
loss or recredU.
(C) the reason why productwn of 1M o'V&nal cMcle.
another 'U6stltute clue", or tI betur copy of the ol"lllUUll
c~cl IS necessary to cktermuae tlac 1HIluL.t" of tM cluu6c to
the COMumer account or the WGrrant1 elGIn..; and
(D) "n(ormaJUJn sufflCunt for the I,.ndcmtUbU16 baM 1o
&fUn"fy the substltut~ check and to Inuat"ate the claun.
(2) REqUIREMENTS RELATING TO COPIES 0' SUBsrrrvrB
CHECKS -If the m{ormabon ,ubmltted 6, II clauraant bcml pur·
luan' to paragraph (1) In conMchon Wltla II cltum for Oil ~.
dlted recnd"t Ulcluda a copy of any $Ubstltute clue. for winch
Qll,y such claun " nuuk, the claimant banlt shoJI ltdc ,.,tUOII-
able steps to ensur, thai. any ,ru;h copy cannot be-
(A) mIStaken for the legal equivalent of the checlc under.
"ctlon 4(bJ. or
(BJ sent or handkd by any baM, Includuag the "n.dem-
TUfy'1I/l bank, as (J forward collectIOn or returMd checJe
(3) CLAIM IN WRITING -
(A) IN GENERAL.-An Incknanlfylng btJnj may, 111 tM
dlscretwn of tAe bank, requll"£ the clG&mant beaM to .ubmu
the InformtJtlOn requtnd by ptUtJBraph (1) In wn~, &1&-
cludmg Q cop, of 1M IAIntten or electronICally ."bmlttccl
elalnl. if GIIY. that tM C01lSu~r profJltkd "" acconltuace
WIth sedlOn 7(6)
(B) MEANS OF SUBM ISSlON -All IntUmnlbl"6 6GAi
that reqUU'f$ a submISSIOn of I.nformatlon undU ,,,,bptJlYJ-
graph (AJ may ~rmt.l the claImant ba.M to make 1M .u6·
mlUlOn ekctronICdU" "tM clmmant baM Illd lJ81Wetl to
commUlucate WIth the lndemmfymg baM &n tluJ.t mallnu
(c) RBCRBDlT BY INDEMNIFYING BANK-
(1) PROMPT ACTION REqUlRED.-No loter than 10 bu.U&as
day, after th~ bUSl1le'8 day on whICh an mdemlUfylng baM re-
CIUveS 0 cltJI.m under subsectIon (a) from (J cltu17UJnt bad With
re,~ct to a substItute checJc~ the lruUmnl.f"ng ba.M s1uJll-
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(AJ proUJcU, to the claimant bcnlt, the on6lnaJ checJc
(with re.pect to such ,ubshtuu cMcI) or (I copy of the OTJ6&·
nal cJaec" (&nclud&". 41& Ullage or 4 substitute claeclcJ thot-
(&) accurately represents aU of the Information on
t~ front and back of the ong&ncl checJc (41 of tlu! tUIW
the orlllmal check WGS truncatedJ, or
(u) 18 otherwISe sufficunt to tktemuM fM bani's
cloun u IUJt ualul, and
fB) recrldlt ,he clcumant baM for the amount of the
claIm up to 'M amount of the .ub,t&tu~ checi, plus Intere,t
If 4JJpllcabk. or
(C) Pl'OUJtU InformatIOn to tM c141mont ban' 4B to why
tM uulemtubmg bani &a IIOt obl'l1t1ted to compl, wltla .ub·
ptJragroph (A) or (B)
(2) RECRED1T DOBS NOT ABROGATE OTHER LIABILITIES-
ProlJlcbng a recredJt under tla.. ,ubsectlOn to 4 claimant bonk
WIth respect 10 4 sub.tltute claeck .la4ll not ab$olw tlu IIIt'km-
nlfy&r&g banlc from lUJblhty for claims brought under any DtMr
lOUJ or from addwoMl dGmoge. IlIUUr scctlon 6 or 10 WIth n ..
specl to sua. checlc
(3) RUUND ro INDEIINlFYlNG BANIC.-lf a clounant lHmJ,
reueIWs, In occordana! with sectIOn 1(e), 4 ncredU preuwualy
mcuk to tJ consum,r account under sectlO" 1(C), or otMrwIBC n·
t:e1W' 4 cretht or I'fCr«U.t WIth regard to .uch .ub,tllUle ch«11~
the clmmont bani shall promptly refund to any UldemnJ/ymg
ban' emy amount pnulOIUly adlJtlllCed ", flu! uulenuufYl1I6
baM III connectlOll With ,uch substitute cMcJc
(d) PaODUCDON 0' ORIGINAL CHECK OR A SU",C,BNr COpy
GOVERNED BY 8EC17ON 6(d) -If 1M IndemmlYu'w ban' prouack, the
claimant boni with 1M OIVIMl checJc or a copy of the 0l16.n.al
ch«1e ("nclu.d,,., all ""UWc or a .ub.t"tute cMc/c) uncUr .ubscctaon
(c)(lXAJ, sectIOn 6(dJ .hall 60WTII any ngAt of the "ncUmlu!ymg
banle to any repayment of any fun.ds the lRtUmmfylT&g bani ha, Te-
credlted to tAt cl4UII.CIIU bani pursuant to sub.ctJ.on. (e)
SEC• •• DBLAYS IN AN DlBRGBNCY.
A delay by a baM b4!y0nd the tune limits pracnbfd Or per-
mitted by tin. Act ,1UJll be t%CUsed "the delay IS coused by Inter-
ruption of commWUCGtlOll or computer (acdu,e,. ,uapeUlon of pay-
nunts bylUUJther baM, WGT. emergency concldlOlIS, failure of~Ulp·
mant, or other ClTCumsltJlICa beyond the control ofa ballA and "the
bt:mA lUes such dIl,.,&ee cu tM clrCunJ,stanca require
sse. Jo.. IlBASVU OF lJAJIAG£S.
(cc) LrABIUTY-
(1) IN GENERAL -Excqt as prouuUd In ftCtlOn. 6, ony per-
BOI& who6 &II connection wuh a Bubstltut. c1&eci, breaches any
worrall'Y under thIS Act or !am to comJJly With any requln-
naent Impoled by. or rt!8WBtUJA prescnbetl pursua.nt to, tlus Act-
With respect to any otMr person. ,IUJU be lUJbk to such person
1ft 4n amount equal to the sum 0(-
(N the lcaer of-
(I.) the amount of the loss su(fend by 1M otlu!r per-
.on GI G re.ult of the breach or (,"lure, or
(I.&) ,he amount of tlac .ubst&tu~ cAeci, and
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(8) Interest and apense.· (Including costs and reuon-
o6k attorney's fee. and other e%peMU of repramttmon) re-
lated to the substitute check
(2) OFFSI:'F OF RECREDFrS -T~ amount of dtuntllle. any
person receIves rmcUr ptUYJlra.ph (1). afony• •hall 6e reduced by
the amount~ "any. tho.t the clo.t.man.t receiVes and retGJM cu G
recredJt uluUr sectIOn 1 or 8
(6) COMPARATIVE NEGUGENCE-
(1) IN GENERAL -If 0 person Incurs oom06e, thot resulted
1ft whole or In peu:t from the negugence or fculure of thot [JeraDl&
to act In good (mth. then the amount ofany luJJlllty due to t1uJt
penon. under .ub.ect,on (a) shall be reduced In proportUJ1& to
the amount of Ilf,lwence Or bad faith attrlbut4ble to tAat per-
Ion
(2) RULB OF CONSTR UcnON -Nothang In thIS subJeCtion ,,-
duca, the 118l1t, of a COMunler or any other penon wuler tit,
Uruform CommercUJl Code or otMr applIcable proUISIOII ofFed-
eral or State law
SEC. 11. STATUrB OF UJlITA'f'ONS AND NO'I'ICM OF CLAIM.
(a) ACTIONS UNDBR THIS ACT-
(1) IN GENERAL -An actIOn to mforee G dtUm IU'UUr tlau
Act m4:Y be bTOUBM III QI&.1 Umttd States dutnet court. or III
any other court of competent JurwlctlOft. b~fo", tlac entl 0( tlte
I-year perwcl begllllU"8 on t~ claU the cause ofadIoII fJ«TIIa
(2) ACCRUAL -A co". of a.ctlOll accrua G$ of 1M dole 1M
Irvured perl, pm Ieorns# or by wluch .uch penon """""y
should Atw,' leamed. of the fa.c:ts 4I&d CU"trunstfJllCe. ""•• I'IN
10 the caUIe ofodaon
(bJ DISCHARG. OF CWMS -Except o.r proUId«l III .ub.dIoI&
(c). unless a penon ••1Ja notICe· of CI claun to the ,1UkmtUbuw or
warrantIng baM wlthm 30 day. after the per"", hcu reason to
lnow of the clmnl and the ldentlt1 of tM Indemm(yuag or war-
rantIng bani# t~ mdemmfylng or warrantIng bcua.i IS ducAarged
from llabillty In an actIon to enforce a cltum under t/ua Act to the
extent ofGny los. mused 6, the cUlay In glUIng notIce of the claun.
(c) NOTICE OF CLAIM BY CONSUMER ~ '.mel, clcum lw G COli-
Butner under sectIOn 1 for upedUed recredlt constitutes '"nely notlQl
of (J cUJUn by the consunlU for purposes of6ub.ctlOn (b)
SEC. II. CONSUMER AWARENBSS.
(oj IN GENBRAL -Eacla baM .hall prou.tU. In accordance WIth
subsection (6), (l bnef notice about substItute checJu tluJt descrme..-
(1) how a ,ub.tltute checJ& IS the ,.aJ eqwualent of an
ongl.nal check for all purposes. mcludlng any prOUIBUJn of any
Federal or State law, and for all persons, if the ,ub.ttUUle
checll,-
(A) ClCCurat~' repre,ents all of the In(ornUIJ.IDA on tM
front and 6ac1c 0 the Onglnal checA as of the tune at wInd
til. O~lnal cIA WGa truncated; cuad
(8) bear, the le'dnd Tim IS Cl legal ~opy ofyour checJc
You can use It In. the some way you would use the 0l16mal
checlc.', and
(2) tilt consumer recredJt nghts establuhed utuUr .edlOl& 1
when G consumer bel,eue, III good ftJUh that a .ub,tltute c1&cc1c
W(J$ not properly charged to the account ofthe consumer
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(b) DISTRIBUTION -
(1) EX/STING CUSTOMB RS -With respect to consumers who
are ClUtomera of (I baM 011 tlte effective date of tAli Act and
who receive ongr.nal cMclu or substitute clu!cl., 4 banA .1uJll
prouuU the not~ de-enbed In .ub.ectton. (a) to ~h such con-
sumer no Wer tlum the fir,t regularly 8CMdukd commullJCc-
twn wIth the COMumer aftcr tM effectlue dt:JU of tlus Act
(2) NEW ACCOUNT HOLDERS -A ban. shall prouule the no-
tice described 11& SUbsectlOlI (a) to each consumer who WIll re·
ceille or&glnal checle. or ,ubatlt,," checle•• other than eZf"tlll8
custonaers re~rred to 1ft paragraph. (1). at the lUlU! at wlllch the
customer r.laJwnsJup IS IlUtlClt,d
, (3) MODB OF DELlVBRY.--A baM may BCnd 1M not~. re..
qurnd by tlus .ubsedwn by Unded StGle. me" or by CIIIy other
mean, through wluch tM coll8umer 1uu agned to recewe tIC-
count anformtJtlOll
(4) CONSUMERS 'WHO REQUEST COPIES OF CHECKS-Notu:c
.1uJl be prolJuUd to tach. CMlumu of 1M baM that requests a
copy of a. CMclc and recelWI a su.tuufe eMCIc, at 1M tame 0(
tIu! request.
(c) MODEL LANGUAGE -
(1) IN GENERAL -Before tM end of the 9-molltl& perIOd be-
gUl1Ung on the dale of 1M e1l4Ctment of the, Act, t~ Board.
,1UJl publlSA modd forms and clause. th4t G baM may use to
<uscnbe each oflhe elements nquved b1 subsectwn (oJ
(2) SAn lIAIUIOR.-
(A) IN OVIBRAL.---A banII sholl be tnoted as beJng III
complltJACe unth tile requJnm.enls 0( subsectwn (oJ if tM
baM's .ubshtute cMcl notice lUeS a model form or cl4,,"
publWted by 1M Board and .ucA model form or daUBe oc-
clU'Otely MlCr,ba 1M baM', polICIe' and prlJCtaces.
(B) DBUTION OR REARRANGEIIBNT..--A banle may ck-
kte 41&11llfortlUltwn Ul the rno<Ul form or cla.use thtJt JS not
requvcd by thIS Act or rearrange the format
(3) USB OF MODEL LANGUAGB NOT REQUIRED.-Thl, ,eetlon
shall not ~ construed lIS reqwr&nB 4n, baM to usc CI mocUl
form or clau. that 1M Board prepara untkr tAu subsectwn
SBC. ". BF'BCTON OTHER lAW.
TAg Act .1uJ1 ."perscde any proulBlon ofF~ral or State law.
Including tM Uniform CommercUJl Cotlt!. tJuJl JS InooMJ8tent with
thIS Act. bu.t 0'"' to the utent 0{ tM IIJ.t:OllSlSlency
SEC 14. VARIATION BYAGRBEJlVl'l'.
(a) SECTION 8 -Any pl"OIJlSlOn of sectIon 8 may be IHJIVd by
agrunwnt of tM bcJnAs lAuol~d
(6) No OTHER PROVISIONS MAY BEV ABIBD -Euept o.s pro·
ulcled 111 .ub.cchon (a.), no proviSIOn of tAu Act may ~ vaned by
agnement of tu&y peTIOli or per60NI
SEC. J6. UaUIATIONS.
The Board may pnscnN such regulGtIDM tU the Board tUter-
nl&M6 to be necessary to Implement, preuent clrcumuelltloR or ella-
SIOR 0(. or facultate compluJnce with. the proUCSlOru of thu Act.
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SEC IS. STUDY AND REPORT ON FUNDS AVAIlABILITY.
(aJ STVDY.-In order to eualuate the implementatIon and lhe
unpact of tlus Act, thl Board -holl conduct CI stud, of-
(I) the percenttJBe oftolal checks cleared III winch 1M paper
check II Mt f'Cturmd to tIte payen. boni,
(2) llu! alent to wluch bana make (unth aUOIlabk to con-
sumers for local and nonlocal checJc. prIOr to tM UP&rGtlOli of
m4S&mum hold penods;
(3) t~ length of tIme wIthIn wInch dePOSl.tory bani. kG11l
of the nOllpayment oflocal and nonlocal clucks;
(4) the mcTeose or decrease III check-related lo••, ouer tAe
study penod, and
(5) tla, a.ppropnatenl" ofthe t.me penods and amount lun-
.ts applu:tJble under sectlOlIB 603 culd 604 of the EzpetUted
Fund& AlNUlab&l.ty Act, Q,$ In effect on the date of enactment of'Iu. Act
. (b) RBPoRT TO CONGRBSS -Before tM end of the 3D-moAtIa pe-
r&Od. bq&1UUng 011 th, effective date of Uus Act, the Boord .hall • .m.
mIt (I r,port to the Co,.,es. contcumng the results of the .u.dy con·
ducted under tlus 8eCl101l. t~r wl.th recommendotl.OM (or ,.,.-
lat,w actIOn
SEC. 11. Sf'ATlSTlCAL IlBPOIITlNQ OF COSTS AND IIIlVVlUBS '0.
TlUNSPORTING eBBeD BBTWBBN RBSBRVB BAND.
/n the annWJl report prepared by the Board for tAe fir- fuU cal·
endar year after the date of enoctment of thIS Act end III celt of
the. 9 sub~uent ann.ual reports by the Board, the Boord Moll III-
clutk 1M amount of operatmg costs attributable 106 and GIl allmtJte
of tM Federal Reserve 1Janj.' unputed reuenuea denued from, Ih,
transportatIOn of commeTCUJl check. between F«kral Raerw bc:uai
checle Procu-UIB celli,,..
SEC. 111. EVALUATION AND UPORT BY THB COJIPTROLLBll Q~aIAL
. (oJ STUDY.-Duruag the 5·year perIOd begl.nnlng on tJac date of
the encctmcnt of th,. Act, 1M ComptrolUr ~Mrtil of the United
States shGll eualuate the unplementatlon and adnun••tral,on of tm.
Act. mcludl.l16-
(1) an est,ma.te of the 8G1.M ,n econom Ie e(fu;Jency mt&de
possIble from checJ& truncot1011,
(2) aR eualuatlOlI of the benefits accruIng to COMunuTl and
fi1UJ.ncud l",t,tllllOll' from reduced transportatum casU, lorwer
hours for' accepting ~o,"S for CredIt wlth,n 1 bUl,neu da.~.
the Impact of fraud lossu, tmd 411 estunote ofCOMumen' .Juve
of the total benefit. tknued lronl tlus Act, Clnd
(3) an tUsessment ofconsumer acceptance of the checi tr-un·
cation process result,ng from tlus Act, os weU tu. tiny MW co••
IlI.CuITed by consume,.. who had thear or&glnal cMck. return«l
WIth theu- regulor monthly statements prIOr to the d4te ofelttJd·
nlf~llt of tlus Act
(6) REPORT TO CONGRESS -Before the end of the S·,ear penod
.referred to 111 subsectlOlI (aJ, the Comptroller General shall .ubm&t
a report to the Co".r,ss colltGlnuag tM (uuJ.lng6 tuld colICllUlon. of
the Comptroller GeMral U& connectl.on. WIth tM eualuatlO1& con-
ducted punutult to .",".ectaon (0), together With auch ncommcnd4·
t'OI&l for legislative and admlluslrotllJe actIon (I' the Comptrolkr
GeMral may dctemuM to be approprJ4~.
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SBC. 1'. DBPOSITAllY SBRVICBS BFnClBNCYAND COST REDUCTION.
(0) FINDINGS -TM Collfre•• finds tJ6 follows·
(1) The &cretary of the Treasury has 10118 conlpenBtJted fl·
tUUlCl4l.natltutlOnB for uanou, CT~tJ.Cal thporda.ry and fina1&CJal
age~ HrUICft proulcled for or on beJuJlf of tM Umced Stata
by-
(A) plo.cU&8 l~e balonas, commonly referred to as
"compensotU18 balonce,", on depo.1.t at .ueh InsntutWnB,
and
(B) US&1I6 Imputed Interest on .ueI& lunda to offset
charge. for tM 1HInOU8 depo,Jtory and (uumcl4l agency
.rvlCe. provided to or on behDlfof tM Government
(2) As a result of aharp tkcunu 111 ..merest rate. over tM
loat lew year, 1o record low levels, or the publiC debt out·
stan.dJ'W na.chU18 t~ statutory debt amIt, lIae Department of
the Treasury often has IuJd to drcunatJCtJlly ulCnose or decrease
the .Ia of tM compell8tJtUtg balance. on deposit at tM. (&r&tJn-
caal UUtltUllOM
(3) The fluctuatIon of 1M compeuatang balance., and the
MCeatJl'y~~ of collateral by fllltJn.cuiJ u&atltutwM to .~.
cure tJae uidw ofcompenso.tuag balGnca~ wah those IASU-
tutlOlIS, haJJe creakd ulUntelitkd filUJniuJl wu:erttJInty for tM
Secretary of1M Treasury and for 1M ~m~1&t by fiTUUlCUJl
m,II,"t",,,, of their CGIh and ucur"~a.
(4) It IS lmJ!ertJt,ue that the process for P'O.uuU1I6 financuJ
BerulCft to tIN Gowrnment be trtJllSparellt. iutd prot/w 1M .n-
formatwn MCeSBar;y for the Congress to effectJlidy ~aTCI.. Its
approprWI01l4M OVU$wht nSpoMlbllula.
(5) Tn. use of duect payment {or aenJJen nncknd would
Stnft6llaeR ctUh Clnd debt m.tJIItJPm~nt rapolUabJhlle. of the
S,cretory of the TrftUury beccusc Me 8«retary would no long~r
need to drGmatr.colly &nC~ or ~crease tJu! level of such bal-
ances when Int~re.t mtlls fluctuate shG!Ply or when tM publIC
cUbt outstanchng recclaa the statuto,., debt l.mlt
(6) An alterntJt,u, to the use 01 compensatl"'6 bala.n.ces. such
as du-ect payment. to fmancUJl mstltutwM. would ensure tha.t
PCYllUllts to financUJI InstitutIOns for the servJ«S. thq_ prouuU
would be made III tJ mo~ predl.ctahk manner and could lUult
In COBt saulngs
(1) Lunltlng the use of compensating balances could ~.ult
In CI more clu-«t and cosl·effu;aent method of obttJlll~ thOft
servlCa currently prouulal under compensating balance or-
l'Ull6ement,
(8) A traMWoft from the ". of COMpelUtJtl"8 balan.ca to
another com~1l$4twn method must ". carefuUJI 1IUJnaged to
preuent AwMr·tJuur,-nece6SGry transitIOnal cost. and ena.bk
part'Clpatuw /ill4naal InstitutIOns to modify tM,r planned In-
vestmen.t ofCtJIA tuUl sccuntaa
(b) AUl7l01l1ZATlON OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR SERVICES REN-
DUBD BY DEPOSITARIES AND FINANCIAL AOENCIES OF niB UNITED
STAfES.-Tlaerc on Guthonzed to be opproprlt1ted for fuml yean
bcwmnlllB o(~,. /iscal year 2003 to the &eretary of 1M Treo.sury
.uCh .UIM tU may be neceuary for recmbur$uw fUltJnt:&al Inst,tu-
110118 ,n thev CtJPOCIty fIB ckposwna cuul fintmcud tI6~n.t, of 1M
Uruted Stat•• for all aenJu:t!s nquved or dJreclecl by the Secretcuy
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of the Treasury. or (J deslglU!e of the Secretary, to be performed by
auch finallClal uastltut&OIU on behalfof the Secntary of the TlWUUry
or Q.Ilotlw- Federal OIency, uu:ludlrJg _TVu:e. rend.red before fw:ol
yetJT 2004
(c) ORDERLY TRANSlTION.-
(1) IN GBNBRAL.--A3 oppropnotlon. authonzed In sub-
section (6) become GU4Ucble, the Secretary oflhe Treaury .1uJll
promptly begm the process of phasU16 In tne u" of tlac Gpprtr
pnatwM to pay financuJl InstItutlOM servIng as tUptMU4nu
and fU&4I1£UJI agents of thl! UnIted States. and trons,ho,"",
from tM use ofcom~MCJ.tlngbalo.ncu to furul the., .rua«.
(2) POST-TRANSl71ON USB UJll7'BD TO .DT&4.0RDINARY ClB·
CUJlS'I'ANCBS.-
(A) IN GENBRAL -Followrn.g the transltwn to th, UM of
the approPT14tI01&8 Guthonzcd In subsection (6), tlae 8«·
rettJry of the 2'na.tUI')' may use the·compensatIng 6aloI&cea
to pay (lnoncUJJ InstitutiOns urll,ng as cUposatane. and Ii·
ntJllCIal 06ent. of tM Unu~d Stela only &II utraortlllUJTY
SltutJtlOns where the Secrrttuy fktermmea that they 01W
I1ftd.d to flMure the fiscal OpeNlt.OIlS of the Gouernmenl
contuuu to fullCt&On In CUI e(flcU!llt GIld effective manner
(8) REPoRT.-Any at ofcomptlUGtllll bal4nce, pur.u-
ant to subporcwraph (A) .hall promptly be nport«l 6.Y tA,
Secretary of the Tre4Sury to 1M Committee on Fa1UlIICUJ'
SeNJ~Sof the HOIU(! of&presentatlut. and the Comnutl.
on Bonimg. HoIUUI6. and Urban AffOln of the &1UJte
(3) RBQUIRBJlaNTS FOR ORDERLY TRANsmON -11'1
tT(J1l$ltlonmg to the ". oftAe opproprudaollS Guthonud &11 .u6·
section (bJ. the &cntary of 1M TreaU.Ty .JuJU t4JIe .ucla ,tepa
as may be a.ppropl14te 10-
(A) preuent abrupt fi~l(Jl cU.ruptwn to the (utU:tIOM
of the DepartIfUlnt of the TreASury or to the partICIpating fi-
nancUJllnBtltutlOl'l.; and
(B) maUltal1& adequate accountlll8 and mtlr&CJ6ement
controls to ensure tJuJt payments 1o financuzl ItUtllutlOlU
for their baMUW reru&Cu prouuled 10 the Gouernm.nt cg
cUposltqne. and !&nanclol astn,. are tJCcurezk and that the
arrangement.lut no longer thcua IS 1I«essar:1.
(4) REPoRTS RBQUlRBD.-
(A) ANNUAL RBPORT.-
(&) IN GENERAL.-For each fiscal year, the Sec-
retOlJ' of1M Tr~G$ury shall submit a report to the Con·
gress on the u. of compeMot&ng balance. and on tAc
U$~ of a.p~roP114twns authonud In 8ubsectWI& (6) dur·
Ing that fisci:d year
(u) INCLUSION IN BUDGET -The report requIred
under clause (I) may be submitted CIS port of the b~d
submitted by tM Presulent under HctUJn 1105 of the
title 31, Umtecl States Cotk, for the folloUJI~ fUcol
year and ,f so, th, report moll be submltt«l coneur·
rently to the CommIttee on FllIGn.cuU &ruu:e. 0{ the
HolUe of RePrtSlttl t4tICJe' and the Committee on Btuai·
Ing. HOtu1n& and UrbcJn Affair' oft~ Senate
(B) FINAL RBPORT FOLLOWING TRANSmON.-
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(.) IN GENERAL.-Followuag completwn of tM tran·
sltlOn. from the u.e of COmptMtJIULB balances to th, use
of the appropnotJOn' authonzed In ,ubltetlon. (6) to
pay fa1UJ1lCuU IMhtutaDU for theIT seruJCe. os depoa·
Io.ne, and filUUlCUJI 06cnts of tAe UlUted StD.te.. 1M
Secretary of the 7nasury .hall submit (J re~rl on the
trunatwn to 1M Commlttft on FI1UInaal Serulcn of
the House of Representatlue. and the Comnuttte on
BGnlUl6. HOIUIII6, and Urban AfTau-. of tM Sentlte.
(II) CONrENf'S OF REPORT -TM report subm.&tted
uruUr~ (,) ,1a4ll lncl.ucU a detailed tJIlolysl6 0(-
a) the co.t of t1'DII8Uwn.
(11) tM cl&red com of the ftrulCf. being po,ul
from the appropnatlOn8 outhonzed In .ubsectlon
(6), and
aU) llu! benefit. realued from the use of cbrect
paym.ent for such S~rulceS~ rather tluJ,., 1M IUe of
com~nsCJtl1l6balance CJ17'G'Wement.
(dJ TBCHNICAL AJlBNDJlBNT -TIw 2d ulides'81&oJed paragraph
of sectIOn 16 of the F,ural Be.rue Act (12 USC 412) &6 GlMnd-
ed-
(1) III tM 3d .n~. by InHrllnB "or GIIy otMr asset of
(I FedmJl ",.rue bank" hefon the penod at tM end, and
(2) In 1M lat aentence. by mserllng '~ or are otherwue held
by or on b'l&DJfof,- afler -&II the uaults or.
(,) ErFBCTlV2 DATB -NotWltlasttUUlJ.'Y/ HetIOn. 20. thl.s ,ectwR
Bhall ta.a effect Oil the date of the elUJCbnen' of tlu, kt
SEC. JO. BFFBGTlVB DAf'B.
Tllu Act Moll tCJ1Je effect at the end of the 12-molllh penod be-
,11'lIIU&g on 1M date of tM fllGCtment of tlus Act. Ut%pt eI' otherwl.se
speclfiCall, prould«l &1& tlus Act.
And the Senate agree to the aame
For coll81deratlon of the Houae btll and the Senate amend-
ment, and mocWicatlona comuutted to conference-
MICHAEL G OXLEY,
SPENCER BACHUS.
STEVEN C LAToUBETrE.
MELISSA A. HART,
PATRICK J. TIBERI,
BARNEY FRANK,
HAROLD E FORD, Jr ,
Manacers on tM Part of tM House.
RICHARD C SHELBY,
ROBBRT F BENNBTT,
WAYNE ALLARD,
PAUL S SAIlBANES,
'riM JOHNSON
Ma.TUJB,n on. the Part of the SellDU
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{{8-31-98 p.3079}}
PART 359-GOLDEN PARACHUTE AND INDEMNIFICATION PAYMENTS
Sec.
;J.Q.ft.o. ....._..SGPR-G..
~_~1t~J l2.~11QjtiQn~ ..
~.~.9.~_2.. GQIq~.o p~r..9GtJl)J~ .. .P?Ym~nt$ ...p.rQhip iJ~.q,
~.~.9~.~ J?.f.Q.hJ.Qtt.~.q !n.~J~r.nn..!.nG?ti.9.Q p.fJ.Y.m.~.Dt.$ ..~.
.3.5.~.~..4 P.~.fOJj$$.jPIQgQtc.jGnPflr9G~]JJJe.p.9yrn~nt$.~
3~J)_~Q P~rmj$;; i.Q!?JncJ~DIJ1Jfj~.~tt9J1J~_Qyrrt~nl~.:
;?.~.9..:.Q f.!.UO.9..Jn.?trV.QtJQ.D.§.:.
;?';?9~7. ... ApPUG9bi.Uty.inJ.h.~~.Y~DtQtr.~G§i.y.~r$.bip,.
Authority: .1_2_.U.~_S.~.C.:.._.18.2J~(kJ..
SOURCE: The provisions of this part 359 appear at 61 Fed. Reg. 5930, February 5, 1996, except as
otherwise noted.
§ 359.0 Scope.
(a) This part limits and/or prohibits, in certain circumstances, the ability of insured depository
institutions, their subsidiaries and affiliated depository institution holding companies to enter into
contracts to pay and to make golden parachute and indemnification payments to institution-affiliated
parties (lAPs).
(b) The limitations on golden parachute payments apply to troubled insured depository institutions
which seek to enter into contracts to payor to make golden parachute payments to their lAPs. The
limitations also apply to depository institution holding companies which are troubled and seek to enter
into contracts to payor to make golden parachute payments to their lAPs as well as healthy holding
companies which seek to enter into contracts to payor to make golden parachute payments to lAPs of
a troubled insured depository institution subsidiary. A "golden parachute payment" is generally
considered to be any payment to an lAP which is contingent on the termination of that person's
employment and is received when the insured depository institution making the payment is troubled or,
if the payment is being made by an affiliated holding company, either the holding company itself or the
insured depository institution employing the lAP, is troubled. The definition of golden parachute
payment does not include payments pursuant to qualified retirement plans, nonqualified bona fide
deferred compensation plans, nondiscriminatory severance pay plans, other types of common benefits
plans, state statutes and death benefits. Certain limited exceptions to the golden parachute payment
prohibition are provided for in cases involving the hiring of a white knight and unassisted changes in
control. A procedure is also set forth whereby an institution or lAP can request permission to make
what would otherwise be a prohibited golden parachute payment.
(c) The limitations on indemnification payments apply to all insured depository institutions, their
subsidiaries and affiliated depository institution holding companies regardless of their financial health.
Generally, this part prohibits insured depository institutions, their subsidiaries and affiliated holding
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companies from indemnifying an lAP for that portion of the costs sustained with regard to an
administrative or civil enforcement action commenced by any federal banking agency which results in
a final order or settlement pursuant to which the lAP is assessed a civil money penalty, removed from
office, prohibited from participating in the affairs of an insured depository institution or required to
cease and desist from or take an affirmative action described in section 8(b) (12..Jl.~..S.~C.~._1Jlla.cb» of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FOI Act). However, there are exceptions to this general prohibition.
First, an institution or holding company may purchase commercial insurance to cover such expenses,
except judgments and penalties. Second, the institution or holding company may advance legal and
other professional expenses to an lAP directly (except for judgments and penalties) if its board of
directors makes certain specific findings and the lAP agrees in writing to reimburse the institution if it is
ultimately determined that the lAP violated a law, regulation or other fiduciary duty.
{{8-31-98 p.3080}}
[Codified to 12 C.F.R. § 359.0J
§ 359.1 Definitions.
(a) Act means the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended (12 U.S.C. 1811, et seq.).
(b) Appropriate federal banking agency, bank holding company, depository institution holding
company and savings and loan holding company have the meanings given to such terms in section 3
of the Act.
(c) Benefit plan means any plan, contract, agreement or other arrangement which is an "employee
welfare benefit plan" as that term is defined in section 3(1) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, as amended (29 U.S.C. 1002(1», or other usual and customary plans such as
dependent care, tuition reimbursement, group legal services or cafeteria plans; provided however, that
such term shall not include any plan intended to be subject to paragraphs (f)(2) (iii) and (v) of this
section.
(d) Bona fide deferred compensation plan or arrangement means any plan, contract, agreement or
other arrangement whereby:
(1) An lAP voluntarily elects to defer all or a portion of the reasonable compensation, wages or fees
paid for services rendered which otherwise would have been paid to such party at the time the
services were rendered (including a plan that provides for the crediting of a reasonable investment
return on such elective deferrals) and the insured depository institution or depository institution holding
company either:
(i) Recognizes compensation expense and accrues a liability for the benefit payments according to
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP); or
(ii) Segregates or otherwise sets aside assets in a trust which may only be used to pay plan and
other benefits, except that the assets of such trust may be available to satisfy claims of the institution's
or holding company's creditors in the case of insolvency; or
(2) An insured depository institution or depository institution holding company establishes a
nonqualified deferred compensation or supplemental retirement plan, other than an elective deferral
plan described in paragraph (e)(1) of this section:
(i) Primarily for the purpose of providing benefits for certain lAPS in excess of the limitations on
contributions and benefits imposed by sections 415, 401(a)(17), 402(g) or any other applicable
provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 415,401 (a)(17), 402(g»; or
(ii) Primarily for the purpose of providing supplemental retirement benefits or other deferred
compensation for a select group of directors, management or highly compensated employees
(excluding severance payments described in paragraph (f)(2)(v) of this section and permissible golden
parachute payments described in § 359.4); and
(3) In the case of any nonqualified deferred compensation or supplemental retirement plans as
described in paragraphs (d) (1) and (2) of this section, the following requirements shall apply:
(i) The plan was in effect at least one year prior to any of the events described in paragraph (f)(1)
(ii) of this section;
(ii) Any payment made pursuant to such plan is made in accordance with the terms of the plan as
in effect no later than one year prior to any of the events described in paragraph (f)(1)(ii) of this section
and in accordance with any amendments to such plan during such one year period that do not
increase the benefits payable thereunder;
(iii) The lAP has a vested right, as defined under the applicable plan document, at the time of
termination of employment to payments under such plan;
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(iv) Benefits under such plan are accrued each period only for current or prior service rendered to
the employer (except that an allowance may be made for service with a predecessor employer);
(v) Any payment made pursuant to such plan is not based on any discretionary acceleration of
vesting or accrual of benefits which occurs at any time later than one year prior to any of the events
described in paragraph (f)(i)(ii) of this section;
{{8-29-03 p.3081}}
(vi) The insured depository institution or depository institution holding company has previously
recognized compensation expense and accrued a liability for the benefit payments according to GAAP
or segregated or otherwise set aside assets in a trust which may only be used to pay plan benefits,
except that the assets of such trust may be available to satisfy claims of the institution's or holding
company's creditors in the case of insolvency; and
(vii) Payments pursuant to such plans shall not be in excess of the accrued liability computed in
accordance with GAAP.
(e) Corporation means the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in its corporate capacity.
(f) Golden parachute payment. (1) The term golden parachute payment means any payment (or any
agreement to make any payment) in the nature of compensation by any,insured depository institution
or an affiliated depository institution holding company for the benefit of any current or former lAP
pursuant to an obligation of such institution or holding company that:
(i) Is contingent on, or by its terms is payable on or after, the termination of such party's primary
employment or affiliation with the institution or holding company; and
(ii) Is received on or after, or is made in contemplation of, any of the following events:
(A) The insolvency (or similar event) of the insured depository institution which is making the
payment or bankruptcy or insolvency (or similar event) of the depository institution holding company
which is making the payment; or
(8) The appointment of any conservator or receiver for such insured depository institution; or
(C) A determination by the insured depository institution's or depository institution holding
company's appropriate federal banking agency, respectively, that the insured depository institution or
depository institution holding company is in a troubled condition, as defined in the applicable
regulations of the appropriate federal banking agency (§ 303.101(c) of this chapter); or
(D) The insured depository institution is assigned a composite rating of 4 or 5 by the appropriate
federal banking agency or informed in writing by the Corporation that it is rated a 4 or 5 under the
Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination COtJncil,
or the depository institution holding company is assigned a composite rating of 4 or 5 or unsatisfactory
by its appropriate federal banking agency; or
(E) The insured depository institution is subject to a proceeding to terminate or suspend deposit
insurance for such institution; and
(iii)(A) Is payable to an lAP whose employment by or affiliation with an insured depository
institution is terminated at a time when the insured depository institution by which the lAP is employed
or with which the lAP is affiliated satisfies any of the conditions enumerated in paragraphs (f)(i)(ii) (A)
through (E) of this section, or in contemplation of any of these conditions; or
(8) Is payable to an lAP whose employment by or affiliation with an insured depository institution
holding company is terminated at a time when the insured depository institution holding company by
which the lAP is affiliated satisfies any of the conditions enumerated in paragraphs (f)(1 )(ii)(A),(C) or
(D) of this section, or in contemplation of any of these conditions.
(2) Exceptions. The term golden parachute payment shall not include:
(i) Any payment made pursuant to a pension or retirement plan which is qualified (or is intended
within a reasonable period of time to be qualified) under section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 (26 U.S.C. 401) or pursuant to a pension or other retirement plan which is governed by the laws
of any foreign country; or
(ii) Any payment made pursuant to a benefit plan as that term is defined in paragraph (c) of this
section; or
{{8-29-03 p.3082}}
(iii) Any payment made pursuant to a bona fide deferred compensation plan or arrangement as
defined in paragraph (d) of this section; or .
(iv) Any payment made by reason of death or by reason of termination caused by the disability of
an institution-affiliated party; or
(v) Any payment made pursuant to a nondiscriminatory severance pay plan or arrangement which
provides for payment of severance benefits to all eligible employees upon involuntary termination other
than for cause, voluntary resignation, or early retirement; provided, however, that no employee shall
receive any such payment which exceeds the base compensation paid to such employee during the
G - 3
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twelve months (or such longer period or greater benefit as the Corporation shall consent to)
immediately preceding termination of employment, resignation or early retirement, and such severance
pay plan or arrangement shall not have been adopted or modified to increase the amount or scope of
severance benefits at a time when the insured depository institution or depository institution holding
company was in a condition specified in paragraph (f)(1 )(ii) of this section or in contemplation of such a
condition without the prior written consent of the appropriate federal banking agency; or
(vi) Any severance or similar payment which is required to be made pursuant to a state statute or
foreign law which is applicable to all employers within the appropriate jurisdiction (with the exception of
employers that may be exempt due to their small number of employees or other similar criteria); or
(vii) Any other payment which the Corporation determines to be permissible in accordance with
§ 359.4.
(g) Insured depository institution means any bank or savings association the deposits of which are
insured by the Corporation pursuant to the Act, or any subsidiary thereof.
(h) Institution-affiliated party (lAP) means:
(1) Any director, officer, employee, or controlling stockholder (other than a depository institution
holding company) of, or agent for, an insured depository institution or depository institution holding
company;
(2) Any other person who has filed oris required to file a change-in- control notice with the
appropriate federal banking agency under section 7(j) of the Act (12 U_~~Q~~a1L(j);
(3) Any shareholder (other than a depository institution holding company), consultant, joint venture
partner, and any other person as determined by the appropriate federal banking agency (by regulation
or case-by-case) who participates in the conduct of the affairs of an insured depository institution or
depository institution holding company; and
(4) Any independent contractor (including any attorney, appraiser, or accountant) who knowingly or
recklessly participates in: Any violation of any law or regulation, any breach of fiduciary duty, or any
unsafe or unsound practice, which caused or is likely to cause more than a minimal financial loss to, or
a significant adverse effect on, the insured depository institution or depository institution holding
company.
(i) Liability or legal expense means:
(1) Any legal or other professional fees and expenses incurred in connection with any claim,
proceeding, or action;
(2) The amount of, and any cost incurred in connection with, any settlement of any claim,
proceeding, or action; and
(~) The amount of, and any cost incurred in connection with, any judgment or penalty imposed with
respect to any claim, proceeding, or action.
(j) Nondiscriminatory means that the plan, contract or arrangement in question applies to all
employees of an insured depository institution or depository institution holding company who meet
reasonable and customary eligibility requirements applicable to all employees, such as minimum
length of service requirements. A nondiscriminatory plan, contract or arrangement may provide
different benefits based only on objective criteria such as salary, total compensation, length of service,
job grade or classification, which are applied on a proportionate basis (with a variance in severance
benefits relating to any
{{8-29-03 p.3082.01}}criterion of plus or minus ten percent) to groups of employees consisting of not
less than the lesser of 33 percent of employees or 1,000 employees.
(k) Payment means:
(1) Any direct or indirect transfer of any funds or any asset;
(2) Any forgiveness of any debt or other obligation;
(3) The conferring of any benefit, including but not limited to stock options and stock appreciation
rights; and
(4) Any segregation of any funds or assets, the establishment or funding of any trust or the
purchase of or arrangement for any letter of credit or other instrument, for the purpose of making, or
pursuant to any agreement to make, any payment on or after the date on -which such funds or assets
are segregated, or at the time of or after such trust is established or letter of credit or other instrument
is made available, without regard to whether the obligation to make such payment is contingent on:
(i) The determination, after such date, of the liability for the payment of such amount; or
(ii) The liquidation, after such date, of the amount of such payment.
(1) Prohibited indemnification payment. (1) The term prohibited indemnification payment means any
payment (or any agreement or arrangement to make any payment) by any insured depository
institution or an affiliated depository institution holding company for the benefit of any person who is or
was an lAP of such insured depository institution or holding company, to payor reimburse such person
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for any civil money penalty or judgment resulting from any administrative or civil action instituted by
any federal banking agency, or any other liability or legal expense with regard to any administrative
proceeding or civil action instituted by any federal banking agency which results in a final order or
settlement pursuant to which such person:
(i) Is assessed a civil money penalty;
(H) Is removed from office or prohibited from participating in the conduct of the affairs of the
insured depository institution; or
(Hi) Is required to cease and desist from or take any affirmative action described in section 8(b) of
the Act with respect to such institution.
(2) Exceptions. (i)The term prohibited indemnification payment shall not include any reasonable
payment by an insured depository institution or depository institution holding company which is used to
purchase any commercial insurance policy of fidelity bond, provided that such insurance policy or bond
shall not be used to payor reimburse an lAP for the cost of any judgment or civil money penalty
assessed against such person in an administrative proceeding or civil action commenced by any
federal banking agency, but may pay any legal or professional expenses incurred in connection with
such proceeding or action or the amount of any restitution, to the insured depository institution,
depository institution holding company or receiver.
(ii) The term prohibited indemnification payment shall not include any reasonable payment by an
insured depository institution or depository institution holding company that represents partial
indemnification for legal or professional expenses specifically attributable to particular charges for
which there has been a formal and final adjudication or finding in connection with a settlement that the
lAP has not violated certain banking laws or regulations or has not engaged in certain unsafe or
unsound banking practices or breaches of fiduciary duty, unless the administrative action or civil
proceeding has resulted in a final prohibition order against the lAP.
[Codified to 12 C.F.R. § 359.1J
[Section 359.1 amended at 68 Fed. Reg. 50461, August 21, 2003, effective September 22, 2003J
§ 359.2 Golden parachute payments prohibited.
No insured depository institution or depository institution holding company shall make or agree to
make any golden parachute payment, except as provided in this part.
[Codified to 12 C.F.R. § 359.2J
{{8-29-03 p.3082.02}}
§ 359.3 Prohibited indemnification payments.
No insured depository institution or depository institution holding company shall make or agree to
make any prohibited indemnification payment, except as provided in this part.
[Codified to 12 C.F.R. § 359.3J
§ 359.4 Permissible golden parachute payments.
(a) An insured depository institution or depository institution holding company may agree to make or
may make a golden parachute payment if and to the extent that:
(1) The appropriate federal banking agency, with the written concurrence of the Corporation,
determines that such a payment or agreement is permissible; or
(2) Such an agreement is made in order to hire a person to becpme an lAP either at a time when
the insured depository institution or depository institution holding company satisfies or in an effort to
prevent it from imminently satisfying any of the criteria set forth in § 359.1 (f)(1) (ii), and the institution's
appropriate federal banking agency and the Corporation consent in writing to the amount and terms of
the golden parachute payment. Such consent by the FDIC and the institution's appropriate federal
banking agency shall not improve the IAP's position in the event of the insolvency of the institution
since such consent can neither bind a receiver nor affect the provability of receivership claims. In the
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event that the institution is placed into receivership or conservatorship, the FDIC and/or the institution's
appropriate federal banking agency shall not be obligated to pay the promised golden parachute and
the lAP shall not be accorded preferential treatment on the basis of such prior approval; or
(3) Such a payment is made pursuant to an agreement which provides for a reasonable severance
payment, not to exceed twelve months salary, to an lAP in the event of a change in control of the
insured depository institution; provided, however, that an insured depository institution or depository
institution holding company shall obtain the consent of the appropriate federal banking agency prior to
making such a payment and this paragraph (a)(3) shall not apply to any change in control of an
insured depository institution which results from an assisted transaction as described in section 13 of
the Act (1..2_..U_._S:..Q_~_JJ3..2.;3') or the insured depository institution being placed into conservatorship or
receivership; and
(4) An insured depository institution, depository institution holding company or lAP making a
request pursuant to paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section shall demonstrate that it does not
possess and is not aware of any information, evidence, documents or other materials which would
indicate that there is a reasonable basis to believe, at the time such payment is proposed to be made,
that:
(i) The lAP has committed any fraudulent act or omission, breach of trust or fiduciary duty, or
insider abuse with regard to the depository institution or depository institution holding company that
has had or is likely to have a material adverse effect on the institution or holding company;
(ii) The lAP is substantially responsible for the insolvency of, the appointment of a conservator or
receiver for, or the troubled condition, as defined by applicable regulations of the appropriate federal
banking agency, of the insured depository institution, dispository institution holding company or any
insured depository institution subsidiary of such holding company;
(iii) The lAP has materially violated any applicable federal or state banking law or regulation that
has had or is likely to have a material effect on the insured depository institution or depository
institution holding company; and
(iv) The lAP has violated or conspired to violate section 2JQ, ~Q9., 6_~Z,1.Q.Q.~., J..o.O_9., J_QQI, ~Lo..1..1.,
Jlt3l, or J344. of title 18 of the United States Code, or section 1~11 or 1~.4..3 of such title affecting a
federally insured financial institution as defined in title 18 of the United States Code.
{{8-31-98 p.3082.03}}
(b) In making a determination under paragraphs (a) (1) through (3) of this section, the appropriate
federal banking agency and the Corporation may consider:
(1) Whether, and to what degree, the lAP was in a position of managerial or fiduciary responsibility;
(2) The length of time the lAP was affiliated with the insured depository institution or depository
institution holding company, and the degree to which the proposed payment represents a reasonable
payment for services rendered over the period of employment; and
(3) Any other factors or circumstances which would indicate that the proposed payment would be
contrary to the intent of §.~GltQD..J..~.OsJ of the Act or this part
[Codified to 12 C.F.R. § 359.4J
§ 359.5 Permissible indemnification payments.
(a) An insured depository institution or depository institution holding company may make or agree to
make reasonable indemnification payments to an lAP with respect to an administrative proceeding or
civil action initiated by any federal banking agency if:
(1) The insured depository institution's or depository institution holding company's board of
directors, in good faith, determines in writing after due investigation and consideration that the
institution- affiliated party acted in good faith and in a manner he/she believed to be in the best
interests of the institution;
(2) The insured depository institution's or depository institution holding company's board of
directors, respectively, in good faith, determines in writing after due investigation and consideration
that the payment of such expenses will not materially adversely affect the institution's or holding
company's safety and soundness;
(3) The indemnification payments do not constitute prohibited indemnification payments as that
term is defined in § 359.1 (1); and
(4) The lAP agrees in writing to reimburse the insured depository institution or depository institution
holding company, to the extent not covered by payments from insurance or bonds purchased pursuant
to § 359.1 (1 )(2), for that portion of the advanced indemnification payments which subsequently
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become prohibited indemnification payments, as defined in § 359.1(1).
(b) An lAP requesting indemnification payments shall not participate in any way in the board's
discussion and approval of such payments; provided, however, that such lAP may present his/her
request to the board and respond to any inquiries from the board concerning his/her involvement in the
circumstances giving rise to the administrative proceeding or civil action.
(c) In the event that a majority of the members of the board of directors are named as respondents in
an administrative proceeding or civil action and request indemnification, the remaining members of the
board may authorize independent legal counsel to review the indemnification request and provide the
remaining members of the board with a written opinion of counsel as to whether the conditions
delineated in paragraph (a) of this section have been met. 'If independent legal counsel opines that
said conditions have been met, the remaining members of the board of directors may rely on such
opinion in authorizing the requested indemnification.
(d) In the event that all of the members of the board of directors are named as respondents in an
administrative proceeding or civil action and request indemnification, the board shall authorize
independent legal counsel to review the indemnification request and provide the board with a written
opinion of counsel as to whether the conditions delineated in paragraph (a) of this section have been
met. If independent legal counsel opines that said conditions have been met, the board of directors
may rely on such opinion in authorizing the requested indemnification.
[Codified to 12 C.F.R. § 359.5J
{{8-31-98 p.3082.04}}
§ 359.6 Filing instructions.
Requests to make excess nondiscriminatory severance plan payments pursuant to § 359.1 (f)(2)(v)
and golden parachute payments permitted by § 359.4 shall be submitted in writing to the appropriate
regional director (DOS). For filing requirements, consult _.12 CfR__3J)_~_~_2_~t4. In the event that the consent
of the institution's primary federal regulator is required in addition to that of the FDIC, the requesting
party shall submit a copy of its letter to the FDIC to the institution's primary federal regulator. In the
case of national banks, such written requests shall be submitted to the OCC. In the case of state
member banks and bank holding companies, such written requests shall be submitted to the Federal
Reserve district bank where the institution or holding company, respectively, is located. In the case of
savings associations and savings association holding companies, such written requests shall be
submitted to the OTS regional office where the institution or holding company, respectively, is located.
In cases where only the prior consent of the institution's primary federal regulator is required and that
agency is not the FDIC, a written request satisfying the requirements of this section shall be submitted
to the primary federal regulator as described in this section.
[Codified to 12 C.F.R. § 359.6J
[Section 359.6 amended at 63 Fed. Reg. 44751 August 20, 1998, effective October 1, 1998J
§ 359.7 Applicability in the event of receivership.
The provisions of this part, or any consent or approval granted under the provisions of this part by the
FDIC (in its corporate capacity), shall not in any way bind any receiver of a failed insured depository
institution. Any consent or approval granted under the provisions of this part by the FDIC or any other
federal banking agency shall not in any way obligate such agency or receiver to pay any claim or
obligation pursuant to any golden parachute, severance indemnification or othef agreement. Claims for
employee welfare benefits or other benefits which are contingent, even if otherwise vested, when the
FDIC is appointed as receiver for any depository institution, including any contingency for,termination
of employment, are not provab.le claims or actual, direct compensatory damage claims against such
receiver. Nothing in this part may be construed to permit the payment of salary or any liability or legal
expense of any lAP contrary to J~.J.J~~~._c~_JJ12a_(K)(3).
[Codified to 12 C.F.R. § 359.7J
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Financial Institution Letters
Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices by State-Chartered Banks
TO:
SUBJECT:
Summary:
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (also of interest to Compliance Officer)
Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices Under Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act
The FDIC and the Board of Governors of the Federal ReseIVe System
are issuing guidance to state-chartered banks to outline the standards
that the agencies will consider when applying the prohibitions against
unfair or deceptive acts or practices found in section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. The guidance also provides information about
managing risks relating to unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including
best practices.
FIL-26-2004
March 11, 2004
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System are jointly issuing the attached guidance to state-chartered banks regarding unfair or deceptive
acts or practices prohibited by section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act.
In FIL-57-2002, issued May 30, 2002, the FDIC informed state nonmember banks that these
prohibitions apply to their activities, and that the FDIC would issue guidance about how institutions could
avoid engaging in practices that might be viewed as unfair or deceptive. In its corresponding release,
the Federal Reserve Board indicated that it would work with the FDIC to prepare additional guidance for
state member banks on this subject. The attached guidance fulfills these commitments.
Specifically, the guidance explains:
• the standards used to assess whether an act or practice is unfair or deceptive;
• the interplay between the FTC Act and other consumer protection statutes; and
• guidelines for managing risks related to unfair and deceptive practices.
Although most insured banks adhere to high levels of professional conduct, managers of all banks must
remain vigilant against possible unfair or deceptive acts or practices to protect consumers and to
minimize their own risk.
For more information about the guidance, please contact April P. Breslaw, Section Chief (202- 898-
6609); Deirdre Foley, Senior Policy Analyst (202-898-6612); or Mira N. Marshall, Senior Policy Analyst
(202-898-3912), in the Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection.
For your reference, FDIC Financial Institution Letters (FILs) may be accessed from the FDIC's Web site
at WyY..V1.JqjG.~gQv/nf?v:l$./n~y.y.§lfjJJ.Q.nG.i.qV2.Q.Q4ILnq~.x.JJ.trDJ.
Michael J. Zamorski
Director
Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection
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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices by State-Chartered Banks
March 11, 2004
Purpose
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(the "Board" and the "FDIC," or collectively, the "Agencies") are issuing this statement to outline the
standards that will be considered by the Agencies as they carry out their responsibility to enforce the
prohibitions against unfair or deceptive trade practices found in section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act ("FTC Act") as they apply to acts and practices of state-chartered banks. The Agencies
will apply these standards when weighing the need to take supervisory and enforcement actions and
when seeking to ensure that unfair or deceptive practices do not recur.
This statement also contains a section on managing risks relating to unfair or deceptive acts or
practices, which includes best practices as well as general guidance on measures that state-chartered
banks can take to avoid engaging in such acts or practices.
Although the majority of insured banks adhere to a high level of professional conduct, banks must
remain vigilant against possible unfair or deceptive acts or practices both to protect consumers and to
minimize their own risks.
Coordination of Enforcement Efforts
Section 5(a) of the FTC Act prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,"
and applies to all persons engaged in commerce, including banks. The Agencies each have affirmed
their authority under section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to take appropriate action when
unfair or deceptive acts or practices are discovered.
A number of agencies have authority to combat unfair or deceptive acts or practices. For example, the
FTC has broad authority to enforce the require·ments of section 5 of the FTC Act against many non-
bank entities. In addition, state authorities have primary responsibility for enforcing state statutes against
unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The Agencies intend to work with these other regulators as
appropriate in investigating and responding to allegations of unfair or deceptive acts or practices that
involve state banks and other entities supervised by the Agencies.
Standards for Determining What is Unfair or Deceptive
The FTC Act prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Congress drafted this provision broadly in
order to provide sufficient flexibility in the law to address changes in the market and unfair or deceptive
practices that may emerge.
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An act or practice may be found to be unfair where it "causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition." A representation, omission, or practice is
deceptive if it is likely to mislead a consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances and is likely to
affect a consumer's conduct or decision regarding a product or service.
The standards for unfairness and deception are independent of each other. While a specific act or
practice may be both unfair and deceptive, an act or practice is prohibited by the FTC Act if it is either
unfair or deceptive. Whether an act or practice is unfair or deceptive will in each instance depend upon
a careful analysis of the facts and circumstances. In analyzing a particular act or practice, the Agencies
will be guided by the body of law and official interpretations for defining unfair or deceptive acts or
practices developed by the courts and the FTC. The Agencies will also consider factually similar cases
brought by the FTC and other agencies to ensure that these standards are applied consistently.
Unfair Acts or Practices
Assessing whether an act or practice is unfair
An act or practice is unfair where it (1) causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers, (2)
cannot be reasonably avoided by consumers, and (3) is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition. Public policy may also be considered in the analysis of whether a
particular act or practice is unfair. Each of these elements is discussed further below.
• The act or practice must cause or be likely to cause substantial injury to consumers.
To be unfair, an act or practice must cause or be likely to cause substantial injury to consumers.
Substantial injury usually involves monetary harm. An act or practice that causes a small amount of
harm to a large number of people may be deemed to cause substantial injury. An injury may be
substantial if it raises a significant risk of concrete harm. Trivial or merely speculative harms are typically
insufficient for a finding of substantial injury. Emotional impact and other more subjective types of harm
will not ordinarily make a practice unfair.
• Consumers must not reasonably be able to avoid the injury.
A practice is not considered unfair if consumers may reasonably avoid injury. Consumers cannot
reasonably avoid injury from an act or practice if it interferes with their ability to effectively make
decisions. Withholding material price information until after the consumer has committed to purchase
the product or service would be an example of preventing a consumer from making an informed
decision. A practice may also be unfair where consumers are subject to undue influence or are coerced
into purchasing unwanted products or services.
The Agencies will not second-guess the wisdom of particular consumer decisions. Instead, the Agencies
will consider whether a bank's behavior unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an obstacle to the
free exercise of consumer decision-making.
• The injury must not be"outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.
To be unfair, the act or practice must be injurious in its net effects -that is, the injury must not be
outweighed by any offsetting consumer or competitive benefits that are also produced by the act or
practice. Offsetting benefits may include lower prices or a wider availability of products and services.
Costs that would be incurred for remedies or measures to prevent the injury are also taken into account
in determining whether an act or practice is unfair. These costs may include the costs to the bank in
taking preventive measures and the costs to society as a whole of any increased burden and similar
matters.
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• Public policy may be considered.
Public policy, as established by statute, regulation, or judicial decisions may be considered with all other
evidence in determining whether an act or practice is unfair. For example, the fact that a particular
lending practice violates a state law or a banking regulation may be considered as evidence in
determining whether the act or practice is unfair. Conversely, the fact that a particular practice is
affirmatively allowed by statute may be considered as evidence that the practice is not unfair. Public
policy considerations by themselves, however, will not serve as the primary basis for determining that
an act or practice is unfair.
Deceptive Acts and Practices
Assessing whether an act or practice is deceptive
A three-part test is used to determine whether a representation, omission, or practice is "deceptive."
First, the representation, omission, or practice must mislead or be likely to mislead the consumer.
Second, the consumer's interpretation of the representation, omission, or practice must be reasonable
under the circumstances. Lastly, the misleading representation, omission, or practice must be material.
Each of these elements is discussed below in greater detail.
• There must be a representation, omission, or practice that misleads or is likely to mislead the
consumer.
An act or practice may be found to be deceptive if there is a representation, omission, or practice that
misleads or is likely to mislead the consumer. Deception is not limited to situations in which a consumer
has already been misled. Instead, an act or practice may be found to be deceptive if it is likely to
mislead consumers. A representation may be in the form of express or implied claims or promises and
may be written or oral. Omission of information may be deceptive if disclosure of the omitted information
is necessary to prevent a consumer from being misled.
In determining whether an individual statement, representation, or omission is misleading, the
statement, representation, or omission will not be evaluated in isolation. The Agencies will evaluate it in
the context of the entire advertisement, transaction, or course of dealing to determine whether it
constitutes deception. Acts or practices that have the potential to be deceptive include: making
misleading cost or price claims; using bait-and-switch techniques; offering to provide a product or
service that is not in fact available; omitting material limitations or conditions from an offer; selling a
product unfit for the purposes for which it is sold; and failing to provide promised services.
. • The act or practice must be considered from the perspective of the reasonable consumer.
In determining whether an act or practice is misleading, the consumer's interpretation of or reaction to
the representation, omission, or practice must be reasonable under the circumstances. The test is
whether the consumer's expectations or interpretation are reasonable in light of the claims made. When
representations or marketing practices are targeted to a specific audience, such as the elderly or the
financially unsophisticated, the standard is based upon the effects of the act or practice on a reasonable
member of that group.
If a representation conveys two or more meanings to reasonable consumers and one meaning is
misleading, the representation may be deceptive. Moreover, a consumer's interpretation or reaction may
indicate that an act or practice is deceptive under the circumstances, even if the consumer's
interpretation is not shared by a majority of the consumers in the relevant class, so long as a significant
minority of such consumers is misled.
In evaluating whether a representation, omission or practice is deceptive, the Agencies will look at the
entire advertisement, transaction, or course of dealing to determine how a reasonable consumer would
respond. Written disclosures may be insufficient to correct a misleading statement or representation,
particularly where the consumer is directed away from qualifying limitations in the text or is counseled
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that reading the disclosures is unnecessary. likewise, oral disclosures or fine print may be insufficient to
cure a misleading headline or prominent written representation.
• The representation, omission, or practice must be material.
A representation, omission, or practice is material if it is likely to affect a consumer's decision regarding
a product or service. In general, information about costs, benefits, or restrictions on the use or
availability of a product or service is material. When express claims are made with respect to a financial
product or service, the claims will be presumed to be material. Similarly, the materiality of an implied
claim will be presumed when it is demonstrated that the institution intended that the consumer draw
certain conclusions based upon the claim.
Claims made with the knowledge that they are false will also be presumed to be material. Omissions will
be presumed to be material when the financial institution knew or should have known that the consumer
needed the omitted information to evaluate the product or service.
Relationship to Other Laws
Acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive within the meaning of section 5 of the FTC Act may also
violate other federal or state statutes. On the other hand, there may be circumstances in which an act or
practice violates section 5 of the FTC Act even though the institution is in technical compliance with
other applicable laws, such as consumer protection and fair lending laws. Banks should be mindful of
both possibilities. The following laws warrant particular attention in this regard:
Truth in Lending and Truth in Savings Acts
Pursuant to the Truth in lending Act (TllA), creditors must "clearly and conspicuously" disclose the
costs and terms of credit. The Truth in Savings Act (TISA) requires depository institutions to provide
interest and fee disclosures for deposit accounts so that consumers may compare deposit products.
TISA also provides that advertisements shall not be misleading or inaccurate, and cannot misrepresent
an institution's deposit contract. An act or practice that does not comply with these provisions of TILA or
TISA may also violate the FTC Act. On the other hand, a transaction that is in technical compliance with
TllA or TISA may nevertheless violate the FTC Act. For example, consumers could be misled by
advertisements of "guaranteed" or "lifetime" interest rates when the creditor or depository institution
intends to change the rates, whether or not the disclosures satisfy the technical requirements of TllA or
TISA.
Equal Credit Opportunity and Fair Housing Acts
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) prohibits discrimination in any aspect of a credit transaction
against persons on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age (provided
the applicant has the capacity to contract), the fact that an applicant's income derives from any public
assistance program, and the fact that the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under the
Consumer Credit Protection Act. Similarly, the Fair Housing Act (FHA) prohibits creditors involved in
residential real estate transactions from discriminating against any person on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. Unfair or deceptive practices that target or
have a disparate impact on consumers who are members of these protected classes may violate the
ECOA or the FHA, as well as the FTC Act.
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices related to the
collection of consumer debts. Although this statute does not by its terms apply to banks that collect their
own debts, failure to adhere to the standards set by this Act may support a claim of unfair or deceptive
practices in violation of the FTC Act. Moreover, banks that either affirmatiyely or through lack of
oversight, permit a third-party debt collector acting on their behalf to engage in deception, harassment,
or threats in the collection of monies due may be exposed to liability for approving or assisting in an
unfair or deceptive act or practice.
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Managing Risks Related to Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices
Since the release of the FDIC's statement and the Board's letter on unfair and deceptive practices in
May 2002, bankers have asked for guidance on strategies for managing risk in this area. This section
outlines guidance on best practices to address some areas with the greatest potential for unfair or
deceptive acts and practices, including: advertising and solicitation; servicing and collections; and the
management and monitoring of employees and third-party service providers. Banks also should monitor
compliance with their own policies in these areas, and should have procedures for receiving and
addressing consumer complaints and monitoring activities performed by third parties on behalf of the
bank.
To avoid engaging in unfair or deceptive activity, the Agencies encourage use of the following practices,
which have already been adopted by many institutions:
Review all promotional materials, marketing scripts, and customer agreements and disclosures to
ensure that they fairly and adequately describe the terms, benefits, and material limitations of the
product or service being offered, including any related or optional products or services, and that they do
not misrepresent such terms either affirmatively or by omission. Ensure that these materials do not use
fine print, separate statements or inconspicuous disclosures to correct potentially misleading headlines,
and ensure that there is a reasonable factual basis for all representations made.
Draw the attention of customers to key terms, including limitations and conditions, that are important in
enabling the customer to make an informed decision regarding whether the product or service meets the
customer's needs.
Clearly disclose all material limitations or conditions on the terms or availability of products or services,
such as a limitation that applies a special interest rate only to balance transfers; the expiration date for
terms that apply only during an introductory period; material prerequisites for obtaining particular
products, services or terms (e.g., minimum transaction amounts, introductory or other fees, or other
qualifications); or conditions for canceling a service without charge when the service is offered on a free
trial basis.
Inform consumers in a clear and timely manner about any fees, penalties, or other charges (including
charges for any force-placed products) that have been imposed, and the reasons for their imposition.
Clearly inform customers of contract provisions that permit a change in the terms and conditions of an
agreement.
When using terms such as "pre-approved" or "guaranteed," clearly disclose any limitations, conditions,
or restrictions on the offer.
Clearly inform consumers when the account terms approved by the bank for the consumer are less
favorable than the advertised terms or terms previously disclosed.
Tailor advertisements, promotional materials, disclosures and scripts to take account of the
sophistication and experience of the target audience. Do not make claims, representations or
statements that mislead members of the target audience about the cost, value, availability, cost savings.
benefits, or terms of the product or service.
Avoid advertising that a particular service will be provided in connection with an account if the bank
does not intend or is not able to provide the service to accountholders. Clearly disclose when optional
products and services - such as insurance, travel services, credit protection, and consumer report
update services that are offered simultaneously with credit - are not required to obtain credit or
considered in decisions to grant credit.
Ensure that costs and benefits of optional or related products and services are not misrepresented or
presented in an incomplete manner.
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When making claims about amounts of credit available to consumers, accurately and completely
represent the amount of potential, approved, or useable credit that the consumer will receive.
Avoid advertising terms that are not available to most customers and using unrepresentative examples
in advertising, marketing, and promotional materials.
Avoid making representations to consumers that they may pay less than the minimum amount due
required by the account terms without adequately disclosing any tate fees, overlimit fees, or other
account fees that will result from the consumer paying such reduced amount.
Clearly disclose a telephone number or mailing address (and, as an addition, an email or website
address if available) that consumers may use to contact the bank or its third-party servicers regarding
any complaints they may have, and maintain appropriate procedures for resolving complaints.
Consumer complaints should also be reviewed by banks to identify practices that have the potential to
be misleading to customers.
Implement and maintain effective risk and supervisory controls to select and manage third-party
servicers.
Ensure that employees and third parties who market or promote bank products, or service loans, are
adequately trained to avoid making statements or taking actions that might be unfair or deceptive.
Review compensation arrangements for bank employees as well as third-party vendors and servicers to
ensure that they do not create unintended incentives to engage in unfair or deceptive practices.
Ensure that the institution and its third party servicers have and follow procedures to credit consumer
payments in a timely manner. Consumers should be clearly told when and if monthly payments are
applied to fees, penalties, or other charges before being applied to regular principal and interest.
The need for clear and accurate disclosures that are sensitive to the sophistication of the target
audience is heightened for products and services that have been associated with abusive practices.
Accordingly, banks should take particular care in marketing credit and other products and services to
the elderly, the financially vulnerable, and customers who are not financially sophisticated. In addition,
creditors should pay particular attention to ensure that disclosures are clear and accurate with respect
to: the points and other charges that will be financed as part of home-secured loans; the terms and
conditions related to insurance offered in connection with loans; loans covered by the Home Ownership
and Equity Protection Act; reverse mortgages; credit cards designed to rehabilitate the credit position of
the cardholder; and loans with pre-payment penalties, temporary introductory terms, or terms that are
not available as advertised to all consumers.
Conclusion
The development and implementation of policies and procedures in these areas and the other steps
outlined above will help banks assure that products and services are provided in a manner that is fair,
allows informed customer choice, and is consistent with the FTC Act.
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FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
12 CFR Parts 303 and 324
RIN 3064-AC78
Filing Procedures; Transactions With Affiliates
AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
SUMMARY: Insured State nonmember banks are subject to the restrictions
and limitations on transactions by member banks with affiliates found
in sections 23A and 238 of the Federal Reserve Act "in the same manner
and to the same extent" as though they were member banks. The Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRS) adopted 12 CFR 223
("Regulation W") governing sections 23A and 238. The FDIC is
proposing to add a new part to title 12 of the CFR that would cross
reference Regulation W to make it clear that insured State nonmember
banks are subject to the restrictions and limitations, and may take
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advantage of the exemptions, contained in Regulation W. FDIC's
regulation would also make it clear that the FDIC administers the
restrictions and limitations contained in Regulation W as to insured
State nonmember banks, may grant case-by-case exemptions from those
restrictions and limitations, and is the appropriate agency to make
other determinations under Regulation W. The proposal would also amend
part 303 of FDIC's regulations governing filing and hearing procedures
by adding a new section that would govern requests for exemptions from
new part 324 and hearings that are held for the purpose determining
whether a shareholder or company exercises a controlling influence over
another company.
DATES: Written comments must be received on or before May 3,2004.
ADDR~SSES:You may submit comments, identified by RIN number by any of
the following methods:
Agency Web Site: http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federallpropose.html.
Follow instructions for
submitting comments on the Agency Web site.
E-mail: Comments@FDIC.gov. Include the RIN
number in the subject line of the message.
Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary,
Attention: Comments, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20429.
Hand Delivery/Courier: Guard station at rear of
the 550 17th Street Building (located on F Street) on business days
between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name
and RIN for this rulemaking. All comments received will be posted
without change to http://www.fdic.gov/regulationsllaws/federal/propose.htmI
including any personal information provided.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Curtis Vaughn, Senior Examination
Specialist, Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection, (202) 898-
6759 or cvaughn@fdic.gov, Kenyon T. Kilber, Senior Examination
Specialist, Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection, (202) 898-
8935 or kkilber@fdic.gov or Pamela E.F. LeCren, Counsel, Legal
Division, (202) 898-3730 or plecren@fdic.gov, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 550 17th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20429.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Section 180)(1) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C.
18280)(1) ("FDI Act") provides that "Sections 371c and 371c-1 of
[title 12] shall apply with respect to every nonmember insured bank in
the same manner and to the same extent as if the nonmember insured bank
were a member bank." Sections 371c and 371c-1 of title 12 (12 U.S.C.
371c, 371c-1) are respectively sections 23A and 238 of the Federal
Reserve Act (FRA). They establish restrictions and limitations with
respect to transactions between member banks and their affiliates. The
purpose of those restrictions is to protect member banks from suffering
losses when entering into transactions with affiliates.
Section 23A (1) establishes limits on the amount of "covered
transactions" between a member bank and its affiliates (anyone
affiliate and in the aggregate as to all affiliates); (2) requires that
all covered transactions between a member bank and its affiliates be on
terms and conditions that are consistent with safe and sound banking
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practices; (3) prohibits the purchase of low quality assets from an
affiliate; and (4) requires that extensions of credit by a member bank
to an affiliate, and guarantees on behalf of affiliates, be secured by
statutorily defined amounts of collateral. Section 238 (1) requires
that transactions (covered transactions as well as other identified
transactions such as the sale of assets to an affiliate) between a
member bank and its affiliates be on market terms (on terms and under
circumstances that are substantially the same, or at least as favorable
to the bank, as those prevailing at the time for comparable
transactions with nonaffiliates); (2) prohibits purchases of assets
from an affiliate as fiduciary unless one of several exceptions are
met; (3) prohibits purchases of securities during the existence of an
underwriting or selling syndicate if the principal underwriter of the
securities is an affiliate; and (4) prohibits any advertisements or
agreements by a member bank suggesting that the bank is responsible for
the obligations of an affiliate.
The FDIC interprets and enforces the restrictions and requirements
of sections 23A and 238 of the FRA as to FDIC insured State banks that
are not members of the Federal Reserve System (insured State nonmember
banks) and has done so for many years. Until recently neither the FR8
nor the FDIC had adopted, or proposed, a regulation on the restrictions
of sections 23A or 238 as applicable to the depository institutions
over which each is given responsibility under the FRA and FOI Act
respectively. Both agencies relied, rather, upon the language of the
FRA and careful coordination of their interpretations of the statutory
restrictions. On May 11,2001, the FRS published a proposed regulation
(Regulation W) designed to implement sections 23A and 238 of the FRA if
that proposal were adopted in final. (66 FR 24186). The FDIC filed a
formal comment on the proposal. On December 12, 2002, the FR8 published
Regulation W as a final rule. (67 FR 76560). It became effective on
April 1, 2003, and is codified at 12 CFR 223. The preamble accompanying
Regulation W as adopted in final form indicated that member
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banks would be given certain time periods to bring outstanding
transactions into compliance with the new regulation.
Regulation W defines terms; restates the statutory prohibitions
found in section 23A and 238; establishes a number of exemptions to
those restrictions; explains how to value credit transactions and asset
purchases for purposes of complying with the limits on covered
transactions; sets out rules on when covered transactions arise for
purposes of Regulation W; sets out rules with respect to derivative
transactions and how section 23A and 238 apply to foreign branches;
defines the term '''financial subsidiary" for purposes of Regulation W;
and sets out the standards under which the FRS will grant requests for
exemptions on a case-by-case basis.
In keeping with section 180)(1) of the FDI Act, the FDIC is
proposing to add a new part to title 12 of the CFR. The purpose of this
new part is to make clear that insured State nonmember banks must
comply with the restrictions and limitations contained in Regulation W
in order to comply with sections 23A and 238 of the FRA and section
180)(1) of the FDI Act. As previously stated, section 180)(1) of the
FDI Act provides that sections 23A and 238 shall apply to insured State
nonmember banks ""in the same manner and to the same extent" as if the
nonmember banks are member banks. This requirement in the FDI Act means
that the substantive requirements and restrictions set out in
Regulation W apply equally to insured State nonmember banks. The FDIC
has taken those requirements and restrictions into consideration in
interpreting and applying sections 23A and 238 to insured State
nonmember banks since the adoption of Regulation W. The FDIC is now
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proposing to add part 324, which will expressly incorporate through
cross reference the substantive provisions of Regulation W. The part
also identifies the FDIC as the appropriate agency for State nonmember
banks in the administration and interpretation of those requirements
and in granting exemption requests.
Discussion
Description of Proposal
Proposed part 324 is divided into six sections. Section 324.1 sets
out the authority under which the FDIC is proposing to act and
describes the purpose and scope of the regulation. Section 324.2
provides that the restrictions and limitations of Regulation W apply to
insured State nonmember banks and contains an exemption for certain
subsidiary relationships that were entered into prior to the date on
which the FDIC's proposed part was published for public comment.
Section 324.3 informs insured State banks that they are to follow the
FDIC's procedures set forth in part 303 of the FDIC's regulations when
requesting a hearing or making any filing under part 324. Section 324.4
makes it clear that "member bank" should be read as "insured State
nonmember bank", "Board" should be read as "FDIC" and
"appropriate Federal banking agency" should be understood to mean
"FDIC" wherever those terms appear in Regulation W. Section 324.4
also contains a definition of "State nonmember bank". Section 324.5
provides that insured State nonmember banks may obtain an exemption
from the restrictions and limitations of this part concerning section
23A if the FDIC determines that such an exemption is in the public
interest and is consistent with the purposes of section 23A. Procedures
for filing exemption requests are proposed in this section and would,
if adopted, be added to part 303 of FDIC's regulations (Filing
Procedures) as new Sec. 303.251. Finally, Sec. 324.6 provides that
determinations that a shareholder or company exercises a controll~ng
influence over another company will only be made after notice and
opportunity for hearing. Hearings would be conducted in accordance with
the proposed amendments to part 303 that are set out as part of this
rulemaking. Proposed part 324, and the accompanying proposed amendments
to part 303, are discussed in more detail below.
Section 324.1 Authority, Purpose and Scope
The FDIC derives the authority from section 9 (Tenth) of the FDI
Act (12 U.S.C. 1819 (Tenth)) to adopt rules implementing sections 23A
and 238 of the FRA as made applicable to insured State nonmember banks.
Section 9 (Tenth) of the FDI Act authorizes the FDIC to issue rules and
regulations "to carry out the provisions of this chapter or of any
other law which it has the responsibility of administering or
enforcing".
The FDIC has the responsibility of administering and enforcing
section 180)(1) of the FDI Act as to state nonmember banks. The
language in section 9 (Tenth) of the FDI Act limits the FDIC's
authority to adopt regulations governing a particular area only if
"authority to issue such rules and regulations has been expressly and
exclusively granted to any other regulatory agency". Nothing in the
text of section 23A or section 238 or the legislative history of those
sections indicates that the FR8 has the"exclusive" rulemaking
authority with respect to those sections as they apply to institutions
other than member banks.\1\
\1\ Congress could have amended the FRA to refer to "bank"
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rather than .... member bank" if it wanted to provide the FRS with
exclusive rulemaking authority with regard to sections 23A and 238
but it did not do so. Instead Congress amended the FDI Act, not once
but twice, by incorporating a cross reference first to section 23A
and then to section 238 after that section was added to the FRA. The
fact that Congress chose to amend the FDI Act and not the FRA
signals an intent to provide the FDIC with a role in the
administration and interpretation of sections 23A and 238.
The text of sections 23A and 238 itself bear out the proposition
that the FDIC is free to adopt regulations in this area. Sections 23A
and 238 do not parcel out responsibility between the FR8 and the
appropriate Federal banking agencies as is the case with sections 22(g)
and 22(h) of the FRA, both of which are also made applicable to insured
State nonmember banks by section 180) of the FDI Act .... in the same
manner and to the same extent" as though they were member banks.
Section 23A and 238's silence with respect to what role the other
Federal banking agencies are to play shows that the FRA does not
operate as a constraint on the authority the FDIC derives from its own
statute to establish rules implementing section 23A and 238 and the
FDIC's ability to make decisions in applying those sections to insured
State nonmember banks. The only restraint placed on the FDIC by the FDI
Act is that all of the restrictions and limitations of section 23A and
238 be applied "'in the same manner and to the same extent" as those
restrictions and limitations are applied to member banks. As discussed
below, the FDIC will in fact be applying Regulation Wand section 23A
and 238 to State nonmember banks in the same way as those provisions
apply to member banks.
Section 324.2 Affiliate Transactions
General Requirements--Paragraph (a) of Sec. 324.2 of the proposal
cross references Regulation Wand restates the requirement found in
section 180)(1) of the FDI Act that sections 23A and 238 of the FRA
apply to insured State nonmember banks as though they were member
banks. The purpose of paragraph (a) is to clarify that insured State
nonmember banks must comply with the substantive provisions of
Regulation W in order to comply with section 180)(1) of the FDI Act
and part
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324. The effect going forward of the cross reference in Sec. 324.2(a)
to Regulation W is that State nonmember banks will automatically be
subject to any changes made to Regulation W by the FR8 without the need
for the FDIC to take any action to amend its own regulation.
Exception to General Requirements--The FDIC is proposing to adopt a
regulatory exemption to the general rule set out in paragraph (a) of
Sec. 324.2 of the proposal that insured State nonmember banks are
subject to the restrictions and requirements of Regulation W.\2\
Paragraph (b) of Sec. 324.2 would exempt from the restrictions of part
324 certain subsidiary relationships that were established prior to the
date on which the FDIC's proposal is pUblished for comment. If a
subsidiary relationship predates that date and that subsidiary
relationship was not considered by the FDIC to be subject to section
23A and 238 prior to December 12, 2002 (Le., the subsidiary was not
considered to be an affiliate for purposes of section 23A and 238 as it
was interpreted and applied by the FDIC) but is subject to section 23A
and 238 after that date (is considered an affiliate relationship under
Regulation W) the subsidiary will not be treated as an affiliate for
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purposes of part 324. Under the exemption, the bank's investment in the
company, and its other covered transactions, if any, with the company,
will not count toward the quantitative amount limitations that would
otherwise apply under part 324 and outstanding transactions with the
company do not need to be brought into compliance with part 324. It
also means that, going forward, the bank is not subject to the
restrictions of part 324 whenever it dears with that subsidiary
company, e.g., any future extensions of credit to, or investments in,
the subsidiary will not count toward the limits on covered transactions
with affiliates to which the bank is subject. The exemption only
applies, however, for so long as the subsidiary's activities are
limited to those that were approved by the FDIC by regulation or order,
or which are covered by an exception in section 24 of the FDI Act (12
U.S.C. 1831a) ("section 24"), and were conducted as of the date on
which the FDIC's proposal is published for comment. If, for example,
the subsidiary changes its line of business in such a way that under
Regulation W a newly established subsidiary of the bank doing the same
thing would be considered an affiliate, the subsidiary will be treated
as an affiliate from that point forward. The effect of the loss of the
exemption is that, going forward, covered transactions between the bank
and the subsidiary will be subject to part 324. Although the exemption
would no longer apply, the outstanding investment in the subsidiary,
any outstanding extensions of credit to the subsidiary and any other
prior transactions with the subsidiary would not be affected by the
loss of the exemption.
\2\ The FDIC has the authority to adopt by regulation or order
exemptions from the restrictions of section 23A if the FDIC
determines that the exemption is in the public interest and is
consistent with the purposes of the section 23A of the FRA.
The exemption provided for under the proposal is intended to cover
several categories of subsidiaries. The first category is those
subsidiaries that, prior to the date on which the FDIC's proposal was
issued for comment, were 'established after the FDIC issued an approval
order under section 24 of the FDI Act and 12 CFR 362 ("section 24
subsidiaries"). Such subsidiaries are by definition engaged in
activities that are not permissible for a subsidiary of a national
bank. The exemption is not limited, however, to State nonmember banks
that applied for and obtained consent to establish a subsidiary under
12 CFR 362. It also covers section 24 subsidiaries that were
established prior to the date on which the FDIC's proposal was
published for comment that were (1) established after filing a notice
under part 362,\3\ or (2) established pursuant to a provision of part
362 that permits State nonmember banks to establish certain
subsidiaries without filing notice or making application to the
FDIC.\4\ Finally, the exemption also is intended to cover subsidiaries
established prior to the relevant date pursuant to a statutory
exception in section 24 of the FDI Act which is restated in 12 CFR 362.
\3\ 12 CFR 362 permits state nonmember banks to establish
certain subsidiaries after filing a notice with the FDIC provided
that certain conditions and requirements are met. In each such
instance the conditions include affiliate transaction restrictions.
\4\ 12 CFR 362 permits an insured state nonmember bank to
establish a subsidiary that invests in bank stock (Sec.
362.4(b)(4)(ii»); engages in certain leasing activities (Sec.
362.4(b)(6); invests in adjustable rate preferred stock, money
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market preferred stock and similar instruments (Sec. 362.4(b)(7));
and holds a control interest in a company that engages in insurance
agency activities, any national bank permissible activity, real
estate leasing, or that invests in adjustable rate and money market
preferred stock (Sec. 362.4(b)(3)(ii)) without filing an
application or a notice.
As proposed, the subsidiary relationship exemption may be over
inclusive to the extent that some of the section 24 subsidiaries
described above fall within an exception to the definition of financial
subsidiary found in Regulation W and thus are not considered to be
affiliates. As it may be possible to construe the exceptions to the
definition of financial subsidiary found in Regulation W narrowly, the
FDIC has opted to draft the proposed exemption broadly so as to avoid
any undue confusion or ambiguity as to how insured State nonmember
banks with existing section 24 subsidiaries are affected by the
adoption of FRS Regulation W.
The FDIC intends to limit the exemption to the types of section 24
subsidiaries described above. Comment is invited on whether the
regulatory text is sufficiently clear as to its scope or has broader
effect than intended. In addition, comment is requested on whether the
FDIC should consider narrowing the scope of the exemption or making it
broader.
It has been the FDIC's practice to include in section 24 approval
orders conditions on the manner and extent to which an insured State
nonmember bank may interact with its subsidiary that engages in
activities that are not permissible for a subsidiary of a national
bank.\5\ Those conditions are very similar but not identical to the
restrictions found in section 23A and 238 and Regulation W. In
addition, the FDIC's regulations which provide that a bank may simply
file a notice before establishing a certain type of subsidiary require
in most instances that a bank must abide by certain affiliate
transaction restrictions when interacting with the subsidiary if a bank
wants to take advantage of the notice procedure. The affiliate
transaction restrictions that apply in the case of a notice are the
same restrictions which have been imposed by the FDIC by order on a
case-by-case basis. Banks that are eligible for the SUbsidiary
relationship exemption but which are subject by order or regulation to
conditions placing restrictions on the bank's transactions with its
subsidiary would still be subject to those conditions (Le., the
proposed exemption would not supercede or invalidate those conditions).
\5\ Section 24 of the FDI Act requires the FDIC to determine
that the activities to be engaged in by the subsidiary do not
present a significant risk to the fund. The FDIC can, and typically
has, determined that a particular activity does not present a
significant risk to the fund provided that the activity is
conditioned in such a way as to make any risk associated with the
conduct of that activity by the subsidiary acceptable.
As indicated above, the FDIC may, by regulation or order, exempt
transactions or relationships from the requirements and restrictions of
sections 23A and 238 of the FRA if the FDIC finds that the exemption is
in the public interest and consistent with the purposes of the
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FRA. The proposed subsidiary relationship exemption should not have an
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adverse impact on the public interest or be inconsistent with the
purposes of section 23A and 23B as most banks that have subsidiaries
that are eligible for the exemption are already subject to affiliate
transaction conditions very similar to those found in Regulation. The
exemption would not affect those conditions. The majority of the
section 24 subsidiaries which have been approved by the FDIC involved
either real estate subsidiaries or subsidiaries that invest in equity
securities.\6\ The majority of the real estate subsidiaries are subject
to affiliate transaction restrictions similar to those found in
Regulation Wand many of those that are not subject to such
restrictions are approvals to hold certain real estate investments
pending their liquidation. The FDIC carefully reviewed the requests for
consent to engage in equity securities investments through a
subsidiary. Although many of the equity securities applications were
. not made subject to affiliate transaction restrictions, the
applications that were approved were made subject to whatever
conditions the Board found necessary in its best judgment to protect
the deposit insurance funds from risk given the facts and circumstances
of each application. (Section 24 requires the FDIC to determine that
the conduct of business by subsidiaries such as these does not present
a significant risk before the FDIC may give its consent to acquisition
or establishment of the subsidiary.) The majority of the equity
subsidiaries that were approved involved small investments (less than
10% of tier one capital) and in many cases the equities in which those
subsidiaries sought consent to invest were bank holding companies and
other similar firms. Most of the approvals were conditioned in such a
way as to limit lending to the subsidiaries and to limit the amount of
the investments that the subsidiaries may in turn make. Given the
Board's initial review and determination and the conditions to which
the approvals are subject, the FDIC does not believe that
grandfathering these subsidiaries will be contrary to the public
interest. What is more, the FDIC notes that these equity investment
securities are in many ways similar to private equity funds (the
vehicle through which financial holding companies may invest in equity
securities) which are provided special treatment under Regulation W.
\6\ A summary of requests approved by the FDIC's Board of
Directors can be viewed at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/approvedlindex.html
Section 324.2(b) of the proposal does not exempt transactions
entered into by a State nonmember bank prior to the publication date of
the proposal from compliance with Regulation Wand part 324. All
transactions with affiliates, regardless of when entered into, are
governed by Regulation Wand the phase-in periods adopted by the FRB in
the case of member banks. Transactions entered into after December 12,
2002, but before April 1, 2003, by member banks with their affiliates
were required to comply with Regulation W as of April 1, 2003.
Transactions entered into prior to December 12, 2002, were required to
comply with Regulation W no later than July 1, 2003. State nonmember
banks that entered into transactions with affiliates that would have
been required to be in compliance with Regulation W by either April 1,
2003, or July 1, 2003, if entered into by a member bank and which are
not in compliance at this time will be cited for a violation of section
23A and 238 and section 18(j)(1) of the FDI Act as appropriate. Comment
is invited as to whether the FDIC should consider adopting some other
treatment in part 324. For example, should the FDIC grant an additional
compliance period or perhaps grandfather pre-existing transactions?
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Section 324.3 Submissions and Requests for Hearing
Section 324.3 informs insured State nonmember banks that all
filings, submissions, requests for hearings and other requests made
under this part are to be made in accordance with the procedures set
out in 12 CFR 303. The intent of the provision is to eliminate any
confusion that might arise as to the procedures to be followed by
insured State nonmember banks (procedures found in Regulation W or
elsewhere in FRS regulations or procedures found in the FDIC's
regulations which might differ from those used by the FRB). This
rulemaking would add a new Sec. 303.251 to 12 CFR 303 that would set
out the applicable procedures for submissions, filings, and requests
for hearing that are made under Sec. Sec. 324.5 and 324.6 of the
proposal. The proposed procedures are discussed in more detail below.
Section 324.4 Definitions and Usage of Terms
Section 324.4 of the proposal substitutes appropriate terminology
for that found in Regulation W to make it clear that, for the purposes
of compliance with section 180)(1) of the FDI Act and this part,
"member bank" should be understood to mean "insured State nonmember
bank"; "Board" should be understood to mean "FDIC"; and
"appropriate Federal banking agency" should be understood to mean
"'FDIC" wherever those words or phrases are used in Regulation W. The
section also defines "State nonmember bank" by cross referencing the
definition found in section 3 of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(e».
Sections 324.2(a), 324.3 and 324.4 together accomplish two
important things. They make clear that (1) the FDIC, as the Federal
supervisor of insured State nonmember banks, is the appropriate party
to whom insured State nonmember banks must look for guidance in
interpreting the requirements of sections 23A and 23B of the FRA as
they apply to insured State nonmember banks through section 180) of
the FDI Act, and (2) it is the FDIC which exercises discretion in
applying the restrictions and limitations found in Regulation W in
those instances in which Regulation W provides for relief, calls for
determinations, or provides for the exercise of discretion by the FRB.
In short, by adopting the cross reference to Regulation W the FDIC is
satisfying its obligation to ensure that insured State nonmember banks
are subject to sections 23A and 238 as though they were member banks.
It is only appropriate, and is in fact necessary to the effective
. accomplishment of the FDIC's charge to oversee the safety and soundness
of insured State nonmember banks, for the FDIC to exercise the
authority to make decisions with respect to particular insured State
nonmember banks and their transactions with affiliates in the context
of the overall facts and circumstances affecting those banks. The FDIC
is the supervisor of these particular institutions and the Federal
supervisory agency that is in the best position to evaluate the need
for relief.
As indicated above, part 324 makes it clear that the reference to
the "appropriate Federal banking agency" as found in Regulation W
means the FDIC. References to the FDIC in FDIC's regulations will
normally be understood to refer to the FDIC's Board of Directors unless
the Board of Directors has delegated the matter to some other
individual within the agency. Regulation W contains several provisions
that permit the "appropriate Federal Banking agency" to make certain
decisions. For example, section 223.15(b)(3) of RegUlation W provides
that the appropriate Federal banking agency may set the amount by which
a bank's share of a participation in a loan originated by an affiliate
which is now a problem loan and which is being
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renewed (or for which additional funds are extended) may exceed 5% of
the bank's original exposure without the renewal constituting a
purchase of a low quality asset. Insured State nonmember banks should
note that it is the FDIC's present intent that the authority to make
determinations under Regulation W that are to be made by the
"appropriate Federal banking agency" will be delegated to the
Director of the Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection and the
Directors designee.
Section 324.5 Exemption Requests
Section 223.43 of Regulation W (12 CFR 223.43) provides that the
FRS may, by regulation or order, at its discretion, exempt transactions
or relationships from the requirements of section 23A if the FRS
determines that the exemption is in the public interest and is
consistent with the purposes of section 23A. FDIC's proposed Sec.
324.5 provides that insured State nonmember banks may request an
exemption from the requirements and restrictions of section of 23A, as
implemented by Regulation W, by filing a written request with the FDIC.
The FDIC may, in its discretion, grant an exemption if the FDIC
determines that it is in the public interest to do so and the FDIC
determines that granting the exemption is consistent with the purposes
of section 23A. This provision is similar in purpose to Sec. Sec.
324.2,324.3 and 324.4 in that it makes clear that it is the FDIC which
is the appropriate agency to grant relief in the case of an insured
State nonmember bank.
Exemptions from the restrictions of Regulation Ware available for
insured State nonmember banks under the same standards that apply to
member banks, i.e., if the exemption is in the public interest and it
is consistent with the purposes of section 23A. Exemptions are thus
available to member and nonmember banks "in the same manner" (after
filing a request for an exemption) and "to the same extent" (after
the bank's request is evaluated based upon the same standards). The
only difference is that it is the FDIC which, based on its unique
supervisory perspective and familiarity with the institution in
question, evaluates whether those standards are met and whether it is
appropriate to grant an exemption.
Past practice has been for insured State nonmember banks to apply
to the FRS to obtain exemptions from the restrictions of section 23A.
Usually the FRS consults with the FDIC prior to granting exemptions.
Absent unusual circumstances, if the FDIC objects to the exemption
request, it is not granted. Rather than continue the practice of
allowing insured State nonmember banks to file exemption requests with
the FRS, the FDIC is proposing to instruct insured State nonmember
banks to file all exemption requests with the FDIC. Since FDIC is the
primary Federal banking supervisor of insured State nonmember banks and
is more familiar with the condition and overall management of those
banks than the FRS, it is more appropriate for the FDIC to review and
act on exemption requests from insured State nonmember banks. It is not
only more appropriate to do so, but the FDIC expects that following
this new procedure will result in more efficiency in the review of the
requests which will in turn benefit banks. We anticipate that
individual reviews will take less time even though it is the FDIC's
intent to continue to coordinate with the FRS to ensure that the
standards under which exemption requests are evaluated are consistently
applied by the FDIC and the FRS. If adopted, the regulation would not
have any effect on exemptions previously granted by the FRS. Those
exemptions will continue to be valid and there would be no need for an
insured State nonmember bank to seek an order from the FDIC affirming
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the prior exemption granted by the FRS.
Procedures for filing exemption requests are proposed for comment
and are discussed below under the heading "Section 303.251 Affiliate
Transactions". If adopted, those procedures would be set out in a new
Sec. 303.251.
Section 324.6 Controlling Influence Determinations
Section 23A of the FRA requires a shareholder or a company to be
given notice and opportunity for a hearing before the shareholder or
company is determined to directly or indirectly exercise a controlling
influence over the management or policies of another company. The
impact of a determination that such influence is found to exist is that
the shareholder or company is considered to control the other company,
thus making the companies affiliates for the purposes of section 23A.
Section 324.6 of the proposed regulation restates the statutory
obligation for opportunity for a hearing prior to the control
determination being made. It also makes it clear that the FDIC and not
the FRS is the agency that affords the opportunity for a hearing and
makes the final determination on the control issue when an insured
State nonmember bank is involved. (See, Roque De La Feunte II v. FDIC,
332 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2003) (FDIC has the authority and obligation to
afford opportunity for hearing and to conduct a control hearing). The
standard under the proposal for determining if control exists is
whether the shareholder or company has a controlling influence over the
management or policies of the other company. This standard is identical
to that found in section 23A of the FRA and is the same standard in FRS
Regulation W.\7\
\7\ The FDIC recognizes that it will be necessary to coordinate
with the FRS to assure consistency as between the application of the
standard to member banks and state nonmember banks. We note,
however, that to date the FRS has never had a control hearing under
the relevant provisions of section 23A of the FRA. At this time
there is no existing prior FRS precedent resulting from a control
hearing for the FDIC to take into consideration.
If a hearing is requested by an insured State nonmember bank, or
one of its shareholders, the hearing will be conducted in accordance
with the procedures set out in 12 CFR 303. (See discussion below under
the heading "Section 303.251 Affiliate transactions" for information
regarding the hearing procedures that are proposed for comment.)
Proposed Amendments to 12 CFR 303
Section 303.251 Affiliate Transactions
FDIC is proposing to amend part 303 governing filing procedures and
certain hearings. Under the proposal, a new section would be added to
subpart M- "Other Filings" that would (1) set out the procedures for
filing a request for an exemption from section 23A, and (2) set out the
procedures governing hearings to determine whether or not a shareholder
or company exercises a controlling influence over another company.
Exemption requests--As proposed in Sec. 303.251 (a), the procedures
governing requests for an exemption from the restrictions of section
23A would require the requesting bank to file a letter with the
appropriate FDIC office that (1) describes in detail the relationship
or transaction for which the bank is seeking an exemption, (2)
identifies the requirements or restrictions from which the bank is
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seeking relief, and (3) sets out an explanation of why the exemption is
in the public interest and is consistent with the purposes of section
23Aw The FDIC may request any additional information that is, in its
opinion, necessary to properly evaluate the request. Banks that file
exemption requests will receive written notification of the FDIC's
decision. The proposed exemption procedures are substantially
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the same as those adopted by the FRS in Regulation W for member banks
with the exception that, unlike member banks, State nonmember banks
would file requests with an FDIC regional office rather than with the
agency's General Counsel. At the present time it is anticipated that
the FDIC's Board of Directors will retain the authority to grant
exemptions and will not delegate that responsibility.
Controlling influence hearing requests--Procedures governing
requests for hearings and the actual conduct of hearings to determine
control are set out in proposed Sec. 303.251(b). Under the proposed
procedures the FDIC is required to provide a shareholder or company
written notice of an opportunity for hearing before the agency makes a
determination that there is an affiliation based on the ability to
exercise a controlling influence over the management or policies of
another company. A company or shareholder that wants a hearing must
respond to that effect no later than 10 days after receiving the
written notice of opportunity for hearing by filing a request for a
hearing with the "appropriate FDIC office" as that term is defined in
12 CFR 303. Which FDIC office is the "appropriate FDIC office" is
dependent upon whether the institution that is the subject of a filing
is not part of a group of related institutions. If that is the case,
the appropriate regional office for that institution, and any
individual associated with the institution, is the FDIC region in which
the institution is located. (See Sec. 303.2(g)(1) of current part
303). If the institution that is the subject of a filing is part of a
group of related institutions, the appropriate FDIC regional office for
that institution, and any individual associated with that institution,
is the FDIC region in which the group's major policy and decision
makers are located (or any other region the FDIC designates on a case-
by-case basis). (See Sec. 303.2(g)(2) of current part 303).
Requests for a control hearing will be acknowledged in writing. The
date and time for hearings will be set by the FDIC solely in its
discretion ("such time as FDIC determines to be reasonable"). In
setting the date for the hearing the FDIC will take care to consider
the convenience of the participants in addition to other factors such
as the complexity of the issues and the potential effects of the timing
of the hearing on associated matters such as a pending examination. The
presiding officer will be the Director of the Division of Supervision
and Consumer Protection or the Director's designee. The presiding
officer is responsible for conducting the hearing, determining any
procedural question that is not specifically addressed by Sec.
303.251 (b), and rendering a final determination within 20 days of the
date on which the hearing record is closed. The participants will be
notified in writing of the final disposition which will contain an
explanation of the reasons for the final decision.
The final determination may be appealed to the Board of Directors
of the FDIC. To do so a request for review must be filed the Executive
Secretary of the FDIC within 15 days of the date on which notification
of the final decision is received.
The proposal indicates that the procedures currently set out in
Sec. Sec. 303.10(f) through 303.1 O(i), 303.10(k) and 303.10(m) will
govern the conduct of the hearing. Section 303.10 is titled" Hearings
and other meetings". Paragraph (f) governs participation in hearings.
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Paragraph (g) governs transcripts. Paragraph (h) governs presentations
and information that may be submitted. It also identifies federal laws
that are not applicable to hearings. Paragraph (i) governs the closing
of the hearing record. Paragraph (k) governs the computation of time.
Paragraph (m) provides that the Board of Directors may delegate by
resolution to the presiding officer the authority to adopt different
procedures in individual matters.
Request for Comments
In addition to any other comments on the proposal, the FDIC
specifically requests comment on the following.
1. Is it advisable for the FDIC to adopt separate rules
implementing section 180)(1) of the FDI Act and section 23A and 23B of
the FRA as they apply to insured State nonmember banks?
2. If the FDIC does adopt separate regulations, should the
regulation set out the full text of Regulation W rather than adopt the
proposed cross reference? If the FDIC adopted a full text version it
would be identical to Regulation W with the exception that "insured
State nonmember bank" would be substituted for "member bank';
"FDIC" would be substituted for "Board'; "FDIC" would be
substituted for "appropriate Federal banking agency"; the definition
of "member bank" would be replaced with a definition of "State
nonmember bank" (definition would be the same as currently proposed)
and the authority, purpose and scope paragraph as found in Regulation W
would be modified to read as those paragraphs are proposed for comment.
3. Should the FDIC continue its past practice of allowing the FRS
to act on exemption requests by insured State nonmember banks or adopt
the proposed change in practice which would direct insured State
nonmember banks to file such requests with the FDIC, which would then
grant or deny the request?
4. If the FDIC adopts the practice of acting on exemption requests,
are the proposed procedures for exemption requests sufficiently clear?
Is the information that is required to be presented in an exemption
request burdensome? Should the regulation require that additional,
specifically identified information be included in the request? Should
the regulation provide specifics on the time in which the FDIC will act
on exemption requests?
5. Are the proposed hearing procedures adequate? What additional
procedures if any should be included? Should the regulation specify
that the hearing will take place no later than a certain specified
period of time after the request for hearing is submitted to the FDIC?
Is it appropriate to apply the procedures found in Sec. Sec. 303.10(f)
through 303.1 O(i), 303.10(k) and 303.1 O(m) to a controlling influence
hearing?
6. Should the Board of Directors delegate the authority to grant
exemptions under the regulation or retain the authority to grant
exemptions at the Board level?
7. Should the Board of Directors delegate the authority to make a
final control determination or should that authority be retained only
at the Board level?
8. If decision making authority with respect to control
determinations is delegated, is it appropriate to allow an appeal of
the decision and if so, to whom?
9. Is the FDIC correct in its initial view that the proposed
exemption for section 24 subsidiaries that were established prior to
the publication of this proposal from part 324 will not adversely
impact the public or be inconsistent with the purposes of section 23A
and 23B?
10. Should the FDIC draft the subsidiary exemption more narrowly?
If so, why? Should the exemption be broader in scope? If so, why?
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11. Should the FDIC consider additional exemptions at this time?
12. Should the FDIC consider granting a phase-in period for
transactions that were entered into prior to the publication of the
proposal? If so, should the phase-in period mirror the phase-in period
the FRB adopted for ..
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member banks (Le., three months from the effective date of the rule)
or would some other period be more appropriate?
13. Should the FDIC consider exempting from part 324 transactions
that were entered into prior to the publication of the proposal? If so,
why? Would such an exemption pose safety and soundness issues?
14. FDIC's view is that insured State branches, agencies, and
commercial lending companies of foreign banks are subject to the
substantive provisions of Regulation Wand this part. Comment is
requested on whether the proposed regulation is sufficiently clear in
that regard and whether or not the FDIC is justified in its view.
15. Are the proposed amendments to the FDIC's regulations written
clearly and in "plain language"? If not, what changes should be made
to the proposed language to make it clearer and easier to understand?
Paperwork Reduction Act
In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et
seq.), the FDIC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not
required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays
a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number.
The collection of information contained in this rule has been submitted
to OMS for review.
Written comments on the collection of information should be sent to
the Joseph F. Lackey, FDIC desk officer: Office of Management and
Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, New Executive
Office Building, Washington, DC 20503. Copies of comments should also
be sent to: Thomas Nixon, Legal Division, FDIC, 550 17th Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20429, (202) 898-8766. For further information on the
Paperwork Reduction Act aspect of this rule, contact Thomas Nixon at
the above address.
Comment is solicited on:
1. Whether the collection of information is necessary for the
proper performance of FDIC functions, including whether the information
will have practical utility;
2. The accuracy of our estimate of burden of the proposed
collection of information, including the validity of the methodology
and assumptions used;
3. The quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be
collected;
4. Ways to minimize the burden of the information collection on
those who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate
automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection
techniques or other forms of information technology, for example,
permitting electronic submission of responses; and
5. Estimates of capital or start-up costs and costs of operation,
maintenance, and purchases of services to provide information.
Title of the collection: Transactions with affiliates.
Summary of the collection: As discussed more fully in the preamble,
the FDIC's 12 CFR part 324 will make clear that insured State nonmember
institutions must conform to the standards of FRS's Regulation Wand
that the FDIC is responsible for administering Regulation W as it
applies to such institutions, including receiving and acting on notices
required by Regulation W.
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The notices required in this collection are required to evidence
compliance with sections 23A and 238 of the Federal Reserve Act (12
U.S.C. 371c and 371c-1) and section 18(j)(1) of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act ("FDI Act"). The respondents for part 324 will be
insured State nonmember institutions.
Regulation W established four notices at (12 CFR) sections
223.15(b)(4), 223.31(d)(4), 223.41 (d)(2) and 223.43(b). The FDIC will
require insured state nonmember institutions to provide the first three
of these notices to the FDIC by the part 324's cross-reference to
Regulation W. The fourth Regulation W notice (223.43(b)) will not be
required through the part 324 cross-reference. Instead, the FDIC
equivalent of that notice will be required through 12 CFR 303.251.
The first notice requirement, described in Regulation W's section
223.15(b)(4), is a condition to an exemption for renewals of loan
participations involving problem loans. Regulation W requires the
participating depository institution to provide its appropriate Federal
banking agency with written notice of the renewal or extension of
additional credit not later than 20 days after consummation. The FDIC
is the appropriate Federal banking agency to which insured State
nonmember institutions are to provide this notice. There will be no
reporting form associated with this information collection. The FDIC
estimates that approximately three insured State nonmember institutions
will file this notice annually and that it will take approximately two
hours to prepare the notice.
The second notice requirement, described in Regulation W's section
223.31(d)(4), is a condition to an exemption for a depository
institution's acquisition of an affiliate that becomes an operating
subsidiary of the institution after the acquisition. Regulation W
requires the institution to provide its appropriate Federal banking
agency and the FRS with written notice of its intention to acquire the
company at or before the time that the company becomes an affiliate of
the institution. Through part 324's cross-reference, insured State
nonmember institutions will provide that notice to the FDIC. There will
be no reporting form associated with this information collection. The
FDIC estimates that approximately three insured State nonmember
institutions will file this notice annually and that it will take
approximately six hours to prepare the notice.
The third notice requirement, described in Regulation W's section
223.41 (d)(2), is a condition to an exemption for internal corporate
reorganization transactions. Regulation W requires the depository
institution to provide its appropriate Federal banking agency and the
FRS with written notice of the transaction before consummation. Insured
State nonmember institutions will provide notice to the FDIC. The
notice must describe the primary business activities of the affiliate
and indicate the proposed date of the reorganization. There will be no
reporting form associated with this information collection. The FDIC
estimates that approximately seven insured state nonmember institutions
will file this notice annually and that it will take approximately six
hours to prepare a notice.
Finally, part 324 will not require insured state nonmember
institutions to send a notice to the FDIC through a cross-reference to
Regulation W's section 223.43(b). Instead, pursuant to Sec. 303.251,
they must submit a request to the appropriate FDIC regional office. The
request must describe in detail the transaction or relationship for
which the institution seeks exemption; explain why the FDIC should
exempt the transaction or relationship; and explain how the exemption
would be in the public interest and consistent with the purposes of
section 23A. There will be no reporting form associated with this
information collection. The FDIC estimates that approximately two
insured State nonmember institutions will file these requests annually
and that it will take approximately 10 hours to prepare a request.
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Burden estimate: The total estimated annual burden for insured
State nonmember institutions that must comply with the above-mentioned
requirements is 86 hours. Based on a rate of $50 per hour, the total
annual
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cost to the public for these collections of information is estimated to
be $4,300.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
In accordance with section 3(a) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act
(5 U.S.C. 603(a», the FDIC must publish an initial regulatory
flexibility analysis with this rulemaking or certify that the proposed
rule, if adopted, will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. For the purposes of the required
analysis or certification, financial institutions with total assets of
$150 million or less are considered to be "small entities". For the
reasons set out below the FDIC hereby certifies pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
605(b) that the proposed rule, if adopted, will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
Sections 23A and 238 of the FRA limit transactions between a member
bank and its affiliates. The FDIC enforces sections 23A and 23B of the
FRA as to insured State nonmember banks under section 180)(1) of the
FDI Act which provides that insured State nonmember banks are subject
to sections 23A and 238 of the FRA as though they were member banks.
Section 9 (Tenth) of the FDI Act authorizes the FDIC to issue such
regulations as may be necessary to administer and carry out the
purposes of those sections. The proposed rule would make clear to
insured State nonmember banks that in order to comply with section
180)(1) of the FDI Act they must comply with the substantive
provisions of FRB Regulation W which was adopted in final by the FR8 on
December 12, 2002 to implement the requirements and restrictions of
sections 23A and 238 of the FRA as they apply to member banks.
Regulation W is codified at 12 CFR 223. It appeared in volume 67 of the
Federal Register at page 76560 (67 FR 76560). A full description of the
reasons why the FR8 considered and adopted Regulation Ware set out in
the Federal Register document which contained Regulation W as
originally proposed for comment (66 FR 24186, May 11, 2001) and in
Regulation W as adopted in final form. The FR8 describes Regulation W
as a regulation which, although designed to comprehensively implement
sections 23A and 23B of the FRA, is a regulation that in large measure
simply codifies the FR8's past practice and interpretations with
respect to sections 23A and 238. The reasons the FDIC is proposing to
adopt a cross reference to Regulation W in its regulations and, is
further proposing to amend its regulations to make clear that the FDIC
is the appropriate agency to grant exemptions from sections 23A and 238
to insured State nonmember banks as well as to make other
determinations under Regulation W, are set out more fully under the
supplementary information section of this document. The proposed rule
would apply to all insured State nonmember banks regardless of their
size.
Regulation W largely codifies the application of section 23A and
238 of the FRA as to member and State nonmember banks as interpreted
and applied before that rule's adoption. In most instances the
differences between what a bank needed to do to comply with section 23A
or 238 previously and what is required to be done in order to comply
with section 23A or 238 post Regulation Ware minimal. In many
instances Regulation W actually grants relief from restrictions
contained in the statute. Regulation W does contain some new notice
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requirements and sets out specifics as to filing requirements if a bank
wishes to obtain an exemption from section 23A as to a particular
transaction or relationship. Those requirements are discussed above
under the heading .... Paperwork Reduction Act". Of the requirements
discussed under that heading, the requirements necessary to obtain an
exemption are the most onerous. Based on FDIC's experience as to the
number and size of State nonmember banks that have sought such
exemptions in the past, we anticipate very few such requests and the
institutions most likely to file an exemption request can be expected
to be larger than $150 million in total assets. In 2003 only three
insured State nonmember banks requested exemptions from section 23A.
Only one of the three institutions was under $150 million in total
assets. Regulation W also requires a notice in connection with
corporate reorganizations that are exempted from some of the
restrictions of section 23A and 23B without need of a case-by-case
determination. Again based on our past experience we anticipate that
banks that will take advantage of this exemption are likely to be
larger than $150 million in total assets. Over the years, exemption
requests have typically involved reorganization transactions and as
stated above, banks that file exemption requests are more likely to be
banks in excess of $150 million in total assets. Although we cannot
come to the same conclusion with respect to the final two categories of
notices described under the Paperwork Reduction Act heading, those
notice requirements are minimal in terms of the information required to
be filed. Banks will not require the services of attorneys,
consultants, appraisers, accountants or other professionals to prepare
and submit the notices nor do these notices require the use of
sophisticated computer programs, statistical analysis, or other complex
tracking or recordkeeping systems. While some aspects of Regulation W
may require tracking or other compliance systems in order for a bank to
comply with the requirements of the rule or to take advantage of
certain exemptions contained in the rule, those systems as well as any
burden arising out of FDIC's proposed rule would be present for State
nonmember banks regardless of whether the FDIC adopts the proposal or
not. The impact of the proposed rule is largely procedural in that its
purpose is to clarify for State nonmember banks that it is the FDIC
that administers the requirements of Regulation W as to insured state
nonmember banks. The rule does not impose any new or different
substantive requirement. In short, proposed part 324 does not itself
impose any burden on small institutions that is not already imposed
under Regulation W.
Impact on Families
The FO'IC has determined that this proposed rule will not affect
family well-being within the meaning of section 654 of the Treasury and
General Government Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law 105-277, 112
Stat. 2681 (1998).
List of Subjects
12 CFR Part 324
Banks, banking, Safety and Soundness, Transactions with affiliates.
12 CFR Part 303
Administrative practice and procedure, Authority delegations
(Government agencies), Bank deposit insurance, Banks, banking, Bank
merger, Branching, Foreign branches, Foreign investments, Gold
parachute payments, Insured branches, Interstate branching, Reporting
G - 33
and recordkeeping requirements, Savings associations.
The Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
hereby proposes to add a new part 324 to title 12 of the Code of
Federal Regulations and amend part 303 of title 12 of the Code of
Federal Regulations as follows:
1. The authority citation for part 324 reads as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1819(tenth), 18280)(1).
2. New part 324 is added to read as follows:
[[Page 12579]]
PART 324--TRANSACTIONS WITH AFFILIATES
Sec.
324.1 Authority, purpose and scope.
324.2 Affiliate transactions.
324.3 Filings, submissions, requests and hearings.
324.4 Definitions and usage of terms.
324.5 Exemptions.
324.6 Controlling influence determinations.
Sec. 324.1 Authority, purpose and scope.
(a) Authority. This part is issued under the authority of sections
9 (tenth) and 180)(1) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FOI Act)
(12 U.S.C. 1819 (tenth), 18280)(1».
(b) Purpose. This part implements section 18(j)(1) of the FOI Act
and sections 23A and 238 of the Federal Reserve Act (FRA) (12 U.S.C.
371 c, 371 c-1) as to insured State nonmember banks. Section 180)(1) of
the FDI Act makes insured State nonmember banks subject to the
restrictions of sections 23A and 238 of the FRA in the same manner and
to the same extent as if insured State nonmember banks are member banks
of the Federal Reserve System. Section 23A and 238 of the FRA establish
certain quantitative limits and other prudential requirements for
loans, purchases of assets, and certain other transactions between a
member bank and its affiliates. Federal Reserve Board (FRS) Regulation
W (12 CFR 223) implements sections 23A and 238 of the FRA as to member
banks by defining terms used in sections 23A and 238, explaining the
requirements of those statutory provisions and exempting certain
transactions from the restrictions and limitations of the FRA.
(c) Scope. This part applies to insured State nonmember banks.
Sec. 324.2 Affiliate transactions.
(a) General. Insured State nonmember banks are subject to the
restrictions and limitations contained in section 23A and 238 of the
FRA and FR8 Regulation W on transactions by member banks with
affiliates in the same manner and to the same extent as if they were
member banks of the Federal Reserve System.
(b) Exception. Any subsidiary relationship that predates March 17,
2004, is exempt from the requirements and restrictions of this part
that would otherwise apply if such relationship would not have been
subject to section 23A and 238 of the FRA prior to December 12, 2002,
because the subsidiary would not have at that time been considered to
be an affiliate.
G - 34
Sec. 324.3 Filings, submissions, requests and hearings.
Filings, submissions, and requests made under section 324.5 and
section 324.6 of this part are governed by 12 CFR 303.251. All other
filings, submissions or requests under this part are governed by
subpart A of 12 CFR 303. Procedures to which member banks are subject
under F.RB Regulation W for filings, submissions, requests and hearings
do not apply in the case of a State nonmember bank.
Sec. 324.4 Definitions and usage of terms.
For purposes of compliance with this part insured state nonmember
banks should substitute "insured State nonmember bank" for "member
bank" and "FDIC" for "Board" wherever those terms appear in
Federal Reserve Board Regulation W. The phrase "appropriate Federal
banking agency" as used in Federal Reserve Board Regulation W should
in all instances be read to mean "FDIC". "State nonmember bank" has
the same meaning as in 12 U.S.C. 1813(e)(2).
Sec. 324.5 Exemptions.
An insured State nonmember bank may request that the FDIC exempt
transactions or relationships from the requirements of section 23A of
the FRA as implemented by this part. Exemption requests may be granted
by the FDIC in its discretion if it finds such exemption to be in the
public interest and to be consistent with the purposes of section 23A.
Sec. 324.6 Controlling influence determinations.
Determinations by the FDIC that a shareholder or company directly
or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the management or
policies of another company wiH only be made after notice and
opportunity for hearing. Hearings will be conducted in accordance with
12 CFR 303.251.
3. The authority citation for part 303 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 378, 1813,1815,1817; 1818, 1819 (Seventh
and Tenth), 1820,1823,1828, 1831a, 1831e, 18310, 1831p-1, 1831w,
1835a, 1843(1),3104,3105,3108,3207; 15 U.S.C. 1601-1607.
4. Sections 303.251 and 303.252 of subpart M of part 303 are
redesignated as Sec. Sec. 303.252 and 303.253.
5. Section 303.251 is added to subpart M of part 303 to read as
follows:
Subpart M--Other Filings
*****
Sec. 303.251 Affiliate transactions.
(a) Exemption requests. (1 ) Scope-This paragraph contains the
procedures to be followed by an insured state nonmember bank that wants
to obtain an order from the FDIC exempting affiliate transactions or
relationships from the requirements of part 324 (12 CFR 324) and
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section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 371c) as made
applicable to insured state nonmember banks by section 18(j)(1) of the
FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 18280)(1 ).
(2) Where to File. Applicants shall submit a letter application to
the appropriate FDIC office.
(3) Content of Filing. The application shall contain the following:
(i) A detailed description of the relationship or transaction for
which the applicant is seeking an exemption,
(ii) An identification of the requirements or restrictions from
which the applicant is seeking relief, and
(iii) A statement of why the requested relief is in the public
interest and consistent with the purposes of section 18(j)(1) of the
FDIAct. .
(4) Additional information. The FDIC may request additional
information at any time during the processing of the filing.
(5) Processing. The FDIC will provide the applicant with written
notification of the final action when the decision is rendered.
(b) Controlling influence determinations. (1) Scope--This paragraph
contains the procedures the FDIC will follow when determining for the
purposes of part 324 whether a company or shareholder controls another
company as a result of directly or indirectly exercising a controlling
influence over the management or policies of such company.
(2) Opportunity for hearing. Prior to determining that a
shareholder or a company has a controlling influence over the
management or policies of another company, the shareholder or company
will be provided written notice of an opportunity for hearing.
(3) Hearing requests. Requests for a hearing must be received by
the FDIC no later than 10 days after a written notice of opportunity
for a hearing is received.
(4) Where to File. Requests for a hearing must be submitted by
letter to the appropriate FDIC office.
(5) Timing of hearing. Upon receipt of a request for hearing, the
FDIC will acknowledge the request in writing and set such date for the
hearing as is determined by the FDIC to be reasonable.
(6) Hearing Procedures. The presiding officer shall be the Director
of the Division of Supervision and Consumer
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Protection or the Director's designee. Hearings will be conducted in
accordance with sections 303.1 O(f)-section 303.10(i), section 303.10(k)
and section 303.10(m). The presiding officer is responsible for
conducting the hearing, determining all procedural questions not
governed by paragraph (b) of this section and making the final
determination within 20 days of the date on which the hearing record is
closed. Participants will be notified in writing of the final
disposition and provided an explanation of the reasons for the final
decision.
(7) Review of final decision. Final decisions resulting in a
determination that control exists may be appealed to the Board of
Directors of the FDIC by filing a request for review with the Executive
Secretary of the FDIC no later than 15 days after the date on which
.written notification of the final decision is received.
Dated at Washington, DC, this 10th day of March, 2004.
By order of the Board of Directors.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
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12 CFR Part 330
RIN 3064-AC54
Deposit Insurance Regulations; Living
Trust Accounts
AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: The FDIC is amending its
regulations to clarify and simplify the
deposit insurance coverage rules for
living trust accounts. The rules are
amended to provide coverage up to
$100,000 per qualifying beneficiary
who, as of the date of an insured
depository institution failure, would
become the owner of the living trust
assets upon the account owner's death.
EFFECnYE DATE: April 1, 2004.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Joseph A. DiNuzzo, Counsel, Legal
Division (202) 898-7349; Kathleen G.
Nagle, Supervisory Consumer Affairs
Specialist, Division of Supervision and
Consumer Protection (202) 898-6541; or
Martin W. Becker, Senior Receivership
Management Specialist, Division of
Resolutions and Receiverships (202)
898-6644, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Washington, DC 20429.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
In June 2003 the FDIC published a
proposed rule to simplify the insurance
coverage rules for living trust accounts
("proposed rule"). 68 FR 38645, June
30, 2003. The FDIC undertook this
rulemaking because of the confusion
among bankers and the public about the
insu~cecoverage of these accounts.
A living trust is a fonnal revocable
trust over which the owner (also known
as the grantor) retains ownership during
his or her lifetime. Upon the owner's
death, the trust generally becomes
irrevocable. A living trust is an
increasingly popular instrument
designed to achieve specific estate-
planning goals. A living trust account is
subject to the FDIC's insurance rules on
revocable trust accounts. Section 330.10
of the FDIC's regulations (12 CFR
330.10) provides that revocable trust
accounts are insured up to $100,000 per
"qualifying" beneficiary designated by
the account owner. If there are multiple
owners of a living trust account,
coverage is available separately for each
owner. Qualifying beneficiaries are
defined as the owner's spouse, children,
grandchildren, parents and siblings. 12
CFR 330.10 (a).
The most common type of revocable
trust account is the "payable-on-death"
e'POD") account, comprised simply of a
signature card on which the owner
designates the beneficiaries to whom the
funds in the account will pass upon the
owner's death. The per-beneficiary
coverage available on revocable trust
accounts is separate from the insurance
coverage afforded to any single-
ownership accounts held by the owner
or beneficiary at the same insured
institution. That means, for example, if
an individual has at the same insured
bank or thrift a single-ownership
account with a balance of $100,000 and
a POD account (naming at least one
qualifying beneficiary) with a balance of
$100,000, both accounts would be
insured separately for a combined
amount of $200,000. If the POD account
names more than one qualifying
beneficiary, then that account would be
insured for up to $100,000 per
qualifying beneficiary. 12 CFR
330.10(a}.
Separate, per-beneficiary insurance
coverage is available for revocable trust
accounts only if the account satisfies
certain requirements. First, the title of
the account must include a term such as
"in trust for" or Hpayable-on-death to"
(or corresponding acronym). Second,
each beneficiary must be either the
owner's spouse, child, grandchild,
parent or sibling. Third, the
beneficiaries must be specifically named
in the deposit account records of the
depository institution. And fourth, the
account must evidence an intent that
the funds shall belong unconditionally
to the designated beneficiaries upon the
owner's death. 12 CFR 330.10(a) and (b).
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As noted, the most common form of
revocable trust account is the POD
account, consisting simply of a
signature card. With POD accounts, the
fourth requirement for per-beneficiary
coverage does not present a problem
because the signature card nonnally will
not include any conditions upon the
interests of the designated beneficiaries.
In other words, the signature card
provides that the funds shall belong to
the beneficiaries upon the owner's
death. In contrast, many living trust
agreements provide, in effect, that the
funds might belong to the beneficiaries
depending on various conditions. The
FDIC refers to such conditions as
Udefeating contingencies" if they create
the possibility that the beneficiaries may
never receive the funds following the
owner's death.
Living trust accounts started to
emerge in the late 1980s and early
1990s. At that time, the FDIC responded
to a significant number of questions
about the insurance coverage of such
accounts, often times reviewing the
actual trust agreements to determine
whether the requirements for per-
beneficiary insurance were satisfied. In
the FDIC's review of numerous such
trusts, it detennined that many of the
trusts included conditions that needed
to be satisfied before the named
beneficiaries would become the owners
of the trust assets. For example, some
trusts required that the trust assets first
be used to satisfy legacies in the
grantor's will; the remaining assets, if
any, would then be distributed to the
trust beneficiaries. Other trusts provided
that, in order to receive any benefit
under the trust, the beneficiary must
graduate from college. Because of the
prevalence of defeating contingencies
among living trust agreements and the
increasing number of requests to render
opinions on the insurance coverage of
specific living trust accounts, in 1994
the FDIC issued "Guidelines for
Insurance Coverage of Revocable Trust
Accounts (Including "Uving Trust"
Accounts)." FDIC Advisory Opinion 94-
32 (May 18, 1994). As part of its overall
simplification of the deposit insurance
regulations, in 1998 the FDIC revised
§ 330.10 to include a provision
explaining the insurance coverage rules
for living trust accounts. 12 eFR
330.10(0. That provision included a
definition of defeating contingencies.
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Despite the FDIC's issuance of
guidelines on the insurance coverage of
living trust accounts and its inclusion of
a special provision in the insurance
regulations explaining the coverage of
these accounts, there still is significant
public and industry confusion about
how the insurance rules apply to living
trust accounts. Time has shown that the
basic rules on the coverage of POD
accounts are not fully adaptable to
living trust accounts. The POD rules
were written to apply to signature-card
accounts, not lengthy, detailed trust
documents. Because living trust
accounts and PODs are subject to the
same insurance rules and analysis,
depositors and bankers often mistakenly
believe that living trust accounts are
automatically insured up to $100,000
per qualifying beneficiary without
regard to any tenus in the trust that
might prevent the beneficiary from ever
receiving the funds. Our experience
indicates that in a significant number of
cases that is not so under existing rules.
Because of the existence of defeating
contingencies in the trust agreement, a
living trust account often fails to satisfy
the requirements for per-beneficiary
coverage. Thus, the funds in the account
are treated as the owner's single-
ownership funds and, after being added
to any other single-ownership funds the
owner has at the same institution,
insured to a limit of $100,000. The
funds in a non-qualifying living trust
account with more than one owner are
deemed the single-ownership funds of
each owner, with the corresponding
attribution of the funds to each owner's
single-ownership accounts.
The FDIC recognizes that the rules
governing the insurance of living trust
accounts are complex and confusing.
Under the current rules, the amount of
insurance coverage for a living trust
account can only be determined after
the trust document has been reviewed to
determine whether there are any
defeating contingencies. Consequently,
in response to questions about coverage
of living trust accounts, the FDIC can
only advise depositors and bankers that
they should assume that such accounts
will be insured for no more than
$100,000 per grantor, assuming the
grantor has no single-ownership funds
in the same depository institution.
Otherwise, the FDIC suggests that the
owners of living trust accounts seek
advice from the attorney who prepared
the trust document. Depositors who
contact the FDIC about their living trust
insurance coverage are often troubled to
learn that they cannot definitively
determine the amount of their coverage
without a legal analysis of their trust
document. Also, when a depository
institution fails the FDIC must review
each living trust to determine whether
the beneficiaries' interests are subject to
defeating contingencies. This often is a
time-consuming process, sometimes
resulting in a significant delay in
making deposit insurance payments to
living trust account owners.
II. The Proposed Rule
In the proposed rule issued in June
2003, the FDIC identified and requested
comments on what it believed to be two
viable alternatives to address the
confusion surrounding the insurance
coverage of living trust accounts.
The first alternative provided for
coverage up to $100,000 per qualifying
beneficiary named in the living trust
irrespective of defeating contingencies
(H Alternative OneH).
The FDIC would identify the
beneficiaries and their ascertainable
interests in the trust from the depository
institution's account records and
provide coverage on the account up to
$100,000 per qualifying beneficiary. As
with POD accounts, under Alternative
One insurance coverage would be
provided up to $100,000 per qualifying
beneficiary limited to each beneficiary's
ascertainable interest in the trust.
Alternative One expressly required
that the deposit account records of the
institution indicate the ownership
interest of each beneficiary in the living
trust. The infonnation could be in the
form of the dollar amount of each
beneficiary's interest or on a percentage
basis relative to the total amount of the
trust assets. The FDIC requested specific
comments on how such a recordkeeping
requirement should be satisfied when a
trust provided for different levels of
beneficiaries whose interests in the trust
depend on certain conditions, including
the death of a Uhigher-tiered"
beneficiary. In the proposed rule the
FDIC noted that Alternative One
generally would result in an increase in
deposit insurance coverage because~
unlike under the current rules,
beneficiaries would not be required to
have an unconditional interest in the
trust in order for the account to qualify
for per-beneficiary coverage.
The second alternative in the
proposed rule provided, in essence, for
a separate category of ownership for
living trust accounts, insuring such
accounts up to $100,000 per account
owner ("Alternative Two"). An
individual grantor would be insured up
to a total of $100,000 for all living trust
accounts he or she had at the same
depository institution, regardless of the
number of beneficiaries named in the
trust, the grantor's relationship to the
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beneficiaries and whether there were
any defeating contingencies in the trust.
The coverage for a living trust account
would be separate from the coverage
afforded to any single-ownership
accounts or qualifying joint accounts the
owner might have at the same
depository institution. Where there were
joint owners of a living trust account,
the account would be insured up to
$100,000 per grantor. Such accounts
also would be separately insured from
any joint accounts either grantor might
have at the same insured depository
institution. In the proposed rule the
FDIC noted that Alternative Two likely
would result in reduced coverage for
owners of living trusts naming more
than one qualifying beneficiary because
per-beneficiary coverage would be
eliminated.
III. Comments on the Proposed Rule
The FDIC received forty-three
comments on the proposed rule. Thirty-
seven comments were from banks and
savings associations and six were from
state and national depository institution
trade associations. Twenty-five
comments were in favor of Alternative
One or a modified version of that
alternative and sixteen were in favor of
Alternative Two. Two comments
discussed the characteristics of both
alternatives without expressing a
preference for either one. Many of the
comments on the proposed rule praised
the FDIC for attempting to simplify and
clarify the living trust rules. All the
comment letters are available on the
FDIC Web site, http://www.ldic.gov/
regulations/laws/lederal/propose.html.
Seventeen comments expressed
support for Alternative One as
proposed. In general, those commenters
said Alternative One would provide
more coverage for depositors than
Alternative Two and would be more in
line with the current coverage available
for POD accounts. As such, depositors
would not have to place their money
with more than one institution or
through deposit brokers to obtain full
insurance coverage on their deposits.
Along these lines, two commenters
mentioned that Alternative One would
assist depositors in estate-planning
efforts by allowing them to place a
sizable portion of their assets at one
insured institution. Several comments
lauded the certainty provided by
Alternative One. One stated that
"[Alternative Onel provides the amount
of coverage and the clarity and
understanding of living trust accounts
that our customers deserve." Another
argued that it would be inequitable to
treat POD accounts and living trust
accounts differently because they both
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are in the owner's control during his or
her lifetime and may be modified at any
time prior to the owner's death.
Eight of the twenty-five commenters
who supported Alternative One,
however, expressed concerns about
certain aspects of the alternative and
asked the FDIC to modify Alternative
One before finalizing it. One state
financial institution trade association
voiced strong opposition to "any
requirement for financial institutions to:
Obtain any part of a trust document;
provide a certification of trust existence;
and specifically identify a qualifying
beneficiary's interest in trust assets or
relationship to the grantor(s)."
A national depository institutions
trade group cautioned that the proposed
recordkeeping requirements might
jeopardize the protections afforded
under certain state laws for financial
institutions in dealing with trusts. It
cited "compelling practical reasons H
against the proposed recordkeeping
requirements in Alternative One, noting
that:
• Unlike POD accounts, for which the
only document is the institution's
account-opening record, living trusts
can be lengthy, complicated documents
that identify multiple tiers of
beneficiaries.
• It is often difficult for bankers to get
information from accountholders who
may be confused by the complexity and
tenninology of their living trust
documents.
• Living trusts can be amended or
revoked at any time and depository
institutions should not be expected to
repeatedly contact their customers to
detennine whether their account
information is current.
• Customers might perceive such
recordkeeping requirements as an
invasion of privacy.
Two other trade associations and
several depository institutions echoed
these views.
Many of the commenters in favor of
Alternative One without the proposed
recordkeeping requirements suggested
that the FDIC continue its current
practice of ascertaining the existence of
living trust beneficiaries and kinship
information at the time an institution is
closed. In addition to making the same
points on the recordkeeping
requirements as those noted above,
another national trade association
representing community banks said "we
do not see how the FDIC can avoid the
time-consuming process of reviewing
trust agreements when a bank failure
occurs."
Sixteen comments were in favor of
Alternative Two. Generally, the
consensus among these comments was,
as expressed by one community banker~
U(Alternative Two is] easier (than
Alternative One) to explain to the
depositor and for the bank to keep track
of." Another community banker
described the option as
"straightforward." A common point
made by several commenters was that,
because of the simplicity of Alternative
Two, depositors would be able to make
an informed decision in placing living
trust funds with depository institutions.
Another community banker noted that
Alternative Two would be the
"simplest, easiest and cleanest method"
of insuring living trust deposits and
added that "[wle are not lawyers nor tax
accountants and we should not have to
'dive' into someone's trust papers and
try to decide how many beneficiaries,
the relationships (of the parties) and if
there are contingencies in the trust."
Three commenters who favored
Alternative Two suggested that under
Alternative Two the insurance coverage
for living trust accounts be increased to
$200,000 to address the reduction in
coverage some depositors might
experience as a result of the rule change.
(This is not a viable option for the FDIC
because it would take an act ofCongress
to increase the basic deposit insurance
amount.)
A large regional bank commented that
Alternative Two "appears to be the
fairest treatment of these accounts as it
treats them more like individual
accounts. Since revocable accounts are
generally used for the primary benefit of
one, or sometimes two individuals, this
seems more in line with policy of FDIC
insurance than Alternative One."
Many comments in support of
Alternative Two acknowledged that
Alternative One also offered advantages
to depositors and would be an
improvement over the current rule, but
noted that Alternative One would place
an added burden on financial
institutions by imposing new
recordkeeping requirements and would
place institutions in the position of
requesting infonnation from depositors
that they likely would be unwilling or
unable to provide for privacy and other
reasons. One medium-sized institution
favored Alternative Two because "we
wouldn't have to track the names of the
trust beneficiaries and their various
interests." A community banker voiced
support for Alternative Two, saying it
would be "easier to understand by the
customer and bank personnel." She
noted that customers would have the
option to open POD accounts to obtain
separate per-beneficiary POD coverage.
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IV. The Final Rule
A. General Explanation
Upon considering the comments on
the proposed rule, the FDIC has revised
the current living trust account rules to
provide for insurance coverage of up to
$100,000 per qualifying beneficiary
who, as of the date of an institution
failure, would become entitled to the
living trust assets upon the owner's
death. This is a modified version of
Alternative One in the proposed rule,
based in part on a comment from a
community banker that living trust
coverage be based on beneficiaries
"without death related contingencies."
Under the final rule, coverage will be
determined on the interests of
qualifying beneficiaries irrespective of
defeating contingencies. A beneficiary
whose trust interest is dependent on the
death of another trust beneficiary,
however, will not qualify.
For example, an account for a living
trust providing that the trust assets go in
equal shares to the owner's three
children upon the owner's death would
be eligible for $300,000 of deposit
insurance coverage. If the trust provides
that the funds would go to the children
only if they each graduate from college
prior to the owner's death, the coverage
would still be $300,000, because
defeating contingencies will no longer
be relevant for deposit insurance
purposes. Another example is where a
trust provides that the owner's spouse
becomes the owner of the trust assets
upon the owner's death but, if the
spouse predeceases the owner, the three
children then become the owners of the
assets. If the spouse is alive when the
institution fails, the account will be
insured up to a maximum of $100,000,
because only the spouse is entitled to
the assets upon the owner's death. If at
the time of the institution failure,
however, the spouse has predeceased
the owner, then the account would be
eligible for up to $300,000 coverage
because there would be three qualifying
beneficiaries entitled to the trust assets
upon the owner's death.
In developing the final rule the FDIC
was guided by two interwoven
objectives: To simplify the existing rules
and to provide coverage similar to POD
account coverage. The FDIC believes the
final rule achieves these objectives
because it is reasonably straight-forward
and because, as with POD accounts,
coverage is based on the actual interests
of qualifying beneficiaries. The final
rule is similar to Alternative One but
provides coverage based on qualifying
beneficiaries who have an immediate
interest in the trust assets upon the
grantor's death. This concept is the
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same as the coverage theory applicable
to POD accounts: To provide coverage
based on the interests of the
beneficiaries who will receive the
account funds when the owner dies,
detennined as of the date of the
institution failure. Alternative One
could have allowed for potentially
open-ended coverage in some situations,
particularly where a trust provided for
tiered, or sequential, beneficiaries
whose interests in the trust depend on
whether "higher-tiered" beneficiaries
predecease them.
Moreover, Alternative One would
have required that a depository
institution's deposit account records
indicate the name and ascertainable
interest of each qualifying beneficiary in
the trust. The FDIC was persuaded by a
majority of comments contending that
requiring institutions to maintain
records on the names of living trust
beneficiaries and their interests in the
respective trusts would be unnecessary
and burdensome. The FDIC agrees with
the industry assessment of that
proposed requirement because the
grantor of a living trust might during his
or her Iifetime change the trust
beneficiaries and modify the terms of
the trust. Requiring the grantor to
inform a depository institution of these
changes and requiring depository
institutions to maintain records on such
information is impractical and
unnecessarily burdensome. Hence, a key
feature of the final rule is that it requires
no recordkeeping requirement other
than an indication on a depository
institution's records that the account is
a living trust account. Upon an
institution failure, FDIC claims agents
would identify the beneficiaries and
determine their interests by reviewing
the trust agreement obtained from the
depositor. At that time depositors would
attest to their relationship to the named
beneficiaries.
In the final rule the FDIC has
eliminated an unnecessary
recordkeeping requirement.
Specifically, the names of living trust
beneficiaries will no longer have to be
recorded in the deposit account records
of an insured institution in order for the
account to qualify for the deposit
insurance provided for living trust
accounts. The removal of this
recordke~ping requirement supports the
ongoing efforts of the FDIC and the
other federal banking regulators, under
the Economic Growth and Regulatory
Paperwork Reduction Act (HEGRPRA"),
to eliminate unnecessary regulatory
requirements. Detailed infonnation
about the EGRPRA project is available at
http://www.egrpra.gov.
The FDIC believes deposit insurance
coverage under the final rule would
match the coverage many depositors
now expect for their living trust
accounts. Generally, depositors believe
that living trust coverage is essentially
the same as POD account coverage. In
other words, insurance is based on the
number of qualifying beneficiaries with
an ownership interest in the account,
regardless of any conditions, or
contingencies, affecting those interests.
The final rule will match those
expectations because it provides
coverage more closely aligned with POD
coverage than the fonner rules. The
FDIC believes the final rule will provide
bankers and depositors with a better
understanding of the living trust
account deposit insurance rules and
will help to eliminate the present
confusion surrounding the coverage of
living trust accounts.
B. Treatment of Non-Qualifying
Beneficiaries
The treatment of non-qualifying
beneficiaries under the final rule will be
the same as under the current POD
rules. Interests of non-qualifying
beneficiaries in a living trust will be
insured as the owner's single-ownership
(or individual) funds. As such, those
interests will be added to any other
single-ownership funds the owner holds
at the same institution and insured to a
total of $100,000 in that account-
ownership capacity. For example,
assume a living trust provides that the
grantor's assets shall belong equally to
her husband and nephew upon her
death. A living trust account with a
balance of $200,000 held for that trust
would be insured for at least $100,000
because there is one qualifying
beneficiary (the grantor's spouse) who;
upon the institution failure, would be
entitled to the funds upon the grantor's
death. Because the nephew is a non-
qualifying beneficiary, the $100,000
attributable to him would be insured as
the grantor's single-ownership funds. If
the grantor has no other single-
ownership funds at the institution, the
full $200,000 of the living trust account
would be insured-$100,000 under the
grantor's revocable trust ownership
capacity and $100,000 under the
grantor's single-ownership capacity. If,
however, the grantor also has a single-
ownership account with a balance of,
say, $20,000, the $100,000 of the living
trust account attributable to the nephew
would be added to that amount and the
combined amount, in the grantor's
single-ownership capacity, would be
insured to a limit of $100,000, leaving
$20,000 uninsured. This result and
calculation methodology is the same as
G - 40
under the current rules for POD
accounts.
C. Treatment ofLife-Estate and
Remainder Interests
Living trusts sometime provide for a
life estate interest for designated
beneficiaries and a remainder interest
for other beneficiaries. The final rule
addresses this situation by deeming
each life-estate holder and each
remainder-man to have an equal interest
in the trust assets. Insurance is then
provided up to $100,000 per qualifying
beneficiary. For example, assume a
grantor creates a living trust providing
for his wife to have a life-estate interest
in the trust assets with the remaining
assets going to their two children upon
the wife's death. The assets in the trust
are $300,000 and a living trust account
is opened for that full amount. Unless
otherwise indicated in the trust, the
FDIC would deem each of the
beneficiaries (all of whom here are
qualifying beneficiaries) to own an
equal share of the $300,000; hence, the
full amount would be insured. This
result would be the same even if the
wife has the power to invade the
principal of the trust, inasmuch as
under the final rule defeating
contingencies are no longer relevant for
insurance purposes.
Another example would be where the
living trust provides for a life estate
interest for the grantor's spouse and
remainder interests for two nephews. In
that situation the method for
detennining coverage would be the
same as that indicated above: Unless
otherwise indicated, each beneficiary
would be deemed to have an equal
ownership interest in the trust assets
and coverage would be provided
accordingly. Here the life-estate holder
is a qualifying beneficiary (the grantor's
spouse) but the remainder-men (the
grantor's nephews) are not. As such
(assuming an account balance of .
$300,000), the living trust account
would be insured for at least $100,000
because there is one qualifying
beneficiary (the grantor's spouse). The
$200,000 attributable to the grantor's
nephews would be insured as the
grantor's single-ownership funds. If the
grantor has no other single-ownership
funds at the same institution, then
$100,000 would be insured as the
grantor's single-ownership funds. Thus,
the $300,000 in the living trust account
would be insured· for a total of $200,000
and $100,000 would be uninsured. The
FDIC believes this is a simple, balanced
approach to insuring living trust
accounts where the living trust provides
for one or more life estate interests.
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§ 330.10 Revocable trust accounts.
(0 Living trust accounts. (1) This
section also applies to revocable trust
accounts held in connection with a
formal revocable trust created by an
owner/grantor and over which the
owner/grantor retains ownership during
his or her lifetime. These trusts are
usually referred to as living trusts. If a
named beneficiary in a living trust is a
qualifying beneficiary under this
section, then the account held in
connection with the living trust is
eligible for the per-qualifying-
beneficiary coverage described in
paragraph (a) of this section. This
coverage will apply only if, at the time
an insured depository institution fails, a
qualifying beneficiary would be entitled
to his or her interest in the trust assets
upon the grantor's death and that
ownership interest would not depend
on the death of another trust
beneficiary. If there is more than one
grantor, then the beneficiary's
entitlement to the trust assets must be
upon the death of the last grantor. The
coverage provided in this paragraph (n
shall be irrespective of any other
conditions in the trust that might
prevent a beneficiary from acquiring an
IX. Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act
The Office of Management and Budget
has determined that the final rule is not
a "major rule" within the meaning of
the relevant sections of the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996 ("SBREFA") (5
U.S.C. 801 et seq.). As required by
SBFERA~ the FDIC will file the
appropriate reports with Congress and
the General Accounting Office so that
the final rule may be reviewed.
List ofSubjects in 12 CFR Part 330
Bank deposit insurance, Banks,
banking, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Savings and loan
associations, Trusts and trustees.
• For the reasons stated above, the Board
of Directors of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation hereby amends
part 330 of chapter III of title 12 of the
Code of Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 330-DEPOSIT INSURANCE
COVERAGE
• 1. The authority citation for part 330
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1813(1), 1813(mt
18170), 1818(q), 1819 (Tenth)t 1820(Ot
1821(at 1822(c).
• 2. Section 330.10(0 is revised to read
as follows:
v. Effective Date
The final rule will become effective
on April 1, 2004, the beginning of the
first calendar quarter following the
publication date of the final rule. The
final rule will apply as of that date to
all living trust accounts unless, upon a
depository institution failure, a
depositor who established a living trust
account before April 1, 2004, chooses
coverage under the previous living trust
account rules. For any depository
institution failures occurring between
January 13, 2004, and April 1, 2004, the
FDIC will apply the final rule if doing
so would benefit living trust account
holders of such failed institutions.
VI. Paperwork Reduction Act
The final rule will simplify the FDIC's
regulations governing the insurance of
living trust accounts. It will not involve
any new collections of information
pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction
Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).
Consequently, no information has been
submitted to the Office of Management
and Budget for review.
VII. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The FDIC certifies that the final rule
will not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
businesses within the meaning of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C.
605(b)). The amendments to the deposit
insurance rules will apply to all FDIC-
insured depository institutions,
including those within the definition of
"small businesses" under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act. The final
rule eliminates an existing requirement
for all FDIC-insured institutions to
designate living trust beneficiaries in
deposit account records. This change in
recordkeeping will result in a marginal
reduction in time and effort for
depository institution staff which will
not significantly affect compliance
costs. The rule imposes no new
reporting, recordkeeping or other
compliance requirements. Accordingly,
the Act's requirements relating to an
initial and final regulatory flexibility
analysis are not applicable.
VIII. The Treasury and General
Government Appropriations Act,
1999-Assessment of Federal
Regulations and Policies on Families
The FDIC has determined that the
final rule will not affect family well-
being within the meaning of section 654
of the Treasury and General
Government Appropriations Act
enacted as part of the Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act of
1999 (Pub. L. 105-277,112 Stat. 2681).
* * * *
interest in the deposit account upon the
account owner's death.
(Example 1: A is the owner of a living tmst
account with a deposit balance of $300,000.
The trust provides thatt upon A's deatht her
husband shall receive $100,000 and each of
their two children shall receive $100,000, but
only if the children graduate from college by
age twenty-four. Assuming A has no other
revocable trust accounts at the same
depository institutiont the coverage on her
living trust account would be $300,000. The
trust names three qualifying beneficiaries.
Coverage would be provided up to $100,000
per qualifying beneficiary regardless of any
cantingencies.)
(Example 2: B is the owner of a living trust
account with a deposit balance of $200,000.
The trust provides thatt upon B's death, his
wife shall receive $200,000 but, if the wife
predeceases B, each of the two children shall
receive $100,000. Assuming B has no other
revocable trust accounts at the same
depository institution and his wife is alive at
the time of the institution failure, the
coverage on his living trust account would be
$100tOOO. The tnIst names only one
beneficiary (B's spouse) who would become
the owner of the trust assets upon B's death.
If when the institution fails B's wife has
predeceased him, then the account would be
insured to $200,000 because the two children
would be entitled to the trust assets upon B's
death.)
(2) The rules in paragraph (c) of this
section on the interest of non-qualifying
benefi.ciaries apply to living trust
accounts. (Example: C is the owner of a
Iiving trust account with a deposit
balance of $200,000. The trust provides
that upon C's death his son shall receive
$100,000 and his nephew shall receive
$100,000. The account would be
insured for at least $100,000 because
one qualifying beneficiary (e's son)
would become the owner of trust
interests upon C's death. Because the
nephew is a non-qualifying beneficiary
entitled to receive an interest in the
trust upon C's death, that interest would
be considered C's single-ownership
funds and insured with any other
single-ownership funds C might have at
the same institution. Assuming C has no
other single-ownership funds at the
institution, the full $200,000 in the
living trust account would be insured
($100,000 in C's revocable trust account
ownership capacity and $100,000 in C's
single-ownership account capacity).
(3) For living trusts accounts that
provide for a life-estate interest for
designated beneficiaries and a
remainder interest for other
beneficiaries, unless othelWise
indicated in the trust, each life-estate
holder and each remainder-man will be
deemed to have equal interests in the
trust assets for deposit insurance
purposes. Coverage will then be
provided under the rules in this
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Dated at Washington, DC, this 13th day of
January, 2004.
By order of the Board of Directors.
(4) In order for a depositor to qualify
for the living trust account coverage
provided under this paragraph (0, the
title of the account must reflect that the
funds in the account are held pursuant
to a formal revocable trust. There is no
requirement, however, that the deposit
accounts records of the depository
institution indicate the names of the
beneficiaries of the living trust and their
ownership interests in the trust.
(5) Effective April 11' 2004, this
paragraph (f) shall apply to all living
trust accounts, unless, upon a
depository institution failure, a
depositor who established a living trust
account before April 1, 2004, chooses
coverage under the previous living trust
account rules. For any depository
institution failures occurring between
January 13, 2004 and April 1, 2004, the
FDIC shall apply the living trust account
rules in this revised paragraph (0 if
doing so would benefit living trust
account holders of such failed
institutions.
paragraph (I) up to $100,000 per
qualifying beneficiary.
(Example 1: D creates a living trust providing
for his wife to have a life-estate interest in
the trust assets with the remaining assets
going to their two children upon the wife's
death. The assets in the trust are $300,000
and a living tmst deposit account is opened
for that full amount. Unless otherwise
indicated in the trust, each beneficiary (all of
whom here are qualifying beneficiaries)
would be deemed to own an equal share of
the $300,000; hence, the full amount would
be insured. This result would be the same
even if the wife has the power to invade the
principal of the trust, inasmuch as defeating
contingencies are not relevant for insurance
purposes.)
(Example 2: E creates a living trost providing
for a life estate interest for her spouse and
remainder interests for two nephews. The life
estate holder is a qualifying beneficiary (E's
spouse) but the remainder-men (E's nephews)
are nol Assuming a deposit account balance
of $300,0001' the living trust account would
be insured for at least $100,000 because there
is one qualifying beneficiary (E's spouse).
The $200,000 attributable to E's nephews
would be insured as E's single-ownership
funds. If E has no other single-ownership
funds at the same institutionl' then $1001'000
would be insured separately as E's single-
ownership funds. Thus, the $300,000 in the
living trust account would be insured for a
total of $200,000 and $1001'000 would be
uninsured.)
* * * *
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 04-1198 Filed 1-20-04; 8:45 am)
BILLING CODe 6714-01-P
OEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 95
[Docket No. 30402; Arndt. No. 446]
IFR Altitudes; Miscellaneous
Amendments
AGENCY: Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: This amendment adopts
miscellaneous amendments to the
required IFR (instrument flight rules)
altitudes and changeover points for
certain Federal airways, jet routes, or
direct routes for which a minimum or
maximum en route authorized IFR
altitude is prescribed. This regulatory
action is needed because of changes
occurring in the National Airspace
System. These changes are designed to
provide for the safe and efficient use of
the navigable airspace under instrument
conditions in the affected areas.
EFFECTIVE DATE: 0901 UTC, February 19,
2004.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Donald P. Patel' Flight Procedure
Standards Branch (AMCAFs-420),
Flight Technologies and Programs
Division, Flight Standards Service,
Federal Aviation Administration, Mike
Monroney Aeronautical Center, 6500
. South MacArthur Blvd., Oklahoma City,
OK 73169 (Mail Address: P.O. Box
25082, Oklahoma City, OK 73125)
telephone: (405) 954-4164.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This
amendment to part 95 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 95)
arnends,suspends,orrevokesIFR
altitudes governing the operation of all
aircraft in flight over a specified route
or any portion of that route, as well as
the changeover points (COPs) for
Federal airways, jet routes, or direct
routes as prescribed in part 95.
The Rule
The specified IFR altitudes, when
used in conjunction with the prescribed
changeover points for those routes,
ensure navigation aid coverage that is
adequate for safe flight operations and
free of frequency interference. The
reasons and circumstances that create
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the need for this amendment involve
matters of flight safety and operational
efficiency in the National Airspace
System I' are related to published
aeronautical charts that are essential to
the user, and provide for the safe and
efficient use of the navigable airspace.
In addition, those various reasons or
circumstances require making this
amendment effective before the next
scheduled charting and publication date
of the flight information to assure its
timely availability to the user. The
effective date of this amendment reflects
those considerations. In view of the
close and immediate relationship
between these regulatory changes and
safety in air commerce, I find that notice
and public procedure before adopting
this amendment are impracticable and
contrary to the public interest and that
good cause exists for making the
amendment effective in less than 30
days.
Conclusion
The FAA has determined that this
regulation only involves an established
body of technical regulations for which
frequent and routine amendments are
necessary to keep them operationally
current. It, therefore-ell is not a
"significant regulatory action" under
Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a
"significant rule" under DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44
FR 11034; February 26, 1979); and (3)
does not warrant preparation of a
regulatory evaluation as the anticipated
impact is so minimal. For the same
reason, the FAA certifies that this
amendment will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities under the
criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List ofSubjects in 14 CFR Part 95
Airspace, NaVigation (air).
Issued in Washington, DC on January 131'
2004.
James ,. BaJlough,
Director, Flight Standards Service.
Adoption of the Amendment
• Accordingly, pursuant to the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
part 95 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 CFR part 95) is amended
as follows effective at 0901 UTC.
• 1. The authority citation for part 95
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40103, 40106,
40113,40114,40120,44502,44514,44719,
44721.
• 2. Part 95 is amended to read as
follows:
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
John T. McGarvey
Morgan & Pottinger, P.S.C.
The Cecilian Bank v.. Sarver, 2003 WL 23005721, (Ky. App. Dec. 24, 2003 (No. 2002-CA-
4076-MR» (Not to be Published) (Motion for Discretionary Review Pending, 2004-SC-
000036)
The Kentucky Court of Appeals vacated a judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court which
ruled the bank's suit on a note was outside the applicable statute of limitations. The 1990
revisions to Article 3 (effective in Kentucky January 1, 1997) provide, at KRS 355.3-118(1):
"[A]n action to enforce the obligation of a party to a note payable at a definite time must be
commenced within six (6) years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is
accelerated, within six (6) years after the accelerated due date."
The note matured January 15, 1994. The suit to enforce the note was not brought until
August 31, 2000. The trial court found the action untimely and entered judgment for the
defendant. Applying KRS 446.080(3), the Kentucky Court of Appeals found the new statute of
limitations to be only prospective in nature and inappropriately applied by the trial court as
retroactive.
Prior to the enactment ofKRS 355.3-118, the applicable statute of limitations was the 15-
year statute for written contracts, KRS 413.090. Now, 3-118 sets out a series of statutes of
limitation for various forms of instruments, notes, and drafts.
Barnes v. Community Trust Bank, Ky. App, 121 S.W.3d 520 (Published Nov. 7,2003)
The bank obtained summary judgment in the Madison Circuit Court for a deficiency due
under a retail installment contract. (Retail installment contracts for the purchase of a motor
vehicle are governed by KRS 190.090 et seq.) The lawsuit to enforce the contract was filed five
and one half years after the bank repossessed and sold its collateral. The issue raised by Barnes
on appeal was whether the action was barred by the 4-year statute of limitations in KRS 355.2-
725. Until Barnes, purchasers/assignees of retail motor vehicle paper in Kentucky had always
assumed the applicable statute of limitations was the 15-year contract statute, KRS 413.090.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Barnes and held that "an action for breach of a
contract for sale ... should have been brought within four years of defendant's breach."
Although deciding the case under Article 2, Judge Huddleston, writing for a unanimous court,
Copyright 2004 Morgan & Pottinger, P.S. C.
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reached out to the commercial reasonability test of Article 9 in writing the decision, despite
Article 2's exclusion of security transactions. See, KRS 355.2-102.
In its Opinion, the Court neither discussed nor analyzed KRS 355.2-102, the scope
section of Article 2, that holds transactions, which although in the form of an unconditional
contract to sell, are intended to operate only as a security transaction, are excluded. Professor
Hawkland harmonizes the intersection of Article 2 and Article 9 in this manner: "If a question
arises as to the quality of the goods sold, the warranty sections of Article 2 will govern, but the
rights of th~ seller to foreclose will be governed by Part [6] of Article 9. Hawkland, Uniform
Commercial Code Series, § 2-102:5. Presumably the right to foreclose also included the right to
collect the deficiency.
Neither does the Kentucky decision address a decision of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina that found that state's legislature intended Article 9 to govern the security aspects of
purchase money security agreements (including retail installment sale contracts), rejected the
application of the 4-year statute of Article 2 § 725, and applied that state's 10-year statute of
limitations for "sealed instruments."
Kentucky became the eighth state in the nation to apply the 4-year statute of Article 2 to
the enforcement of motor vehicle retail installment contracts. (Maryland, one of the other states,
applied the 4-year statute in lieu of a shorter .statute for the enforcement of general contract
obligations.)
When a purchaser finances a motor vehicle by means of a note and security agreement,
with a bank or credit union, the applicable statute of limitation is the new 6-year statute under
KRS 355.3-118. Senate Bill 72, in the 2004 Legislature, sought to harmonize the statutes of
limitations for the two primary means of financing motor vehicles by adopting a similar 6-year
statute to enforce contracts under KRS Chapter 190. The bill passed the senate and died in house
committee.
The Barnes decision requires the holders of motor vehicle retail installment contracts to
decide from what date the 4-year statute of limitations runs. Options are the date the customer
first misses a payment, the date the holder accelerates the balance due under the contract, the
date of sale in the event of repossession, or the maturity date. There is also the issue of whether
payments subsequent to any of these events t~ll the statute of limitations. There are Kentucky
cases, outside the area of retail installment contracts, that suggest subsequent payments on a debt
toll a statute of limitation. However, without legislative relief, it is safe to say that if there has
ever been a four year gap in payments, the statute has run.
Jones v. Christian County School Employees Federal Credit Union, (Ky. App. 2002-CA-
001635 (Jan. 23, 2004» (Not to be Published).
Jones sought recovery from the credit union for conversion of a draft through forgery of
Jones' endorsement as a co-payee. This is another action involving the statute of limitations
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under KRS 355.3-118, where the Court correctly applied subsection 7(a) to bar an action for
conversion of an instrument more than three years after the claim for relief accrues.
Wise v. Alpha Leasing Company, Inc., (Ky. App. 2002-CA-001254 (Aug. 8, 2003» (Not to be
Published).
The leasing company was protected from an action based on breach of implied warrant
and merchantability through application of KRS 355.2A-212 and 355.2A-213 which contain
exceptions for a "finance lease." The lessor is protected from these claims when the lessor does
not select, manufacture, or supply the leased goods.
Morgan v. Crawford, (Ky. App. 2002-CA-000339 (May 16,2003» (Not to be Published)
Another case that should have been published. It correctly applies Revised Article 3,
including a revision to KRS 355.1-207(2), to overrule the prior Court of Appeals decision in
Ditch Witch Trenching Co., ofKy., Inc. v. C & S Carpentry Services, Inc., Ky. App. 812 S.W.
2d, 171 (1991) on payment in full checks.
KRS 355.3-311 (effective January 1, 1997) specifically provides that if a person against
whom a claim is asserted proves that they in good faith tender payment as full satisfaction, and
the amount was unliquidated or subject to a bone fide dispute, and the claimant obtained
payment of the instrument, the claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is
asserted proves that the instrument, or an accompanying writing contained a conspicuous
statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim.
In the fact situation before the Court, the appellant had stricken the payment in full
language from a check, negotiated the instrument, and brought a claim for an alleged balance
due. Under former Article 3 this was the equivalent of negotiating under protest. It does not
work today.
M. A. Walker Co., Inc. v. PBK Bank, Inc., (Ky. App., 95 S.W.3d, 70, (December 27,2002»
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the bank, as issuer of a letter of credit, against
Walker's claims to seek recovery as a third party beneficiary on the letter of credit issued by the
bank in favor of the Madison County Fiscal Court. The Court correctly applied the definitional
sections ofArticle 5 to find that Walker did not meet the statutory definition of"beneficiary" of a
letter of credit, and that if it was not named as a beneficiary it had no right to recover.
In Re: Alabama Land and Mineral Corp., National City Bank ofKentucky v. Toffel, Trustee,
292 F.3d 1319 (11 th Cir. 2002).
The Eleventh Circuit found that a Kentucky bank held a valid common law pledge of an
uncertificated certificate of deposit and reversed the Bankruptcy Court and District Court for the
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Northern District of Alabama that awarded the proceeds to a trustee in bankruptcy. National
City held over a million dollars in the account as collateral for the Bank's obligation on a letter
of credit that it paid for the benefit of the bankrupt debtor.
The CD was issued in receipt form as opposed to a formal certificate. However, the
lower courts did not distinguish between the various forms that an account known as a CD can
take. The lower courts found National City did not properly perfect its security interest because
it did not take possession of an instrument; an impossibility because none had been issued. A
real Catch 22 for the Bank.
National City argued that the Court should look to Revised Article 9 that recognizes CDs
are not always issued in instrument form and that those not issued as instruments are deposit
accounts. The Circuit Court relied on the authority of Official Comment 12 to Revised 9-102
(noting that Kentucky has adopted the Official Comments as interpretative of its VCC, KRS
355.1-110) as a clarification of the former law, found that the uncertificated CD should be
classified as a deposit account, that deposit accounts were outside the scope of former Article 9,
and that National City's security interest was properly taken through a common law pledge.
Deposit accounts taken as security in commercial transactions are within the scope of
Revised Article 9. A security interest in a deposit account held by the secured party is
automatically perfected through possession. Perfection in a deposit account held by a third party
is through a control agreement or by means of the secured party becoming the customer of the
depository institution.
In Re: Kentuckiana Truck & Trailer Repair, Inc., Ralph and McKinley v. Stock Yards Bank
and Trust Co., 291 DR 84,2002 WL 32065982 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Ky. July 15,2002).
Owners of an interest in a business sold their interest with the debt secured by a security
interest in all of the business's personal property assets. Plaintiffs perfected their security
interest by filing a financing statement; however, the financing statement was filed more than
three years after the date of the bank's filing on the same assets. They attacked the bank's
priority based on the future advances and cross-collateralization clauses in the bank's
documentation.
Plaintiffs argued that loans made by the bank subsequent to the plaintiffs' transaction
with the debtor were not of the same type or class as the bank's previous loans and did not
qualify as future advances for the purpose of the priority of the security interest under
Kentucky's VCC. The only prior case law on this issue involved a consumer transaction and
could have been interpreted as adverse to the bank's interest. However, Judge Joan Cooper
found that the subsequent "loans were business loans for the purchase of inventory, working
capital, the acquisition of real estate, and are not so unlike the [prior] loans [that they should be]
cast as a different type or class of loan."
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In view of the prior ruling, on a consumer credit fact situation, under fonner Article 9, this
decision is an important and correct decision, under current law, on the priority of a security
interest securing future advances in a commercial setting.
STATUS OF KENTUCKY'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Article 1 - General Provisions
Kentucky retains the original version of Article I, with amendments as required by
revisions of other Articles. A new revised Article 1 was offered to the states in December 2001.
It has been adopted in Idaho, Texas, U. S. Virgin Islands, and Virginia. It has been introduced
before the legislatures of six other states. The primary purpose is to harmonize the general
provisions of the Code with ongoing UCC projects and recent revisions. Until more states enact
Article I, and/or there is another UCC revision project in Kentucky, it will not be adopted.
Article 2 - Sales
Article 2 remains in its 1960 version (see the problem caused by the application of 2-725
in the Barnes case). A drafting committee has completed its efforts to revise Article 2 and a final
version was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Unifonn State Laws in
2002 and the American Law Institute in 2003. It was offered to the states in November 2003, but
is not pending before any legislature.
Article 2A - Leases
Kentucky adopted the 1987 text, with the 1990 amendments, in 1990. Additional
drafting is underway as part of the Article 2 project but no action is expected in Kentucky.
Articles 3 and 4 - Negotiable Instruments, Bank Deposits and Collections
Kentucky adopted the 1990 amendments effective January 1, 1997. Additional revisions
were offered to the states in 2002 but have been adopted only by Minnesota and introduced in
only Massachusetts and New York. 2002 amendments to Articles 3 and 4 provide rules for new
technologies and practices in payment systems.
Article 5 - Letters of Credit
Kentucky adopted Revised Article 5 as part of the Revised Article 9 drafting project,
effective July 1, 2001.
Article 6 - Bulk Sales
Kentucky repealed the bulk sales law in 1992. Most states have accepted the
recommendation of NCCUSL and ALI for repeal, however, some have adopted an abbreviated
version of the priory Article.
Copyright 2004 Morgan & Pottinger, P.S. C.
H - 5
Article 7 - Documents of Title
Revised Article 7 was offered to the states in October 2003; it has been adopted in Idaho
and Virginia (effective July '04), and is pending before the legislatures of Alabama, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Maryland, and Minnesota. The revision is to bring the law of documents of title into the
electronic age.
Article 8 - Investment Securities
Kentucky adopted the most recent revisions in conjunction with Revised Article 9
effective July 1, 2001.
Article 9 - Secured Transactions
Revised Article 9 was effective in Kentucky and most other states July 1, 2001 (five
states had non-unifonn effective dates ranging from October 2001 through February 2002,
Indiana delayed some provisions until July 1, 2002); it has been adopted by all 50 states, the
District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, but not in Puerto Rico.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VCC FILING SYSTEMl
On the effective date ofRevised Article 9, July 1, 2001, the Secretary of State became the
filing office for all UCC financing statements and amendments (including in-lieu-of
continuations), other than some real estate related financing statements that remain at the county
level. See, KRS 355.9-501.
Electronic filing became available shortly after the effective date of Revised Article 9,
and is quickly becoming as popular for filers as use of the paper document.
'FY 2001-2002
FY 2002-2003
FY 2003-February 2004
Electronic Filings
15,894
31,240
27,057
Paper Records
75,175
65,082
37,893
COMMON ERRORS IN FILING FINANCING STATEMENTS AND AMENDMENTS
Common Errors for Rejection of Paper Financing Statements
The requirements for a financing statement are not found in a single section of Revised
Article 9. The basic requirements for a financing statement, which will detennine if the
1 Data and information for this portion of the outline was supplied by Ann Clay Hanly, Supervisor of the vee filing
office for the Secretary of State.
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financing statement, if filed, is sufficient, are found at KRS 355.9-502. However, additional
requirements, for which the filing office may reject the filing, are found at KRS 355.9-516. The
model forms, which if properly completed, are both sufficient and accepted by the filing office,
are adopted; by KRS 355.9-521 and the filing office rules for the Kentucky Secretary of State.
The model forms are available on the Secretary of State's website www.kysos.com. (Copies of
the forms and instructions for use are attached at the end of this outline.)
Most frequent reasons for rejection:
1. Debtor is an organization and items Ie, 1:(, and Ig on type of organIzation,
jurisdiction of organization, and organizational I.D. number, have not been
completed.
2. The debtor's name appears in both la and lb without any indication whether
the debtor is an organization or individual.
3. No address is provided for the debtor.
4. An address is provided but it is not complete and omits the city, state, or zip
code.
5. The financing statement is not communicated by an authorized method (use of
an unofficial paper form).
If the secured party chooses electronic filing, and makes any of the errors noted above,
the Secretary of State's system will not accept the electronic filing and the secured party will be
immediately notified of the error and give the opportunity to correct the error.
An item that may not be corrected is the use of a d/b/a in lieu of the organization's formal
name. The only proper name for an organization in a financing statement is the name as it is
found in the organizing documents.
There is no provision, statutory or otherwise, for filing lengthy paper documents such as
security agreements and subordination agreements in the Secretary of State's system. However
you can cut and paste collateral descriptions ofup to 7,000 characters into the block for collateral
description on the electronic fonn.
If your security agreement gives you a security interest in all forms of personal property
collateral, through either specific descriptions or a full list of generic descriptions recognized by
Revised Article 9, the simple words "all assets" work on the financing statement. This is called a
"super generic" description and should be used only on financing statements. Super generic
descriptions are insufficient to describe the collateral subject to the grant of security interest.
Reasons for Rejection of Written DCC Amendments:
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1. The initial financing statement being amended is not correctly identified by
file number. County file numbers cannot be used! Amendment of a county
file, if now required to be with the Secretary of State, is through a new initial
financing statement filed in lieu of the amendment (KRS 355.9-706).
2. Amendment is filed as a debtor name change and an address is not provided
for the new debtor.
3. The new debtor is an organization and the type, jurisdiction, and
organizational I.D. number are not provided.
4. The amendment is filed as a combination assignment and change of secured
party (blocks 4 and 5 are checked). However, an amendment provided for in
either item 4 or 5 requires an address in item 7. There are similar problems
from other "multiple action" filings on a single DCC amendment form. E.g.,
a single form indicates it is to terminate the financing statement, delete a
debtor, and delete collateral. If the intent is to terminate, only block 2 is
necessary. The amendment form should never be used for more than one
form of amendment.
Electronic Forms
See attached printouts of the available screens.
Use of the Secretary of State's Electronic Filing System
Demonstration by the Secretary of State's office.
Copyright 2004 Morgan & Pottinger, P.S.C.
H- 8
UCC FINANCING STATEMENT
FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS (front and back) CAREFULLY
A. NAME &PHONE OF CONTACT AT FILER (optionaq
B. SEND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO: (Name and Address)
L
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY
1. DEBTORfS EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME -insertonly~debtorname (1 a or 1b) -do notabbreviate orcombine names
1a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR 1b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
1c. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE rOSTALCOOE COUNTRY
1d. SEE INSTRUCTIONS IAOO'L INFO RE 11e. TYPE OF ORGANIZAnON 1f. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION 19. ORGANIZATIONAL 10 #, if any
ORGANIZAnON oNONEDEBTOR I I I
2. ADDITIONAL DEBTOR'S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME - insert only~ debtor name (2a or 2b) - do not abbreviate or combine names
2a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR
2b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
2c. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE rOSTALCOOE COUNTRY
2d. SEE INSTRUCTIONS IAOO'L INFO RE 12e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION 2f. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION 2g. ORGANIZATIONAL 10 #, if any
ORGANIZATION
nNONEDEBTOR I I I
3. SECU RED PARTY'S NAME (or NAMEofTOTAL ASSIGNEE ofASSIGNOR SIP) - insertonly~secured party name (3a or3b)
3a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR
3b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
3c. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE IPOSTAL CODE COUNTRY
4. This FINANCING STATEMENT covers the following collateral:
FILING OFFICE COPY - UCC FINANCING STATEMENT (FORM UCC1) (REV. OS/22/02)
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Instructions for UCC Financing Statement (Form UCC1)
Please type or laser-print this form. Be sure it is completely legible. Read all Instructions, especially Instruction 1; correct Debtor name is crucial. Follow
Instructions completely.
Fill in form very carefully; mistakes may have important legal consequences. Ifyou have questions, consult your attorney. Filing office cannot give legal advice.
Do not insert anything in the open space in the upper portion of this form; it is reserved for filing office use.
When properly completed, send Filing Office Copy, with reqUired fee, to filing office. If you want an acknowledgment, complete item B and, if filing in a filing
office that returns an acknOWledgment copy furnished by filer, you may also send AcknOWledgment Copy; otherwise detach. If you want to make a search
request, complete item 7 (after reading Instruction 7 below) and send Search Report Copy, otherwise detach. Always detach Debtor and Secured Party
Copies.
If you need to use attachments, you are encouraged to use either Addendum (Form UCC1Ad) or Additional Party (Form UCC1AP).
A. To assist filing offices that might wish to communicate with filer, filer may prOVide information in item A. This item is optional.
B. Complete item B if you want an acknOWledgment sent to you. If filing in a filing office that returns an acknOWledgment copy furnished by filer, present
simultaneously with this form a carbon or other copy of this form for use as an acknOWledgment copy.
1. Debtor name: Enter onlv one Debtor name in item 1, an organization's
name (1 a) Q!an individual's name (1 b). Enter Debtor's exact full legal
name. Don't abbreviate.
1a. Organization Debtor. 1I0rganization" means an entity having a legal
identity separate from its owner. A partnership is an organization; a sole
proprietorship is not an organization, even if it does business under a
trade name. If Debtor is a partnership, enter exact full legal name of
partnership; you need not enter names of partners as additional Debtors.
If Debtor is a registered organization (e.g., corporation, limited partnership,
limited liability company), it is advisable to examine Debtor's current filed
charter documents to determine Debtor's correct name, organization
type, and jurisdiction oforganization.
1b. Individual Debtor. "Individual" means a natural person; this includes a
sole proprietorship, whether or not operating under a trade name. Don't
use prefixes (Mr., Mrs., Ms.). Use suffix box only for titles of lineage (Jr.,
Sr., III) and not for other suffixes or titles (e.g., M.D.). Use married
woman's personal name (Mary Smith, not Mrs. John Smith). Enter
individual Debtor's family name (surname) in Last Name box, first given
name in First Name box, and all additional given names in Middle Name
box.
For both organization and individual Debtors: Don't use Debtor's trade
name, DBA, AKA, FKA, Division name, etc. in place ofor combined with
Debtor's legal name; you may add such other names as additional
Debtors if you wish (but this is neither required nor recommended).
1c. An address is always reqUired for the Debtor named in 1a or 1b.
1d. Reserved for Financing Statements to be filed in North Dakota or South
Dakota Q.DJy. If this Financing Statement is to be filed in North Dakota
or South Dakota, the Debtor's taxpayer identification number (tax 10#)
- social security number or employer identification number must be
placed in this box.
1e,f,g. IIAdditional information re organization Debtor" is always required.
Type of organization and jurisdiction of organization as well as
Debtor's exact legal name can be determined from Debtor's current
filed charter document. Organizational 10 #, if any, is assigned by the
agency where the charter document was filed; this is different from
tax 10 #; this should be entered preceded by the 2-character U.S.
Postal identification of state of organization if one of the United States
(e.g., CA12345, for a California corporation whose organizational 10
# is 12345); if agency does not assign organizational 10 #, check box
in item 1g indicating "none:'
Note: If Debtor is a trust or a trustee acting with respect to propertyheld in trust,
enter Debtor's name in item 1 and attach Addendum (Form UCC1 Ad) and
check appropriate box in item 17. IfDebtor is a decedent's estate, enter name
of deceased individual in item 1b and attach Addendum (Form UCC1Ad) and
check appropriate box in item 17. If Debtor is a transmitting utility or this
Financing Statement is filed in connection with a Manufactured-Home
Transaction or a Public-Finance Transaction as defined in applicable
Commercial Code, attach Addendum (Form UCC1Ad) and check appropriate
box in item 18.
2. If an additional Debtor is inclUded, complete item 2, determined and
formatted per Instruction 1. To include further additional Debtors,
attach either Addendum (Form UCC 1Ad) or Additional Party (Form
UCC1AP) and follow Instruction 1 for determining and formatting
additional names.
3. Enter information for Secured Party or Total Assignee, determined and
formatted per Instruction 1. To include further additional Secured
Parties, attach either Addendum (Form UCC1Ad) or Additional Party
(Form UCC 1AP) and follow Instruction 1 for determining and formatting
additional names. If there has been a total assignment of the Secured
Party's interest prior to filing this form, you may either (1) enter
Assignor SIP's name and address in item 3 and file an Amendment
(Form UCC3) [see item 5 of that form); or (2) enter Total Assignee's
name and address in item 3 and, if you wish, also attaching Addendum
(Form UCC1Ad) giving Assignor SIP's name and address in item 12.
4. Use item 4 to indicate the collateral covered by this Financing Statement.
If space in item 4 is insufficient, put the entire collateral description or
continuation of the collateral description on either Addendum (Form
UCC1Ad) or other attached additional page(s).
5. If filer desires (at filer's option) to use titles of lessee and lessor, or
consignee and consignor, or seller and buyer (in the case of accounts or
chattel paper), or bailee and bailor instead of Debtor and Secured Party,
check the appropriate box in item 5. If this is an agriCUltural lien (as
defined in applicable Commercial Code) filing or is otherwise not a UCC
security interest filing (e.g., a tax lien, jUdgment lien, etc.), check the
appropriate box in item 5, complete items 1-7as applicable and attach any
other items reqUired under other law.
6. If this Financing Statement is filed as a fixture filing or if the collateral
consists of timber to be cut or as-extracted collateral, complete items 1-
5, check the box in item 6, and complete the reqUired information (items
13, 14 and/or 15) on Addendum (Form UCC1Ad).
7. This item is optional. Check appropriate box in item 7 to request Search
Report(s) on all or some ofthe Debtors named in this Financing Statement.
The Report will list all Financing Statements on file against the designated
Debtor on the date of the Report, including this Financing Statement.
There is an additional fee for each Report. If you have checked a box in
item 7, file Search Report Copy together with Filing Officer Copy (and
AcknOWledgment Copy). Note: Not all states do searches and not all
states will honora search request made via this form; some states require
a separate request form.
8. This item is optional and is for filer's use only. For filer's convenience of
reference, filer may enter in item 8 any identifying information (e.g.,
Secured Party's loan number, law firm file number, Debtor's name or
other identification, state in which form is being filed, etc.) that filer may
find useful.
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9b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME
UCC FINANCING STATEMENT ADDENDUM
FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS (front and back) CAREFULLY
9. NAME OF FIRST DEBTOR (1a or 1b) ON RELATED FINANCING STATEMENT
9a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
ORf----------------r------------~------__tI
IFIRST NAME IMIDDLE NAME,SUFFIX
10.MISCELLANEOUS:
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY
11. ADDITIONAL DEBTOR'S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME - insert only~ name (11 a or 11 b) - do not abbreviate or combine names
11 a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
FIRST NAMEOR 11 b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
CITY
11 f. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION
11 c. MAILING ADDRESS
11 d. SEE INSTRUCTIONS
I
ADD'L INFO RE 111e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION
ORGANIZATION
DEBTOR I I
STATE IPOSTALCODE
11 g. ORGANIZATIONAL 10 #, if any
I
COUNTRY
oNONE
12. ] ADDITIONAL SECURED PARTY'S 2! [ ] ASSIGNOR SIP'S NAME - insertonly~name (12a or 12b)
12a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
13. This FINANCING STATEMENT covers 0 timber to be cut or 0 as-extracted 16. Additional collateral description:
collateral, or is filed as a 0 fixture filing.
14. Description of real estate:
OR 12b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME
12c. MAILING ADDRESS
FIRST NAME
CITY
MIDDLE NAME
STATE rOSTAL CODE
SUFFIX
COUNTRY
15. Name and address of a RECORD OWNER of above-described real estate
(if Debtor does not have a record interest):
17. Checkm if applicable and check~ one box.
Debtor is anTrust ornTrustee acting with respect to property held in trust or0 Decedent's Estate
18. Check~ if applicable and check~ one box.,...
.. Debtor is a TRANSMITTING UTILITY
~ Filed in connection with a Manufactured-Home Transaction - effective 30 years
Filed in connection with a Public-Finance Transaction - effective 30 years
FILING OFFICE COpy - UCC FINANCING STATEMENT ADDENDUM (FORM UCC1Ad) (REV. OS/22/02)
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Instructions for UCC Financing Statement Addendum (Form UCC1 Ad)
9. Insert name of first Debtor shown on Financing Statement to which this Addendum relates, exactly as shown in item 1 of Financing statement.
10. Miscellaneous: Under certain circumstances, additional information not prOVided on Financing Statement may be required. Also, some states have
non-uniform requirements. Use this space to prOVide such additional information orto comply with such requirements; otherwise, leave blank.
11 . If this Addendum adds an additional Debtor, complete item 11 in accordance with Instruction 1 of Financing Statement. To include further additional
Debtors, attach either an additional Addendum (Form UCC1Ad) or Additional Party (Form UCC1AP) and follow Instruction 1of Financing Statement
for determining and formatting additional names.
12. If this Addendum adds an additional Secured Party, complete item 12 in accordance with Instruction 3 of Financing Statement. To include further
additional Secured Parties, attach either an additional Addendum (Form UCC1Ad) or Additional Party (Form UCC1AP) and follow Instruction 1
of Financing Statement for determining and formatting additional names. In the case of a total assignment of the Secured Party's interest before
the filing of this Financing Statement, if filer has given the name and address of the Total Assignee in item 3 of Financing Statement, filer may
give the Assignor SIP's name and address in item 12.
13-15. If collateral is timberto be cut or as-extracted collateral, or ifthis Financing Statement is filed as a fixture filing, check appropriate box in item 13; provide
description of real estate in item 14; and, if Debtor is not a record owner of the described real estate, also prOVide, in item 15, the name and address
of a record owner. Also prOVide collateral description in item 4 of Financing Statement. Also check box 6 on Financing Statement. Description of real
estate must be sufficient under the applicable law of the jurisdiction where the real estate is located.
16. Use this space to provide continued description of collateral, if you cannot complete description in item 4 of Financing Statement.
17. If Debtor is a trust or a trustee acting with respect to property held in trust or is a decedent's estate, check the appropriate box.
18. If Debtor is a transmitting utilityor if the Financing Statement relates to a Manufactured-Home Transaction or a Public-Finance Transaction as defined
in the applicable Commercial Code, check the appropriate box.
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UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT
FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS (front and back) CAREFULLY
A. NAME & PHONE OF CONTACT AT FILER [optional]
B. SEND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO: (Name and Address)
L
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY
1a. INITIAL FINANCING STATEMENT FILE #
1
1b. This FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT is
O
to be filed [for record] (or recorded) in the
REAL ESTATE RECORDS.
2. [ ] TERMINATION: Effectiveness of the Financing Statement identified above is terminated with respect to security interest(s) of the Secured Party authorizing this Termination Statement.
3. 0 CONTINUATION: Effectiveness of the Financing Statement identified above with respect to security interest(s) of the Secured Party authorizing this Continuation Statement is
continued for the additional period provided by applicable law.
4. ASSIGNMENT (full or partial): Give name of assignee in item 7a or 7b and address of assignee in item 7c; and also give name of assignor in item 9.
5. AMENDMENT (PARTY INFORMATION): This Amendment affects Debtor Qf. Secured Party of record. Check only QM of these two boxes.
Also check 20§. of the following three boxes and. provide appropriate information in items 6 and/or 7.
CHANGEnameand/oraddress: Please referto the detailed instructions DELETE name: Give record name
inre ardstochan in thenameiaddressofa a . to be deleted in item 6a or 6b.
6. CURRENT RECORD INFORMATION:
6a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR 6b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME
7. CHANGED (NEW) OR ADDED INFORMATION:
FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
7a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR
7b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
7c. MAILING ADDRESS CI1Y STATE IPOSTAL CODE COUNTRY
7d. SEEINSTBUCTIONS IADD'llNFO RE Ile. lYPE OF ORGANIZATION 7f. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION 7g. ORGANIZATIONAL 10 #, if any
ORGANIZATION oNONEDEBTOR I
8. AMENDMENT (COLLATERAL CHANGE): check only QM box.
Describe collateral 0 deleted or 0 added, or give entire0 restated collateral description, or describe collateral oassigned.
9. NAME OF SECURED PARTY OF RECORD AUTHORIZING THIS AMENDMENT (name of assignor, if this is an Assignment). If this is an Amendment authorized by a Debtor which
adds collateral or adds the authorizing Debtor, or if this is a Termination authorized by a Debtor, check here and enter name of DEBTOR authorizing this Amendment.
9a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR 9b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME
10.0PTIONAL FILER REFERENCE DATA
FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
FILING OFFICE COPY - UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT (FORM UCC3) (REV. OS/22102)
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Instructions for UCC Financing Statement Amendment (Form UCC3)
Please type or laser-print this form. Be sure it is completely legible. Read all Instructions, especially Instruction 1a; correct file number of initial financing
statement is crucial. Follow Instructions completely.
Fill in form very carefUlly; mistakes may have important legal consequences. Ifyou have questions, consult your attorney. Filing office cannot give legal advice.
Do not insert anything in the open space in the upper portion of this form; it is reserved for filing office use.
An Amendment may relate to only one financing statement. Do not enter more than one file number in item 1a.
When properly completed, send Filing Office Copy, with required fee, to filing office. If you want an acknOWledgment, complete item B and, if filing in a filing
office that returns an acknOWledgment copy furnished by filer, you may also send Acknowledgment Copy, otherwise detach. Always detach Debtor and
Secured Party Copies.
If you need to use attachments, you are encouraged to use either Amendment Addendum (Form UCC3Ad) or Amendment Additional Party (Form UCC3AP).
Always complete items 1a and 9
A. To assist filing offices that might wish to communicate with filer, filer may provide information in item A. This item is optional.
B. Complete item B ifyouwant an acknowledgment sent toyou. If filing in a filing office that returns an acknowledgment copy furnished by filer, present simultaneously
with this form a carbon or other copy of this form for use as an acknowledgment copy.
1a. File number: Enter file numberof initial financing statement towhich this
Amendment relates. Enter only one file number. In some states, the file
number is not unique; in those states, also enter in item 1a, after the file
number, the date that the initial financing statement was filed.
1b. Only if this Amendment is to be filed or recorded in the real estate records,
check box 1b and also, in item 13 of Amendment Aqdendum, enter
Debtor's name, in proper format exactly identical to the format of item 1
of financing statement, and name ofrecord owner ifDebtor does not have
a record interest.
Note: Show purpose of this Amendment by checking box 2, 3, 4, 5 (in item 5
you must check two boxes) or 8; also complete items 6, 7 and/or 8 as
appropriate. Filer may usethis Amendment form to simultaneously accomplish
both data changes (items 4,5, and/or 8) and a Continuation (item 3), although
in some states filer may have to pay a separate fee for each purpose.
2. To terminate the effectiveness ofthe identified financing statement with
respecttosecurityinterest(s) of authorizing Secured Party, check box 2.
See Instruction 9 below.
3. To continue the effectiveness of the identified financing statement with
respect to security interest(s) of authorizing Secured Party, check box 3.
See Instruction 9 below.
4. To M§ign (i) all of assignor's interest under the identified financing
statement, or (ii) a partial interest in the security interest covered by the
identified financing statement, or (iii) assignor's full interest in some (but
not all) of the collateral covered by the identified financing statement:
Check box in item 4 and enter name of assignee in item 7a if assignee is
an organization, or in item 7b, formatted as indicated, if assignee is an
individual. Complete 7a or 7b, but not both. Also enter assignee's
address in item 7c. Also enter name of assignor in item 9. If partial
Assignment affects only some (but not all) of the collateral covered bythe
identified financing statement, filer may check appropriate box in item 8
and indicate affected collateral in item 8.
5 J6,7.To change the name of a party: Check box in item 5 to indicate
whether this Amendment amends information relating to a Debtor or
a Secured Party; also check box in item 5 to indicate that this is a name
change; also enter name of affected party (current record name) in
item 6a or 6b as appropriate; and enter new name (7a or 7b). If the
new name refers to a Debtor complete (7c); also complete 7e-7g if
7a was completed.
5,6,7.To change the address of a party: Check box in item 5 to indicate
whether this Amendment amends information relating to a Debtor or
a Secured Party; also check box in item 5 to indicate that this is an
address change; also enter name of affected party (current record
name) in item 6a or 6b as appropriate; and enter new address (7c)
in item 7.
5,6,7.To change the name and address of a party: Check box in item 5 to
indicate whether this Amendment amends information relating to a
Debtor or a Secured Party; also check box in item 5 to indicate that this
is a name/address change; also enter name of affected party (current
record name) in items 6a or 6b as appropriate; and enter the new name
(7a or 7b). If the new name refers to a Debtor complete item 7c; also
complete 7e-7g if 7a was completed.
5,6. To delete a party: Check box in item 5 to indicate whether deleting a
Debtor or a Secured Party; also check box in item 5 to indicate that this
is a deletion of a party; and also enter name (6a or 6b) of deleted party
in item 6.
5,7. To add a party: Check box in item 5 to indicate whether adding a Debtor
or Secured Party; also check box in item 5 to indicate that this is an
addition of a party and enter the new name (7a or 7b). If the new name
refers to a Debtor complete item 7c; also complete 7e-7g if 7a was
completed. To include further additional Debtors or Secured Parties,
attach Amendment Additional Party (Form UCC3AP), using correct
name format.
Note: The preferred method for filing against a new Debtor (an
individual or organization not previously of record as a Debtor under
this file number) is to file a new Financing Statement (U CC1) and not
an Amendment (UCC3).
7d. Reserved for Financing Statement Amendments to be filed in North
Dakota or South Dakota Q.Q1y. If this Financing Statement Amendment
is to be filed in North Dakota or South Dakota, the Debtor's taxpayer
identification number (tax 10#) - social security number or employer
identification number must be placed in this box.
8. Collateral change. To change the collateral covered by the identified
financing statement, describe the change in item 8. This may be
accomplished either by describing the collateral to be added or deleted, or
by setting forth in full the collateral description as it is to be effective after
the filing ofthis Amendment, indicating clearly the method chosen (check
the appropriate box). If the space in item 8 is inSUfficient, use item 13 of
Amendment Addendum (Form UCC3Ad). A partial release of collateral is
a deletion. If, due to a full release of all collateral, filer no longer claims a
security interest under the identified financing statement, check box 2
(Termination) and not box 8 (Collateral Change). If a partial assignment
consists of the assignment of some (but not all) of the collateral covered
by the identified financing statement, filer may indicate the assigned
collateral in item 8, check the appropriate box in item 8, and also comply
with instruction 4 above.
9. Always enter name of partyof record authorizing this Amendment; in most
cases, this will be a Secured Partyof record. If more than one authorizing
Secured Party, give additional name(s), properly formatted, in item 13 of
Amendment Addendum (Form UCC3Ad). If the indicated financing
statement refers to the parties as lessee and lessor, or consignee and
consignor, or seller and buyer, instead of Debtor and Secured Party,
references in this Amendment shall be deemed likewise so to refer to
the parties. If this is an assignment, enter assignor's name. If this is
an Amendment authorized by a Debtor that adds collateral or adds a
Debtor, or if this is a Termination authorized by a Debtor, check the box
in item 9 and enter the name, properly formatted, of the Debtor
authorizing this Amendment, and, if this Amendment or Termination is
to be filed or recorded in the real estate records, also enter, in item 13
of Amendment Addendum, name of Secured Party of record.
10. This item is optional and is for filer's use only. For filer's convenience of
reference, filer may enter in item 10 any identifying information (e.g.,
Secured Party's loan number, law firm file number, Debtor's name or other
identification, state in which form is being filed, etc.) that filer may find
useful.
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UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT ADDENDUM
FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS (front and back) CAREFULLY
11. INITIAL FINANCING STATEMENT FILE # (same as item 1a on Amendment form)
12. NAME OF PARTY AUTHORIZING THIS AMENDMENT (same as item 90n Amendment form)
12a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR 12b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME
13. Use this space for additional information
rRSTNAME IMIDDLE NAME,SUFFIX
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY
FILING OFFICE COpy - NATIONAL UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT ADDENDUM (FORM UCC3Ad) (REV. 07/29/98)
H -15
Instructions for National UCC Financing Statement AMENDMENT Addendum (Form UCC3Ad)
11. Enter information exactly as given in item 1a on Amendment form.
12. Enter information exactly as given in item 9 on Amendment form.
13. Ifspace on Amendment form is insufficient or you must provide additional information, enter additional information in item 13.
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Trey Grayson
"Making Kentucky Business-Friendly and Government User-Friendly. "
~ecretarv of State Home Dee Filing Dee Search
Friday, March 12, 2004
Prepaid Account Status
Make an initial or in-lieu Dee fding
When checking your filing, we insure that the fields are complete. We do not, however, validate the contents of those fields. Please verify the
data you have entered before clicking on the FILE button, which is at the bottom of this fonn.
Debtor 1
Enter the debtor's exact full legal name. Use either line la or Ib, but not both. Do not abbreviate or combine names. The mailing address,
city, state and postal code are all required. If an organization name is entered in la, all of Ie, If, and Ig must be completed.
1a. Ot:~anization's Name
or lb. Individual's Last Name First Name Middle Name SuffIX
le..~iling Address City State Postal Code
Add'l info re
organization
debtor
Debtor 2
Ie..Type of organization If. Jurisdiction oforganization Ig. organization ID#, if any
D NoorgID#
Enter an additional debtor's exact fuD legal name. Use either line 2a or 2b, but not both. Do not abbreviate or combine names. The mailing
address, city, state and postal code are all required. If an organization name is entered in 2a, all of 2e, 2f, and 2g must be completed.
or 2b. Individual's Last Name First Name Middle Name SuffIX
Ci~ State Postal Code
Add1 info re
organization
debtor
Debtor 3
2£. Jurisdiction oforga~.iza~~!1
o NoorgID#
Enter an additional debtor's exact fuD legal name. Use either line 3a or 3b, but not both. Do not abbreviate or combine names. The mailing
address, city, state and postal code are all required. If an organization name is entered in 3a, all of 3e, 3f, and 3g must be completed.
https://www.sos.state.ky.us/ucconline/(nOsrt245ndoucw45ugibgxit)/foinitial.aspx
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or
3a. Organ~tion's Name
3b. Individual's Last Name First Name Middle Name SUff'IX
City State Postal Code ~~!1~. . __
Add'l info re
organization
debtor
3e. Type of organization 3f. Jurisdiction oforganization 3g. organization ID#, if any
D NoorgID#
Secured Party 1
Enter the secured party's exact fuU legal name. Use either line 4a or 4b, but not both. Do not abbreviate or combine names. The mailing
address, city, state and postal code are all required.
4a..()~~a~ization's Name
or 4b. Individual's Last Name First Name Middle Name Suff'IX
4c..~~g_Address
Secured Party 2
City State Postal Code
Enter an additional secured party's exact full legal name. Use either line Sa or 5b, but not both. Do not abbreviate or combine names. The
mailing address, city, state and postal code are all required.
5a. Or~anization's Name
or 5b. Individual's Last Name First Name Middle Name Suff'IX
5c. Mailing Address
Filer
6a. _0"g~n~~!i<>!,-'s Name
City State Postal Code Country
or 6b. Individual's Last Name First Name Middle Name Suff'IX
6c._.~~.~_Address
Collateral
City State Postal Code Coun1I'y
Up to 8000 characters of collateral information may be entered in this box. For an in-lieu filing which continues or amends a statement
originally filed in another jurisdiction, a restatement of the collateral is required in this field. To make an in-lieu filing, enter the information
in the table below.
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In-lieu information
Click here for a discussion of in-lieu filings, which are used to continue an existing fmancing statement originally filed in another jurisdiction
or office. Infonnation entered in this section is stored in an additional collateral field. KRS 355.9-706(3) discusses the requirements for an in-
lieu filing. Each row in the table below represents a single previous financing statement.
Iffa continuation was Ided in the previous jurisdiction, complete the next
two fields:
3. Previous Initial File Date and ~. Previous most recent continuation 5. Previous most recent continuation
1. Previous Jurisdiction 2. Previous Initial File Number
Time file Number File Date and Time
Alternative Designation
If you wish to use alternate tenns for the debtor and secured party, check the appropriate box below.
None
Lessee / Lessor
Consignee / Consignor
(:=) Bailee / Bailor
Seller / Buyer (of accounts / chattel paper)
Alternate Filing Type
Ci None
C) Agricultural Lien
o Manufactured Home
o Public Finance
o Transmitting Utility
If you have questions or comments about the UCC online services, please contact: Ahanly@mail.sos.state.ky.us
UCC Branch
363 C Versailles Rd., Frankfort, KY 40601
Office:(502) 573-0265
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Secretarl of State Home Dec Filing uee Search Prepaid Account Status
Fridav March 12 2004
Online UCC Filing - File an Amendment
Enter the Secretary of State's file number for the filing you are amending:
- --- .-. - ~ . - ---'
Filings made with the Secretary of State before July 1, 2001 have a file number consisting of a single 7-digit
number. To amend one of these filings, enter the number below:
...._._, .._.. __ .._..... -_._ .. __ ......_.-
Select the type of amendment you are filing. Amendment combinations cannot be filed online:
o Continuation
o Tennination
o Assignment
o Collateral Change
o Add / change debtors (Maximum of 2)
o Add / change secured party
( )Continue with filing
If you have questions or comments about the UCC online services, please contact: Ahanly@mail.sos.state.ky.us
UCC Branch
363 C Versailles Rd., Frankfort, KY 40601
Office:(502) 573-0265
If you have questions or comments about the Secretary of State's web site, please contact:
webmaster@mail.sos.state.ky.us
.700 Capital Avenue Suite 152, State Capitol Frankfort, KY 40601
Office:(502) 564-3490
Fax:(502) 564-5687
privacy/security policy
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"Making Kentucky Business-Friendly and Government User-Friendly."
/se~rCfar\ of' Staft..' HOUlt' l)('(- Filing Prepaid .;\C('OU 11 t St;;ltus
Friday, March 26 2004
Online UCC Filing - File an Amendment
Your Filing could not be made
for the following reasons:
This filing can't be continued at this time.The six month window for filing this continuation is
from 10/27/2007 to 4/24/2008
Enter the Secretary of State's file number for the filing you are amending:
Filings made with the Secretary of State before July 1, 2001 have a file number consisting of a single 7-digit
number. To amend one of these filings, enter the number below:
Select the type of amendment you are filing. Amendment combinations cannot be filed online:
@ Continuation
o Tennination
o Assignment
o Collateral Change
o Add / change debtors (Maximum of 2)
o Add / change secured party
( Continue.•~ith filing ]
If you have questions or comments about the UCC online services, please contact: Ahanly@mail.sos.state.ky.us
UCC Branch
363 C Versailles Rd., Frankfort, KY 40601
Office:(502) 573-0265
If you have questions or comments about the Secretary of Statels web site, please contact:
webmaster@mail.sos.state.ky.us
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U(~(~ Filing lJC~C Search
Friday, March 26 2004
File a Termination
Click on the Tenninate button below to file a tennination for
Secured Party of Record authorizing this filing
6a Organization's Name
or
i
Filer
I
I
or
6b. Individual's Last Name
6a. Organization's Name
6b. Individual's Last Name
First Name
First Name
Middle Name
Middle Name
Suffix
Suffix
6c. Mailing Address
( Terminate )
City State Postal Code Country
If you have questions or comments about the UCC online services, please contact: AhanlY@mail.sos.state.ky.us
UCC Branch
363 C Versailles Rd., Frankfort, KY 40601
Office:(502) 573-0265
If you have questions or comments about the Secretary of State's web site, please contact:
webmaster@mail.sos.state.ky.us
700 Capital Avenue Suite 152, State Capitol Frankfort, KY 40601
Office:(502) 564-3490
Fax:(502) 564-5687
privacy/security__Q9licy
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Secretary of Statl' .-Iolne
Online Filing Assignment
LJC~(' filing U('(~ S~a reh
Click on the Assign button below to file an assignment for
t\ssignee
Enter the assignee's exact full legal name. Use either line la or Ib, but not both. Do not abbreviate or combine names. The mailing address,
;i state and ostal code are all re uired
Friday, March 26, 2004
la Organization's Name
Jr lb. Individual's Last Name First Name Middle Name Suffix
le. Mailing Address
4.ssignor
la. Organization's Name
City State Postal Code Country
lr
Filer
Jr
lb. Individual's Last Name
6a. Organization's Name
6b. Individual's Last Name
First Name
First Name
Middle Name
Middle Name
Suffix
Suffix
ie. Mailing Address
Assign I
City State Postal Code Country
If you have questions or comments about the UCC online services, please contact: ltlJ~nlY@nl~iI~sQS~_sl~lte.kY-!~_$
UCC Branch
363 C Versailles Rd., Frankfort, KY 40601
Office:(502) 573-0265
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~ecretary of State Home UCC Filing UCC Search Prepaid Account Status
Frida March 12 2004
Collateral Change Amendment
Click on the Amend button below to file an amendment modifying the collateral for
Type of Collateral Change
@Add
Collateral
o Change () Delete o Restate o Assign
Up to 8000 characters of collateral infonnation may be entered in this box.
Secured Party of Record authorizing this amendment
l~__Q!B~~~~'~_~~~_ ._..__.__ _ __ _ .
or
Filer
or
lb. Individual's Last Name
6a·.~CUtization's~~~__
6b. Individual's Last Name
First Name
First Name
Middle Name
Middle Name
SuffIX
SuffIX
Amend
Cit}: .. State Postal Code Counfry'
If you have questions or comments about the UCC online services, please contact: Ahanly@mail.sos.state.ky.us
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SECTION I
PART Ie HIPAA OVERVIEW
Although the confidentiality ofpatient records has long been the subject ofa patchwork
of state and federal statutes and regulations, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), promulgated by the U.S. Department ofHealth and Human Services
("HHS") for the first time established a comprehensive, national medical privacy statute. HIPAA
is actually comprised of 5 titles, each ofwhich regulates a different aspect ofhealth care. The
privacy, security and transaction standards ofHIPAA are the regulations promulgated under
Subtitle F ofTitle II, known as the Act's "Administrative Simplification" provisions. I
The HIPAA rules are part ofa wave of state, federal and even international governmental
activity aimed at protecting the privacy ofconsumers in an age when personal information is
being transmitted by businesses with unprecedented ease and efficiency. Consumer privacy fears
are particularly strong regarding medical records, which are among the most confidential ofall
types of infonnation. These fears have heen heightened by the explosion of Internet-based health
care companies, the increased availability of genetic infonnation and the growing use of
electronic communication technologies by health care organizations for the exchange ofmedical
data. In an effort to allay these concerns, the HIPAA rules require a major change in the way
health care organizations and companies that service them do business. Congress articulated
three purposes for the regulations promulgated under the HIPAA Administrative Simplification
provisions:
1. "To protect and enhance the rights ofconsumers by providing them access to their
health infonnation and controlling the inappropriate use of that information." 65
Fed. Reg. 82462, 82463 (Dec. 28, 2000).
2. To improve the quality ofcare ''by restoring trust in the system" among
consumers, providers and others involved in the delivery of care; Id. and
3. "To improve the efficiency and effectiveness ofhealth care delivery by creating a
national framework for health privacy protection." Id.
II wish to thank Tate M. Bombard, an associate in the Greenebaum Doll & McDonald PLLC, Health Care
and Insurance Practice Group, who assisted me in preparing all the materials for this seminar.
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the regulation and what infonnation is protected by the Privacy Rule are the first steps to being
able to comply with HIPAA.
I. Who must comply?
A. Covered Entities: The Final Privacy Rule applies to three types ofhealth care
organizations, referred to as "covered entities" in the regulations:
1. Health plans (for example, employee welfare benefit plans, health insurance
issuers, health maintenance organizations);
2. health care clearinghouses (for example, re-pricing companies, billing
companies, value-added networks); and
3. health care providers (for example, doctors, hospitals, home health agencies).
Covered entities, however, are only covered if they (1) transmit any health infonnation in
electronicform (2) in connection with a transaction covered by HIPAA.
.h Electronic: At first glace it may appear that this last requirement is a
loophole for those not wanting to undertake HIPAA compliance. In reality, though, in a time
when almost everything is done electronically, and "electronic" encompasses not just
transmission by desk-top computers but also palm pilots, laptop computers, faxes, PDAs and the
myriad of other electronic devices available, the vast majority ofhealth care providers will, at
some time, "transmit health information in electronic fonn." Even one transmission, for example
submitting a claim to a patient's insurance, will subject you to the mandates of the Privacy Rule.
ii. Transaction: Transactions under HIPAA means the transmission of
infonnation between two parties to carry out financial or administrative activities related to
health care. It includes the following types of infonnation transmissions:
1. Health care claims or equivalent encounter information;
2. Health care payment and remittance advice;
3. Coordination ofbenefits;
4. Enrollment and disenrollment in a health plan;
5. Eligibility for a health plan;
6. Health plan premium payments;
7. Referral certification and authorization;
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The basic requirement of the Final Privacy Rule is simply stated as follows: "A Covered
Entity may not use or disclose an individual's protected health information, except as otherwise
pennitted or required by the regulation." Fully understanding the definition ofwho is effected by
the regulation and what infonnation is protected by the Privacy Rule are the first steps to being
able to comply with HIPAA.
I. Who must comply?
A. Covered Entities: The Final Privacy Rule applies to three types ofhealth care
organizations, referred to as "covered entities" in the regulations:
1. Health plans (for example, employee welfare benefit plans, health insurance
issuers, health maintenance organizations);
2. health care clearinghouses (for example, re-pricing companies, billing
companies, value-added networks); and
3. health care providers (for example, doctors, hospitals, home health agencies).
Covered entities, however, are only covered if they (1) transmit any health infonnation in
electronicform (2) in connection with a transaction covered by HIPAA.
b Electronic: At first glace it may appear that this last requirement is a
loophole for those not wanting to undertake HIPAA compliance. In reality, though, in a time
when almost everything is done electronically, and "electronic" encompasses not just
transmission by desk-top computers but also palm pilots, laptop computers, faxes, PDAs and the
myriad of other electronic devices available, the vast majority ofhealth care providers will, at
some time, "transmit health infonnation in electronic fonn." Even one transmission, for example
submitting a claim to a patient's insurance, will subject you to the mandates of the Privacy Rule.
ii. Transaction: Transactions under HlPAA means the transmission of
infonnation between two parties to carry out financial or administrative activities related to
health care. It includes the following types of information transmissions:
1. Health care claims or equivalent encounter infonnation;
2. Health care payment and remittance advice;
3. Coordination ofbenefits;
4. Enrollment and disenrollment in a health plan;
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8. First report of injury;
9. Health claims attachments; and
10. Other transactions that the Secretary may prescribe.
Ifyou are a health care provider, a health plan or a health care clearinghouse and you
transmit any of the preceding information electronically, you are considered a Covered Entity
under HIPAA.
B. Business Associates: Covered entities are bound by HIPAA's privacy standards,
whether they conduct their business affairs themselves or through third parties (known in the
Final Privacy Rule as "Business Associates") who perform some of their essential functions.
Furthennore, even ifyou are not a Covered Entity under the rule, there is a good chance that you
may be considered a Business Associate of a Covered Entity.
1. A Business Associate is a person or entity who provides certain functions,
activities, or services for or to a Covered Entity, involving the use and/or
disclosure ofPHI.
2. A Business Associate is not a member of the health care provider, health plan, or
other Covered Entity's workforce.
3. A health care provider, health plan, or other Covered Entity can also be a Business
Associate to another Covered Entity.
4. The rule includes exceptions. The Business Associate requirements do not apply
to covered entities who disclose PHI to providers for treatment purposes - for
example, information exchanges between a hospital and physicians with admitting
privileges at the hospital.
Examples ofpotential Business Associate relationships include, but are not limited to,
relationships with the following: billing companies, software and/or hardware vendors; waste
hauling/incineration companies; temporary staffing agencies; and lawyers/law firms.
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II. What is protected?
A. Protected Health Information: The Final Privacy Rule applies to protected
health information ("PHI"). Under the proposed rules, PHI was limited to electronic records and
any paper records that previously existed in electronic form. In the Final Privacy Rule, PHI has
been expanded to include information transmitted or maintained in any form or medium,
including oral communications. PHI in any form is protected ifit (1) is created or received by a
Covered Entity; (2) relates to an individual's physical or mental health condition, the provision of
health care to an individual or the payment for the provision ofhealth care to an individual; and
(3) ide11-tifies the individual or creates a reasonable basis to believe that the information,
including demographic infonnation, can be used to identify the individual. 45 Fed. Reg.
§164.501.
B. De-identified Information: A Covered Entity may use pm to create de-identified
health information, which is information that does not identify an individual and where there is
no reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used to identify an individual. De-
identified health infonnation must be created in accordance with the procedures outlined in
§164.514(a) of the Final Privacy Rule. A Covered Entity demonstrates that it has met the
standard outlined in the Privacy Rule either by a statistical determination of a small risk of
identification or by meeting the Safe Harbor provided in the Privacy Rule which requires the
removal ofall of the following identifiers from the information:
1. Name;
2. All geographic subdivisions smaller than a State;
3. All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an individual;
4. Telephone numbers;
5. Fax numbers;
6. Electronic mail addresses;
7. Social security numbers;
8. Medical record numbers;
9. Health plan beneficiary numbers;
10. Account numbers;
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11. Certificate/license numbers;
12. Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers;
13. Device identifiers and serial numbers;
14. Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs);
15. Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers;
16. Biometric identifiers
17. Full face photographic images; and
18. Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code. See
§164.514(b)(2)(i).
To meet the Safe Harbor you must remove this enumerated list of identifiers from the
information and have no actual knowledge that the information could be used to identify an
individual. Id.
III. When must a Covered Entity Comply?
The HIPAA privacy regulation became effective on April 14, 2001, with an April 14,
2003, compliance date. Small health plans are allowed an additional 12 months. However, the
HIPAA regulation provided the secretary ofllliS with a one-year period from the effective date
for modifications in the regulation and on March 27, 2002, HHS proposed certain modifications
to the Final Privacy Rule. The Proposed Rule recommends some changes to the Privacy Rule.
The Proposed Rule modification, however, does not defer the compliance deadline for the
Privacy Rule which remains April 14, 2003 or April 14, 2004 for small health plans. 1
IV. What does the reeulation require?
A. Permitted uses and disclosures of PHI: A Covered Entity is generally permitted
to use and disclose PHI only (1) to the individual who is the subject of the PHI; (2) for treatment,
payment or health care operations, (3) pursuant to a patient's consent or authorization; or (4)
upon a patient's agreement or failure to object following an opportunity to object.
IThe Proposed Rule can be found at 67 Fed. Reg. 14776 et seq.
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1. Treatment, payment and health care operations: The Final Privacy
Rule allows a covered entity to use or disclose PHI, without the individual's authorization, to
carry out treatment,2 paymenf or health care operations4 in certain circumstances. Specifically,
(1) a covered entity can use or disclose PHI for its own treatment, payment, and health care
operations activities; (2) a covered entity may disclose PHI for the treatment activities of any
health care provider (including providers not covered by the Privacy Rule); (3) a covered entity
may disclose PHI to another covered entity or a health care provider (including providers not
covered by the Privacy Rule) for payment activities of the entity that receives the information;
and (4) a covered entity may disclose PHI to another covered entity for certain health care
operation activities of the entity that receives the information if: (a) each entity either has or had a
relationship with the individual who is the subject of the infonnation, and the PHI pertains to the
relationship, and (b) the disclosure is for a quality-related health care operations activity (i.e., the
activities listed in paragraphs (1) and (2) of the definition of "health care operations" at 45 C.F.R.
164.501) or for the purpose of health care fraud and abuse detection or compliance.
2. Authorization: Unless a specific exception applies, a Covered Entity
must obtain an individual's authorization to use or disclose PHI for any reason other than
treatment, payment and health care operations. §§ 164.508. Unlike the consent, a Covered
Entity may not condition treatment, payment, enrollment in a health plan or eligibility for
brreatment means the provision, coordination or management of health care related services by one or
more health care providers, including the coordination or management of health care by a health care provider with
a third party; consultation between health care providers relating to a patient; or the referral of a patient for health
care from one health care provider to another. 45 C.F.R. §164.501.
3payment means activities taken by a health plan to obtain premiums or to determine or fulfill its
responsibility for coverage and provision ofbenefits under the health plan, or the activities of a covered health care
provider or health plan to obtain or provide reimbursement for the provision of health care. Activities include, but
are not limited to: determination of eligibility of coverage; risk adjustment; billing, claims management, collection
activities, obtaining payment, and related health care data processing; review of health care services with respect to
medical necessity, coverage under a health plan, appropriateness of care, or justification of charges; utilization
review activities. 45 C.F.R. §164.501.
4Health Care Operations include a wide range of day-to-day activities that relate to the function of the
health care provider. This includes, but is not limited to, activities such as quality assessment and improvement,
case management and care coordination, contacting providers about care alternatives, reviewing health plan
performance, accreditation, certification, licensing, credentialing, obtaining medical review, legal selVices,
compliance activities, and business planning. 45 C.F.R. §164.501.
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benefits on the signing of a specific authorization except for research related treatment,
enrollment or eligibility prior to the individual's enrollment in a health plan, and payment of
claims by a health plan if such disclosure is necessary and does not include psychotherapy notes.
The following core elements are required for every valid authorization:
1. A description of the information to be used or disclosed that identifies the
information in a specific and meaningful fashion;
2. The name or other specific identification of the person(s), or class ofpersons,
authorized to make the requested use or disclosure;
3. The name or other specific identification of the person(s), or class ofpersons, to
whom the Covered Entity may make the requested use or disclosure;
4. An expiration date or an expiration event that relates to the individual or purpose
ofthe use or disclosure;
5. A statement of the individual's right to revoke the authorization in writing and the
exceptions to the right to revoke, together with a description ofhow the individual
may revoke the authorization;
6. A statement that information may be used or disclosed pursuant to the
authorization and may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be
protected by this rule;
7. Signature of the individual and date; and
8. If the authorization is signed by a personal representative of the individual, a
description of such representative's authority to act for the individual.
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In addition, if an authorization is requested by a Covered Entity for its own use or
disclosure ofPHI that it maintains, the authorization must also contain the following
requirements:
1. A statement that the Covered Entity will not condition treatment, payment,
enrollment in the health plan, or eligibility for benefits on the individual's
providing authorization for the requested use or disclosure;
2. A description of each purpose of the requested use or disclosure;
3. A statement that the individual may:
a. Inspect or copy the PHI to be used or disclosed; and
b. Refuse to sign the authorization; and
4. Ifuse or disclosure of the requested infonnation will result in direct or indirect
remuneration to the Covered Entity from a third party, a statement that
remuneration will result.
If the authorization is requested by a Covered Entity for disclosures by another
Covered Entity to disclose PHI to the Covered Entity requesting the authorization to carry out
treatment, payment or health care operations, the authorization must also contain the following
requirements:
1. A description of each purpose of the required disclosure;
2. A statement that the Covered Entity will not condition treatment, payment,
enrollment in the health plan, or eligibility for benefits on the individual's
providing authorization for the requested use or disclosure; and
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3. A statement that the individual may refuse to sign the authorization
If the authorization is requested by a Covered Entity that creates PHI for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of research that includes treatment of individuals, the authorization must
meet the general authorization requirements and contain the following requirements:
1. A description of the extent to which such PHI will be used or disclosed to carry
out treatment, payment or health care operations;
2. A reference to any consent obtained by the Covered Entity or any notice of
privacy practices provided by the Covered Entity as required under HIPAA.
3. The authorization maybe in the same document as:
a. A consent to participate in the research;
b. A consent to use or disclose PHI to carry out treatment, payment or health
care operations; or
c. A notice ofprivacy practices.
3. Psychotherapy notes: A prominent exception to the consent guidelines are the
requirements pertaining to the release ofpsychotherapy notes. Specifically, the HIPAA privacy
regulation states that an organization may not release psychotherapy notes as part ofnonnal
treatment and business operations without obtaining an individual's specific authorization. This
is counter to the implied pennissions stated above for normal treatment and business operations.
The regulations define psychotherapy notes narrowly to include only detailed notes
recorded by a mental health professional documenting or analyzing the contents of
conversations during a private, family or group counseling session. Psychotherapy notes
expressly do not include medication prescription and monitoring, counseling session start and
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stop times or the modalities and frequencies of treatment furnished, results of clinical tests or a
brief summary ofdiagnosis, functional status, the treatment plan, symptoms prognosis and
progress to date. Most mental health records will not qualify as psychotherapy notes. For
example, a note in the medical record about a mental health diagnosis, treatment plan and
progress is not a psychotherapy note. Importantly however, mental health records that do not
qualify as psychotherapy notes are still subject to the same privacy requirements as other PHI.
The Privacy Rule requires covered entities to obtain a special authorization for most uses
and disclosures ofpsychotherapy notes, including:
1. For treatment purposes, if the person using or disclosing is someone other than the
person who created the notes.
2. For payment or healthcare operations, regardless ofwho is using or disclosing the
infonnation.
Covered entities may use the general consent form to support the following uses or
disclosures ofpsychotherapy notes:
1. Use or disclosure for treatment purposes by the person who created the
psychotherapy notes (and only that person).
2. To conduct training programs in which students, trainees or practitioners in
mental health learn under supervision to practice or improve their skills in group,
joint, family or individual counseling.
3. To defend a legal action or other proceeding brought by the patient. Note that you
are allowed to release the information to your defense attorney under this
provision, but disclosures to others in the course of a judicial or administrative
proceeding requires an authorization.
Neither a consent or authorization is required for the following uses and/or disclosures:
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1. When required for law enforcement purposes.
2. When mandated by law.
3. When needed for oversight of the provider who created the notes.
4. When needed by a coroner or medical examiner.
S. When needed to avert a serious and imminent threat to health or safety.
In addition to the additional consent and authorization requirements, the Final Privacy
Rule also requires that psychotherapy notes be maintained separately from a patient's medical
record and other PHI. The separation requirement does not necessarily mean the records must be
maintained in a separate file from the medical record. Rather, separating the psychotherapy notes
from the rest of the medical file with a tab or other conspicuous separator will likely suffice.
HIPAA privacy generally provides a strong patient right of access to PHI that is used to
make decisions about the patient. An exception is made for psychotherapy notes. The Privacy
Rule allows a provider to refuse a patient access to their own psychotherapy notes, for any
reason. The provider does not need to make a determination that release of the notes would be
hannful to the patient and the patient does not have a right to have the denial reviewed.
B. Minimum Necessary Standard
With certain limited exceptions, when a Covered Entity uses or discloses PHI, or when
requesting such information from other covered entities, the entity must make reasonable efforts
to limit the information to the minimum information necessary to accomplish the intended
purpose, even if the use or disclosure is occurring pursuant to a valid consent or authorization.
§164.502(b). Reasonable efforts include the implementation ofpolicies and procedures for
routine, recurring disclosures, and the development of criteria against which all other disclosures
are individually reviewed to be used to limit the infonnation to that needed to achieve the stated
purposes. § 164.514(d)(3).
The Final Privacy Rule does provide exceptions to the standard in that the minimum
necessary standard does not apply to (1) requests by health care providers for treatment purposes,
or (2) to requests by the individuals themselves. § 164.502(b)(2)(i). In addition, the Privacy Rule
provides that a Covered Entity may rely, if reasonable under the circumstances, on a requested
disclosure ofPHI as the minimum necessary for the stated purposes if:
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1. The information is requested by another Covered Entity; or
2. The information is requested by a professional who is a Business Associate of the
Covered Entity for purposes ofproviding professional services to the Covered
Entity if the professional represents that the infonnation requested is the minimum
necessary for the stated purpose. § 164.514 (d)(3)(iii).
c. Business Associate Agreements
The Final Privacy Rule requires all covered entities to obtain satisfactory assurance that'
their Business Associates will "appropriately safeguard" PHI. The Privacy Rule requires that
these assurances be documented in a written contract or other written agreement with the
Business Associate. Importantly, the Final Rule also imposes liability on Covered Entities ifone
of its Business Associates materially breaches its obligations under such contract.
A contract between the Covered Entity and a Business Associate must:
1. Establish the permitted and required uses and disclosures of such infonnation by
the Business Associate. The contract may not authorize the Business Associate to
use or further disclose the information in a manner that would violate HIPAA
privacy, if done by the Covered Entity, except that:
a. The contract may permit the Business Associate to use and disclose PHI
for the proper management and administration of the Business Associate
[see below]; and
b. The contract may pennit the Business Associate to provide data
aggregation services relating the health care operation of the Covered
Entity.
2. Provide that the Business Associate will:
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a. Not use or further disclose the infonnation other than as permitted or
required by law;
b. Use appropriate safeguards to prevent use or disclosure ofPHI other than
as provided for by the contract;
c. Report to the provider any unauthorized use or disclosure ofPHI ofwhich
it becomes aware;
d. Ensure that any agents, including subcontractors, to whom it provides PHI
agree to the same restrictions and conditions that apply to the Business
Associate;
e. Pennit the subject of the PHI to have access to it as allowed by the Privacy
regulations;
f. Permit the subject ofPHI to amend the infonnation and incorporate the
amendments in accordance with the Privacy regulations;
g. Provide an accounting of disclosures ofPHI when requested by the subject
of the infonnation in accordance with the Privacy regulations;
h. Make its internal practices, books and records relating to PHI available to
the Secretary ofHHS for determining the provider's compliance with the
Privacy regulations;
i. Return or destroy all PHI at the termination of the agreement, if feasible.
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3. Authorize termination of the agreement by the Covered Entity if the Business
Associate violates a material tenn of the agreement.
A contract between the Covered Entity and a Business Associate may:
1. Pennit the Business Associate to use and disclose PHI as necessary (1) for the
proper management and administration of the Business Associate, or (2) to carry
out the legal responsibilities of the Business Associate, IF
a. The disclosure is required by law, or
b. The Business Associate obtains reasonable assurances from the person to
whom the infonnation is disclosed that they will:
1. hold the information confidentially and use or disclose it only as
required by law or for the purposes for which it was disclosed to
them, and
11. notify the Covered Entity of any instances of which it is aware in
which the confidentiality of the PHI has been breached.
D. Directories, Marketing and Fundraising
A Covered Entity may disclose certain PHI without first obtaining a written authorization
in order to maintain a directory of individuals in its facility or to provide information to family
members or close personal friends involved in the care of the individual. The Covered Entity
must inform the individual in advance, orally or in writing, of such use of PHI and offer an
opportunity for the individual to prohibit or restrict the use. §§ 164.510. This rule essentially
creates an "opt out" provision by which an individual has the burden ofobjecting to this limited
use or disclosure ofPHI.
1-14
Similarly, a Covered Entity may use PHI without first obtaining a written authorization
for its own marketing and fundraising purposes. However, the Covered Entity must provide the
individual with an opportunity to "opt out" ofreceiving future marketing or fundraising
communications. §§164.514(e) and (f). Covered Entities should be aware that despite this
exemption from the authorization requirement, the use ofPHI in connection with marketing and
fundraising materials must still comply with requirements specifically related to marketing and
fundraising activities. For instance, marketing materials that include PHI must (1) identify that
the marketing materials come from the Covered Entity and (2) state whether the Covered Entity
receives compensation from a third party for the marketing. §§164.514(e)(3). Further, PHI used
by Covered Entities as part of fundraising activities may only include demographic information
about the individual (i.e., name, address) and dates ofhealth care service provided to such
individual. §§164.514(f)(1).
E. Research
The Privacy Rule establishes the conditions under which PHI may be used or disclosed by
covered entities for research purposes. Under the Privacy Rule, covered entities are pennitted to
use and disclose PHI for research with individual authorization, or without individual
authorization under limited circumstances set forth in the Privacy Rule. Keep in mind, however,
that a Covered Entity may always use or disclose for research purposes health information which
has been de-identified (in accordance with §§ 164.502(d), 164.514(a)-(c) of the rule).
To use or disclose PHI without authorization by the research participant, a covered entity
must obtain one of the following:
Q Documentation that an alteration of the authorization or waiver of the research
participants' authorization for use/disclosure ofinfonnation about them for
research purposes has been approved by an Institutional Review Board (IRB) or a
Privacy Board. This provision of the Privacy Rule might be used, for example, to
conduct records research, when researchers are unable to use de-identified
information and it is not practicable to obtain research participants' authorization.
OR
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o Representations from the researcher, either in writing or orally, that the use or
disclosure of the PHI is solely to prepare a research protocol or for similar
purposes preparatory to research, that the researcher will not remove any PHI
from the covered entity, and representation that PHI for which access is sought is
necessary for the research purpose. This provision might be used, for example, to
design a research study or to assess the feasibility ofconducting a study. OR
o Representations from the researcher, either in writing or orally, that the use or
disclosure being sought is solely for research on the PHI of decedents, that the
PHI being sought is necessary for the research, and, at the request of the covered
entity, documentation of the death of the individuals about whom information is
being sought.
A covered entity may use or disclose PHI for research purposes pursuant to a waiver of
authorization by an IRB or Privacy Board provided it has obtained documentation ofall ofthe
following:
o A statement that the alteration of the authorization or waiver of the authorization
was approved by an IRB or Privacy Board that was composed as stipulated by the
Privacy Rule;
o A statement identifying the IRB or Privacy Board and the date on which the
alteration or waiver of authorization was approved;
o A statement that the IRB or Privacy Board has determined that the alteration or
waiver of authorization, in whole or in part, satisfies the eight criteria designated
in the regulations. See 45 C.F.R. §164.512(iii)(C)(2)(ii).
The Privacy Rule also permits covered entities to use and disclose PHI for research
purposes when a research participant authorizes the use or disclosure of information about him or
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herself. To use or disclose PHI created from a research study that includes treatment (e.g., a
clinical trial), additional research-specific elements must be included in the authorization form
required under §§ 164.508, which describe how PHI created for the research study will be used
or disclosed. For example, if the covered entity/researcher intends to seek reimbursement from
the research subject's health plan for the routine costs of care associated with the protocol, the
authorization must describe types of information that will be provided to the health plan. This
authorization may be combined with the traditional informed consent document used in research.
F. Patient Rights and Protections
The Final Privacy Rule also creates a new set ofrights for patients with respect to PHI.
The final HIPAA privacy regulations grant patients six rights in connection with their PHI.
Although many states already have patients' rights laws that give patients access to their health
information, the rights granted by HIPAA go far beyond what most states require.
Right #1: Patients must get notice of your organization's privacy
practices.
The regulations give patients the right to get a notice describing a Covered Entity's
privacy practices (hereinafter ''Notice''); that is, when and why a Covered Entity uses and
discloses PHI. The Notice language must be very specific and include certain provisions.
1. A Notice must give examples ofPHI disclosures that the particular organization
may make that do not require the patient's consent, as well as PHI disclosures that
are required by law.
2. The Notice must also state that other uses and disclosures will be made only with
the patient's written consent.
3. The Notice must explain that the Covered Entity has a duty to protect confidential
health information, include a description of the patient's PHI rights, and have a
statement describing how a patient can complain ifhe or she thinks a Covered
Entity has violated his or her privacy rights.
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Ifa Covered Entity wishes to make changes to its Notice from time to time, it will need to
include language in it that gives it the right to do so. The regulations also mandate when a
Covered Entity must update its Notice ofprivacy practices and how often it must give it to
patients. For instance, all covered organizations must give the Notice to anyone who requests it,
health plans must give it to all plan enrollees by the compliance deadline, and health care
providers must give it to patients the first time health care is provided.
The Proposed Rule further strengthens the importance of the Notice requirement. In lieu
of written consent (which is voluntary under the Proposed Rule) patients would be asked to
acknowledge receipt of the notice ofprivacy rights and practices. This change is designed to
give patients the opportunity to consider a provider's privacy policies before making health care
decisions, while potentially eliminating barriers that could delay or block patients' access to care.
Right #2: Patients may request restrictions on disclosures to others of
their protected health information.
Patients have the right to request restrictions on covered entities' use and disclosure of
their PHI. For example, a patient could ask his or her physician not to disclose any ofhis or her
PHI to his or her sibling. The regulations say that a health care organization must allow a patient
to request a restriction, but that the organization doesn't have to grant the request. If the
organization agrees to the patient's request, it must then document the restriction through written
or electronic records and comply with it. But if an organization wants to deny a request after
considering it, it can do so for any reason.
Right #3: Patients may request alternative means of communicating
protected health information.
Patients have the right to ask a Covered Entity to communicate their PHI by alternative
means (that is, by other than the method the Covered Entity typically uses) or to alternative
locations. For example, a patient may request that any written correspondence from his or her
doctor (such as appointment reminders, test results, and bills) that are nonnally mailed to his or
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her home address, instead be faxed to him or her at work. If a covered health entity is a health
care provider, you must agree to the patient's request if it is reasonable and ifit is not too
difficult for the Covered Entity to administer. The requirement is slightly different for health
plans. The regulations say that health plans must grant such requests only if the p,\tient states
that the disclosure of the PHI "could endanger the individual." Once the patient makes the
statement, the health plan must accommodate the request. The patient need not give the health
plan the details of the potential danger.
Right #4: Patients may inspect and get a copy of their
protected health information.
One of the broadest rights given to patients by the final regulations is the right ofaccess
to their PHI. Health care organizations must allow patients to inspect and get a copy of their PHI
from the organization. Although there are limited exceptions to the rule, for instance access to
psychotherapy notes may be denied, in general, a Covered Entity will have to give access to PHI
to the patient within 30 days of getting the patient's request. The regulations also specify what
records are covered by the access right and must be provided, the form of the records, the timing
for access, and the fees charged. For example, a Covered Entity can charge a reasonable cost-
based fee for copying, postage, or preparation of the PHI. If a Covered Entity denies the patient's
request for access, the Covered Entity must, in most cases, (1) say why, (2) give the patient a
right to a review by the Covered Entity of its denial, and (3) tell the patient how to complain to
the organization or to the Department ofHealth and Human Services about the denial. The
regulations also set out a procedure and time frame that the Covered Entity must follow for the
review process.
Right #5: Patients may request amendments to their
protected health information.
Patients also have the right to request that their PHI be amended or corrected. A Covered
Entity must respond to each request within 60 days of getting such a request. A Covered Entity
may deny the request if the PHI is accurate and complete, or if a Covered Entity didn't create the
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PHI. Ifa Covered Entity grants the request, it must (1) amend the patient's PHI, (2) infonn the
patient of the change and (3) notify others who may need to know of the change, such as other
health care providers and Business Associates who have access to the patient's PHI.
If a Covered Entity denies the amendment request, it must give the patient a written
denial that explains (1) the reason for the denial, (2) the patient's right to submit a statement
disagreeing with the denial, (3) the patient's right to ask that the original amendment request and
denial be attached to any future disclosures ofhis or her PHI, and (4) how to complain to the
Covered Entity or the Department ofHealth and Human Services about the denial.
Right #6: Patients must be given an accounting of the Covered Entity's
disclosures of their protected health information.
The privacy regulations also give patients the right to request and get an accounting; that
is, a detailed listing of all disclosures of their PHI that the Covered Entity made during the six
years before the date of the request. There are several exceptions to this patient right. The
biggest is that the accounting doesn't have to include any disclosures that were made to carry out
treatment, payment, and health care operations. For example, an accounting prepared by a
hospital need not include a list of all disclosures that were made to billing department personnel
for purposes ofgetting payment for the patient's hospital stay. But the accounting must list other
disclosures made by the organization, including those made to or by its ,Business Associates, such
as its accountants or its billing company_ The accounting must include details of the disclosures,
such as the date the disclosure was made, the name ofthe person or organization receiving the
PHI, the recipient's address (ifknown), a short description of the PHI disclosed, and the reason
for the disclosure. Generally, a Covered Entity must give the accounting to the patient within 60
days ofthe patient's request, but it may get a 30-day extension. The Covered Entity may not
charge the patient for the first accounting in a 12-month period, but may charge a reasonable
cost-based fee for additional requests made by the same patient in the same 12-month period.
G. Administrative Requirements
The Final Rule includes administrative requirements that essentially require Covered
Entities to establish a framework to achieve organizational compliance. §§164.530. These
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administrative requirements require Covered Entities to appoint privacy staff, implement policies
and procedures and train employees.
(1) Privacy Staff: Covered Entities will be required to designate a privacy official to
oversee compliance and a contact person to receive complaints and questions. §§ 64.530(a).
Although HHS indicated that organizations would not necessarily need to create an entirely new
position for these roles, many analysts are skeptical that a person assigned to other duties can
adequately handle this cumbersome task, particularly in larger organizations.
(2) Policies and Procedures: Covered Entities will be required to develop and implement
policies to establish compliance with the Final Rules. §§164.530(c)-(i). Specifically, Covered
Entities must have policies to accomplish the following tasks: (1) protect the accidental or
intentional misuse or disclosure ofPHI; (2) establish a grievance procedure for violations of the
organizations's privacy policies; (3) prevent retaliation for complaints or reports of
noncompliance and address applying changes in privacy policies to Pill already collected; (4)
impose sanctions against employees who violate the organization's privacy policies; (5) mitigate
effects of errant disclosures by the entity or by a Business Associate; and (6) guarantee an
individual's right to complain.
(3) Training: Covered Entities must also train employees on the organization's privacy
polices and must re-train employees ifmaterial changes are made to such policies. §§ 64.530(b).
The controversial provision of the proposed rule that required employees to sign a certification
that they received training on the policies and recertify such document every three years has been
eliminated in the Final Privacy Rule.
v. State Law Pre-Emption
State privacy standards or requirements are pre-empted by the Final Privacy Rule if they
are "contrary to" HIPAA's requirements. "Contrary to" means that (1) a Covered Entity would
find it impossible to comply with both the State and federal requirements, or (2) the provision of
State law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of
HIPAA. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.202. A "contrary" state law provision may still stand if it is an
exception to federal preemption as set forth in the HIPAA privacy rule. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.203.
These exceptions include: state laws related to health care fraud and abuse; regulation ofhealth
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plans; reporting on health care delivery or costs; public health, safety, or welfare; and the
regulation of controlled substances. Under these exceptions, the federal rule will remain in effect
until HHS has made a determination based on reviewing a request for an exception by the state
governor (or his or her designee) as to whether the state law fits into the exception and will stay
in effect.
The HIPAA privacy regulations can be pre-empted by State law. State privacy laws
which are not "contrary to" HIPAA's requirements but instead are "more stringent" than HIPAA,
"preempt" the Final Rule. State privacy laws are "more stringent" than HIPAA when they meet
one or more of the following six criteria:
That is, the state law must:
1. Further prohibit or restrict the use or disclosure of individually identifiable health
information (mIl) than that prohibited or restricted by the HIPAA privacy rule.
2. Pennit patients greater rights to access or greater ability to amend the individually
identifiable health infonnation (mIl)
3. Pennit patients greater rights to know who has used or disclosed mIl, or more
remedies with regard to use and disclosure.
4. Contain authorization or consent requirements that narrow the scope or duration,
reduce the coercive effect or, in general, give mIl more privacy protection than
the federal HIPAA standards.
5. Provide for more record retention requirements or provides for a longer period to
retain the records.
6. Expand or increase the types of health infonnation that must be protected, for
instance as it related to communicable diseases or genetic health infonnation. 45
C.F.R. § 160.202.
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Disputes about whether a state law is more stringent than the corresponding provision in the
HIPAA privacy rule will not be decided by HHS, but must be ruled on by state courts.
VI. Violations (or, why comply?)
The Final Rule does not include a private cause of action, dropping a requirement in the
proposed regulations that patients be designated as third-party beneficiaries ofwritten privacy
agreements between healthcare entities and their business associates. However, Violations of
the rules may subject Covered Entities to criminal or civil penalties. See 42 U.S.C. §§1320d-5
and 1320d-6. HHS may impose civil penalties equal to $100 per violation up to an annual
maximum of $25,000 for the violation of each provision of the rule. The rule indicates, however,
that HHS will take a cooperative approach to civil enforcement, relying on informal dispute
resolution and the provision of technical assistance. Criminal penalties may be imposed on a
Covered Entity who knowingly and in violation ofHIPAA uses or causes to be used a unique
health identifier, or obtains or discloses individually-identifiable health infonnation. The HIPAA
statute authorizes imposition ofa fine of up to $50,000 and ajail sentence ofup to one year for
such a violation. If the offense is committed under false pretenses, the maximum penalty
increases to a $100,000 fine and five years imprisonment. If the offense is committed with the
intent to sell, transfer, or use individually-identifiable health infonnation for commercial
advantage, personal gain or malicious harm, the maximum penalty is a $250,000 fine and 10
years imprisonment.
The Department for Health and Human Services has delegated to the Office of Civil
Rights its authority to enforce the HIPAA privacy regulations. The Office of Civil Rights now
has the authority to impose civil monetary sanctions for non-compliance with the final HIPAA
privacy regulations, determine when state laws aren't pre-empted by HIPAA, administer the
privacy regulations, and make decisions on how to interpret, implement, and enforce the privacy
regulations. The Office of Civil Rights' authority begins on the effective date of the final HIPAA
privacy regulations, which, as noted earlier, is somewhat uncertain at this time.
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PART II. HIPAA AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The extent to which banks are impacted by HIPAA will depend upon the answers to the
following questions:
a. When is a bank a "Healthcare Clearinghouse" under HIPAA? and,
b. When is a bank a "Business Associate" under HIPAA?
These are not mutually exclusive findings as most Healthcare Clearinghouses are also
Business Associates.5
A. When is a Bank a "Healthcare Clearinghouse" under HIPAA?
Background on Healthcare Clearinghouses
Healthcare clearinghouses can have either healthcare providers or health plans or both as
customers. Those serving providers often capture a print image of a paper claim fonn at the
providers site, edit the claim data for errors or required codes, and reformat the claim to meet the
unique data layout requirements of various health plans. Health plan-oriented clearinghouses
provide claims receipt services for health plans, which may delegate the entire task oftrading partner
acquisition and testing to their clearinghouses for a fee. Clearinghouses can serve both the health
plan and provider markets. This is the type ofcompany that clearly was at the forefront ofHHS's
intent when the statute's definition of"Healthcare Clearinghouse" was drafted.
Background on the Banking Industry's Automated Clearinghouse Network
Banks commonly use the term "clearinghouse" to refer to a facility for the exchange of
payment information. There are local and regional check clearinghouses in which paper checks are
exchanged and settled in accordance with rules developed by the members. Perhaps better known
and more important in this context is the Automated Clearing House ("ACH"), a network for the
exchange ofpayment and related remittance infonnation that operates under a unifonn set ofmles
developed and administered by NACHA- (the Electronics Payments Association) on behalfofmore
SThe majority of this section of the materials is based on the"White Paper on HIPAA Related Issues
Affecting the Banking Industry," a Working Paper prepared by the Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force, submitted
for discussion to HHS May 29, 2002, revised July, 2003. It is also based, to a lesser extent, on a Memorandum
prepared by Mornison & Foerster, LLP obtained by Ian Macoy ofNACHA, March 19,2003. Both documents are
attached for review.
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than 12,000 financial institutions and the Federal Reserve. Despite the similarities in their names,
the business function of the ACH is completely distinct of a Healthcare Clearinghouse. An ACH
does not itself take responsibility for any data conversion. The processing of payment files by
NACHA member banks is more focused on routing standard files to effect payment rather than
transforming or refonnatting files as a service. The routine processing ofNACHA files by member
banks may require some editing to ensure that the message is routed correctly. But these routine
payment functions are clearly different (and substantially less expensive) than the services provided
by Healthcare Clearinghouses.
NACHA, the American Bankers Association ("ABA") and the HIPAA Banking Industry
Task Force believe that no bank is a clearinghouse under HIPAA by mere origination or receipt of
an ACH transaction for relevant HIPAA standard transactions (premium and claim payments).
Although banks may originate or receive HIPAA standard transactions such as the Healthcare Claim
Payment (835) and Premium Payment (820), they will often pass the related remittance data without
.any responsibility for conversion or reformatting ofthe X12 message contained in the NACHA CTX
"envelope". Although the messages might be HIPAA standard transactions, the bank may provide
only transport and payment functions. These are the customary services purchased from banks and
many industries including healthcare.
Background on Additional Banking Services
A small number of banks may provide additional services for their healthcare customers.
Some health plans and providers may paybanks to provide additional support services by translating
or editing files to meet the criteria specified in the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines. Banks will
be clearinghouses when they choose to provide services that translate files from non-standard to
HIPAA-compliant standard formats as requested by customers. Other banks provide "lockbox"
services where the bank picks up checks and remittance advices directly from the postal service,
deposits the checks and performs some scanning, photocopying and key entry of remittance data.
This infonnation may be transmitted electronically in a variety of formats to the customer but this
data capture service is not a clearinghouse operation because there is no conversion from an
incoming electronic fonnat.
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Lockbox services have raised the possibility that Banks perfonning such services could be
deemed Business Associates under HIPAA HHS has yet to officially comment directly on this issue.
However, attached to these materials is a Memorandum from Kilpatrick Stockton LLP requested by
the Kentucky Bankers Association regarding this issue (the "Memorandum"). The Memorandum
comes to the conclusion that a Bank can reasonably proceed under the position that the Bank is
conducting an activity that directly facilitates or effects the transfer of funds for compensation for
health care. The HIPAA Preamble indicates that a Bank will not be acting on behalfofa physician
when it " ... conducts any other activity that directly facilitates or effects the transfer of funds for
compensation for health care." The Memorandum also states that while Banks also receives PHI
(such as EOBs and invoices) along with a payment transaction under lockbox transactions, if the
Bank does not need or use this infonnation in perfonning its services and it simply forwards this
infonnation to the physician without any use or disclosure ofthe PHI, it is reasonable to assume the
bank is not a Business Associate under HIPAA. We offer no opinion as to the accuracy of legal
analysis of the Memorandum. It is simply attached for informational purposes.
The HIPAA rules generally pennit the disclosure of PHI by a covered entity for payment
purposes without the need for authorization by the individual. The definition of "payment" in the
HIPAA rules is broad and includes, inter alia, the activities undertaken by a health plan to provide
reimbursement for the provision ofhealthcare. The supplementary information to the final HIPAA
rule notes that:
Covered entities may disclose protected health information for payment purposes to
any other entity, regardless of whether it is a covered entity. For example, a
healthcare provider may disclose protected health information to a financial
institution in order to cash a check or to a Healthcare Clearinghouse to initiate
electronic transactions. 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,495 (Dec. 28, 2000)
The amount ofinfonnation in this disclosure by a covered entity is subject to a "minimum
necessary standard." Despite this limitation, in the supplementary infonnation accompanying the
HIPAA rules, HHS states that the transmission ofboth electronic funds transfer ("EFT") infonnation
and electronic remittance advice ("ERA") information are payment activities. 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462,
82,615, 82,616 (Dec. 28, 2000)
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Most payment services provided by banks do not classify a bank as a Healthcare
Clearinghouse regulated by HIPAA. There is, in fact, a specific exclusion in the regulation for
payment activities.
Section 1179 of the HIPAA statute itselfprovides that:
To the extent that an entity is engaged in activities of a financial institution (as
defined in Section 1101 ofthe Right to Financial Privacy Act of1978) oris engaged
in authorizing, processing, clearing, settling, billing, transferring, reconciling, or
collecting payments, for a financial institution, this part, and any standard adopted
under this part, shall not apply to the entity with respect to such activities, including
the following:
(1) "The use or disclosure of information by the entity for
authorizing, processing, clearing, settling, billing, transferring,
reconciling or collecting, a payment for, or related to, health plan
premiums or healthcare, where such payment is made by any means,
including a credit, debit or other payment card, an account, check, or
electronic funds transfer..."
Although the HIPAA rules do not provide an express exclusion from the definition of
"Healthcare Clearinghouse" for financial institutions, a statement in the supplementary information
accompanying the Hn>AA rules indicates that HHS recognizes this exclusion, at least for payment
purposes. In discussing the definition of a "Business Associate" in Section 160.103 ofthe HIPAA
rules, HHS stated in the supplementary infonnation that:
We do not consider a financial institution to be acting on behalfofa covered entity,
and therefore no Business Associate contract is required, when it processes
consumer-conducted financial transactions by debit, credit, or other payment card,
clears checks, initiates or processes electronic funds transfers, or conducts any other
activity that directly facilitates or effects the transfer of funds for compensation for
healthcare. 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,476 (Dec. 28, 2000)
Under the definitions of"Protected Health Information" and "Healthcare Clearinghouse" a
Receiving Depository Financial Institution ("RDFI") engaged in ACH payment activity could be
construed to be a Healthcare Clearinghouse. For example, an RDFI might receive a credit ACH
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entry for a receiver who is a doctor or other healthcare provider sent bya patient's health insurer.
The entry could include infonnation from both the EFT and ERA component ofthe ASe XI2N 835
standard, thereby identifying the patient and the treatment for which the payment is being made.
This information is PHI within the meaning ofthe HIPAA rules. By receiving ERA information in
a HIPAA standard format and converting the ERA information to the non-standard format in which
the doctor or healthcare provider ordinarilyreceives information about ACH entries, the RDFI could
be interpreted to be performing the functions ofa Healthcare Clearinghouse within the definition of
that term in the HIPAA rules.
However, a reading of the HIPAA rules in their entirety strongly weighs against this
interpretation. The structure ofthe HIPAA rules is to regulate covered entities and the infonnation
they disclose to outside entities. It would be contrary to this structure to believe that HHS intended
a financial institution to become a covered entity simply by processing payments delivered to the
financial institution, directly or indirectly, by a covered entity. In addition, for HHS to regulate
financial institutions due to their participation in payment activities would be contrary to Section
1179. For instance, an Originating Depository Financial Institution ("ODFI") may receive
infonnation for payment purposes from a covered entity, and an RDFI may receive information for
payment purposes from an GDFI. These organizations are entitled to assume that the covered entity
is complying with the HIPAA rules with respect to that information. The mere act ofreceiving and
processing information as described above, even where such information includes PHI would not
seem to transform the ODFI or the RDFI into a covered entity in the form of a Healthcare
Clearinghouse.
This view is consistent with the statutory language in HIPAA creating the detailed Section
1179 exclusion for payment purposes. The view is confinned by statements by HHS in the
supplementary infonnation to the HIPAA rules. There is no evidence that HHS intended to include
financial institutions that would ordinarily enjoy the Section 1179 exclusion within the definition
of a "Healthcare Clearinghouse" simply because they engage in ACH payment activity. For
example, HHS does not purport to interpret Section 1179 in defining Healthcare Clearinghouse to
limit the types ofpayment activities that can be performed by financial institutions. To the contrary,
HHS itself states that payment activity as defined in the HIPAA Privacy Rule includes the
transmission ofboth the EFT and the ERA components ofthe ASC XI2N 835 standard. Further, as
noted above, HHS expressly recognizes that contracts are not required when a financial institution
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processes electronic funds transfers or conducts any other activity that directly facilitates or effects
the transfer of funds for compensation for healthcare.
Therefore, it would appear that under the HIPAA rules, a financial institution engaged in
ACH payment activity should not be considered a Healthcare Clearinghouse and therefore should
not be subject to HIPAA. However, this is far from clear. There has been much debate on this
subject matter. Certain activities performed by banks, specifically, certain value - added translation
services, either bundled with or separate from ACH services, may qualify the bank as a "HIPAA
Healthcare Clearinghouse". Therefore, the Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force has developed a
specific test to determine when banks are or are not considered Healthcare Clearinghouses under
HIPAA. These proposed guidelines for bank clearinghouse status detennination allow banks to
determine under what circumstances they are required to be HlPAA compliant as a Healthcare
Clearinghouse and will indicate what services are "specific value - added" and "clearinghouse -
activities" contrasted with routine payment processing exempted under Section 1179. The purpose
of the proposed guidelines for bank Healthcare Clearinghouse status detennination is to provide a
clearer presentation ofthe banking industry's position on its Healthcare Clearinghouse status under
HIPAA.
A specific test must be applied to detennine ifa bank is or is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse.
The test is based on services provided and should be documented by contractual agreements with
banks and their customers. The test question for a bank to be classified as a Healthcare
Clearinghouse or not is: "Is the bank editing or reformatting data against the specifications of the
HIPAA Implementation Guidelines?" If the answer is "YES", then the bank is a Healthcare
Clearinghouse. Other edits or reformatting tasks performed against financial institutions byX12 and
NACHA requirements are part ofroutine payment processing and are exempt under Section 1179
of the HIPAA statute. Today most contracts between banks and their customers do not have
language that specifies whether the bank is defined as a Healthcare Clearinghouse. The HIPAA
Banking Industry Task Force recommends that contracts between banks and their customers have
standard clauses that clearly state that the bank is or is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse under
HIPAA. According to the Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force, the test question can be applied to
many different scenarios and allow for a clear delineation between routine payment processing and
Healthcare Clearinghouse services.
The Bank Is A Healthcare ClearinKhoDse
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1. ODFI's that contract with "covered entity" customers to convert any ofthe HIPAA
mandated transactions in proprietary data fonnats to HIPAA - compliant standard fonnats are
Clearinghouses under the HIPAA regulations if the following condition applies:
a) The bank is editing or refonnatting files for its customers using the HIPAA
Implementation Guidelines as the source of edits.
2. RDFI's that contract with "covered entity" customers to convert HIPAA - compliant
standard transactions received to non-HIPAA - compliant formats required by the customer are
Healthcare Clearinghouses if the following condition applies:
a) The bank is editing or refonnatting files for its customers using the HIPAA
Implementation Guidelines as the source of edits.
The Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force has developed Healthcare Clearinghouse
detennination test cases that are appropriate to illustrate application of the above test question and
present typical payment processing routines and value added services that would classify the bank
as a Healthcare Clearinghouse and a covered entity under HIPAA. The cases are presented in two
groups based on services for either outgoing (ODFI) or incoming (RDFI) payments.
OriKina\tin& Depository Financial Institution
CASE I
• A health plan sends a proprietary flat file with healthcare claim payments and the
ODFI refonnats the data into the X12 835 standard and further manipulates the data
to create a properly formatted CTX (NACHA format). The properly fonnatted
NACHA file is then submitted to the ACH network for processing. The bank has
contracted with its customer to provide a HIPAA compliant transaction as
detenninedby the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines. Reformatting was proprietary
to X12 and to NACHA.
Determination: Thebank is a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is reformatting and
editing the data against the requirement of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
Receivioa Depository Financial Institution
CASE 2
• An RDFI receives multiple NACHA files via the ACH network. The CTX files are
bound for the same provider payee. The RDFI merges the properly formatted CTX
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files into a consolidated file to send to the intended provider. The RDFI also
received 835 files from value added networks that are to be reassociated with
payment data sent separately. The resulting, merged transactions are then sent to a
receiver in an 835 format. The provider has asked the bank to edit the incoming 835
files against the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines and to manage the receipt or
rejection processing of the 835 data in addition to preforming payment processing
services.
Determination: The bank is a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is formatting and
editing the data against the requirements of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
The Bank Is Not A Healtbcare Clearinehouse
The Banking Industry has been providing payment processing.,services for decades and has
significant regulations and responsibilities for standards - basedpaymentprocessing. Banks provide
occasional file editing and reformatting functionalities in the routine course ofpayment processing.
If the customer does not want to require its bank to perform HIPAA Implementation Guidelines
compliance checking against incoming or outgoing payment files it would be inappropriate to
classify the bank as a Healthcare Clearinghouse for its completion of routine payment services
provided to customers in all industries. This seems to be in line with the Section 1179 exclusion
found in the HIPAA statute.
OriKinatin& Depository Financial Institution
1. ODFI's whose customers ask them to originate payments with Banking Industry
standard editing and reformatting functionalities are not Healthcare Clearinghouses under HIPAA.
These banks are contractually obligated to effect payment and remove remittance data and are not
contractually responsible for editing or formatting payment data against the HIPAA Implementation
Guidelines.
a.) ODFI's can accept NACHA files from customers with or without HIPAA
compliance remittance data enclosed, without being defined as a Healthcare
Clearinghouse.
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b) Reformatting from X12 to NACHA or from a proprietary fonnat to NACHA
for payment processing does not constitute Healthcare Clearinghouse activity.
c) Editing and supplementing payment data for completeness against X12 and
NACHA standards alone does not constitute Healthcare Clearinghouse
activity.
Receivio& Depository Financial Institution
1. RDFI's that merely receive payments in any NACHA format and route any data to
customers based on a variety of routing instructions are not Healthcare Clearinghouses under
HIPAA.
a.) RDFI's can accept NACHA files, with or without HIPAA - compliance
remittance data enclosed, without being a Healthcare Clearinghouse.
b) Reformatting from NACHA files to X12, BAI or proprietary formats and
routing of remittance data does not constitute Healthcare Clearinghouse
activity.
c) Editing and supplementing data for completeness against X12 and NACHA
standards alone does not constitute Healthcare Clearinghouse activity.
The following test cases illustrate typical payment processing routines that would oot
classify the bank as a Healthcare Clearinghouse and a covered entity under HIPAA. The cases are
presented in two groups based on services for either outgoing (ODFI) or incoming (RDFI) payments.
OrieinatioK Depository Financial Institution
CASE 3
• A health plan sends a properly formatted CTX (NACHA format) to its ODFI
containing a healthcare claim payment/advice (835) transaction, and the ODFI
submits the transaction to the ACH network. Edits applied were NACHA. No
reformatting was involved.
Determination: The bank is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is not
refonnatting and editing the data against the requirements ofthe HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
CASE 4
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• A health plan sends a properly formatted healthcare claim payment/advice (835)
transaction to the ODFI, and the ODFI places the properly formatted 835 into the
CTX (NACHA format) and submits the transaction to the ACH network. Edits
applied were X12. Refonnatting was X12 to NACHA.
Determination: Bank is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is oot refonnatting
and editing the data against the requirements of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
Receivioe Depository Financial Institution
CASES
• An RDFI receives a properly formatted CTX (NACHA format) via the ACH
network. That NACHA file is then passed on to the provider receiver (payee). Edits
applied were NACHA. No reformatting was done.
Determination: Bank is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is not formatting
and editing the data against the requirements of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
CASE 6
• An RDFI receives a properly fonnatted CTX (NACHA fonnat) via the ACH network
and extracts the 820 or 835 from the CTX files. That 820 or 835 is then passed onto
the provider receiver (payee). Edits applied were NACHA and X12. Reformatting
was NACHA to X12.
Determination: Bank is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is not reformatting
and editing the data against the requirements of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
CASE 7
• An RDFI receives a properly fonnatted CTX (NACHA fonnat) via the ACH
network. Pertinent data in t4e CTX file is then passed onto the provider receiver
(payee) via human readable methodology. Human readable methodology includes,
but is not limited to, fax, e-mail, printed advice, bank statement, information
reporting terminal or software. The reformatting is NACHA to X12 to human
readable. Edits applied were NACHA and X12.
Determination: Bank is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is not reformatting
and editing the data against the requirements of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
Financial institutions are required byACH network rules promulgated byNACHA to forward
payment related information to receivers upon request. This is, therefore, a normal (and required)
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function of the payment network. Banks and their customers must establish HIPAA - compliant
secure communications for the dissemination of this human readable infonnation.
CASE 8
• Paper healthcare claim payment data in the form of explanation of
benefits/remittance advice statements sent from a health plan to a provider are keyed
in a lock box processing area within the bank and sent electronically in a BAI or X12
fonnat to the provider receiver (payee). Images ofthe items received in the lock box
are also sent to the payee, or othelWise made available upon request. No edits. No
reformatting.
Determination: Bank is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is not reformatting
and editing against the requirements of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
CASE 9
• An RDFI receives a properly formatted CTX (NACHA format) via the ACH
network. Paper transactions keyed in at lock box processing operations at the bank
are then merged with 820 or 835 data. The resulting 820 or 835 is then transmitted
to the receiver (payee). The reformatting is NACHA to X12. Edits applied were
NACHA or X12 to CTX transmission.
Determination: Bank is Dot a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is not refonnatting
and editing the data against the requirements of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
Financial institutions, as a nonnal course of business, receive payments via various
methodologies (ACH, wire, check, et al) and must report on these payments in a manner consistent
with the capabilities ofthe receiver's (payees) account receivable systems. Banks routinely merge
data files and forward a "consolidated" file to the receiver to streamline and simplify the
reconciliation process. The customer in this example is not requesting the bank to edit or refonnat
incoming data against HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
CASE 10
• An RDFI receives a NACHA reformatted file (CCD or CCD +) via the ACH
network. The RDFI receives an 820 or an 835 from and external network or third-
party healthcare provider for reassociation purposes. The resulting, reassociated
transactions are then sent to the receiver (payee) in an 820 or 835 fOlmat. The
reformatting was NACHA to X12. Edits applied were NACHA or X12.
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Determination: Bank is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is not reformatting
and editing the data against the requirements of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
Financial institutions, as a normal course ofbusiness, receive payment and payment related
infonnation from multiple sources. Banks routinely reassociate payments received from the ACH
network with payment related information received from the third-party network or service provider
and merge the data files for reconciliation purposes. This merged file is then sent to the receiver.
The customer is this example is not paying for the bank to edit or supplement incoming data against
the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
It is important to keep in mind that the above discussed test cases are based upon tests
fonnulated by the HIPAA Banking Industry Task Force. While they are helpful guidelines for banks
to determine when they mayor may not qualify as a Healthcare Clearinghouse for the purposes of
HIPAA, they are not necessarily conclusive in this regard. These tests have not been formally
adopted by the Office ofCivil Rights or the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services as carrying
any weight under HlPAA law. The debates regarding whether or not banks are or are not subject to
HIPAA, and in what capacity they are subject to HlPAA remains a very fluid concept. The Office
ofthe Comptroller ofthe Currency has determined that based on Section 1179 ofthe statute, banks
are 100% exempt from HIPAA. In contrast, the framers ofthe statute argue that this exemption was
exclusivelygranted to permit consumer-conducted financial transactions, (i.e. credit cards, personal
checks, etc.), allowing the consumer to decide when to use a card or check that would link them with
sensitive treatments.
Many experts agree that the exemption does not cover PHI (i.e. claims remittance
information) that accompanies health plan payments through the banking system. In the meantime,
a national clearinghouse association drafted a letter to HHS Secretary Thompson objecting to special '
treatment for banks under HIPAA. At the Medical Banking Project's "The Great American
Interoperability Tour," the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services publically acknowledged
that they were considering completely exempting banks from HIPAA. The National Committee on
Vital and Health Statistics will be hearing testimony in February and March of2004 relating to these
issues. Thus, it is clear that many of the issues discussed in this section are still being worked out.
B. When is a Bank a "Business Associate" under HIPAA?
Background on Business Associates
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The Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force identified a need to clarify the application of the
Business Associate relationship to banking services. It is recognized that banks may be deemed
"Business Associates" ofHIPAA covered entities such as health plans and providers when the banks
process payment transactions/remittance data containing PHI. Health plan and provider customers
will, therefore, seek to revise existing bank contracts to incorporate applicable HIPAA privacy and
securityrequirements for banks as Business Associates. To assist the industry, the Banking Industry
HIPAA Task Force has developed, with the assistance of several institution attorneys, a Banking
Industry version of Model Business Associate Contract provisions available at
www.hipaabanking.org/bus content.html
Proposed Guidelines for Business Associate Status Determination
The purpose ofthe proposed guidelines for bank Business Associate status determination is
to provide a clear presentation of the banking industry's position on its business associate status
under HIPAA. Test questions must be answered to determine if a bank is or is not a Business
Associate. The test questions for Business Associate determination will be the following:
"Does the bank have access to PHI? Does its customer have a contractual agreement that
defines the bank as a Business Associate?" Ifthe answer is "YES" to both these questions then the
bank is a Business Associate. Today most contracts between banks and their customers do not have
language that specifies whether the bank is defined as a Business Associate. It is recommended that
contracts between banks and their customers have standard clauses that clearly state that the bank
is or is not a Business Associate under HlPAA. It is the responsibility of the covered entity to
negotiate a Business Associate contract with its bank.
The Bank is a Business Associate
The following Business Associate determination test cases are appropriate to illustrate
application of the above test questions and present typical banking services and contractual
relationships that would classify the bank as a Business Associate under HIPAA.
CASE 11
• A health plan sends a proprietary flat file with healthcare claim payments and the
GDFI fonnats the data into the X12 835 standard and further manipulates the data to
create aproperlyfonnatted CTX (NACHA fonnat). Theproperly formatted NACHA
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file is then submitted to the ACH network for processing. The bank has contracted
with its customer to provide a HIPAA complaint transaction as determined by the
HIPAA Implementation Guidelines. The contract between the bank and its customer
indicates that the bank is a Business Associate. The bank has access to because of
the PHI contained in the 835 HIPAA standard transaction sent by the health plan to
the bank.
Determination: The bank is a Business Associate because the answers to the test
questions are positive. The contract between the bank and its customer does specify that the bank
is a Business Associate, and the bank does have access to PHI. As mentioned earlier, clearinghouses
are also business associates and in this example the bank is both a Clearinghouse and a Business
Associate. Case 11 and Case 1 are the same in order to clearly illustrate that a Clearinghouse can
be a Business Associate.
CASE 12
• An RDFI receives multiple NACHA files via the ACH network. These CTX files
are bound for the same provider payee. The RDFI merges the properly formatted
CTX files into a consolidated file to send to the customer. The RDFI also receives
835 files from value added networks that are to be reassociated with payment data
sent separately. The resulting, merged transactions are then sent to the receiver in an
835 format. The customer has asked the bank to edit the incoming 835 files against
the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines and to manage the receipt or rejection
processing ofthe 835 data in addition to performing payment - processing services.
The contract between the bank and its customer identifies that the bank is a Business
Associate when the bank has access to PHI through the data contained in the 835
HIPAA standard transaction.
Determination: The bank is a Business Associate because the answers to the test
questions are positive. The contract between the bank and its customer does specify that the bank
is a Business Associate. As mentioned earlier, Clearinghouses are also Business Associates and in
this example the bank is both a Clearinghouse and a Business Associate. Case 12 and Case 2 are the
same in order to clearly illustrate that a Clearinghouse can be a Business Associate.
CASE 13
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• A health plan sends a properly formatted CTX (NACHA format) containing a
healthcare claim payment/advice (835) transaction and the ODFI passes on the
received NACHA file to the ACH network. The contract between the bank and its
customer indicates that the bank is a Business Associate. The bank has access to PHI
because of the PHI contained in the 835 HIPAA standard transaction sent by the
health plan to the bank.
Determination: The bank is a Business Associate because the answers to the test
questions are positive. The contract between the bank and its customers does specify that the bank
is a Business Associate. The bank has access to PHI. Unlike the two prior examples the bank is not
a Healthcare Clearinghouse because data translation and validation against the HIPAA
Implementation Guide have not occurred. Case 13 and Case 3 are the same in order to clearly
illustrate a circumstance where the bank is not a Clearinghouse and is a Business Associate.
CASE 14
• Paper healthcare claim payment data in the fonn of explanation of
benefits/remittance advice statements sent from a health plan to a provider are keyed
in a lockbox processing area with the bank and sent electronically in a BAI or X12
format to the provider receiver (payee). hnages ofthe items received in the lock box
are also send to the payee. The contract between the bank and its customer indicates
that the bank is a Business Associate. The bank has access to PHI because ofthe PHI
contained in the 835 HIPAA standard transaction and PHI contained in paper
explanation ofbenefits/remittance advice statements.
Determination: The bank is a Business Associate because the answers to the test
questions are positive. The contract between the bank and its customers does specify that the bank
is a Business Associate. The bank has access to PHI. In this example the bank is not a Healthcare
Clearinghousebecause data translation and validation against the HIPAA Implementation Guide have
not occurred. Case 14 and Case 8 are the same in order to illustrate a circumstance where the bank
is not a Clearinghouse and is a Business Associate.
The Bank is not a Business Associate
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The following Business Associate determination test case is appropriate to illustrate
application ofthe test question and present typical banking services that would not classify the bank
as a Business Associate under HIPAA.
CASE 15
• A health plan uses a bank for a variety of services specifically:
• Trust, safekeeping and custody of investment securities
• Investment services (advice and trade executions)
• Payroll processing
The contract between the bank and the customer indicates that the bank is not a Business
Associate. The bank has no access to PHI.
Determination: The bank is not a Business Associate because the answers to the test
questions are negative. The contract between the bank and its customers does not specify that the
bank is a Business Associate. The bank has no access to PHI.
Again, it is important to note that the tests discussed above for determining whether a bank
is a Business Associate have been detennined by the Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force. These
guidelines are helpful for banks to detennine when they mayor may not be Business Associates
Wlder the HIPAA rules. However, they have not been excepted as definitive tests by the Office of
Civil Rights or the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the agencies responsible for
enforcing and administering the HIPAA rules. One important thing to note under these Business
Associate tests outlined above relates to the absence of a contract stating that a bank is or is not a
Business Associate. This is certainly not definitive of whether or not one is or is not a Business
Associate. There could be many circumstances in which a bank does not have a contract that
delineates it is a Business Associate when, in fact, it is operating as a Business Associate for the
purposes of HIPAA. It is true that banks and its customers should definitely explore providing
specific Business Associate language in its contract where appropriate.
However, the absence ofsuch language does not mean one is not a Business Associate. One
argument used to support this theory is it is the covered entity who is responsible for insuring its
Business Associates are disclosed and delineated under contract. Therefore, presumably, a Business
Associate cannot be punished under HIPAA for operating as a Business Associate without having
a contract that states one is Business Associate. This should be the covered entity's responsibility
and presumably it would be the covered entity that would suffer any enforcement actions under
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HIPAA. However, HIPAA enforcement is relatively new and should be viewed cautiously.
Additionally, covered entities may have indemnity provisions which make this lack ofpunishment
argument moot. So, while helpful, these tests are simply guidelines. They are not to be used as
defmitive determinations of whether a bank has or has not complied with HIPAA rules and
regulations. Another helpful tool that is attached to these materials is a document entitled Financial
Institutions Acting as Business Associates: SelfAssessment Checklistfor HIPAA Privacyfor Health
Care Customers.
CONCLUSION
As noted above, banks mayor may not be considered Healthcare Clearinghouses under
HIPAA depending on the types ofactivities in which they engage. There has been much discussion
regarding Section 1179 ofthe HIPAA statute as to whether this fully exempts banks from Hfi>AA.
As noted above, this is still being considered by HHS. The National Committee on Vital and Health
Statistics is hearing testimony all this month relating to these issues. The primary issue being
discussed in this testimony is whether or not banks should be completely exempted from HIPAA.
As it stands currently, banks are not completely exempt from HIPAA. Several respected experts
have determined that banks engaged in payment processing as defined byHIPAA are not considered
covered entities under the regulation. However, financial institutions engaged in activities that fall
outside the boundaries ofpayment processing as defined byHlPAA may still be considered covered
entities. This generally relates to any type ofvalue added services that are performed on behalfof
bank's customers. The Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force has developed many ofthe guidelines
discussed above that can be used to help banks determine the appropriate classification of your
organization under the HIPAA regulations. But, it is extremely important to note that at the time of
this writing all ofthe guidelines that have been adapted by the Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force
have not been addressed by HHS. Therefore, they are simply guidance and carry no legal weight in
regards to HIPAA at this time. As noted, that may change based on some of the testimony being
heard currently. Consequently, as it stands currently, a bank must thoroughly review the HIPAA
statutes and regulations to determine whether or not, based on their activities, they could be
considered a Healthcare Clearinghouse (covered entity) or a Business Associates under HIPAA.
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I. Introduction
The banking industry, as represented by NACHA-The Electronic Payments Association, and the
American Bankers Association ("ABA"), supports the goals of the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") to standardize and automate the processing of health
insurance transactions. The banking industry also supports the goals of HIPAA to establish
privacy and security standards that safeguard the confidentiality of protected health information.
In an effort to reduce healthcare costs, HIPAA requires healthcare providers and health plans to
adopt standards for electronic administrative and financial transactions. Use of these standards
could generate billions of dollars in savings for both the government and the private-sector
healthcare industry. The banking industry stands ready to assist the healthcare industry in
meeting this public policy goal by providing Automated Clearing House ("ACH") electronic
payment and remittance data processing and services. The ACH Network is a secure, reliable and
cost-effective method of moving both money and data together through the banking system. The
ACH Network serves more than 12,000 financial institutions, 3.5 million businesses, and 100
million individuals. The ACH Network is used by the Federal Government for all electronic
Social Security and vendor payments and by millions of businesses and individuals for direct
deposit of payroll and corporate trade payments. In 2002 the ACH Network processed nearly 9
billion payments of which more than 160 million were business-to-business payments
accompanied by over 500 million lines of remittance information in standard formats.
Financial institutions have been processing a large and growing number of financial electronic
data interchange ("FEDI") transactions for years, including healthcare payments and related
addenda. Moreover, the banking industry's unique capability to keep "dollars and data together"
- i.e., payment-related infonnation flowing as addenda with the payment entry itself through the
ACH Network - is more efficient than routing the payment through a separate pipeline from the
associated infonnation. This approach is therefore wholly consistent with HIPAA's objective to
reduce costs and simplify administration.
The banking industry has always operated under extensive Federal regulatory oversight and the
ACH Network is governed by rules promulgated by the private sector and adopted by the Federal
Government (e.g., 31CFR210). In addition, the Federal Reserve ACH Operating Circular
recognizes the NACHA Operating Rules for ACH Payments originated by the Federal Reserve
Banks, including all ACH payments initiated by Federal Government agencies.
The banking industry also has a long history of having the strongest protections against
unauthorized access to customer information. In 1997, the banking industry announced a set of
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privacy principles that emphasized the need for fmancial institutions to maintain appropriate
security standards and procedures regarding unauthorized access to customer infonnation.
Financial institutions currently receive detailed guidance from federal and state banking
regulators concerning information technology procedures and are regularly examined in this area
by the regulators. In addition, fmancial institutions have in place today security policies and
procedures developed on a bank-by-bank basis, factoring in the size and structure of each
institution.
More importantly, under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley ("GLB") Act and its implementing
regulations, financial institutions are obliged to protect non-public personal information and this
is roblJstly enforced by banking regulators. GLB included a section that requires the banking
agencies to establish appropriate standards relating to administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards for customer records and infonnation. This was codified as Regulation P in 12 CFR
216 on June 1, 2000. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (the "banking agencies") have each adopted Interagency Guidelines for examining
financial institutions in this area. These agencies regularly examine fmancial institutions for
compliance with all applicable rules and regulations. Interagency guidelines establishing
standards for safeguarding customer information were issued on February 1t 2001.
In order to enable the banking industry to fully understand the mpAA regulations, NACHA and
the ABA created the Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force to review the Act and its regulations.
This White Paper represents the work of NACHA, the ABA and the Banking Industry HIPAA
Task Force. Its purpose is to provide guidance for the banking industry and its customers in the
healthcare industry on the impact of HIPAA requirements on the banking industry. NACHA, the
ABA and the Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force further resolve to:
• Work with the Department of Health and Human Services to resolve questions of
interpretation,
• Conduct an education campaign to infonn the banking industry about the HIPAA legislation
and its applicability to banks, including the security of protected health information,
• Develop tools for banks to monitor and measure compliance,
• Review banking industry standards and rules with regard to HIPAA provisions on an
ongoing basis.
Readers are asked to direct their browsers to www.hipaabanking.org for additional information
on the activities of the Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force and updates on HIPAA.
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ll. Key Issues
The Healthcare Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 is legislation that
specifically regulates "covered entities" in the healthcare industry by setting requirements for
standard transactions, privacy and security. Covered entities in turn are mandated by HIPAA to
require their vendors who qualify as "Business Associates" to meet certain performance
requirements. There are two key questions relating to the impact of HIPAA on the banking
industry addressed by the Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force.
1) Are banks considered Healthcare Clearinghouses and thus covered entities?
2) Are banks considered Business Associates of health plans and providers?
NACHA and the ABA created the Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force ("Task Force") and
engaged knowledgeable industry participants to address these and other related questions.
Conference calls and meetings led the Task Force to a consensus on these issues. The Task Force
produced this White Paper to set forth guidelines for banks and their customers to resolve issues
of HIPAA compliance.
• The Task Force determined that:
The majority of banks are not Healthcare Clearinghouses and not covered entities
under HIPAA as a result of their payment processing services.
A small number of banks are Healthcare Clearinghouses and are covered entities
under HIPAA as a result of services provided in addition to their payment
processing services.
• HIPAA-related Banking Industry Guidelines would assist all banks and their
customers to readily determine covered entity status based upon tests and model
contract language developed by the Task Force.
• The Task Force also determined that:
• Banks providing services to the healthcare industry may often be "Business
Associates" ofhealth plans and providers.
• Banks have a long tradition of protecting confidential fmancial information and
have security practices that meet or exceed many ffiPAA requirements.
• HIPAA-related Banking Industry Guidelines could assist all banks and their
customers to adapt existing service contracts with model contract language
developed by the Task Force.
For those readers who are not familiar with HIPAA, a highlight of the key concepts is presented
below.
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m. Key Concepts
A. Covered Entities
HIPAA defines three classes of "covered entity" organizatioIlS' subject to its regulations: health
plans, healthcare providers, and Healthcare Clearinghouses.
1) "Health Plans" are broadly defmed and include all health insurers, government
payers (such as Medicare), private sector group plan arrangements such as HMOs
and PPOs, employer group plans, and union benefit and welfare plans.
2) "Healthcare Providers" broadly include hospitals, physicians and physician
groups, pharmacists and other suppliers of medical goods and services if they
conduct transactions defmed as standard transactions under HIPAA. I
3) "Healthcare Clearinghouses II are defmed in the statute and regulations as any
public or private entity that either:
"(1) Processes or facilitates the processing of information received
from another entity in a nonstandard format or containing nonstandard
data into standard data elements or a standard transaction [or]
(2) Receives a standard transaction from another entity and processes
or facilitates the processing of information into nonstandard format or
nonstandard data content for a receiving entity.,,2
Comment:
It is the understanding of the Task Force that the regulation's definition of tfH~althcare
Cl~aringhouse"was written specifically to cover value-added data service companies in the
healthcare industry commonly called "clearinghouses", but may also include other companies
that offer similar services. The application ofthe definition to payment processing activities will
be clarified in Section IV A, "When is a Bank a IHealthcare Clearinghouse I under HIPAA?"
1 Covered entity means... A health care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form
in connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter. II [Federal Register: August 17, 2000
(Volume 65, Number 160)] page 50365
2 [Federal Register: August 17,2000 (Volume 65, Number 160)] page 50366
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B. Standard Transactions, Privacy and Security Requirements
The HIPAA Administrative Simplification statutes (42 U.S.C. Sees. 1320d - 1320d-8) authorized
the Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS") to publish an integrated set of
regulations for transactional, security and privacy practices to be applied to covered entities. The
regulations are intended to promote greater efficiency and patient confidentiality within the
healthcare industry. DHHS issued fmal rules for transactions in August of 2000, privacy in
April of 2001, and security in March, 2003.
The core requirements of the rules are as follows:
Transactions
• Eight mandated transaction standards including a healthcare claim and two payment
transactions must be conducted in compliance with the Implementation Guidelines
specified by DHHS, if done ele_ctronically by covered entities after the implementation
deadline. The deadline was October 16, 2002 but covered entities that filed a compliance
extension plan with DHHS by that date received an extension until October 16, 2003.
• Health plans and healthcare providers can outsource their standardization issues to a
Healthcare Clearinghouse, if they do not wish to take on the internal responsibility for
confonning to the standard formats. The rule mandating standard formats has an
exception for plans and providers who send non-standardized electronic transactions to a
Healthcare Clearinghouse that translates the transactions into the standard format and
forwards them on its customers' behalf.
Privacy
• Health plans and healthcare providers are required to comply with the HIPAA privacy
rules by the implementation deadline for those rules (April 2003). These rules include:
o Requirements for the confidentiality and management of protected individually-
identifiable patient data, called Protected Health Information ("PHI"),
o Mandated disclosure to patients about the uses and disclosures of their data,
o Procedures for obtaining, recording and confonning to patient consents to use or
disclose that data,
o Administrative procedures for management and training to support these
functions, and,
o Detailed requirements that vendors (which may include financial institutions),
called "Business Associates", who receive and use that data, provide contractual
assurances that they also will maintain the confidentiality of the data and comply
with the applicable restrictions.
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Healthcare Clearinghouses are required to conform to a subset of those rules when acting
as Business Associates for health plans or healthcare providers, and to all of the rules
when processing protected health infonnation on their own account.
Comment:
Regardless of whether a bank is considered a uclearinghouse H, many bank customers
will determine that their banks are vendors subject to the IIBusiness Associate"
requirements ofHIPAA 's privacy and security rules. This will be clarified in Section IV
B, uWhen is a Bank a 'Business Associate' under HIPAA? "
Security
• Covered entities are required to comply with the HIPAA security rules by the
implementation deadline for those rules (April 21, 2005). The security rules require that
each covered entity must:
o Ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic PHI.
o Protect against any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security or
integrity.
o Protect against any non-pennitted disclosures.
o Ensure compliance by its workforce.
Comment:
For additional information created by the HIPAA Banking Task Force on the Security
Regulation see HIPAAbanking.org/XXXXX
IV. Banking Industry Issues under HIPAA
The extent to which banks are impacted by HIPAA will depend upon the answers to the
following questions:
A) When is a bank a "Healthcare Clearinghouse" under HIPAA? and,
B) When is a bank a "Business Associate" under HIPAA?
These are not mutually exclusive findings as most Healthcare Clearinghouses are also
Business Associates.
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A. When is a Bank a "Healthcare Clearinghouse" under HIPAA?
Introduction
Background on Healthcare Clearinghouses
Healthcare Clearinghouses can have either healthcare providers or health plans or both as
customers. Those serving providers often capture a print image of a paper claim fann at the
provider site, edit the claim data for errors or required codes, and reformat the claim to meet the
unique data layout requirements of various health plans. Health plan-oriented clearinghouses
provide claims receipt services for health plans, which may delegate the entire task of trading
partner acquisition and testing to their clearinghouses for a fee. Clearinghouses can serve both
the health plan and provider markets. This is the type of company that clearly was at the
forefront of DHHS's intent when the statute's definition of "Healthcare Clearinghouse" was
drafted.
Background on the Banking Industry 's Automated Clearinghouse Network
Banks commonly use the tenn "clearinghouse" to refer to a facility for the exchange of payment
information. There are local and regional check clearinghouses in which paper checks are
exchanged and settled in accordance with rules developed by the members. Perhaps better
known and more important in this context is the Automated Clearing House ("ACH"), a network
for the exchange of payment and related remittance infonnation that operates under a Wlifonn set
of roles developed and administered by NACHA on behalf of more than 12,000 fmancial
institutions and the Federal Reserve. Despite the similarity in their names, the business function
of the ACH is completely distinct from that of a Healthcare Clearinghouse. An ACH does not
itself take responsibility for any data conversion. The processing of payment files by NACHA
member banks is more focused on routing standard files to effect payment rather than
transforming or reformatting files as a service. The routine processing of NACHA files by
member banks may require some editing to ensure that the message is routed correctly but these
routine payment functions are clearly different (and substantially less expensive) than the
services provided by Healthcare Clearinghouses.
NACHA, the ABA and the HIPAA Banking Industry Task Force believe that no bank is a
clearinghouse under HIPAA by mere origination or receipt of an ACH transaction for relevant
HIPAA standard transactions (premium and claim payments). Although banks may originate or
receive HIPAA standard transactions such as the Healthcare Claim Payment (835) and Premium
Payment (820), they will often pass the related remittance data without any responsibility for
conversion or refonnatting of the X12 message contained in the NACHA CTX "envelope".
Although the messages might be HIPAA standard transactions, the bank may provide only
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transport and payment functions. These are the customary services purchased from banks by
companies in many industries including healthcare.
Background on Additional Banking Services
A small number of banks may provide additional services for their healthcare customers. Some
health plans and providers may pay banks to provide additional support services by translating or
editing files to meet the criteria specified in the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines. Banks will
be clearinghouses when they choose to provide services that translate files from non-standard to
HIPAA-compliant standard fannats as requested by customers. Other banks provide "lockbox"
services where the bank picks up checks and remittance advices directly from the postal service,
deposits the checks and performs some scanning, photocopying and key entry of remittance data.
This infonnation may be transmitted electronically in a variety of fonnats to the customer but
this data capture service is not a clearinghouse operation because there is no conversion from an
incoming electronic format.
Comment:
Most payment services provided by banks do not classify a bank as a Healthcare Clearinghouse
regulated by HIPAA. There is, in fact, a specific exclusion in the regulation for payment
activities.
"Finally, Section 1179 of the Act makes the above provisions inapplicable to financial institutions or anyone acting on
behalf of a financial institution when I 'authorizing, processing, clearing, settling, billing, transferring, reconciling, or
collecting payments for a financial institution. 03 Additional information about the scope of the 1179 exemption can be
found at http://www.hipaabanking.orglhea/thcare.html
However, some banks may choose to perform specific value-added data translation services, (see
page 11) either bundled with or separate from ACH services, that qualify the bank as a HIPAA
"Healthcare Clearinghouse IJ. This White Paper provides guidelines for readers regarding
when a bank is or is not a clearinghouse under HIPAA.
The Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force developed a specific test to determine when banks are
or are not considered as Healthcare Clearinghouses under HIPAA. The proposed guidelines for
Bank Clearinghouse Status Determination below will allow the reader to determine under what
circumstances banks are required to be HIPAA-compliant as a Healthcare Clearinghouse and
will indicate what services are ltspecific value-added" and uclearinghouse-like activities"
contrasted with routine payment processing exempted under section 1179.
3 [Federal Register: August 17, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 160)] [Rules and Regulations]
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Proposed Guidelines for Bank Healthcare Clearinghouse Status Determination
The purpose of the proposed guidelines for bank Healthcare Clearinghouse status determination
is to provide a clear presentation of the banking industry's position on its Healthcare
Clearinghouse status under HIPAA. A specific test must be applied to detennine if a bank is or is
not a Healthcare Clearinghouse. The test is based upon services provided and should be
documented by contractual agreements between banks and their customers.
The following explanation of the guidelines is dJvided into two sections:
o The Bank Is a Healthcare Clearinghouse and,
o The Bank Is Not a Healthcare Clearinghouse.
Within each section, the reader will fmd:
I. A general description of the banking functionality related to the section and,
2. Specific case studies illustrating real life situations and detenninations of Healthcare
Clearinghouse status based on the facts presented in the case study.
Basic Tests
The test question for a bank to be classified as a Healthcare Clearinghouse or not is: "Is the bank
editing or refonnatting data against the specifications of the HIPAA Implementation
Guidelines?"
If the answer is "YES" than the bank is a Healthcare Clearinghouse.
Other edits or reformatting tasks performed by financial institutions against X12 and NACHA
requirements are part of routine payment processing.
Today most contracts between banks and their customers do not have language that specifies
whether the bank is defmed as a Healthcare Clearinghouse. The Task Force recommends that
contracts between banks and their customers have standard clauses that clearly state that the bank
is or is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse under HIPAA.
The test question can be applied to many different scenarios and allow for a clear delineation
between routine payment processing and Healthcare Clearinghouse services.
The Bank Is a Healthcare Clearinghouse
I. Originating Depository Financial Institutions ("ODFIs") that contract with "covered entity"
customers to convert any of the HIPAA mandated transactions in proprietary data fonnats to
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HIPAA-compliant standard formats are clearinghouses under the HIPAA regulations if the
following condition applies:
a) The bank is editing or reformatting files for its customers using the HIPAA
Implementation Guidelines as the source ofedits.
2. Receiving Depository Financial Institutions ("RDFIs") that contract with "covered entities"
to convert HIPAA-compliant standard transactions received to non-HIPAA-compliant
formats required by the customer are Healthcare Clearinghouses if the following condition
applies:
a) The bank is editing or reformatting files for its customers using the HIPAA
Implementation Guidelines as the source of edits.
Test Cases
The following Healthcare Clearinghouse Determination Test Cases are appropriate to illustrate
application of the above test question and present typical payment processing routines and value-
added services that would classify the bank as a Healthcare Clearinghouse and a covered entity
under IDPAA. The cases are presented in two groups based on services for either outgoing
(GDFI) or incoming (RDFI) payments.
Originating Depository Financial Institution
Case One
• A Health Plan sends a proprietary flat file with healthcare claim payments and the ODFI
reformats the data into the X12 835 standard and further manipulates the data to create a
properly formatted CTX (NACHA format). The properly formatted NACHA file is then
submitted to the ACH Network for processing. The Bank has contracted with its customer to
provide a HIPAA-compliant transaction as determined by the HIPAA Implementation
Guidelines.
Edits or Reformatting
o Edits applied: HIPAA Implementation Guidelines, X12 and NACHA
o Reformatting: Proprietary to X12 and to NACHA
Determination: The Bank i! a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is reformatting and
editing the data against the requirements of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
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Receiving Depository Financial Institution
Case Two
• An RDFI receives multiple NACHA files via the ACH Network. These CTX files are bound
for the same provider Payee. The RDFI merges the properly formatted CTX files into a
consolidated file to send to the intended provider. The RDFI also received 835 files from
Value Added Networks that are to be re-associated with payment data sent separately. The
resulting, merged transactions are then sent to the receiver in an 835 fonnat. The provider has
asked the bank to edit the incoming 835 files against the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines
and to manage the receipt or rejection processing of the 835 data in addition to performing
payment processing services.
Edits or Reformatting
o Edits applied: NACHA, X12 and HIPAA Implementation Guidelines
o Reformatting: NACHA to X12
Determination: Bank is a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is reformatting and
editing the data against the requirements of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
The Bank Is Not a Healthcare Clearinghouse
The banking industry has been providing payment processing services for decades and has
significant regulations and responsibilities for standards-based payment processing. Banks
provide occasional file editing and reformatting functionalities in the routine course of payment
processing. It is proposed that DHHS recognize that such traditional payment services between
banks and their healthcare customers do not constitute Healthcare Clearinghouse activities. If the
customer does not want to require its bank to perfonn HIPAA Implementation Guidelines
compliance checking against incoming or outgoing payment files it would be inappropriate to
classify the bank as a Healthcare Clearinghouse for its completion of routine payment services
provided to customers in all other industries.
Originating Depository Financial Institution
1. ODFls whose customers ask them to originate payments with banking industry standard
editing and reformatting functionalities are not Healthcare Clearinghouses under HIPAA.
These banks are contractually obligated to effect payment and move remittance data and are
not contractually responsible for editing or reformatting payment data against the HIPAA
Implementation Guidelines.
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a) ODFIs can accept NACHA files from customers, with or without IllPAA-compliant
remittance data enclosed, without being defined as a Healthcare Clearinghouse.
b) Reformatting from X12 to NACHA or from a proprietary fonnat to NACHA for
payment processing does not constitute Healthcare Clearinghouse activity.
c) Editing and supplementing payment data for completeness against X12 and NACHA
standards alone does not constitute Healthcare Clearinghouse activity.
Receiving Depository Financial Institution
1. RDFls that merely receive payments in any NACHA format and route any data to customers
based on a variety of routing instructions are not Healthcare Clearinghouses under HIPAA.
a) RDFIs can accept NACHA files, with or without HIPAA-compliant remittance data
enclosed, without being a Healthcare Clearinghouse.
b) Reformatting from NACHA files to X12, BAI or proprietary formats and routing of
remittance data to customers does not constitute Healthcare Clearinghouse activity.
c) Editing and supplementing data for completeness against X12 and NACHA standards
alone does not constitute Healthcare Clearinghouse activity.
Test Cases
The following Test Cases illustrate typical payment processing routines that would not classify
the bank as a Healthcare Clearinghouse and a covered entity under HIPAA. The cases are
presented in two groups based on services for either outgoing (ODFI) or incoming (RDFI)
payments.
Originating Depository Financial Institution
Case Three
• A health plan sends a properly formatted ,CTX (NACHA format) to its ODFI containing a
Healthcare Claim Payment/Advice (835) transaction, and the ODFI submits the transaction to
the ACH Network.
Edits or Reformatting
o Edits applied: NACHA
o Refonnatting: None
Determination: Bank is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is not reformatting
and editing the data against the requirements of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
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Case Four
• A health plan sends a properly fonnatted Healthcare Claim Payment/Advice (835)
transaction to the ODFI, and the GDFI places the properly fonnatted 835 into the CTX
(NACHA format) and submits the transaction to the ACH Network.
Edits or Reformatting
o Edits applied: X12
o Refonnatting: X12 to NACHA
Determination: Bank is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is not reformatting
and editing the data against the requirements of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
Receiving Depository Financial Institution
Case Five
• An RDFI receives a properly formatted CTX (NACHA format) via the ACH Network. That
NACHA file is then passed on to the provider receiver (payee).
Edits or Reformatting
o Edits applied: NACHA
o Reformatting: None
Determination: Bank is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is not reformatting
and editing the data against the requirements of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
Case Six
• An RDFI receives a properly formatted CTX (NACHA format) via the ACH Network and
extracts the 820 or 835 from that CTX file. That 820 or 835 is then passed on to the provider
receiver (payee).
Edits or Reformatting
o Edits applied: NACHA and X12
o Refonnatting: NACHA to X12
Determination: Bank is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is not reformatting
and editing the data against the requirements of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
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Case Seven
• An RDFI receives a properly fonnatted CTX (NACHA fonnat) via the ACH Network.
Pertinent data in the CTX file is then passed on to the provider receiver (payee) via Human
Readable Methodology.
Comment: Human Readable Methodology includes, but is not limited to, FAX, E
Mail, Print Advice, Bank Statement, Information Reporting Terminal or Software
(whether suppHed by the Financial Institution or not). This Human Readable
~ethodology might also include pre-formatted - Internet based and other future
t~thnologies. Banks and their customers must establish HIPAA-compliant secure
communications for the dissemination ofany human readable information.
Edits or Reformatting
o Edits applied: NACHA and X12
o Refonnatting: NACHA to X12 to Human Readable
Determination: Bank is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is not reformatting
and editing the data against the requirements of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
Financial Institutions are required by ACH Network rules4 promulgated by NACHA to
forward payment related information to receivers upon request. This is, therefore, a normal
(and required) function of the payment network. Banks and their customers must establish
HIPAA-compliant secure communications for the dissemination of this human readable
information.
Case Eight
• Paper Healthcare Claim Payment data in the fonn of Explanation of Benefit/Remittance
Advices statements sent from a health plan to a provider are keyed in a Lockbox processing
area within the Bank and sent electronically in a BAI or X12 format to the provider receiver
(payee). Images of the items received in the lockbox are also sent to the payee, or otherwise
made available upon request.
Edits or Reformatting
4 NACHA ACH Network Operating Rules - Article Four, Subsection 4.4.3 - Provision of Payments-Related
Information to Receiver.
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o Edits applied: None
o Reformatting: Not applicable as paper is not an electronic format whose data can be
"refonnatted". Similarly, the creation of images of paper transactions is not a
"refonnatting" of data.
Determination: Bank is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is not refonnatting
and editing the data against the requirements of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
Case Nine
• An RDFI receives a properly formatted CTX (NACHA format) via the ACH Network. Paper
transactions keyed in at Lockbox Processing Operations at the bank are then merged with
820 or 835 data. The resulting 820 or 835 is then transmitted to the receiver (payee).
Edits or Reformatting
o Edits applied: NACHA or X12 to CTX transmission, none to Lockbox Data
o Refonnatting: NACHA to X12
Determination: Bank is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is not refonnatting
and editing the data against the requirements of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
Financial Institutions, as a normal course of business, receive payments via various
methodologies (ACH, Wire, Check, et a1) and must report on these payments in a manner
consistent with the capabilities of the receiver's (payee's) accounts receivable system(s).
Banks routinely merge data files and forward a "consolidated" file to the receiver to
streamline and simplify the reconciliation process. The customer in this example is not
requesting the bank to edit or refonnat incoming data against HIPAA Implementation
Guidelines.
Case Ten
• An RDFI receives a NACHA fonnatted file (CCD or CCD+) via the ACH network. The
RDFI receives an 820 or 835 from an external network or third party healthcare provider for
re-association purposes. The resulting, re-associated transactions are then sent to the receiver
(payee) in an 820 or an 835 format.
Edits or Reformatting
o Edits applied: NACHA or X12
o Reformatting: NACHA to X12
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Determination: Bank is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse because it is not refonnatting
and editing the data against the requirements of the HIPAA Implementation Guidelines.
Financial Institutions, as a normal course of business, receive payments and payment
related information from multiple sources. Banks routinely re-associate payments
received from the ACH Network with payment related infonnation received from a third
party network or service provider and merge these data files for reconciliation purposes.
This merged file is then sent to the Receiver. The customer in this example is not paying
for the bank to edit or supplement incoming data against HIPAA Implementation
Guidelines.
Based on the answers to the Basic Test and Test Case evaluations presented in Section A, the
reader will be able to detennine if the bank is or is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse. The reader
should now address the second question "When is a bank a 'Business Associate' under HIPAA?"
to determine to what extent a bank is impacted by HIPAA in this regard.
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B. When is a Bank a "Business Associate" under HIPAA?
Introduction
Background on Business Associates
The Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force identified a need to clarify the application of the
Business Associate relationship to banking services. It is recognized that banks may be deemed
"Business Associates" of HIPAA covered entities such as health plans and providers when the
banks process payment transactions/remittance data containing PHI. Health plan and provider
customers will therefore seek to revise existing bank contracts to incorporate applicable HIPAA
Privacy and Security requirements for banks as Business Associates. To assist the banking
industry, the Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force has developed, with the assistance of several
financial institution attorneys, a banking industry version of Model Business Associate Contract
provisions available at http://www.hipaabanking.org/bus_contract.html
Background on the HIPAA Privacy Rule
The HIPAA Privacy Rule requires health plans and providers to enter into "Business Associate
contracts" with their vendors and service providers who use, disclose, or store protected health
information, regardless of whether those third parties are "Healthcare Clearinghouses. tI
Healthcare Clearinghouses are Business Associates of providers or health plan customers under
the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Under the Privacy Rule, in most situations, there are no additional
requirements for Healthcare Clearinghouses other than those applicable to other Business
Associates. Protected health infonnation broadly covers patient medical data and can include
payment remittance data. Demographic data about patients such as name and address, or patient
IDs will be deemed "protected" if associated or associatable with a provider name, treatment or
product description, or other data from which medical facts about the patient may be inferred.
The Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force developed a specific test to determine when banks are
or are not considered Business Associates under HIPAA. The proposed guidelines for Bank
Business Associate Status Determination below will allow the reader to determine under what
circumstances banks are Business Associates or are not Business Associates.
Proposed Guidelines for Bank Business Associate Status Determination
The purpose of the proposed guidelines for bank Business Associate status determination is to
provide a clear presentation of the banking industry's position on its Business Associate status
under HIPAA. Two questions must be answered to determine if a bank is or is not a Business
Associate.
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The following explanation of the guidelines is divided into two sections:
o The Bank Is a Business Associate and,
o The Bank Is Not a Business Associate
Within each section, the reader will find specific case studies illustrating real life situations and
detenninations of Business Associate status based on the facts presented in the case study.
Basic Test
Today most contracts between banks and their customers do not have language that specifies
whether the bank is defined as a Business Associate. It is recommended that contracts between
banks and their customers have standard clauses that clearly state that the bank is or is not a
Business Associate under HIPAA. It is the responsibility of the covered entity to negotiate a
Business Associate agreement with its bank.
The test questions for Business Associate determination will be the following:
"Does the bank have access to PHI and does its customer have a contractual agreement that
defines the bank as a Business Associate?"
If the answer to the test question is "YES" to both these questions than the bank is a Business
Associate.
These test question can be applied to many different scenarios and allow for a clear delineation
of when a bank is a Business Associate,
The Bank Is a Business Associate
The following text is taken from the HIPAA Privacy Rule and it provides a defInition of the
Business Associate.
45 CFR Sec. 160.103
"a person who ...
• ,.. Performs [for a covered entity], or assists [a covered entity] in the performance of ... a
function or activity involving the use or disclosure of individually identifiable health
infonnation, including claims processing or administration, data analysis, processing or
administration, utilization review, quality assurance, billing, benefit management,
practice management, and repricing; or
• Any other function ... regulated by this subchapter; or
• provides .,. legal, actuarial, accounting, consulting, data aggregation ... management,
administrative, accreditation, or financial services ,., to [a] covered entity, ... [that ]
involves the disclosure [of] individually identifiable health infonnation ...
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Test Cases
The following Business Associate Determination Test Cases are appropriate to illustrate
application of the above test question and present typical banking services and contractual
relationships that would classify the bank as a Business Associate under HIPAA.
Case Eleven
• A Health Plan sends a proprietary flat file with healthcare claim payments and the ODFI
refonnats the data into the X12 835 standard and further manipulates the data to create a
properly formatted CTX (NACHA format). The properly fonnatted NACHA file is then
submitted to the ACH Network for processing. The Bank has contracted with its customer to
provide a HIPAA-compliant transaction as detennined by the HIPAA Implementation
Guidelines. The contract between the Bank and its customer indicates that the Bank is a
Business Associate. The bank has access to Protected Health Infonnation because of the PHI
contained in the 835 HIPAA Standard Transaction sent by the health plan to the bank.
Contractual Requirement
o Contractual Requirement for Business Associate' Determination: Corporate Service
Contract states that the bank is a Business Associate.
Access to PHI
o The bank has access to PHI
Determination: The Bank is a Business Associate because the answers to the test
questions are positive. The contract between the bank and its customer does specify that
the bank is a Business Associate, and theBank does have access to PHI. As mentioned
earlier, clearinghouses are also Business Associates and in this example the bank is both
a clearinghouse and a Business Associate. Case eleven and case one are the same in order
to clearly illustrate that a clearinghouse is a Business Associate.
Case Twelve
• An RDFI receives multiple NACHA files via the ACH network. These CTX files are bound
for the same Provider Payee. The RDFI merges the properly fonnatted CTX files into a
consolidated file to send to the customer. The RDFI also received 835 files from Value
Added Networks that are to be re-associated with payment data sent separately. The
resulting, merged transactions are then sent to the Receiver in an 835 fonnat. The customer
has asked the bank to edit the incoming 835 files against the HIPAA Implementation
Guidelines and to manage the receipt or rejection processing of the 835 data in addition to
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performing payment-processing services. The contract between the Bank and its customer
indicates that the Bank is a Business Associate when the Bank has access to Protected Health
Infonnation through the data contained in the 835 HIPAA Standard Transaction.
Contractual Requirement
o Contractual Requirement for Business Associate Determination: Corporate Service
Contract states that the bank is a Business Associate.
Access to pm
o The bank has access to PHI
Determination: The Bank is a Business Associate because the answers to the test
questions are positive. The contract between the bank and its customer does specify that
the bank is a Business Associate. As mentioned earlier, clearinghouses are also Business
Associates and in this example the bank is both a clearinghouse and a Business
Associate. Case twelve and case two are the same in order to clearly illustrate that a
clearinghouse is a Business Associate.
Case Thirteen
• A health plan sends a properly formatted CTX (NACHA fonnat) containing a Healthcare
Claim Payment!Advice (835) transaction and the ODFI passes on the received NACHA file
to the ACH Network. The contract between the Bank and its customer indicates that the Bank
is a Business Associate. The bank has access to Protected Health Information because of the
PHI contained in the 835 HIPAA Standard Transactions sent by the health plan to the bank.
Contractual Requirements
o Contractual Requirement for Business Associate Determination: Corporate Service
Contract states that the bank is a Business Associate.
Access to PHI
o The bank has access to PHI
Determination: The Bank is a Business Associate because the answers to the test
questions are positive. The contract between the bank and its customers does specify that
the bank is a Business Associate. The Bank has access to PHI. Unlike the two prior
examples the bank is not a Healthcare Clearinghouse because data translation and
validation against the HIPAA Implementation Guide have not occurred. Case thirteen and
case three are the sa,me in order to clearly illustrate a circumstance where the bank is not
a clearinghouse and is a Business Associate.
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Case Fourteen
• Paper Healthcare Claim Payment data in the fonn of Explanation of BenefitIRemittance
Advice statements sent from a health plan to a provider are keyed in a Lockbox processing
area within the Bank and sent electronically in a BAI or X12 format to the provider receiver
(payee). Images of the items received in the lockbox are also sent to the payee. The contract
between the Bank and its customer indicates that the Bank is a Business Associate. The bank
has access to Protected Health Information because of the PHI contained in the 835 HIPAA
Standard Transactions and the PHI contained in paper Explanation of Benefit/Remittance
Advice statements.
Contractual Requirement
o Contractual Requirement for Business Associate Determination: Corporate Service
Contract states that the bank is a Business Associate.
Access to PHI
o The bank has access to PHI
Determination: The Bank is a Business Associate because the answers to the test
questions are positive. The contract between the bank and its customers does specify that
the bank is a Business Associate. The Bank has access to PHI. In this example the bank is
not a Healthcare Clearinghouse because data translation and validation against the
HIPAA Implementation Guide have not occurred. Case fourteen and case eight are the
same in order to clearly illustrate a circumstance where the bank is not a clearinghouse
and is a Business Associate.
The Bank Is Not a Business Associate
Test Cases
The following Business Associate Determination Test Cases are appropriate to illustrate
application of the test question and present typical banking services that would not classify the
bank as a Business Associate under HIPAA.
Case Fifteen
• A health plan uses a bank for a variety of services specifically:
• Trust Safekeeping and custody of investment securities
• Investment Services (Advice and trade executions)
• Payroll processing
July, 2003
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The contract between the Bank and its health plan customer indicates that the Bank is not a
Business Associate. The bank has no access to Protected Health Information.
Contractual Requirement
o Contractual Requirement for Business Associate Determination: The Corporate
Service Contract between the bank and its customer has no specification that the bank
is a Business Associate.
Access to PHI
o The Bank does not have access to PHI
Determination: The Bank is not a Business Associate because the answers to the test
questions are negative. The contract between the bank and its customers does not specify
that the bank is a Business Associate. The Bank has no access to PHI.
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About the ABA
The American Bankers Association ("ABA") is a not-for-profit trade association that brings
together all categories of banking institutions to best represent the interests of this rapidly
changing industry. Its membership - which includes community, regional, and money center
banks and bank holding companies, as well as savings associations, trust companies and savings
banks - makes ABA the largest banking trade association in the country.
AboutNACHA
NACHA - The Electronic Payments Association is the leading organization in developing
electronic solutions to improve the payments system. NACHA is a not for profit association that
represents more than 12,000 fmancial institutions through direct memberships and a network of
regional payments associations, and 650 organizations through its industry councils. NACHA
develops operating rules and business practices for the Automated Clearing House ("ACH")
Network and for electronic payments in the areas of Internet commerce, electronic bill and
invoice presentment and payment (EBPP, EIPP), e-checks, fmancial electronic data interchange
("EDI"), international payments, and electronic benefits transfer ("EBT").
Background on the NACHAIABA Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force
The Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force was created by NACHA and the ABA. Together, the
ABA and NACHA--The Electronic Payments Association, represent all payment processing
fmancial institutions that' may process HIPAA claim and premium payment transactions.
Recognizing the need for industry consensus and leadership on HIPAA the ABA and NACHA
assembled an expert panel and created The Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force.
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AboutMMI
The Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force enlisted the services of McLure-Moynihan, Inc,
("MMI") a Healthcare EDI and HIPAA consulting and services fmn, to facilitate meetings on
the impact of HIPAA on the Banking Industry and to write the White Paper on HIPAA Related
Issues affecting the Banking Industry. Marcia McLure Ph.D, Jamie Clark JD and John Matthews
CCM, MBA ofMMI made significant contributions to the development of the paper.
James Moynihan, MBA, of MMI was the primary participant from MMI within the Banking
Industry HIPAA Task Force and the principle author of the White Paper. Prior to founding MMI,
Mr. Moynihan was a banker for 15 years with Irving Trust Company and First Chicago. Mr.
Moynihan is one of the founding members of ANSI ASC X12N and was one of the first Co-
chairs of the Payments Work Group that created the ASC X12 835 Healthcare Claim
Payment!Advice, which is one of the two Standard Transaction for payment under HIPAA.
McLure-Moynihan, Inc. has implemented both of the HIPAA mandated standard payment
transactions and brought practical experiences to bear in the preparation of this White Paper.
Mr. Moynihan has written and lectured widely on HIPAA and its requirements.
Marcia L. McLure Ph.D. is a Principal and Senior Consultant at MMI. Dr. McLure is a
member of ANSI ASC X12 and was Co-Chair of the X12N Healthcare Transactions Steering
Work Group from 1993 to 1996. During that time, the X12N subcommittee developed several
Type Two X12 documents that are still valuable today, including "ED! Transactions: A Business
Primer" and "The Healthcare Industry Transaction Blueprint", a messaging model for the
Healthcare industry for all X12 transactions. Dr. McLure also co-chaired the Medical Stop Loss
Work Group from 1996 to 1998. She also served as co-chair of the X12N Medical Stop Loss
Work Group and is currently serving on the ebXML Initiative that is working on the evolution of
international Internet and technologies. Dr. McLure was the Team Lead for the Business
Process Project Team and Delivery Team within the Electronic Business XML (ebXML) project
and a member of the ebXML Steering Committee.
Dr. McLure earned her Ph.D. from UCLA. Her specialty area is Research Methods and
Evaluation ("RME") with a cognate in Business Management and Policy from the UCLA
Anderson School of Management
Jamie Clark JD is Vice President and the General Counsel of MMI. Mr. Clark is the current
chairman of the Electronic Commerce Subcommittee of the American Bar Association's
Business Law Section, and co-chair of the health information task force of its Privacy
Subcommittee. He is a co-author of the recently-released open business process standards
documents for the international Electronic Business XML ("ebXML ") joint project of
UN/CEFACT and OASIS. He is also a member of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL ") expert panel on Electronic Commerce.
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He is a frequent speaker on infonnation use confidentiality and security standards, HIPAA
implementation, electronic signatures and automated contracting.
He received a B.S. degree in 1980 from the University College, University of Minnesota, and a
J.D. degree cum laude in 1988, from the University of Minnesota Law School. He joined .. )
Sheannan & Sterling on Wall Street upon graduation and practiced as a corporate lawyer
handling complex fmancial transactions in New York and Los Angeles. Prior to joining MMI,
he was a partner in the corporate practice of a small law frrm in Los Angeles, primarily
responsible for acquisitions, supply chain contracts and software transactions.
John Matthews is Vice President of Technology for MMI. Mr. Matthews and was the Co-chair
of the Insurance Subcommittee from 1990 to 1993 He is the former representative of the ANSI
ASe X12 organization to HISPP, the Healthcare Infonnation Systems Planning Panel, a body
that is coordinating the development of clinical and financial EDI standards across such
organizations as ACR-NEMA, IEEE, NCPDP, HL7 and others.
Prior to joining MMI in 1994, Mr. Matthews was a vice president and project manager for
Mellon Bank. His project management responsibilities for the bank included the multi-million
dollar Global Cash Management Office Automation Project, installing a LAN for over 400 in-
house users, and the development of a variety of software-based cash management products. He
was also responsible for implementing secure remote access capabilities. In that role Mr.
Matthews also worked to evaluate new technologies to determine their effectiveness,
appropriateness and feasibility in a financial transactions environment.
Mr. Matthews earned his B.A. degree in Economics and his M.B.A from the University of
Pittsburgh. He is also a Certified Cash Manager ("CCM").
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HIPAA Medica! Banking
Hceo HIPAA Conformance
Certification Organization
HIPAA Accreditation and Certification Services
Page I ot 1
HIPAA Medical Banking
HCCO offers healthcare covered entities, financial
institutions and their business partners a specific HIPAA
Medical Banking Certification. This industry leading
certification is focused solely on the capability of institutions
to properly handle the 835 and 820 HIPAA transaction sets.
HeeD has created very specific test conditions to evaluate
the HIPAA readiness of healthcare organizations in dealing
with the financial aspects of HIPAA. The HceD Medical
Banking Certification is designed for aU inbound and
outbound aspects of HIPAA testing for covered entities,
financial institutions and their business partners.
The Medical Banking Certification is built upon HCCQ's
industry best CCAP testing methodology which used by over
80% of healthcare EDI translation and EDI validation
technology. This ensures transaction interoperability among
most of the industry leading payers, providers and
clearinghouses. The Medical Banking Program provides
unlimited online testing using the HCeO HIPAA testing
engine, monthly test files and expected results, compliance
issue resolution and HCCQ Medical Banking Certification for
all participants.
Download an Overview to the CCAP Methodology
Sign up today and take part in the most innovative and
fastest growing HIPAA compliance program for healthcare.
For additional information on how HeCD's Medical Banking
Certification will enable your organizationls financial goals,
please contact admin@hcco"us.
To pay by credit card for the Medical Banking Certification
Program, click the button below.
Hceo Medical Banking Test Files and
Certification $295.00
18 HCCQ's testing program uses
all facets of testing, from test
files to test plans to expected
results. No other certifier uses
this combined methodology.
18 Keep current on EDI
validation issues
It] Stay in synch with the
nationIS leading EDI Translators
and Validators
l!1The Medical Banking program
includes thousands of HIPAA
test conditions
Privacy Policy I Contact Us
[ tlIM.A T~.tf.J.J.§] [ HIP..t\-A EDI...I.egJn9.] [ HIPAA Medical Banking]
[ HIPAA Privacy] [ ebXML Interoperabjlity ] [ HCCQ Leadership]
[ HeeD Com mlttees ] [ HeeD Accreditation] [ HeeD Certifications]
( .tte.CO Affillate-PJ.QQf9JJ1] [ jj~QD.S.Q.r.s.] [ .tlC;c..Q...~.e.Ws. ]
1225 W Main St. SUite 101-202, Mesa, AZ. 85201
webmaster@hccQ.us
Copyright © 2002, 2003, 2004 HCCO, Inc.
http://www.hcco.us/medicalban... 1-69 2/20/04
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HIPAA-Application to the Banking Industry
The Health InsuralJ-ce Portability and Accountability Act of1996 (HIPAA) is intended,
among other things, to improve portability of health insurance coverage, to protect the
privacy of individual health information, and to simplify and improve the efficiency of
administering health insurance. HIPAA defines and regulates "covered entities" that
may be healthcare providers or healthcare plans, healthcare clearinghouses, or business
associates (third-party vendors used by covered entities).
To understand HIPAA's impact on financial institutions, the American Bankers
Association (ABA) and NACHA-The Electronic Payments Association created the
Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force (Task Force) and engaged knowledgeable industry
participants to review HIPAA and accurately interpret its coverage and related financial
institution responsibilities.
HIPAA's IMPACT ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
HIPAA may impact financial institutions in two ways.
First, HIPAA sets transaction standards for the electronic processing ofhealthcare
claims and payments. At this point, it is unclear whether payment processing activities
related to health care that use these standards would make financial institutions "covered
entities" subject to HIPM.
Second, HIPAA establishes requirements for the privacy of personally identifiable
"protected health information" (PHI) and security policies for the storage and
transmission of that information. Financial institutions that process PHI for their
customers that are covered entities may be "business associates" subject to the privacy
and security provisions of HIPAA. These HIPAA requirements may conflict with
federal banking law.
ABA and NACHA are cooperating to obtain critical clarification of these issues from the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the agency that implements and
enforces HIPAA. I
Needfor immediate action. HIPAA requires that all covered entities be in compliance
with its provisions effective October 16, 2002, a mere three months from now. However,
it is very likely that HHS will not make its determination as to whether payment
1 The Task Force has produced a White Paper to set forth guidelines for financial institutions and their customers to
resolve issues ofHIPAA compliance. The text of the White Paper on HIPAA Related Issues Affecting the Banking
Industry can be found on the Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force web page: www.hipaabanking.org.
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processing activities make financial institutions "covered entities" until after that
deadline. HHS will extend that deadline for one year, until October 16, 2003, for
institutions that file an extension letter with the agency by October 16, 2002. The
extension letter states that if the institution is deemed to be a covered entity, it will be in
compliance by October 16, 2003.
The Task Force has drafted a model letter, available at www.hipaabanking.org. that
financial institutions may use to file for the extension. Note that the extension should be
submitted to HHS via certified mail.
BACKGROUND
Payment Processing
As part of its objective of simplifying the administration of health insurance and reducing
waste in that process, HIPAA sets requirements for processing financial EDI
transactions 2 using a unifonn electronic standard. HIPAA requires healthcare
clearinghouses to edit incoming/outgoing electronic transactions against the HIPAA
Implementation Guide.3 This means that healthcare clearinghouses must edit down to the
data element level (i.e., the smallest data segment) and ensure that the all-medical codes
utilized in the document are current and correct. If they are not, the transaction is to be
rejected and sent back to the originator.
The critical issue for the banking industry is what payment processing activities do - or
do not - constitute actions of a "covered entity" under HIPAA. It has been suggested by
some that a literal interpretation of HIPAA's definition of a "healthcare clearinghouse"
covers financial institutions that, in the normal course of business: (1) receive a payment
instruction from a HIPAA-covered entity (e.g. J healthcare provider or insurance
company), and send an ACH transaction with addenda in a HIPAA-compliant format; or
(2) receive an ACH transaction with addenda in a HIPAA-compliant format and pass this
information on to a covered entity in a human-readable or other useable format.
The banking industry does not believe that routine financial EDI processing of
healthcare transactions (e.g., premium and claim payments), constitute the actions
2 Financial EDI transactions are payment transactions accompanied by addenda information to assist processing and
reconcilement by the receiving company. These transactions are typically sent through the Automated Clearing
House (ACH) Network. The ACH Network is a secure, reliable and cost-effective method of moving both money
and data together through the nation's banking system. The ACH Network serves 20,000 financial institutions, 3.5
mi1~ion businesses, and 100 million individuals. In 2001, the ACH Network processed 8 billion transactions, of
which approximately 170 million were business-to-business financial ED! transactions (with a sizable percentage of
these being healthcare-related transactions). Use of financial EDI eliminates the need for senders and receivers to
rely on multiple channels to transmit and process payments and payment-related data, and eliminates the need to re-
associate the payment and remittance data on the receiving end.
3 The mandated electronic transactions relevant to financial institutions are the ANSI ASe X12 820 and 835.
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of a "healthcare clearinghouse," nor does the industry believe that this was the
intent ofHIPAA's authors.
When is ajinancial institution a "healthcare clearinghouse" under HIPAA? Among
other functions, healthcare clearinghouses serve healthcare providers and/or health plans
by editing claim data for errors or required codes, refonnatting claims to meet the unique
data layout requirements of various health plans, and editing against the HIPAA
Implementation Guide. This is the type of company that clearly was intended to be
defined as a healthcare clearinghouse in the Act, and the overwhelming majority of
financial institutions do not provide this type of service.
Although financial institutions may originate or receive HIPAA standard transactions
such as the Healthcare Claim Payment (835) and Premium Payment (820), they will
often pass on the related remittance data without any responsibility for conversion or
reformatting of the X12 message contained in the NACHA CTX "envelope." Although
these messages might be HIPAA standard transactions, the financial institution typically
provides only transport and payment functions.
A small number of financial institutions may choose to provide value-added services for
their healthcare customers that would fall within the intent of the "healthcare
clearinghouse" definition. For example, some health plans and providers may contract
with financial institutions for support services whereby files are translated or edited to
meet the criteria specified in the HIPAA Implementation Guide. On the receipt side,
some financial institutions may provi de value-added services that translate specific
transactions/addenda from non-standard to HIPAA-compliant standard formats as
specifically requested by customers.
Applying a literal interpretation of the "healthcare clearinghouse" definition to routine
financial EDI processing would:
• Subject thousands offinancial institutions to coverage as covered entities, resulting in
the need to comply with and bear potential liability for HIPAA-related requirements
solely by the nature ofthe underlying transaction they process, rather than their
specific intent to provide services contemplated by Congress as those ofa covered
entity.
• Require allfinancial institutions handling CTXACH transactions to edit ACHfiles
for healthcare related transactions,4 thereby dramatically increasing the time and
cost ofprocessing, presumably increasing the price for such processing services to at
least partially recover this added cost, and reducing the overall efficiency of
payments processing, including the processing offinancial EDI healthcare
transactions.
4 Currently, there is no way upon receipt of a file containing CTX transactions to determine which transactions are
healthcare-related and which are not.
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• Subjectfinancial institutions to. potential liability for handling CTXACH transactions
that include improperly formatted HIPAA standard addenda records, where such
transactions are not detected and rejected by the financial institution.
• Potentially result in the rejection oftransactions by financial institutions that the
receiver would have translated into proper format upon receipt (i.e., the receiver did
not request or contractfor this service with its financial institution.)
Privacy and Security Issues
The proposed HIPAA privacy rule requires health plans and providers to enter into
"business associate contracts" with their vendors and service providers who use, disclose,
or store personally identifiable protected health information (PHI), regardless ofwhether
those third parties are "healthcare clearinghouses". That rule was finalized on August 14,
2002. PHI broadly covers patient medical data and can include payment remittance data.
Demographic data about patients such as name and address, or patient IDs will be
deemed "protected" if associated or able to be associated with a provider name, treatment
or product description, or other data from which medical facts about the patient may be
inferred.
It is clear that financial institutions whose customers are HIPAA "covered entities" (such
as health plans and providers) will become "business associates" if they have access to
PHI in the normal course of business. Accordingly, those health plan and provider
customers wi 11, as required by HIPAA, seek to revise existing bank contracts to
incorporate applicable HIPAA privacy and security requirements. The Task Force has
determined that some of the HIPAA requirements conflict with provisions of federal
banking law and is exploring this issue more fully.
Generally, the banking industry should be well positioned to meet the confidentiality
requirements of HIPAA as a result of the significant privacy and information security
rules imposed under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
The Task Force is creating a Business Associate Contract Guide that would provide
model business contract language that meets HIPAA's requirements as well as
appropriate responses to customer requests for amended business contracts. The model
contract language would include:
• Standard language for "reasonable assurances" of confidentiality that will be
acceptable to financial institutions while meeting legitimate customer needs under
• Definitions of banks' HIPAA responsibilities to maintain records of, and log access
to, the relevant patient information in a manner that is minimally disruptive to normal
banking operations.
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In its review ofHIPAA's coverage of financial institution healthcare payment
processing, the Task Force detennined that:
• The large majority of financial institutions are not Healthcare Clearinghouses and
therefore not covered entities under HIPAA.
• A small number of financial institutions perform value-added services for customers
that would classify them as Healthcare Clearinghouses.
The Task Force also determined that:
• Financial institutions providing services to the healthcare industry may often be
classified as "business associates" of health plans and providers.
• Financial institutions have a long tradition of protecting confidential financial
information and have security practices that meet or exceed many HIPAA
requirements for privacy and security.
• HIPAA-related Banking Industry Guidelines could assist financial institutions and
their customers to readily determine covered entity status based upon tests, and to
adapt existing service contracts with model contract language developed by the Task
Force.
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MEMORANDUM
TO: Ian Macoy
NACHA
FROM: Oliver Ireland
Peter Swire
Morrison & Foerster LLP
DATE: March 19,2003
RE: Application of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
Rules to Receiving Depository Financial Institutions
You have asked us to examine the treatment of certain activities by a Receiving
Depository Financial Institution ("RDFI") under the rules adopted by the Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS") to implement the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA Rules"). The factual setting in this memorandum, 1
which we call "ACH Payment Activity," is where an RDFI receives an ACH Entry that
includes protected health infonnation as a part of the remittance information in the Entry
and provides that information to its Receiver customer in a statement or other form in
which the Receiver nonnally receives information about the receipt of ACH Entries.
The legal question addressed here is whether the RDFI would thereby become a health
care clearinghouse subject to the requirements in the IDPAA Rules for health care
clearinghouses.
Due to the exemption in section 1179 of the HIPAA statute and the defmition and
explanation of "payment" in the HIPAA Rules, we believe that the HIPAA Rules do not
apply to ACH Payment Activity. The defInition of "health care clearinghouse" in the
HIPAA Rules, taken alone, might seem to apply to ACH Payment Activity, and the IDPAA
Rules do not expressly exclude an RDFI from the definition of"health care clearinghouse."
Importantly, however, section 1179 of the HIPAA statute itself expressly exempts entities
engaged in the activities of a fmancial institution, or in processing payments for a financial
institution, from the coverage of HIPAA. Although the HIPAA Rules limit the infonnation
that can be provided to financial institutions for payment purposes, the HIPAA Rules do not
purport to interpret the financial institution exemption narrowly so that ACH Payment
Activity by financial institutions would be covered by the HIPAA Rules. In fact, the HIPAA
Rules' definition of the term "payment" is sufficiently broad to include ACH Payment
1 Capitalized tenns that are not defined in this memorandum are defined in the rules of the National
Automated Clearing House Association.
* Reprinted by permission ofNACHA - The Electronic Payments Association
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Activity. This broad defInition of "payment" suggests that HHS should view ACH Payment
Activity by a fmancial institution as outside the HIPAA Rules.
BACKGROUND
The HIPAA Rules apply to "health care providers," "health care plans," and "health
care clearinghouses." These "covered entities" are required to comply with standards for
electronic transactions, privacy of medical records, and security of those records. Other
organizations are not bound by the HIPAA Rules, although covered entities may be
required to enter into business associate contracts in order to disclose protected health
infonnation ("PHI") lawfully to these non-covered organizations.2 For RDFIs, the question
is whether their activities bring them within the defInition of "health care clearinghouse."
The HIPAA Rules defme the term "health care clearinghouse" to mean:
a public or private entity, including a billing service, repricing company,
community health management information system, and "value-added" networks
and switches, that does either of the following functions:
(2) Receives a standard transaction from another entity and processes or
facilitates the processing of health infonnation into nonstandard fonnat or
nonstandard data content for the receiving entity. 3
The IDPAA Rules define the tenn "protected health information" to include
individually identifiable health information. 4 "Health information" is defined broadly to
include:
any information, whether oral or recorded in any fonn or medium, that:
(1) Is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, public
health authority, employer, life insurer, school or university, or health care
clearinghouse; and
(2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or
condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the
past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual. 5
2 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e).
3 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
4 45 C.F.R. § 164.501.
S [d.
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The HIPAA Rules generally pennit the disclosure ofpm by a covered entity for
payment purposes without the need for authorization by the individual. 6 The definition of
"payment" in the HIPAA Ru1es is broad and includes, inter alia, the activities undertaken
by a health plan to provide reimbursement for the provision of heath care. 7 The
supplementary information to the fmal HIPAA Rules notes that:
Covered entities may disclose protected health information for payment purposes to
any other entity, regardless of whether it is a covered entity. For example, a health
care provider may disclose protected health information to a fmancial institution in
order to cash a check or to a health care clearinghouse to initiate electronic
transactions. 8
The amount of information in this disclosure by a covered entity is subject to a "minimum
necessary standard.,,9 Despite this limitation, in the supplementary information
accompanying the HIPAA Rules, HHS states that the transmission of both electronic funds
transfer ("EFT") infonnation and electronic remittance advice ("ERA") infonnation are
payment activities. 10
Section 1I 79 of HIPAA itself provides that:
To the extent that an entity is engaged in activities of a fmancial institution
(as defmed in section 1101 of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978) or is
engaged in authorizing, processing, clearing, settling, billing, transferring, .
reconciling, or collecting payments, for a financial institution, this part, and any
standard adopted under this part, shall not apply to the entity with respect to such
activities, including the following:
(1) The use or disclosure of information by the entity for authorizing,
processing, clearing, settling, billing, ~ansferring, reconciling or collecting, a
payment for, or related to, health plan premiums or health care, where such
payment is made by any means, including a credit, debit, or other payment card,
an account, check, or electronic funds transfer. 11
6 Sef! 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(1 )(iii). An exception exists in the definition requiring authorization before
PHI can be disclosed with respect to psychotherapy notes. Id.
7 45 C.F.R. § 164.501. This definition of payment only applies in the HIPAA privacy rule in Section 164.
8 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,495 (Dec. 28, 2000).
9 45 C.F.R. §§ I64.502(b), 164.514(d)(4).
10 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462,82,615,82,616 (Dec. 28, 2000).
11 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-8. There is some debate over whether this exclusion for financial institutions applies
to all authorized activities of financial institutions or merely to payment activities. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-
736, at 268-269 (1996), "[t]he conferees do not intend to ex.clude the activities of financial institutions or
their contractors from compliance with the standards adopted under this part [i.e., the transactions rule and
the privacy rule] if such activities would be subject to this part."
3
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Finally, although the InPAA Rules do not provide an express exclusion from the
definition of "health care clearinghouse" for financial institutions, a statement in the
supplementary information accompanying the HIPAA Rules indicates that HHS
recognizes this exclusion, at least for payment purposes. In discussing the definition ofa
"business associate" in section 160.103 of the HIPAA Rules, HHS stated in the
supplementary information that:
We do not consider a financial institution to be acting on behalfof a
covered entity, and therefore no business associate 'contract is required, when it
processes consumer-conducted financial transactions by debit, credit, or other
payment card, clears checks, initiates or processes electronic funds transfers, or
conducts any other activity that directly facilitates or effects the transfer of funds
for compensation for health care. 12
ANALYSIS
Under the definitions of "protected health information" and "health care
clearinghouse," an RDFI engaged in ACH Payment Activity could be construed to be a
health care clearinghouse. For example, an RDFI might receive a credit ACH Entry for a
Receiver who is a doctor or other health care provider sent by a patient's health insurer.
The Entry could include information from both the EFT and ERA component of the
ASC XI2N 835 standard, thereby identifying the patient and the treatment for which the
payment is being made. This information is PHI within the meaning of the HIPAA Rules.
By receiving ERA information in a HIPAA standard format and converting the ERA
information to the nonstandard format in which the doctor or healthcare provider ordinarily
receives information about ACH Entries, the RDFI could be interpreted to be performing
the functions of a health care clearinghouse within the definition of that term in the HIPAA
Rules. 13
However, a reading of the HIPAA Rules in their entirety strongly weighs against
this interpretation. The structure of the IllPAA Rules is to regulate covered entities and the
information they disclose to outside entities. It would be contrary to this structure to
believe that HHS intended a financial institution to become a covered entity simply by
processing payments delivered to the financial institution, directly or indirectly, by a
covered entity. In addition, for HHS to regulate fmancial institutions due to their
participation in payment activities would be contrary to section 1179. For instance, an
12 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,476 (Dec. 28 t 2000). Although the first part of this statement refers to
consumer-conducted financial transactions by debit, credit, or payment card, the references to clearing
checks and processing electronic funds transfers are not limited to consumer-conducted transactions.
13 The analysis in this memorandum applies to debit Entries as well as credit Entries. Depending on the
format in which information about an Entry is provided to an RDFI's customer, there may be good
arguments that the RDFY is not performing the function ofa health care clearinghouse. For example, it may
be argued that merely deleting a '~wrapper" for the EFT or ERA component does not constitute processing
the health information.
4
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Originating Depository Financial Institution ("ODFI") may receive information for
payment purposes from a covered entity, and an RDFI may receive infonnation for
payment purposes from an ODFI. These organizations are entitled to assume that the
covered entity is complying with the mpAA Rules with respect to that information. The
mere act of receiving and processing the information as described above, even where such
information includes pm, would not seem to transfonn the ODFI or the RDFI into a
covered entity in the form of a health care clearinghouse.
This view is consistent with the statutory language in HIPAA creating the detailed
section 1179 exclusion for payment activities. The view is confumed by statements by
HHS in the supplementary information to the HIPAA Rules. There is no evidence that
HHS intended to include fll1ancial institutions that would ordinarily enjoy the section 1179
exclusion within the definition of a "health care clearinghouse" simply because they
engage in ACH Payment Activity. For example, HHS does not purport to interpret section
1179 in defining health care clearinghouse to limit the types ofpayment activities that can
be perfonned by financial institutions. 14 To the contrary, HHS itself states that payment
activity as defined in the HIPAA privacy rule includes the transmission of both the EFT
and the ERA components of the ASe XI2N 835 standard. IS Further, as noted above, HHS
expressly recognized that contracts are not required when a financial institution processes
electronic funds transfers or conducts any other activity that directly facilitates or effects
the transfer of funds for compensation for health care. 16
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we believe that under the mpAA Rules, a financial
institution engaged in ACH Payment Activity should not be considered a health care
clearinghouse and therefore should not be subject to HIPAA.
Oliver Ireland is a Partner at the law fmn of Morrison & Foerster LLP. Mr.
Ireland was fonnerly an Associate General Counsel at the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System with responsibilities for payment system issues.
Peter P. Swire is a Professor at the Moritz College of Law of the Ohio State
University, and is a consultant to Morrison & Foerster LLP. From 1999 to early 2001,
Mr. Swire served as the Chief Counselor for Privacy, u.S. Office of Management and
Budget. In that role, he was the White House coordinator for the proposed and final
HIPAA medical privacy rule, and he chaired the inter-agency process for defining
"payment" in that rule.
14 There is some doubt that an effort by HHS to limit the section 1179 exception would be effective under
the standards established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.• 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
15 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462,82,616 (Dec. 28,2002).
16 See, supra note 12.
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lie: Lookbox Servioes under the HlPAA Privacy Rules
You have asked for guidance regarding whether the operation of a lockbox service for a
physici.an by a Kentucky Bankers Associati011 member bank (a uBantet, will subject a Bank to
the business associate ndes ofthe Standards for Privacy ofIndividually Identifiable Health
Information (the 4'Privacy Rules'').
II Paeala) BacklraUlld
Certain Banks operate what is commonly referred to as a "lockbox servicet ' for its
customers. some ofwhom are physicians. Although ~b. Bank has slightly different procedures,
generally, ifa physician contracts with a Bank for a lockbox service, the physician will route all
ofthe physician)s payments for services to the lockbox that is established by th.e Bank When
tbe BanJe receives these payments, typically through U.S. mail, the BaDk will open the envelope,
deposit the checks in the phySjciatl~s account at the Bd and forward any correspondence in the
envelope to the physician1s office.
In general, a Bank receives payments from two di.fferent sources - patients and insurance
companies I third-party administrators. IfaBank reoeives apayment from apatient, it deposits
the check in tho physician·s aooount and forwards an.y other materials (e.g., copy ofan invoice or
a·bill) in the envelopo to the physician. Ifnothing is included witb the check, tho Bank may
make a photocopy ofthe oheck or otl1erwise have some other type ofsystem for informing the
physician who made the paYJ.uent. Ifa Bank rec::eives a payment from an insurance com.panyor
thinl""party administrator, the check is usually for multiple patie11ts and/or procedures. Therefort\
in order for the physician to detennine for which patients or procedures the check relates. the
insurance cornpanywiU send a copy ofthe various explanations ofbenefits ("EOBs'') with the
check. When the Bank receives this type ofpayment. it deposits the check in tbephysician's
account and sends the BOBs to the physician. In either situation, patient or insuranoe company_
the Bank 1\88 no reason to examine or retain any copies ofil1voices or EOBs that may be
included with the payments in order to operate the lockbox. In all cases, the Bank simply
AT~MT" AlJlUSTA OHARLOnJ: 1-0NtI0N RALEIGN ITOCIOtCKM wAltm.TCN WINSTON.........,.
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forwards these materials di.rectly to the physician without examination. In addition) the Banks do
not maintain individualized paticmt or "accounts receivable information as part ofthe operation of
the lookbox. The lookbox services only entail the d.epositing ofthe checks in the physician's
aooount. The physician or another Qntity unrelated to the Bank is responsible for adj\lsting and
maintab:Ung accounts receivable infonnation.
II. Prlvaey Rule ProVfdODS aad Analysis
Under the Privacy RuloJ in general, a business associate is an entity that performs or
assists in the performance ofa N11ction or activity involving the use or disclosure ofprotected
health information (UPHI'~ for or on behalfofan entity covered by the Privacy Rules. such as a
health oare provider. 45 CPR § 160.103. 1borcfol", a Bank could be construed as a business
associate ofa pbysicim for whom it operates alockbox service, ifthe Bank is perfonning a
covered service for the physwian and suoh service involves the use or disclosure ofpm. Ifa
Bank is treated as abusiness associate ofa physician. the Bank would be required to eater into a
business associate agreement with the physician and to meet certain other requirements as
specifiedby the Privacy Rule, See, 45 CPR § S04(e).
In order to determine whether a Bank is performing a service for a physician that is
covered by the PrivacyRules, we tint need to examine two important statements made by HHS
with respeot to financial institutions.
HHS has stated that a physician or other covered entity may disclose PHI to aBank in
order to cash a check or initiate electronic transacti011S. This disclosure by itselfwould not mean
that the Bank was a business associate, However, if a physician. engaged mother entity, suclt as
a Bank. to conduct payment aotivities on its behalt tho Bank may meet the deSnition ofa
business associate under the Privacy Rule. The example givea. by HIlS in this regard is when the
entityt such as a Baolc, is operating an accounts receivable system on bel1altofthe physician.
See. 65 Fed. Reg. 82495 (December 28,2(00). Based upon your description oftbe lackbox
servioes as summarized abov~ a Bank shauld not be operating an accounts rcceivable systmn of
aphysician. The main functi.on ofthe lockbox servioe is to deposit the checks in the physician's
account, whilo the physician or some oth.or entity unrelated to the BaDk adjusts the acOOlDlts
receivable. (The other fUnction ofthe lockbox service is to forward any materials to the
physician tbat are inoluded with the payments. This function is discussed below.) Therefore,
based on this stalcment by HHS, the Banks should not be conducting ttpaymentn activities on
behalfofaphysician because they are not operating an accounts receivable system on behalfof
physicians.
In addition, BHS has stated that a Bank will not be acting on behalf ofa physician when
it "processes consumer-conduoted financial traDIactions by debit, credit or other payment cardt
olears checks. initiates or processes electronic funds transfers, 07 canducu any other actiVity tJlat
dir,ctlyfacilities 07 ejJBcts the tran8/er o/funds for compensationfor health care!' (emphasis
added)'. HHS indioates that in these cases '~o identity ofthe consumer is always included and
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some health information (e.g., diagnosis or procedure) maybe implied throup. thenamc ofthc
health care provider being paid.d Despile the presence ofthis potentialp~ the processing of
those transactions d.oes not rise to the level ofa Bank being treated as abusiness associate under
the Privacy Rules., Sec, 65 Fed. Reg. 82476 (December 28. 2000) and HHS FAQ, Page 43
(December 3., 2002).
While not entirely clear, based upon the etnphasized language above, it is reasonable for
a Bank to proceed under the position that the Batik: is conducting an activity that directly
facilities or effects the transfer offunds for compensation for health care. While it is true that a
Bank also receives PHI (such as BOBs and invoices) along with a payment transaction, iftbc
Bank docs not need or usa this infonnatiou in performing i.m services and it simply forwards this
information to the physician without any use or disclosure ofthe pm, it is reasonable to proceed
without abusin.ess associate agreement.
In this regardt it is important to Dote that HHS does not consider janitorial services as
siving rise to a business associate relationship. HHS has provided that janitors, while having
access to PHI, do not need to use or discloso PHI in order to perform their services. Any usc or
disclosure ofPID that may occur during the performance ofjanitorial services is incidental and
therefore exempt under the incidental provisions ofthe PrivacyRule, Sec, HHS FAQ Page 48
(December 3, 2002). Similarly. if the Banks cio not need to use or disclose tile pm (such as the
BOBs and invoioes) in order to perfonn the lockbox serviccst the Banks shauld be able to take
the same position as janitorial services under the HHS guidance. Therefore, ifthe Banks simply
forward anypm to the physician. similar to a janitor forwarding any trash containing pm to the
shralder or other disposal unit~ any use or disclosure oftlic PHI would most likely be incidental
to the DOnna! bankiDg services orthe Bank and, as such, should be exempt from the Privacy
Rule. See) 4S CFR § 160.S02(a)(1)(iii). However, ifa Bank does need to use the PHI that it
receives~such as inspecting the BOB or invoice to determine the payee or amount ofthe check,
then th.e Bank would most likely be troated as a business associato under the Privacy Rules.
Based upon the foregoing, ifa Bank does not use or disclose the PHI tbat it may receive
with a lockbox payment, but rather forwards it to the physician without examining it. it is
reasonable for a Bank to continue to provide its lookbox services to a physician without treating
itselfas abusiness associate under the Privacy Rules.
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Fi••ac;.' '.sl;lali••s' ~CI;•• •• BusiBess JAsse.;.'es:
Se,f.lls.es.....' C"ec~';sl
I.r H'P~~ 1";•••7 I.r He.""care CuSI...ers
P.r".se: This self-assessment tool is intended to provide financial institutions that offer
services to health care providers and payors with a checklist of the privacy regulation
requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (lllPAA).
This checklist breaks down major aspects of the privacy regulations of lllPAA for a
clearinghouse OR a business associate as defined in the lllPAA regulations. lllPAA citations
are included in the checklist so you can reference the text of the regulations to get a better
Wlderstanding ofyour responsibilities under HlPAA.
As a provider of financial services for health care providers and payors, you must first decide
whether or not your organization will receive protected health infonnation (PIll). If so, you
need to further detennine whether you will be functioning solely as a "business associate" OR as
a "healthcare clearinghouse acting as a business associate" when you handle that PIll. This
self-assessment has been developed with these two scenarios in mind Businesses, including
financial institutions, that will regularly have direct contact with individuals regarding their health-
related diagnoses, treatments, or payments have additional responsibilities for notices,
disclosures, and record keeping that are not addressed in this document.
The IllPAA Banking Task ForceI has published two papers that may help you detennine the
appropriate classification of your organization under the HIPAA regulations. Morrison &
Foerster, a respected Washington law finn with special expertise in the payments arena, has
rendered an opinion that Receiving Depository Financial Institutions (ROFI's) engaged in
payments processing as defmed by HIPAA are not considered covered entities under the
regulation.2 At the time of this writing this interpretation has not been addressed by the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). However, it does provide a framework on
which a fmancial institution could evaluate its role with respect to the healthcare services it
I The HIPAA Banking Task Force was formed by NACHA, the Electronic Payments Association, and the
American Bankers Association with support from the ANSI ~12F Finance Committee, a number of
individual financial institutions, Regional Payment Associations, healthcare industry experts, and
America's Community Bankers. Membership is voluntary and is open to representatives of any interested
financial institution or trade association representing the financial industry. Additional information is
available at www.hipaabanking.oTi:.
2 Financial institutions engaged in activities that fall outside the boundaries of payment processing as
defined by HIPAA may still be considered covered entities and should consult with legal counsel to
determine actual status.
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offers. A second document, White Paper On HIPAA Related Issues Affecting The Banking
Industry, provides practical examples ofprocessing arrangements in which financial institutions
might be involved to provide further insight into the Morrison & Foerster interpretation. Both
papers can be viewed or downloaded at www.hipaabanking.org. (please note that any
financial institution that handles PHI needs to recognize the privacy provisions of
HIPAA even if the financial institution is not considered a clearinghouse under
HIPAA.)
Disc'.i.er: This self-assessment checklist has been developed by Ernst & Young LLP
in conjunction with the members of the IllPAA Banking T~k Force. This document is
provided to your organization :free of charge and is intended for your internal use only. Any
reproduction of this document for commercial gain is strictly prohibited. This self-assessment
checklist is based on the opinions of Ernst & Young LLP and the members of the IllPAA
Banking Task Force and should not be construed as a legal opinion or legal guidance, and as
such, Ernst & Young LLP and the IllPAA Banking Task Force do not accept any liability for
your use of the thoughts and opinions expressed herein.
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."., is HIPJlJj?
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 was enacted to
achieve many goals. Besides setting standards to improve the efficiency for electronic data
transmissions and processing, one of lllPAA's major goals is to make sure that sensitive,
individually identifiable health infonnation is protected and maintained in a secure manner when it
. is transmitted both inside and outside of the healthcare provider's organization. With respect to
the privacy of an individual's health infonnation, lllPAA applies to "covered entities" and their
"business associates."
."., ;s • C."ere" £.,;17'
A covered entity is a:
• Health care payor (Le., insmance company);
• Health care provider who transmits infonnation electronically using one of the standard
lllPAA transactions3 health care clearinghouse (see definition below),
."., is,. Susiaess JI•••ci.,.?
A business associate is a person or company that, on behalf of a covered entity, perfonns or
assists in the perfonnance of a function or activity involving the use or disclosure of pm.
Because many types of healthcare transactions can contain PHI, financial institutions providing
services like lockbox processing, ACH processing or infonnation reporting to healthcare payors
and providers need to detennine whether Pill is being exchanged in a fonnat that makes it
visible to anyone (including an employee of the financial institution) other than the intended
recipient. If so, the covered entity will likely require the financial institution to become a business
associate. If PHI never flows through the financial institution or if it is processed in a manner
that makes it recognizable only to the intended recipient and not the financial institution (like data
encryption), a business associate relationship is not likely to be needed.
3 The HIPAA standard transactions are defined in the HIPAA Transactions Rules (i.e.,
transactions using the ANSI X12N 4010 version for the (1) healthcare claims or equivalent
encounter infonnation, (2) healthcare payment and remittance advice, (3) coordination ofbenefits,
(4) healthcare claim status, (5) enrolhnent and disenrollment in a health plan, (6) eligibility for a
health plan, (7) health plan premium payments, (8) referral certification and authorization, (9) first
report of injury, (10) health claims attachments and (11) other transactions that the Secretary may
prescribe by regulation.
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."., is a Heall" -Care Cle.rin."•••e?
A health care clearinghouse is a public or private entity that either (1) processes (or facilitates
the processing of) health infonnation received from a covered entity in an electronic form to
ensure that the data complies with HIPAA transaction standards, or (2) receives a HIPAA-
compliant electronic transaction from another entity and processes (or facilitates the processing
of) the health infonnation into a human-readable or other non-HIPAA compliant fonnat for the
receiving entity.
• "., is 1',.,••,." H••IIII '.'.r...,i••7
Protected Health Infonnation (PIn) is individual identifiable health information that is
maintained or transmitted either electronically or in any other fonn or medium. Pill may be
used by covered entities and their business associates solely for purposes of treatment,
payment or operations.
Health infonnation includes (1) aly information (oral, written, or electronic) (2) relating to an
individual's past, present or future physical or mental health or condition OR to payment for
health care; and (3) created or received by a healthcare provider, healthcare plan, public health
authority, school, employer, life insurer or healthcare clearinghouse.
Identifiable information includes:
• Names;
• All geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, including street address, city, county,
precinct, zip code, and their equivalent geocodes, except for the initial three digits of a zip
code it: according to the current publicly available data from the Bureau ofthe Census:
(1) The geographic unit fonned by combining all zip codes with the
same three initial digits contains more than 20,000 people; and
(2) The initial three digits ofa zip code for all such·geographic units
containing 20,000 or fewer people is changed to 000.
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• All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an indiviclua.4 including birth
date, admission date, discharge date, date ofdeath; and all ages over 89 and all elements of
dates (including year) indicative of such age, except that such ages and elements may be
aggregated into a single category of age 90 or older;
• Telephone numbers;
• Fax numbers;
• Electronic mail addresses;
• Social security numbers;
• Medical record numbers;
• Health plan beneficiary numbers;
• Account numbers;
• Certificate/license numbers;
• Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate numbers;
• Device identifiers and serial numbers;
• Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs);
• Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers;
• Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints;
• Full face photographic images and any comparable images; and
• Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code; such that the covered entity
does not have actuallmowledge that the infonnation could be used alone or in combination
with other infonnation to identify an individual who is a subject ofthe infonnation.
Page 5
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The HIPAA regulations are very clear that, with limited exceptions, pm can only be exchanged
with the covered entity responsible for that data and approved business associates. However, if
the data is de-identified (Le., the infonnation related to the medical condition or payment can no
longer be associated with a particular individual because the identifying information described
above has been removed) then the underlying data can be used more broadly. Given the
complexities ofde-identification and re-identification, Ernst & Young and the HIPAA
Banking Task Force strongly recommend that financial institutions retain expert
counsel before embarking on any program to use PHI outside ofpayment processing
on behalfofcovered entities and approved business associates•
• "., is Trea'...aI7
Treatment is the provision, coordination or management of health care and related services by
one or more health care providers.
What is Payment?
Payment is obtaining premiwns or detennining coverage responsibilities with regard to:
• Eligibility detenninations;
• Risk adjustment ofpayments;
• Billing
• Claims management;
• Medical review;
• Utilization review; or
• Pre-certification/pre-authorization.
The definition of "paymenf' in the HIPAA regulations at 12 C.F.R. § 164.501(1) includes: the
"activities undertaken by: . . . (ii) A covered health care provider or health plan to obtain or
provide reimbursement for the provision of health care." This specifically includes "Billing,
claims management, collection activities ... " 12 C.F.R. §164.501(2)(ili). Thus, the payment
processing activities of financial institutions, including the delivery of remittance data in
connection with health care claims payments, are clearly encompassed in the definition of
"payment."
."., are He.I'" C.re Opera,;••s?
Health Care Operations, as defmed by HIPAA are certain administrative, financial, legal, and
quality improvement activities of a covered entity that are necessary to nul its business and to
support the core functions of treatment and payment. The definition of "health care operations"
can be found at 45 CFR § 164.501.
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C.or"i••,;•• • illl Curre..' Pri".c7 Policies
Although not necessarily required for a business associate or a clearinghouse acting as a
business associate, the HIPAA Banking Task Force and Emst & Young strongly recommend
that financial institutions amend their existing privacy policies to reflect compliance with the
privacy requirements ofHIPAA. For example, most financial institutions will want to restrict the
internal use and prohibit the use or distribution of healthcare related infonnation to any parties
other than the covered entities responsible for the data, any other business associates as
authorized by the covered entities, and those disclosures to governmental and regulatory
agencies as authorized under the regulation.
Page 7
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1. Do you have staff dedicated to §164.530a(l)
your institution's compliance
responsibilities for medical
privacy-related requirements?
Recommended
2. Have all Business Associates
with which you will exchange
data been identified*? Will
appropriate contract language be
developed and inserted into the
contracts governing your
exchange and processing ofdata
by April 14, 2003, except that
the deadline is April 14, 2004
for:
· contracts in existence as of
October 15, 2002 that are not
modified or renewed before
April 14, 2003; or
· contracts that automatically
renew without changes in tenns.
*(This includes both contracts
with covered entities and
contracts you may have with
third parties, such as temp
personnel providers.)
§164.502(d)
§164.504(e)
Required CJ
4 Unless otherwise noted, all references to HIPAA regulations refer to volume 45 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (e.g., 45CFR§164.530)
• "Required, " this applies 10 Business Associates and covered Entities. For all others, it is a recommendation.
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3. Have all your employees who §164.530(b) Recommended CJ 0
have access to PIll been trained
about your company's policies
and procedures regarding PHI?
Have you documented the
successful completion of that
training?
4. Have you implemented §164.530(c) Recommended 0 0
administrative, technical, and
physical safeguards to protect
privacy of PHI while it is in your
ossession?
5. Have you amended your §164.530(c) Recommended [J 0
infonnation security policies to
reflect the safeguards required by
HIPAA to protect the privacy of
pm when sending or receiving
data?
6. Does your organization's privacy §l64.53o(i) Recommendeds 0 0
policy cover PHI?
7.. Are policies and procedures in §J64.502(g) Required 0
place to refer requests by §164.510(b)
individuals for pm to the §164.514(h)
covered entity?
S Although HIPAA does not require Healthcare Clearinghouses acting only as Business Associates to
comply with this section of the privacy regulations, Ernst & Young recommends that organizations have
appropriate policies and procedures in place for compliance. Healthcare Clearinghouses acting as Business
Associates may be required to have these policies and procedures to achieve compliance with Business
Associate contract language specified by the Covered Entity engaging that financial institution.
*"Required, " this applies to Business Associates and covered Entities. For all others, it is a recommendation.
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Required
# Question
8. Do you have a process to track
disclosures of Pill other than for
payment, treatment and health
care operations that are
authorized by individuals so you
can respond to pertinent requests
b covered entities?
HIP.:\;\
Regulation
Reference"
§164.528
Required ~': or••
Ret'Olllnlcndcd
\res No
• •
9. Do you have policies and
procedures to track uses and
disclosures .that do not require
authorization by the individual
(such as disclosures to law
enforcement officials, health
oversi t a encies, etc.)?
10 Have you identified the minimwn
necessary PHI required for the
use and disclosure of Pill and
implemented policies and
procedures consistent with the
regulations?
11. Does your Employee Manual or
Code of Ethics cover violations
involving the confidentiality of
PHI, including the imposition of
sanctions against a member of
the workforce who is lmown to
be in violation of those policies
and rocedures?
12. Is a process in place to mitigate,
to the extent practical, any
harmful effect of a violation of
your policies and procedures?
§164.512
§l64.502(b)
§164.514(d)
§164.530(e)
§164.530(f)
Required
Required
Recommended
Recommended
[J
[J
CJ
(J
[J
o
Cl
13. Is there a procedure in place to §164. 524(a) (1) Recommended [J
allow covered entities to fulfill
their requirements for access to
PHI?
*"Required, " this applies to Business Associates and covered Entities. For all others, it is a recommendation.
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I~rqujr('d .:: 01.••
Recommended .
,res No
• •
J-llPf\;\
I{cguJation
RcfcrCJ1CC"
# Question
14. Have you defmed a policy and §164.502(c) Required
procedure for managing the §164.522(a)
requests of the covered entity's
individual customers who ask for
restrictions on the uses and
disclosures of their PHI?
15. Is a policy in place allowing the §164.526 Recommended 0 0
covered entity's individual
customers to request an
amendment to the PHI you have
concerning them?
16. Does your complaint process §164.530(d) Recommended CJ Cl
address complaints by the
covered entity's individual
customers about your policies
and procedures about PHI?
• "Required, " this applies to Business Associates and covered Entities. For all others. it is a recommendation. Page 11
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SECTION J

The Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003
("FACT Act")
• Introduction.
On December 4, 2003, President Bush signed into law the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transaction Act of2003 (Pub. L. 109-159, 117 Stat. 1952, the "FACT Act"). The FACT
Act brings together a number of industry and consumer legislative initiatives: (1)
perm~ent extension of the federal preemptions contained in the Fair Credit Reporting
Act ("FCRA") as amended in 1996 (15 U.S.C. 168 et.seq.), most notably affiliate
information sharing, prescreened credit offers, furnisher liability for reporting consumer
information, and form of adverse action notice; (2) federal redress for victims of identity
theft; (3) expanded obligations for all participants in the consumer credit information
process: information furnishers, information users, and consumer reporting agencies
("CRA's"); and (4) protection of the privacy ofmedical information reported to or
obtained from CRA's. Federal preemption is established for the FACT Act's nine
identity theft provisions, for example, identity verification, eRA fraud alerts, red flag
guidelines to help financial institutions recognize instances of identity theft, truncation of
credit and debit card account numbers, and the blocking of information resulting from
identity theft. There is NO federal preemption for state laws, such as those in California,
governing display or use of social security numbers, alerts for data base intrusions, or
penalties for identity theft. The multiple purposes of the FACT Act are discussed in the
Conference Report on H.R. 2622, which is contained in Attachment #1.
While a few sections of the FACT Act have statutory effective dates, the effective dates
ofmost provisions were established by regulations issued jointly by the Federal Reserve
Board ("FRB") and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") on February 5,2004. Unless
otherwise specified in the FACT Act, March 31, 2004 is the effective date for provisions
of the FACT Act that do not require significant changes to business procedures, and
December 1, 2004 is the effective date for those provisions likely to entail significant
changes to business procedures. A summary of the regulatory effective dates ofFACT
Act provisions is set out in Attachment 2. Statutory effective dates are noted in the text
of this presentation, which will focus on those provisions of the FACT Act that will
require action by financial institutions in the form of drafting and implementation ofnew
procedures and employee training on the new procedures.
• New Notice Requirements.
The FACT Act creates four new notice requirements and one revised notice requirement,
each with its own effective date.
1. Affiliate Marketing Information Sharing Notice and Opt Out (New)
J-l
Section 214 of the FACT Act adds yet a third information sharing notice and opt-out
to the notices and opt-outs already required by the FCRA and Title V of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (Pub. L. 106-102, "GLB"). This new notice is in effect the quid pro
quo for the permanent federal preemption for financial institution affiliate information
sharing.
Recall that Section 603(d)(2)(A)(ii) of the FCRA permits affiliated institutions to
share without notice customer identification, transaction and experience information,
for example, name, address, social security number, account balances, and loan
payment histories. Section 603(d)(2)(A)(iii) requires customer notice and opt-out if
the financial institution wishes to share "other" information, such as application data,
financial statements, or credit scores. FCRA Section 624(b)(2) created a federal
preemption for affiliate information-sharing, which was reauthorized and made
permanent by the FACT Act. Title V of the GLB Act requires a notice and opt-out
before a financial institution shares any information with an unaffiliated third party
unless the disclosure is made pursuant to one of the GLB exceptions, for example, to
process a transaction, sale of accounts, subpoena, or other legal process, reports to
credit reporting agencies, or with customer consent. Both notices and opt-outs are
contained in the consumer privacy disclosures made by financial institutions when
accounts are established and annually thereafter.
The FACT Act creates a new affiliate sharing notice if any information, for example,
transaction, experience, or application information, will be shared with an affiliate for
marketing purposes. This new notice must be "clear, conspicuous and concise," and a
consumer's opt-out choice must be honored for five years. After five years, the
financial institutions must send another notice and opt-out if it wants to send
marketing solicitations. The .. affiliate marketing notice and opt-out is not required if
the consumer has a preexisting business relationship with both affiliates. Other notice
exceptions include transfers to (i) facilitate communications relating to an employee
benefit plan; (ii) permit one affiliate to perform services for another affiliate; (iii)
respond to a communication initiated by a consumer; (iv) respond to solicitations
authorized by the consumer; or (v) comply with state insurance law anti-
discrimination provisions.
Regulations implementing the marketing notice and opt-out requirements are due by
September 4, 2004, with an effective date six months after the regulations are issued.
Information acquired prior to the regulatory effective date may be shared without the
marketing notice and opt-out. The challenge to financial institutions will be to add
this new notice to their privacy statements without totally confusing their customers.
2. Negative Information Reporting Notice (New)
Section 217 of the FACT Act requires creditors who report negative information (i.e.
delinquencies or charge-offs) to nationwide CRA's to provide notice to the affected
consumer before or no later than 30 days after such information is reported. The
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notice need be provided only once but may not be included with the initial Truth-in-
Lending disclosure. The notice may, however, be included in a default notice, on a
billing statement or in the institution's GLB privacy disclosure. The regulators must
develop a model form ofno more than 30 words by June 2004, and financial
institutions must begin providing the notice no later than December 1, 2004. Using
the model form will provide a "safe harbor."
After providing the notice, the financial institution may submit additional information
about the same account without providing another notice. A financial institution will
not be liable for failure to provide the notice if it maintains reasonable compliance
policies and procedures or the financial institution reasonably believes it is prohibited
by law from contacting the customer.
3. Risk-based Pricing Notice (New)
Section 615 of the FCRA requires credit report users who take "adverse action" on
the basis of credit report information to send an "adverse action" notice that identifies
the CRA that provided the information.
Section 311 of the FACT Act requires lenders that use "risk-based" pricing
underwriting programs based in whole or in part on credit report information to
provide a notice to applicants when credit report information could cause "material"
credit terms to be "materially less favorable than the most favorable terms available to
a substantial portion" of the lender's new customers. The notice may be oral, written
or electronic. This notice is required, for example, where the consumer accepts a
counter offer with less favorable terms because of credit report information. It would
not be required where a financial institution sends the standard FCRA adverse action
letter. The notice would also not apply to a prescreened offer unless the lender
changes the terms after the consumer responds to the prescreened offer. The FRB
and FTC are to prescribe regulations concerning the form, content, time and manner
ofdelivery ofnotice, as well as a model form. The notice must at a minimum:
• include a statement informing the consumer that the offered terms are based
on information from a consumer report;
• identify the CRA that furnished the report;
• tell the consumer that the consumer may obtain a copy of the consumer report
without charge from the CRA; and
• include contact information for the CRA (including a toll free telephone
number for nationwide CRA's).
The regulations will define "material" and materially less favorable."
Unless the regulations provide otherwise, the notice may be provided at time of
application or credit approval. This notice requirement becomes effective on
December 1, 2004.
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4. Home Loan Application Notice (New)
Section 212(g) of the FACT Act requires lenders to provide to applicants for
consumer open or closed end loans secured by one to four units of real property a
copy of their credit score(s) and a new notice telling the applicant that the lender must
disclose the credit score(s) used in connection with the home loan application and the
key factors affecting the credit scores.
The notice must include the name, address and telephone number of each CRA that
provided a credit score used in connection with the application. The text of the notice
as provided in the FACT Act is as follows:
NOTICE TO THE HOME LOAN APPLICANT
In connection with your application for a home loan, the lender
must disclose to you the score that a consumer reporting agency
distributed to users and the lender used in connection with your home
loan, and the key factors affecting your credit scores.
The credit score is a computer generated summary calculated at
the time of the request and based on information that a consumer
reporting agency or lender has on file. The scores are based on data
about your credit history and payment patterns. Credit scores are
important because they are used to assist the lender in determining
whether you will obtain a loan. They may also be used to determine
what interest rate you may be offered on the mortgage. Credit scores
can change over time, depending on your conduct, how your credit
history and payment patterns change, and how credit scoring
technologies change.
Because the score is based on information in your credit history,
it is very important that you review the credit-related information that is
being furnished to make sure it is accurate. Credit records may vary
from one company to another.
If you have any questions about your credit score or the credit
information that is furnished to you, contact the consumer reporting
agency at the address and telephone number provided with this notice,
or contact the lender, if the lender developed or generated the credit
score. The consumer reporting agency plays no part in the decision to
take any action on the loan application and is unable to provide you
with specific reasons for the decision on a loan application.
If you have any questions concerning the terms of the loan,
contact the lender.
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The lender is not obligated to explain the credit score or to assume any liability for
the content of the notice. If the lender uses an automated underwriting system, the
lender may disclose the credit score and associated key facts provided by a CRA. If
the lender uses the Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac automated underwriting systems, the
lender must disclose the score disclosed to the lender by the system. Only one
disclosure is required per transaction. No disclosure is required for credit scores
obtained after loan closing. This requirement preempts state laws except for selected
provisions of law in California, Colorado, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey,
and Vennont.
Any provision in a contract between a lender and a CRA that prohibits disclosure of a
credit score is rendered void by the FACT Act.
The regulators will establish both the form and the effective date of the new notice.
5. FCRA Prescreen Notice (Revised)
Section 213 of the FACT Act requires the FTC and the financial institution regulators
to issue a revised fonnat for the notice contained in prescreened credit offers no later
than December 4, 2004.
The revised notice is to be "in such fonnat and in such type size and manner as to be
simple and easy to understand." The prescreen opt-out will be effective for five
rather than two years. The FTC is to publicize the CRA opt-out addresses and
telephone numbers on its website, and the FRB is to study and report on the prescreen
opt-out process with a recommendation as to whether further statutory limitation on
prescreened offers is required.
• New Duties for Users of Credit Report Information.
The FACT Act recognizes that lenders have a significant role to play in limiting the
effects of identity theft and imposes new duties on lenders who use CRA information.
1. Fraud and Active Duty Alerts (FACT Act Section 112)
If a consumer suspects that he/she may be the victim of identity theft, the consumer
may notify a CRA, and the CRA must place an "initial" fraud alert on the consumer's
file. The "initial" fraud alert is good for 90 days. A consumer serving in the military
may require a CRA to place an "active duty" alert on his/her file. The "active duty"
alert lasts 12 months.
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If a consumer's credit report contains an "initial" fraud alert or "active duty" alert, the
lender must contact the consumer at the telephone number provided by the consumer
and shown in the alert or take other reasonable steps to confirm the consumer's
identity. Once the consumer files a fraud report with a law enforcement agency, the
alert becomes an "extended" alert. "Extended" alerts are good for seven years. If a
lender receives a credit report that contains an "extended alert," the lender must
contact the consumer by phone or other method designated by the consumer to
confirm that the credit application is not the result of identity theft. CRA's are
required to exclude consumer files with "extended" fraud alerts from prescreened lists
for five years. Credit files with "active duty" alerts must be excluded from prescreen
lists for two years. The FTC will prescribe regulations to implement the fraud and
active duty alert requirements, which will be effective by December of2004.
Financial institution credit underwriters must become familiar with the significance of
the fraud and active duty alerts.
The consumer need contact only one CRA. The contacted CRA is then responsible
for notifying other national CRA's.
2. Red Flag Guidelines
Section 114 of the FACT Act requires the regulatory agencies to establish "red flags,"
whose presence should alert financial institutions to possible identity theft. The red
flag customer identification requirements are to be consistent with Patriot Act
requirements. A specific red flag identified in the FACT Act is the receipt by a debit
or credit card issuer of a request for a new or replacement card within 30 days after an
address change on the account. The card issuer must either notify the cardholder at
the cardholder's former address or use other means to assess the validity of the
address change. The red flag regulations must also contain reasonable guidelines for
dealing with transactions on credit or deposit accounts that have been inactive for
more than 2 years. The regulations are to become effective on December 1, 2004.
3. Employee Investigations
The FCRA as amended in 1996 established an elaborate consent and notification
process when employer or prospective employers use consumer reports for
employment purposes. Section 611 of the FACT Act eliminates the consent
requirement when a third party is retained in connection with an investigation
involving job misconduct, compliance with federal, state or local laws or the rules of
self-regulatory organizations (e.g., NASD), or preexisting written policies of the
employer. Results of the investigation may be communicated only to the employer,
federal, state, or local officers, to self-regulatory organization, or as otherwise
required by law.
The employee must still receive an adverse action notice, but the source(s) of
information that resulted in the adverse action need not be identified. Section 611
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responds to a 1999 FTC opinion that held that the third party investigator could be a
CRA for FCRA purposes.
4. Address Discrepancies
Section 315 of the FACT Act directs the FTC and the federal financial institution
regulatory agencies to establish guidance on "reasonable polices and procedures" to
be followed by a user of a consumer report when the user is notified by a CRA that
the address of consumer supplied by the user is substantially different from the
address in the consumer's file maintained by the CRA. These procedures are to
become effective on December 1, 2004.
• New Duties for Furnishers of Information to eRA's
1. Section 154(a) of the FACT Act provides that a furnisher of information to a CRA
must have reasonable procedures to respond to a notice from the CRA that the
information it has provided is the result of identity theft. Such procedures must
include procedures to prevent refurnishing of such information.
2. Section 154(a) also requires information furnishers to have procedures to block
information arising from a purported identity theft when the identity theft report is
submitted by the alleged victim. Financial institutions may specify an address for
submission of such reports.
3. To further limit the spread of information arising from an alleged identity theft,
Section 154(b) provides that except in the case ofrepurchase, securitization, or
transfer as a result ofmerger or acquisition, a creditor may not sell, transfer for
consideration or place for collection a debt after the creditor has been notified that the
debt is the result of identity theft.
4. Section 312(a) of the FACT Act requires the FTC and the financial institution
regulators to establish and maintain guidelines for use by information furnishers with
respect to the accuracy and integrity of information furnished to CRA's. The
regulators are to consider, among other factors: (1) patterns, practices, and activity
that can compromise the accuracy and integrity of such information; (2) the methods
used to furnish information; (3) policies and procedures currently in place; and (4)
procedures for investigating complaints.
5. Section 312(b) of the Fact Act modifies the FRCA Section 623(a)(I)(A) information
accuracy standard for furnishers of information by replacing the current standard
"knows or consciously avoids knowing that the information is accurate" with "knows
or has reasonable cause to believe that the information is accurate."
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6. Section 312(b) also requires the FTC and the federal financial institution regulators to
identify the circumstances when a furnisher is required to reinvestigate a disputed
report to a CRA if the reinvestigation request is made directly by the consumer.
Section 312(e) details the procedures to be followed both by the consumer disputing
information supplied to a CRA and by the furnisher of that information.
• New Duty to Furnish Information to Identity Theft Victims.
In order for identity theft victims to document fraudulent transactions, Section 151(e) of
the FACT Act provides that any business entity that has provided credit, goods, or
services to an alleged identity thief must, within 30 days of a victim's request, provide a
copy of the account application and transaction records to the victim and to a law
enforcement agency or officer specified by the victim. The alleged victim must provide
identification information, a copy of the police report and a standard identity theft
affidavit (to be developed by the FTC) or other acceptable affidavit of fact. The business
entity may specify an address for receipt of this document and may request additional
information to support the claim of identity theft, but it may not charge for providing the
requested documentation. A business may decline to provide the information if, for
example, it does not have a high degree of confidence that it knows the true identity of
the person requesting the information or the request is based on a misrepresentation of
fact. A business entity that in good faith furnishes information to an alleged victim may
not be held liable for such disclosure.
This provision will become effective in early June 2004 (180 days after December 4,
2003.) Financial institutions will need to designate an area for receipt of these record
requests and develop procedures to document and comply with these requests.
• New Duties for Debt Collectors Where Identity Theft is Alleged.
Section 155 of the FACT Act provides that debt collectors must notify the creditor if the
debt collector is advised that the debt may be the result of identity theft.
This requirement takes effect on December 1, 2004.
• Limitation on Use of Medical Information.
Title IV of the FACT Act (Sections 411 and 412) limits the use ofmedical information1
that reaches the financial system. The consumer's written consent is required before a
I "Medical Information" under the FACT Act means "information or data, whether oral or recorded, in any
form or medium, created by or derived from a health care provider or the consumer that relates to: (A) the
past, present, or behavioral health or condition of an individual; (B) the provision of health care to an
individual; or (C) payment for the provision ofhealth care to an individual."
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CRA may furnish medical information for employment, insurance or credit purposes. An
insurer who receives medical information may use and disclose it only for insurance
purposes. A creditor may not obtain or use a consumer's medical information to
determine credit eligibility except as permitted under regulations by the federal bank
regulatory agencies for operations, transactional and other necessary and appropriate
reasons. Regulations are to be finalized by June 2004. Medical information, as defined
by the FACT Act, which includes lists of identified consumers based on their payment
transactions for medical products or services, may not be shared among affiliates unless
the information is provided for the purchase of an annuity or insurance, and in
accordance with HIPAA, or as otherwise permitted by regulations.
• Miscellaneous Provisions.
1. Truncation ofDebit and Credit Card Account Numbers.
Section 113 of the FACT Act provides that machines that print debit or credit card
receipts must truncate all but the last five digits of the card number as well as the
card expiration date. For machines put into use before January 1, 2005, the effective
date is three years after enactment, that is, December 4, 2005. Machines installed
after January 1, 2005, must comply immediately.
2. Proper Disposal ofDocuments Containing Consumer Report Information and Other
Records
Section 216 of the FACT Act provides that by December, 2004, the financial
institution regulators are to issue final regulations, consistent with GLB, requiring any
entity that maintains or possesses consumer information, or compilations of consumer
information derived from credit reports to properly dispose of the information.
3. Change in Statutes ofLimitations for FCRA
Section 156 of the FACT Act increases the time period for claims that the FCRA has
been violated. Effective March 31, 2004, the consumer has the earlier of two years
after discovery or five years after the violation to bring suit. Private rights of action
are not available for violations of Section 623(a) of the FCRA as revised except
where a state official brings an action on behalf of state residents after a furnisher has
violated an injunction. Similarly there are no private rights of action for violation of
furnisher accuracy provisions (FACT Act Section 312) or for the "red flag"
prOVISIons.
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has done to pass H.R. 2622, the Fair and Ac-
curate Credit Transactions Act of 2003. H.R.
2622 includes numerous consumer protection
measures designed to combat the growing
crime of identity theft and to improve the accu-
racy of the credit reporting system. This land-
mark legislation will also ensure the continued
vibrancy of our national credit mar1<ets.
Given the complexity of H.R. 2622, it is both
appropriate and important to submit for the
record a section-by-section summary of the
legislation in order to help provide an under-
standing of the legislation and its impact on
the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
The legislation provides significant meas-
ures to help consumers, financial institutions
and consumer reporting agencies prevent and
mitigate identity theft. For example, the legisla-
tion establishes requirements for the place-
ment of fraud alerts on consumer credit files,
investigation of changes of address, truncation
of credit card and debit card account numbers
on receipts, and the manner in which informa-
tion identified as having resulted from identity
theft is blocked.
In addition, the legislation establishes re-
quirements for verifying the accuracy of con-
sumer information and preventing the report-
ing of consumer information that results from
identity theft. Financial institutions must also
take certain steps before establishing new
loans and credit accounts for consumers who
have fraud alerts on their credit files.
Lastly, the legislation includes provisions en-
titling consumers to obtain free credit reports
and access to their credit scores. This provi-
sion will likely do more for financial literacy
and consumer education than any legislation
in decades.
I am submitting this section-by-section anal-
ysis on behalf of myself and the gentleman
from Alabama (Mr. BACHUS). the Chairman of
the Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit
Subcommittee, who introduced H.R. 2622 and
presided over a series of hearings over the
past year that laid the groundwork for this
landmark legislation.
SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE
LEGISLATION
Section 1. Short title; table ofcontents
This section establishes the short title of
the bill. the "Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003" (the FACT Act).
Section 2. Definitions
This section adds a number of definitions
for use in provisions of the Act that are not
amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting
Act.
Section 3. Effective dates
This section specifies effective dates for
the legislation. Several sections are given
specific effective dates. For sections adding
new provisions or standards where no effec-
tive date is provided. this section provides a
general rule providing for the Federal Re-
serve Board (the Board) and the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) within 2 months to
jointly detennine the appropriate effective
dates for the remaining provisions. not to ex-
ceed 10 months from making their deter-
mination.
TITLE 1- IDENTITY THEFT PREVENTION
AND CREDIT HISTORY RESTORATION
Subtitle A- Identity Theft Prevention
Section 111. Amendment to definitions
This section includes a number of defini-
tions' including definitions for fraud alerts,
identity theft reports. financial institutions.
and nationwide specialty consumer reporting
agency.
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Friday, November 21,2003
Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to ex-
press my appreciation for the work Congress
Division 1 championship game record 252
rushing yards-spearheaded the offense,
while Elder's swarming defense held opposing
teams to just seven points in four of the five
playoff games. And. as always, thousands of
Elder faithful traveled across the state braving
the cold to support the Panthers throughout
the playoffs.
The hard work and sacrifice of the young
men at Elder have brought pride and honor to
Price Hill and our entire community. Football
fans throughout the Cincinnati area congratu-
late the Panthers on their back-to-back cham-
pionships and share in their celebration.
Mr. Speaker, to appropriately honor these
young men and coaches, I'd like to submit for
the RECORD the roster of the 2003 Elder Pan-
thers and a copy of their schedule and game
results.
ELDER HIGH SCHOOL. 2003 OHIO HIGH SCHOOL
STATE FOOTBALL CHAMPIONS, FINAL
RECORD: 14- 1
REGULAR SEASON
Game 1: August 21. 2003. Elder 33- Winton
Woods 14
Game 2: August 30. 2003, Indianapolis Warren
Central 45- Elder 20
Game 3: September 5.2003, Elder 50- Western
Hills 8
Game 4: September 12, 2003, Elder 17- Indian-
apolis Bishop Chatard 16
Game 5: September 19. 2003. Elder 42- La-
Salle 7
Game 6: September 26. 2003, Elder 49- Cov-
ington Catholic 21
Game 7: October 3. 2003, Elder 21- Moeller 20
Game 8: October 10, 2003. Elder 28- St. Xavier
7
Game 9: October 17. 2003, Elder 21- Indianap-
olis Cathedral 1
Game 10: October 24,2003, Elder 24- Oak Hills
21
OF FLORIDA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PLAYOFFS Monday. December 8.2003
Round 1: November 1, 2003. Elder 28- Ander- Mr. GINNY BROWN-WAITE of Florida. Mr.
son 7
Round 2: November 8,2003. Elder 33- Clayton Speaker. I rise today to honor CPL Sebastian
Northmont 7 Degaetano. a veteran of the second world war
Regional Championship: November 15. 2003. and a resident of Port Richey. Florida in my
Elder 24- Colerain 23 Fifth Congressional District.
State Semi-Final: November 22. 2003. Elder I will soon have the pleasure of recognizing
31- Dublin Scioto 7 CPL. Sebastian Degaetano for his heroism
State Championship: November 29, 2003, and bravery as a U.S. soldier who fought in
Elder 31- Lakewood St. Edward 7
2003 ELDER PANTHERS VARSIlY FOOTBAlL the European Theater from January 19, 1943
ROSTER through March 28, 1946.
During the pivotal Battle of the Bulge, which
HEAD COACH turned the tide against the Germans and was
Doug Ramsey. the largest land battle of World War II, CPL
ASSISTANT COACHES Degaetano was hit in his leg by shrapnel.
Ken Lanzillotta; Ray Heidorn; Mike I will present CPL Sebastian Degaetano
Kraemer; Craig James; Tim Schira: Matt with the Purple Heart. the oldest military deco-
Eisele; and Pat Good. ration in the world. nearly 50 years overdue.
SENIORS Though he earned this honor, he never re-
No. 34 Eric Andriacco; No. 54 Steve ceived it from the Defense Department and I
Baum; No. 58 Kenny Berling; No. 26 Ryan am honored to have the opportunity to present
Brinck; No. 20 Michael Brown: No. 50 Dave to him the Purple Heart for his selfless devo-
Bullock: No. 68 Alec Burkhart; No. 23
Mark Byrne: No. 5 Charlie Coffaro; No. 71 tion to duty and service to the United States.
Justin Crone; No. 29 Brett Currin; No. 12 /
Rob Florian; No. 84 Kurt Gindling: No. 11 £!CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 2622.
Bradley Glatthaar: No. 99 Alex Harbin. FAIR AND ACCURATE CREDIT
No. 97 Steve Haverkos: No. 70 Chris
Heaton: No. 82 Nick Klaserner: No. 7 Dan TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003
Kraft; No. 48 Joe Lind; No. 47 Pat Lysaght;
No. 53 Corey McKenna: No. 60 Mike Meese;
No. 92 Tim Mercurio: No. 30 Drew Metz;
No. 72 Mark Naltner; No. 28 Alex Niehaus;
No. 21 Billy Phelan: No. 31 Seth Priestle.
No. 65 Nick Rellar; No. 2 Jake Rich-
mond; No. 91 Tony Stegeman; No. 88 Ian
Steidel: No. 9 Mike Stoecklin: No. 45 Tim
Teague: No. 24 John Tiemeier; No. 90 Matt
Umberg; No. 10 Jeff Vogel: No. 16 Eric
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Section 112. Fraud alerts and active duty alerts
The section sets forth a uniform national
consumer protection standard for the proc-
essing of credit and verification procedures
where there is an elevated risk of identity
theft. The section allows certain identity
theft victims and active duty military con-
sumers to direct nationwide consumer re-
porting agencies to include a fraud alert or
active duty alert in each consumer report
furnished on them that can be viewed by
creditors and other users of the report in a
clear and conspicuous manner. Upon receiv-
ing proof of the consumer's identity and the
consumer's request for an alert. the agency
must place the alert in the consumer's file
for a certain time period (or such other time
agreed to upon the request or subsequently)
in a manner facilitating its clear and con-
spicuous viewing. inform the consumer of
the right to request free credit reports with-
in 12 months. provide the consumer with the
disclosures required under section 609 within
3 business days of requesting the disclosures,
and refer the necessary information related
to the alert to the other nationwide credit
reporting agencies. The request must be
made directly by the consumer or by an indi-
vidual acting on their behalf or as their rep-
resentative. This limitation on the request is
intended to allow a consumer's family or
guardian to request an alert for the con-
sumer where appropriate. while preventing
credit repair clinics and similar businesses
from making such requests. Resellers of
credit reports must reconvey any alert they
receive from a consumer reporting agency.
Agencies other than those described in sec-
tion 603(p) must communicate to the con-
sumer how to contact the Commission and
the appropriate agencies.
The national standard creates 3 types of
alerts. A consumer with a good faith sus-
picion that he or she has been or is about to
be a victim of identity theft or other fraud
may request an initial alert. The initial alert
must be placed in the consumer's file for 90
days and the consumer may request one free
credit report within 12 months. If the con-
sumer has an appropriate identity theft re-
port (typically a police. report) alleging that
a transaction was the result of fraud by an-
other person using the consumer's identity,
then the consumer may alternatively re-
quest an extended alert. The agency must
place the extended alert in the consumer's
file for 7 years, inform the consumer of the
right to 2 free credit reports within 12
months, exclude the consumer's name from
lists used to make prescreened offers of cred-
it or insurance for 5 years, and include in the
file the consumer's telephone number (or an-
other reasonable contact method designated
by the consumer). An active duty member of
the military may alternatively request an
active duty alert. which does not imply the
immediate threat of identity theft. but as a
preventative' measure, a nationwide con-
sumer reporting agency must respond to
such a request by placing an active duty
alert in the member's file for one year and
exclude the member from lists used to make
prescreened offers of credit or insurance for
2 years.
Users of consumer reports that contain an
alert cannot establish a new credit plan or
provide certain other types of credit in the
name of a consumer. issue additional cards
at the request of a consumer on an existing
credit account. or grant an increase in a
credit limit requested by the consumer on an
existing credit account, without utilizing
reasonable policies and procedures to form a
reasonable belief of the requester's identity.
In the case of an initial or active duty alert.
if the requester has specified a telephone
number to be used for identity verification.
then the user may contact the consumer
using that number or must take other rea-
sonable steps to verify the requester's iden-
tity and confirm that the request is not the
result of identity theft. In the case of an ex-
tended alert, the user may not grant the re-
quest unless the consumer is contacted ei-
ther in person (such as in a bank branch or
retail store location), by telephone, or
through any another reasonable method pro-
vided by the consumer, to confirm that the
request is not the result of identity theft.
Section 113. Truncation of credit card and debit
card account numbers
This section creates a uniform national
standard requiring businesses that accept
credit or debit cards to truncate the card ac-
count numbers (printing no more than the
last 5 digits) and exclude card expiration
dates on any electronically printed receipts.
This requirement becomes effective 3 years
after enactment for any cash registers in use
on or before January 1. 2005 and 1 year after
enactment for any register put into use after
January 1. 2005. The requirement does not
apply to transactions in which the sole
means of recording the person's credit card
or debit card number is by handwriting or by
an imprint or copy of the card.
Section 114. Establishment ofprocedures for the
identification of possible instances of iden-
tity theft
This section directs the Federal banking
agencies. the National Credit Union Admin-
istration (NCUA), and FTC to jointly formu-
late various red flag gUidelines to help finan-
cial institutions and creditors identify pat-
terns. practices and specific forms of activ-
ity that indicate the possible existence of
identity theft. These agencies also must pre-
scribe regulations creating uniform national
standards for the entities they supervise re-
quiring the entities to establish and adhere
to reasonable policies and procedures for im-
plementing the guidelines. The policies and
procedures established under this section are
not to be inconsistent with the policies and
procedures required by section 326 of the
USA PATRIOT Act. particularly with re-
spect to the identification of new and pro-
spective customers. In issuing regulations
and guidelines under this Act, the Federal
agencies are expected to take into account
the limited personnel and resources avail-
able to smaller institutions and craft such
regulations and guidelines in a manner that
does not unduly burden these smaller insti-
tutions.
The red flag regulations shall include re-
quiring issuers of credit cards and debit
cards who receive a consumer request for an
additional or replacement card for an exist-
ing account within a short period of time
after receiving notification of a change of
address for the same account to follow rea-
sonable policies and procedures to ensure
that the additional or replacement card is
not issued to an identity thief. Specifically,
before issuing a new or replacement card the
issuer must either notify the cardholder of
the request at the cardholder's former ad-
dress and provide a means of promptly re-
porting an incorrect address change; notify
the cardholder of the request in a manner
that the card issuer and the cardholder pre-
Viously agreed to; or otherwise assess the va-
lidity of the cardholder's change of address
in accordance with reasonable policies and
procedures established by the card issuer
pursuant to the :'red flag" guidelines appli-
cable to the card issuer.
The Federal banking agencies. the NCUA
and the FTC also are directed to consider
whether to include in the red flag gUidelines
instructions for institutions to follow when a
transaction occurs on a credit or deposit ac-
count that has been inactive for more than 2
J - 13
years in order to reduce the likelihood of
identity theft.
Section 115. Authority to truncate social secu-
rity numbers
This section allows consumers. upon pro-
viding appropriate proof of identity. to· de-
mand that a consumer reporting agency
truncate the first 5 digits of the consumer's
social security or other identification num-
ber on a consumer report that the consumer
is requesting to receive pursuant to section
609(a) of the FCRA.
Subtitle B- Protection and Restoration of
Identity Theft Victim Credit History
Section 151. Summary of rights of identity theft
victims
This section requires the FTC. in consulta-
tion with the banking agencies and the
NCVA, to prepare a model summary of the
rights of consumers to help them remedy the
effects of fraud or identity theft. Consumer
reporting agencies must provide any con-
sumer contacting them expressing the belief
of identity theft victimization with a sum-
mary of rights containing the information in
the FTC's model summary and the FTC's
contact information for more details. The
section also requires the FTC to develop and
implement a media campaign to prOVide
more information to the public on ways to
prevent identity theft. It is important for
the agencies to let consumers know that
identity thieves target home computers be-
cause they contain a goldmine of personal fi-
nancial information about individuals. In
educating the public about how to avoid be-
coming a victim of identity theft. the FTC
and the federal banking regulators should in-
form consumers about the risks associated
with having an 'always on' InteITlet connec-
tion not secured by a firewall. not protecting
against viruses or other malicious codes.
using peer-to-peer file trading software that
might expose diverse contents of their hard
drives without their knowledge, or failing to
use safe computing practices in general.
The section further includes a provision
creating an obligation to make certain
records of identity theft victims more avail-
able to those victims and law enforcement.
This section requires businesses that enter
into a commercial transaction for consider-
ation with a person who allegedly has made
unauthorized use of a victim's identification
to provide a copy of the application and busi-
ness transaction records evidencing the
transaction under the businesses' control
within 30 days of the victim's request. The
records are to be provided directly to the vic-
tim or to a law enforcement agency author-
ized by the victim to receive the records. The
business can require proof of the identity of
the victim and proof of the claim of identity
theft, including a police report and an affi-
davit of identity theft developed by the FTC
or otherwise acceptable to the business. A
business may decline to provide the records
if in good faith it determines that this sec-
tion does not require it to; it does not have
a high degree of confidence it knows the true
identity of the requester; the request is
based on a relevant misrepresentation of
fact; or the infonnation is navigational data
or similar infonnation about a person's visit
to a website or online service. The business
is not required under this section to retain
any records (the obligation only applies to
applications and transaction records that
the business already is retaining under its
otherwise applicable record retention pol-
icy), nor is it required to provide records
that do not exist or are not reasonably avail-
able (such as those that are not easily re-
trieved. in contrast to records such as peri-
odic statements listing transactions made on
a credit or deposit account that are easily
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retrieved). Businesses are also not reqUired
to produce records not within their direct
control.
Section 152. Blocking of infonnation relating to
identity theft
This section prOVides that a consumer re-
porting agency must block information iden-
tified as resulting from identity theft within
4 business days of receiving from the con-
sumer appropriate proof of identity, a copy
of an identity theft report, an identification
of the fraudulent information, and confirma-
tion that the transaction was not the con-
sumer's. The agency must then promptly no-
tify the furnishers of the information identi-
fied that the information may have resulted
from identity theft, that an identity theft
report has been filed. that a block on report-
ing the information has been requested. and
the effective date of the block.
Section" 153. Coordination of identity theft com-
plaint investigations
This section directs nationwide consumer
reporting agencies to develop and maintain
procedures for referring consumer com-
plaints of identity theft and requests for
blocks or fraud alerts to the other nation-
wide agencies, and to provide the FTC with
an annual summary of this information.
That summary may be a brief description of
the estimated number of calls received per-
taining to identity theft, the number of
fraud alerts requested, and other issues
which may be relevant. The FTC, in con-
sultation with the Federal banking agencies
and the NCUA, is directed to develop model
forms and model standards for identity theft
victims to report fraud to creditors and con-
sumer reporting agencies.
Section 154. Prevention of repollution of con-
sumer reports
This section creates a national standard
governing the duties of furnishers to block
refurnishing information that is allegedly
the result of identity theft. Specifically,
companies that furnish information to a con-
sumer reporting agency are required to es-
tablish reasonable procedures to block the
refurnishing of the information if they have
received a notification from the agency that
the information furnished has been blocked
because it resulted from identity theft. Simi-
larly, if a consumer submits an identity
theft report to a company furnishing infor-
mation to a consumer reporting agency and
states that the information resulted from
identity theft, the furnisher may not furnish
the information to any consumer reporting
agency. unless the furnisher subsequently
knows or is informed by the consumer that
the information is correct.
The section also restricts the sale or trans-
fer of debt caused by identity theft. This pro-
vision applies to any entity collecting a debt
after the date it is appropriately notified
that the debt has resulted from an identity
theft. The entity is then prohibited from
selling. transferring. or placing for collec-
tion the debt that is identity theft-related.
The prohibition does not apply to the repur-
chase of a debt where the assignee of the
debt requires such repurchase because the
debt results from identity theft; the
securitization of debt (public or private) or
the pledge of a portfolio of debt as collateral
in connection with a borrowing: or the trans-
fer of debt as a result of a merger, acquisi-
tion, purchase and assumption transaction
or transfer of substantially all of the assets
of an entity.
Section 155. Notice by debt collectors with re-
spect to fraudulent information
This section requires third-party debt col-
lectors who are notified that the debts they
are attempting to collect may be the result
of identity theft or other fraud to notify the
third party on whose behalf they are col-
lecting the debt that the information may be
the result of identity theft or fraud. The debt
collector must also then, upon the request of
the consumer to whom the debt purportedly
relates, prOVide the consumer with all the in-
formation that the consumer would be enti-
tIed to receive if the information were not
the result of identity theft and the consumer
were disputing the debt under applicable law.
Section 156. Statute oflimitations
This section extends the statute of limita-
tions for violations of the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act. The section requires claims to
be brought within 2 years of the discovery of
the violation (instead of the original stand-
ard of 2 years after the date on which the
violation occurred), but with an outside re-
striction that all claims must be brought
within 5 years of when the violation oc-
curred.
Section 157. Study on the use of technology to
'combat identity theft
This section directs the Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Federal
banking agencies, the FTC. and other speci-
fied public and private sector entities. to
conduct a study of the use of biometrics and
other similar technologies to reduce the in-
cidence of identity theft.
TITLE 11- IMPROVEMENTS IN USE OF
AND CONSUMER ACCESS TO CREDIT IN-
FORMATION
Section 211. Free consumer reports
This section prOVides consumers with new
rights to obtain an annual free consumer re-
port from each of the nationwide credit bu-
reaus (including the nationwide specialty
consumer reporting agencies). With respect
to agencies defined in 603(p), the free report
only has to be provided if the consumer
makes the request through the centralized
source system established for such purpose.
The centralized source shall be established
in accordance with regulations prescribed by
the FTC in a manner to ensure that the con-
sumer may make a single request for the free
reports using a standardized form for mail or
Internet. With respect to the nationwide spe-
cialty consumer reporting agencies (as de-
fined in 603(w». the FTC may prescribe a
streamlined process for consumers to request
their free reports directly from that agency.
which shall include. at minimum, the estab-
lishment of a toll-free telephone number by
each agency, and shall take into account the
costs and benefits to each agency of how re-
quests may be fulfilled and the efficacy of
staggering the availability of requests to re-
duce surges in demand.
The nationwide consumer reporting agen-
cies must provide the report to the consumer
within 15 days. Any disputes raised by a con-
sumer who receives a free report under this
section must be reinvestigated within 45
days after the consumer raises the dispute,
which is a IS-day increase over the 30-day re-
investigation time frame that would other-
wise apply. The new right to free reports
shall not apply to any agency that has not
been furnishing consumer reports to third
parties on a continuing basis for the 12
months previous to a request. This exclusion
is intended to allow credit bureaus that have
just begun to fully operate on a nationwide
basis (as defined in section 603{p) and (w» a
window of time to ramp up for at least 12
straight months before being subjected to
the costs of complying with free requests
under this section. The FTC is directed to
prescribe regulations preventing consumer
reporting agencies from avoiding being
treated as an agency defined in section 603(p)
by manipulating their corporate structure or
consumer records in a manner that allows
them to operate with essentially identical
activities but for a technical difference.
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In addition. the FTC is directed to prepare
a model summary of the rights of consumers
under the FeRA, including: the right to ob-
tain a free consumer report annually and the
method of doing so. the right to dispute in-
formation in" the consumer's credit file, and
the right to obtain a credit score and the
method of doing so. The FTC is further di-
rected to actively publicize the availability
of the summary of rights. and make the sum-
mary available to consumers promptly upon
request.
Section 212. Disclosure ofcredit scores
This section establishes a Federal standard
governing the provision of credit scores to
consumers. Consumer reporting agencies are
reqUired to make available to consumers
upon request (for a reasonable fee that the
FTC shall prescribe) the consumer's current
or most recently calculated credit score, as
well as the range of scores possible, the top
4 factors that negatively affected the score.
the date the score was created, and the name
of the company prOViding the underlying file
or score. The disclosure of the top factors is
intended to be consistent with the provisions
of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)
requiring a creditor making an adverse ac-
tion to disclose the principal reasons in a
credit score that most contributed to the ad-
verse action. Credit scores are to be derived
from models that are widely distributed in
connection with mortgage loans or more
general models that assist consumers in un-
derstanding credit scoring. and must include
a disclosure to the consumer stating that the
information and credit scoring model may be
different than that used by a particular lend-
er.
Credit scores do not include mortgage
scores or automated underwriting systems
that consider factors other than credit infor-
mation. such as loan to value ratio. Con-
sumer reporting agencies that do not dis-
tribute credit scores in connection with resi-
dential mortgage lending or develop scores
in connection with assisting credit providers
in understanding a consumer's general credit
behavior and predicting the future credit be-
havior of the consumer are not required to
develop or disclose any scores under this sec-
tion. Consumer reporting agencies that dis-
tribute scores developed by others are not re-
quired to provide further explanation of
them or to process related disputes, other
than by providing the consumer with contact
information regarding the person who devel-
oped the score or its methodology. unless the
agency has further developed or modified the
score itself. Consumer reporting agencies are
not required to maintain c~edit scores in
their files.
If a consumer applies for a mortgage loan.
and the mortgage lender uses a credit score
in connection with an application by the
consumer for a closed end loan or establish-
ment of an open end consumer loan secured
by 1 to 4 units of residential real property,
then the mortgage lender is reqUired to pro-
vide the consumer with a free copy of the
consumer's credit score. In addition. the
lender must provide a copy of the informa-
tion on the range of scores possible. the top
4 negative key factors used, the date the
score was created. and the name of the com-
pany providing the underlying file or score.
to the extent that the information is ob-
tained from a consumer reporting agency or
developed and used by the lender. A lender is
not required to prOVide a proprietary credit
score. but instead may provide a Widely dis-
tributed credit score for the consumer to-
gether with the relevant explanatory infor-
mation regarding the consumer's credit
score. Beyond the information prOVided to
the lender by a third party score provider.
the lender is only required to provide a no-
tice to the home loan applicant. This notice
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includes the contact information of each
agency providing the credit score used. and
provides specific language to be disclosed to
educate consumers about the use and mean-
ing of their credit scores and how to ensure
their accuracy.
A mortgage lender that uses an automated
underwriting system to underwrite a loan or
otherwise obtains a credit score from some-
one other than a consumer reporting agency
may satisfy their obligation to provide the
consumer with a credit score by disclosing a
credit score and associated key factors sup-
plied by a consumer reporting agency. How-
ever. if the lender uses a numerical credit
score generated by an automated under-
writing system used by the Federal National
Mortgage Association or the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation or their affili-
ates. and the score is disclosed to the lender,
then that score must be disclosed by the
lender to the consumer.
Mortgage lenders are not required by this
section to explain the credit score and the
related copy of information provided to the
consumer. to disclose any information other
than the credit score or negative key factor,
disclose any credit score or related informa-
tion obtained by the lender after a loan has
closed. prOVide more than 1 disclosure per
loan transaction. or prOVide an additional
score disclosure when another Person has al-
ready made the disclosure to the consumer
for that loan transaction.
The only obligation for a mortgage lender
providing a credit score under this section is
to provide a copy of the infonnation used
and received from the consumer reporting
agency. A mortgage lender is not liable for
the content of that information or the omis-
sion of any information in the report pro-
vided by the agency. This section and the re-
quirement for mortgage lenders to provide
credit scores do not apply to the Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association or the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or their
affiliates.
Any provision in a contract prohibiting the
disclosure of credit scores by a person who
makes or arranges loans or a consumer re-
porting agency is void, and a lender will not
have liability under any contractual provi-
sion for disclosure of a credit score pursuant
to this section.
This section also amends section 605 of the
FCRA to prOVide that if a consumer report-
ing agency furnishes a consumer report that
contains any credit score or other risk score
or other predictor. the report must include a
clear and conspicuous statement that the
number of enquiries was a key factor (as de-
fined in section 609(e)(2)(B» that adversely
affected a credit score or other risk score or
predictor if that predictor was in fact one of
the key factors that most adversely affected
a credit score. This statement will be made
in those instances in which the number of
enquiries had an influence on the consumer·s
credit score. and it will thus alert a user of
the consumer report when the number of
enquiries has had an adverse effect on the
consumer's credit score.
This section's technical and conforming
amendments clarify the application of cer-
tain Federal standards. State laws are pre-
empted with respect to any disclosures re-
qUired to be made as a result of various pro-
visions of the FACT Act. including the sum-
mary of rights to obtain and dispute infor-
mation in consumer reports and to obtain
credit scores. the summary of rights of iden-
tity theft victims. prOViding information to
victims of identity theft, and prOViding cred-
it score and mortgage score disclosures
under this section. except for certain State
laws governing credit score disclosures that
are grandfathered. State laws that regulate
the disclosure of credit-based insurance
scores in an insurance activity are similarly
not preempted by the requirements of those
specific provisions. State laws governing the
frequency of credit report disclosures are
also preempted. except for certain specific
grandfathered laws.
Section 213. Enhanced disclosure of the means
available to opt out ofprescreened lists
This section relates to the disclosure that
has to be provided in connection with a
prescreened offer of credit or insurance using
a consumer's credit report. This section pro-
vides that the disclosure must include the
address and toll-free number for the con-
sumer to request exclusion from certain
prescreened lists and must be presented in a
fonnat. type size, and manner that is simple
and easy for reasonable consumers to under-
stand. The FTC, in consultation with the
Federal banking agencies and the NCVA,
shall establish regulatory guidance con-
cerning the format of the disclosure within
one year of enactment. The length of time a
consumer can request to be excluded from
lists for prescreened solicitations is in-
creased by this section from 2 years to 5
years. The FTC is directed to publicize on its
website how consumers can opt-out of
prescreened offers (including through the
telephone number now reqUired) and under-
take additional measures to increase public
awareness of this right. The Federal Reserve
Board is directed to study and report to Con-
gress on the ability of consumers to opt out
of receiving unsolicited written offers of
credit or insurance and the impact further
restrictions on these offers would have on
consumers.
Section 214. Affiliate sharing
This section adds a new Section 624 to the
FCRA creating a uniform national standard
for regulating the use and exchange of infor-
mation by affiliated entities. While affiliates
are allowed to share information without
limitation. they may not use certain shared
information to make certain marketing so-
licitations without the consumer receiving a
notice and an option to opt-out of receiving
those solicitations. Specifically, an entity
that receives certain consumer report or ex-
perience information from an affiliate that
would be a ··consumer report" except for the
FCRA's affiliate sharing exceptions may not
use that information to make a marketing
solicitation to the consumer about the prod-
ucts or services of that entity. unless it is
clearly and conspicuously disclosed to the
consumer that information shared among af-
filiates may be used for marketing purposes
and the consumer is given an opportunity
and simple method to opt out of those mar-
keting solicitations. The notice must allow
the consumer to prohibit those types of mar-
keting solicitations based on that affiliate's
information. but also may allow the con-
sumer to choose from different options when
opting out.
The opt-out notice may be prOVided to the
consumer together with disclosures required
by any other provision of law, such as the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act or other informa-
tion sharing notices reqUired under FCRA.
This provision (as well as a parallel coordi-
nation and consolidation provision in the
rulemaking directions to the regulators) is
intended to allow an entity to time its no-
tice to a consumer (after the effective date
of the regulations) in the next regularly
scheduled mailing to that consumer of other
legally required notices. This coordination
and consolidation is intended to reduce con-
sumer confusion and avoid duplicative no-
tices and disclosures.
The consumer's election to opt out is effec-
tive for at least five years. beginning on the
date the person receives the consumer's elec-
tion. unless the consumer revokes the opt
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out or requests a different mutually agree-
~ble period. After the expiration of the five-
year period. the consumer must receive an-
other notice and similar opt-out opportunity
before the affiliate can send another covered
marketing solicitation to the consumer.
There are a number of exceptions to the
limitations on the use of affiliate informa-
tion for marketing solicitations, where no-
tice and opt out are not required. For exam-
ple. the notice and opt-out do not apply to
an entity using affiliate information to
make a marketing solicitation to a con-
sumer if the enti~ already has a pre-exist-
ing business relationship with that con-
sumer. An entity that has a pre-existing
business relationship with the consumer can
send a marketing solicitation to that con-
sumer on its own behalf or on behalf of an-
other affiliate. For the purposes of deter-
mining a pre-existing business relationship,
an entity and· the entity·s licensed agent
(such as an insurance or securities agent or
broker) are treated as a single entity. with
the pre-existing business relationships of one
imputed to the other.
A pre-existing business relationship exists
between an entity and a consumer when,
within the previous 18 months. the consumer
has purchased. rented, or leased goods or
services from the entity, or where some
other continuing relationship exists between
the consumer and the entlty- for example
where a financial transaction has been made
with respect to the consumer. where the con-
sumer has an active account (such as an un-
expired credit card), or where the consumer
has an in-force policy or contract. The term
·'active account" is intended to include any
account where continuing legal obligations
are in-force (such as a multi-year certificate
of deposit) or for which a consumer regularly
or periodically receives statements (even if
there have been no recent transactions) such
as a securities brokerage, bank. or variable
annuity account. A pre-existing business re-
lationship also exists when the consumer
makes an inquiry or application regarding
the entity·s products or services during the
three-month period immediately preceding
the date on which the consumer is sent a so-
licitation. The financial functional regu-
1ators and the FTC are allowed to create fur-
ther categories of pre-existing business rela-
tionships. which is in part intended to build
upon the extensive recognition of customer
relationships in existing regulations and
guidance issued by the regulators under the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
In addition to the pre-existing relationship
exception. the notice and opt-out require-
ments do ·not apply to a person using infor-
mation to facilitate communications with an
individual for whose benefit the person pro-
vides employee benefit or other services pur-
suant to a contract with an employer related
to and arising .. out of the current employ-
ment relationship of the individual partici-
pant or beneficiary of an employee benefit
plan. The requirements also do not apply to
the use of affiliate information to perform
services on behalf of an affiliate. unless the
affiliate could not send the solicitation itself
because of a consumer opt out. Thus, an af-
filiate cannot act as a servicer for another
affiliate and send out solicitations for its
own products or services to a consumer who
has opted out of receiving such solicitations.
However. an entity can send a marketing so-
licitation on behalf of an affiliate that has a
pre-existing business relationship with the
consumer regarding the products or services
of that affiliate or another affiliate. Further-
more, the notice and opt-out do not apply to
a person using information in response to a
communication initiated by the consumer,
to a consumer request about a product or
service, or to solicitations authorized or re-
quested by the consumer. Additionally, the
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notice and opt-out are not reqUired where
they would conflict with any provision of
State insurance law related to unfair dis-
crimination. This last exception is in part
intended to enable insurers and agents to
continue full compliance nationwide with
State laws prohibiting insurers from dis-
criminating against similar risks or placing
similar risks in different rating programs,
laws that provide for "mutual exclusivity".
and "best rate" laws that may reqUire insur-
ers to provide customers with the best quali-
fied rates from among their affiliated enti-
ties.
These provisions governing the exchange
and use of information among affiliates do
not apply to information used to make mar-
keting solicitations if that infonnation was
shared into a common database or received
by any individual affiliate before the effec-
tive date of the regulations implementing
this section. Furthermore, the section makes
clear that any State law that relates to the
exchange and use of information to make a
solicitation for marketing purposes is pre-
empted.
The Federal banking agencies, the NCUA.
the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). and the FTC are directed to prescribe
regulations to implement this new section.
To the extent that the section is applicable
to insurers. it is intended that any enforce-
ment of FCRA would continue to be per-
formed by the State insurance departments.
The Federal agencies also must jointly con-
duct regular studies of the information shar-
ing practices of affiliates of financial institu-
tions and other persons who are creditors or
users of consumer reports to examine how
that information is used to make credit un-
derwriting decisions regarding consumers.
Finally. the section includes a technical
and conforming amendment to Section
603(d)(2)(A) of the FCRA. This amendment is
simply intended to integrate the new Section
624 into the FCRA and does not affect the
definition of a "consumer report."
Section 2J5. Study of the effects of credit scores
and credit-based insurance scores on avail-
ability and affordability of financial prod-
ucts.
Section 215 requires the FTC and the Board
to study the use of credit scores and credit-
based insurance scores on the availability
and affordability of financial products.
Section 216. Disposal of consumer credit infor-
mation
Section 216 directs the Federal banking
agenCies. the NCUA. the SEC and the FTC to
issue regulations requiring the appropriate
classes of persons that maintain or possess
consumer information "derived" from credit
reports to properly dispose of such records.
The provision clarifies that it does not apply
to other types of information· (other than
consumer report information) and does not
impose an obligation to maintain or destroy
any infonnation that is not imposed under
other laws. The provision does not alter or
affect any such requirement, either.
TITLE III- ENHANCING THE ACCURACY
OF CONSUMER REPORT INFORMATION
Section 311. Risk-based pricing notice
This section establishes a new notice re-
qUirement for creditors that use consumer
report information in connection with a
risk-based credit underwriting process for
new credit customers. If a creditor grants
credit to a new credit customer "on material
terms that are materially less favorable than
the most favorable terms available to a sub-
stantial proportion of [the creditor's other
new] consumers" based on information from
a consumer report, the creditor must give
the consumer a notice stating that the terms
offered to the consumer are based on infor-
mation from a consumer report. Nothing in
the section, however. precludes a creditor
from prOViding such a notice to all of its new
credit customers, such as in a loan approval
letter or other communication that the cred-
it has been granted. Such a notice is not re-
qUired, however. if the consumer applied for
specific material terms and was granted
those terms and those terms are not changed
after the consumer responds to the credit
offer. Also. such a notice is not reqUired if
the person has prOVided or will provide an
adverse action notice pursuant to section
615(a) of the FCRA in connection with an ap-
plication that is declined. In addition. the
creditor is provided with flexibility in the
timing of prOViding such notice, which can
be given to the consumer at the time of ap-
plication for credit or. at communication of
loan approval. except where the regulations
issued under this section specifically require
otherwise.
The notice is intended to be a concise no-
tice that includes: a statement that the
terms offered are based on information from
a consumer report: the name of a consumer
reporting agency used by the creditor; a
statement that the consumer may receive a
free consumer report from that consumer re-
porting agency; and the consumer reporting
agency's contact information for obtaining a
free credit report. The creditor is not re-
quired to tell the consumer that it has taken
or may take any unfavorable action. only
that it used or will use credit reporting in-
formation in the underwriting process.
The FTC and FRB are directed to jointly
prescribe Ttl les to carry out this section. The
rules are to address the form, content, time
and manner of delivery of the notice; the
meaning of the terms used in the section: ex-
ceptions to the notice requirement: and a
model notice. The section provides creditors
with a safe harbor if they maintain reason-
able policies and procedures for compliance.
and the section is only subject to adminis-
trative enforcement by the appropriate Fed-
eral agenCies.
This section also adds a national uni-
formity provision prohibiting any Stc:':te from
imposing a requirement or prohibition relat-
ing to the duties of users of consumer re-
ports to provide notice with respect to cer-
tain credit transactions.
Section 312. Procedures to enhance the accuracy
and integrity of infonnation furnished to
consumer reporting agendes
This section directs the Federal banking
agenCies, the NCUA and the FTC, with re-
spect to entities subject to their respective
enforcement authority and in consultation
and coordination with one another, to estab-
lish and maintain gUidelines for use by fur-
nishers to enhance the accuracy and integ-
rity of the infonnation they furnish to con-
sumer reporting agencies. .,Accuracy and in-
tegrity" was selected as the relevant stand-
ard, rather than "accuracy and complete-
ness" as used in sections 313 and 319. to focus
on the quality of the information furnished
rather than the completeness of the informa-
tion furnished. The agencies also are di-
rected to prescribe regulations requiring fur-
nishers to establish reasonable policies and
procedures for implementing the new guide-
lines. In developing the gUidelines. the agen-
cies are instructed to: identify patterns.
practices and specific forms of activity that
can compromise the accuracy and integrity
of the information furnished; review the
methods used to furnish information; deter-
mine whether furnishers maintain and en-
force policies to assure the accuracy and in-
tegrity of information furnished to consumer
reporting agencies; and examine the policies
and processes that furnishers employ to con-
duct investigations and correct inaccurate
information.
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In addition. this section modifies the
standard in the FCRA regarding the duty of
furnishers to prOVide accurate information.
The FCRA prohibits furnishers from report-
ing information with knowledge that it is
not accurate. The standard in section
623(a)(I) of the FCRA. "knows or consciously
avoids knowing that the information is inac-
curate." is amended to "knows or has rea-
sonable cause to believe that the informa-
tion is inaccurate." This section defines the
new standard, "knows or has reasonable
cause to believe that the information is inac-
curate," to mean "having specific knowl-
edge. other than solely allegations by the
consumer, that would cause a reasonable
person to have substantial doubts about the
accuracy of the information."
This section also enables a consumer to
dispute the accuracy of the information fur-
nished to a nationwide consumer reporting
agency directly with a furnisher under cer-
tain circumstances. Specifically. the Federal
banking agenCies. the NCUA and the FTC are
reqUired tojointly prescribe regulations that
identify the circumstances under which a
furnisher is required to reinvestigate a dis-
pute concerning the accuracy of infonnation
contained in a consumer report, based on the
consumer's request submitted directly to the
furnisher. rather than through the consumer
reporting agency. While the section author-
izes a consumer to submit a dispute directly
to a furnisher, it is not to be used by credit
repair clinics to submit disputes on behalf of
one or more consumers.
In developing the regulations reqUired by
this section. the regulators are directed to
weigh the benefits to consumers against the
costs on furnishers and the credit reporting
system; the impact on the ov.erall accuracy
and integrity of consumer reports of reqUir-
ing furnishers to reinvestigate disputes
brought directly by consumers; whether di-
rect contact by the consumer with the fur-
nisher would likely result in the most expe-
ditious resolution of any such dispute; and
the potential impact on the credit reporting
system if credit repair organizations are able
to circumvent the prohibition on their sub-
mission of disputes on behalf of one or more
consumers,
A consumer who seeks to dispute the accu-
racy of information directly with a furnisher
must: prOVide a dispute notice directly to
such person at the mailing address specified
by the person: identify the specific informa-
tion disputed; explain the basis for the dis-
pute: and include all supporting documenta-
tion required by the furnisher to substan-
tiate the basis of the dispute. Upon receipt of
a consumer's notice of dispute. the furnisher
has specified responsibilities. The furnisher
must: conduct an investigation of the dis-
puted information; review all relevant infor-
mation provided by the consumer with the
notice; and complete the investigation and
report the results to the consumer before the
expiration of the period under section
611(a)(1) "within which a consumer reporting
agency would be reqUired to complete its ac-
tion if the consumer had elected to dispute
the information under that section." Accord-
ingly. for example. where the agency would
have 30 days to complete the investigation of
disputes regarding a consumer report ob-
tained .by the consumer follOWing receipt of
an adverse action notice. the furnisher would
have 30 days as well. Similarly. where the
consumer reporting agency has 45 days to
complete a reinvestigation of a consumer
dispute because the consumer has requested
a consumer report through the centralized
system under section 612, a furnisher also
would have the 45 days to complete an inves-
tigation if the consumer has requested a con-
sumer report through the centralized system
and then disputed information on that con-
sumer report directly with the furnisher. In
December 8, 2003 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- Extensions of Remarks E2517
addition. if the investigation finds that the
information reported was inaccurate, the
furnisher must promptly notify each con-
sumer reporting agency to which informa-
tion was furnished and provide the agency
with any correction necessary to make the
information accurate.
The fUnlisher requirements do not apply if
the person receiving a notice of a dispute di-
rectly from a consumer reasonably deter-
mines that the dispute is frivolous or irrele-
vant. Upon making such a determination.
the person must notify the consumer of this
de"termination wi"thin five business days
after making the determination. by mail. or
if authorized by the consumer for that pur-
pose, by any other means available to the
person. The notice prOVided to the consumer
must include the reasons for the detennina-
tion. and identification of any information
required to investigate the disputed infonna-
tion. which may consist of a standardized
form describing the general nature of the in-
formation.
This section also amends section 623(a) (5)
of the FCRA to prOVide that a person that
furnishes information to a consumer report-
ing agency regarding a delinquent account
may rely upon the date prOVided by the enti-
ty to whom the account was owed at the
time that the delinquency occurred. so long
as a consumer has not disputed such infor-
mation.
Section 623 of the FCRA also is amended to
clarify liability and enforcement under the
FCRA. Specifically. the new requirements
imposed upon furnishers of information are
subject to administrative enforcement. not
private rights of action. Section 623 is
amended by prOViding that "Except as pro-
vided in section 62l(c)(1)(B). sections 616 and
611 do not apply to any violation of" the fur-
nisher responsibilities under section 623(a),
the accuracy guidelines and regulations
under section 623(e) and the red flag guide-
lines and regulations and the requirements
dealing with the prohibition of the sale or
transfer of a debt caused by identity theft
under sections 615(e) or (f) respectively. As a
result. the various sections cited in section
312(e) will be subject to the administrative
enforcement mechanisms prOVided under the
FCRA. and such mechanisms represent the
exclusive remedy for violations of such sec-
tions. A similar rule applies to any other
section of the legislation that limits enforce-
ment remedies to those administrative rem-
edies set forth under the FCRA. including
section 151. which adds a new section 609(e)
relating to assistance to identity theft vic-
tims.
Section 313. FTC and consumer reporting agen-
cy action concerning complaints
This section directs the FTC to compile a
record of complaints against nationwide con-
sumer reporting agencies. If a complaint is
received by the FTC about the accuracy or
completeness of information maintained by
a consumer reporting agency. the FTC must
transmit the complaint to the consumer re-
porting agency for response. Each nation-
wide consumer reporting agency under sec-
tion 603(p) that receives a complaint from
the FTC must: review the complaint to de-
termine if the agency has met all legal obli-
gations imposed under the FCRA; report to
the FTC the determinations and actions
taken by the agency with respect to the
complaint: and maintain. for a reasonable
time. records regarding the disposition of
such complaint in a manner sufficient to
demonstrate compliance with the FCRA.
In addition, the FTC and the Board are di-
rected to study and report jointly on the per-
formance of consumer reporting agencies
and furnishers of credit reporting informa-
tion in complying with the FCRA's proce-
dures and time frames for the prompt inves-
tigation and correction of disputed informa-
tion in a consumer's credit file.
Section 314. Improved disclosure of the results of
reinvestigation
This section amends sections 611 and 623 of
the FCRA to require consumer reporting
agencies to promptly delete information
from a consumer's file. or modify that item
of information as appropriate. if the infor-
mation is found to be inaccurate. and to
promptly notify the fUnlisher of that infor-
mation that the information has been modi-
fied or deleted from the consumer's file. In
addition. this section requires that fur-
nishers. upon completion of a reinvestiga-
tion. if the information is found to be inac-
curate or incomplete or cannot be verified,
must. for purposes of subsequently reporting
to a consumer reporting agency, modify the
item of information. delete the information,
or block the reporting of the information.
Section 315. Reconciling addresses
This section amends section 605 of the
FCRA to require a nationwide consumer re-
porting agency under section 603(P). when it
provides a consumer report, to inform the
user requesting that report if the request re-
ceived from the user includes an address for
the consumer that subs"tantially differs from
the addresses in the file of the consumer.
The Federal banking agencies. the NCVA and
the FTC are directed to prescribe regulations
regarding reasonable policies and procedures
that users of consumer reports within the
agencies' respective enforcementjurisdiction
should employ when they receive notice of
an address discrepancy. These regulations
are to describe reasonable policies and proce-
dures that a user may employ to fonn a rea-
sonable belief that the user knows the iden-
tity of the person to whom the consumer re-
port pertains and. if the user establishes a
continuing relationship with the consumer,
to furnish the consumer reporting agency
with the appropriate address. as part of in-
formation that the user regularly fUnlishes
for the period in which the relationship is es-
tablished.
Section 316. Notice ofdispute through reselJer
This section amends section 611 of the
FCRA to require consumer reporting agen-
cies to reinvestigate consumer disputes for-
warded to them by resellers of consumer re-
ports. Furthermore. if a reseller receives no-
tice from a consumer of a dispute concerning
the accuracy or completeness of any item of
information contained in a consumer report,
the reseller must. within five business days
and free of charge. determine the accuracy
or completeness of the information in ques-
tion and either correct or delete it, if it is
the reseller's error. within 20 days after re-
ceiving the notice. or convey the notice of
dispute with any relevant information to
each consumer reporting agency that pro-
vided the information that is the subject of
the dispute. if the error is not the reseller's.
In the latter circumstance, the consumer re-
porting agency must report the results of its
reinvestigation to the reseller that conveyed
the notice. and the reseller must then re-
convey the notice to the consumer imme-
diately.
Section 317. Reasonable reinvestigation required
This section amends section 611 of the
FCRA to prOVide that when a consumer dis-
putes the accuracy of information contained
in a consumer report. the consumer report-
ing agency that prepared the report must
conduct a reasonable investigation free of
charge to determine whether the disputed in-
formation is inaccurate.
J - 17
Section 318. FTC study of issues relating to the
Fair Credit Reporting Act
This section requires the FTC to study and
report to Congress within one of the date of
enactment of the FACT Act on ways to im-
prove the operation of the FCRA. The FTC is
directed to study and report on: the efficacy
of increasing the number of points of identi-
fying information that a credit reporting
agency must match before releasing a con-
sumer report; the extent to which requiring
additional points of identifying information
to match would enhance the accuracy of
credit reports and combat the provision of
incorrect consumer reports to users; the ex-
tent to which requiring an exact match of
first and last name, social security number
and address and ZIP Code of the consumer
would enhance the likelihood of increasing
the accuracy of credit reports; and the ef-
fects of allowing consumer reporting agen-
cies to use partial matches of social security
numbers and name recognition software. The
FTC also must report on the impact of pro-
viding independent notification to con-
sumers when negative information is in-
cluded in their credit reports. and to con-
sider the effects of requiring that consumers
who experience adverse actions receive a
copy of the same credit report used by the
creditor in taking the adverse action. Fi-
nally. the FTC is to study and report on
common financial transactions not generally
reported to consumer reporting agencies
that may bear on creditworthiness, and pos-
sible actions to encourage the reporting of
such transactions within a voluntary sys-
tem.
Section 319. FTC study of the accuracy of con-
sumer reports
This section directs the FTC to conduct an
ongoing study of the accuracy and complete-
ness of information contained in consumer
reports. and to submit interim reports and a
final report to Congress on its findings and
conclusions, together with recommendations
for legislative and administrative action.
TITLE IV- LIMITING THE USE AND SHAR-
ING OF MEDICAL INFORMATION IN THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Section 411. Protection ofmedical information in
the financial system
Section 411 amends section 604 of the
FCRA to generally prohibit a consumer re-
porting agency from prOViding credit reports
that contain medical infonnation for em-
ployment purposes or in connection with a
credit or insurance transaction (including
annuities). Medical information may be in-
cluded in a report as part of an insurance
transaction only with the consumer·s affirm-
ative consent. Medical information may be
included in a report for employment or cred-
it purposes only where the information is
relevant for purposes of processing or ap-
proving employment or credit requested by
the consumer and the consumer has prOVided
specific written consent. or if the informa-
tion meets certain specific requirements and
is restricted or reported using codes that do
not identify or infer the specific provider or
nature of the services. products, or devices
to anyone other than the consumer.
In general, creditors are. prohibited from
obtaining or using medical information in
connection with any determination of a con-
sumer·s eligibility for credit. Certain excep-
tions are provided where authorized by Fed-
eral law. for insurance activities (including
annuities). and where determined to be nec-
essary and appropriate by a regulation or
order of the FTC or a financial regulator (in-
cluding the State insurance authorities).
Any person who receives medical informa-
tion through any of the exceptions of this
section is prohibited from further disclosure
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of the information to any other person. ex-
cept as necessary to carry out the purpose
for which it was originally disclosed or as
otherwise permitted by law. The Federal
banking agencies and the NCUA are directed
to prescribe regulations that are necessary
and appropriate to protect legitimate busi-
ness needs with respect to the use of medical
information in the credit granting process.
including allowing appropriate sharing for
verifying certain transactions as well as for
debt cancellation contracts, debt suspension
agreements, and credit insUrance that are
generally not intended to be restricted by
this provision.
This section further amends section 603(d)
of the FCRA to restrict the disclosure among
affiliates of consumer reports that are med-
ical information except as provided in the
exceptions above. SPecifically. the exclu-
sions from the term "consumer report" in
section 603(d){2) (e.g., sharing among affili-
ates of transaction and experience informa-
tion) do not apply if the information is med-
ical information, an individualized list or de-
scription based specifically on the payment
transactions of the consumer for medical
products and services, or an aggregate list of
consumers identified based on their payment
transactions for medical products or serv-
ices. The section also creates a new defini-
tion for the term ""medical information". de-
fining it as information derived through a
health care prOVider with respect to an indi-
vidual consumer relating to the individual's
past. present. or future physical, mental. or
behavioral health, the provision of health
care to the individual, or the payment for
the provision of health care to the indi-
vidual. The definition specifically excludes
information that is age, gender. demographic
information (including addresses). or other
information unrelated to the individual con-
sumer"s physical, mental. or behavioral
health.
Section 412. Confidentiality of medical contact
infonnation in consumer reports
Section 412 requires furnishers whose pri-
mary business is prOViding medical services,
products. or devices to notify the consumer
reporting agencies of their status as a med-
ical information furnisher for purposes of
compliance with the medical information
coding requirements. Once an entity notifies
a consumer reporting agency of its status as
a medical information furnisher, the agency
may not include in a consumer report the
furnisher's name. address, or telephone num-
ber unless that contact information is en-
coded in a manner that does not identifY' or
infer to anyone other than the consumer the
specific company or the nature of the med-
ical services, products. or devices provided.
An exception is prOVided for consumer re-
ports provided to insurance companies for in-
surance activities (including annuities)
other than property and casualty insurance.
The encoding requirement for medical infor-
mation furnisher contact information ap-
plies regardless of the dollar amounts in-
volved.
TITLE V- FINANCIAL LITERACY AND
EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT
Section 511. Short title
,This section establishes the short title of
"Financial Literacy and Education Improve-
ment Act."
Section 512. Defmitions
This section defines the terms "Chair-
person" and "Commission" for purposes of
this title.
Section 513. Establishment ofFinancial Literacy
and Education Commission
This section establishes the Financial Lit-
eracy and Education Commission with the
Secretary of the Treasury as the Chair-
Person. The section sets forth the member-
ship of the Commission to include federal
agencies with significant financial literacy
programs. and authorizes the President to
designate up to five additional members. The
Commission is required to meet at least once
every four months and all such meetings
shall be open to the public. The initial meet-
ing shall take place not later than 60 days
after the date of enactment of the FACT Act.
Section 514. Duties of the Commission
This section sets forth the duties of the
Commission to, among other things. review
financial literacy and education efforts
throughout the federal government; to iden-
tify and eliminate duplicative federal finan-
cial literacy efforts; to coordinate the pro-
motion of federal financial literacy efforts
including outreach between federal. state
and local governments, non-profit organiza-
tions and private enterprises: to increase
awareness and improve development and dis-
tribution of multilingual financial literacy
and education materials: to improve finan-
cial literacy and education through all other
related skills, including personal finance and
related economic education: to develop and
implement within 18 months a national
strategy to promote financial literacy and
education among all Americans: and to issue
a report. the Strategy for Assuring Financial
Empowerment ("SAFE Strategy"). to Con-
gress within the first 18 months of the Com-
mission's first meeting and annually there-
after. on the progress of the Commission in
carrying out this title. The Commission also
shall establish a website and a toll-free num-
ber as a one-stop-shop for all federal finan-
cial literacy programs. The Commission's
Chairperson is required to provide annual
testimony to the relevant congressional
committees.
Section 515. Powers of the Commission
This section authorizes the Commission to
hold hearings and receive testimony as nec-
essary to carry out the title: to receive infor-
mation directly from any Federal depart-
ment or agency: to undertake periodic stud-
ies regarding the state of financial literacy:
and to take any action to develop and pro-
mote financial literacy and education mate-
rials in languages other than English, as the
Commission deems appropriate.
Section 516. Commission personnel matters
This section prOVides that members of the
Commission shall serve without compensa-
tion in addition to that received for their
primary duties. however. the Commission
may pay for travel expenses of members for
official duties of the Commission. In addi-
tion. the Director of the Office of Financial
Education of the Treasury Department shall
provide assistance to the Commission. The
section also permits federal employees to be
detailed to the Commission.
Section 517. Studies by the Comptroller General
This section mandates that the General
Accounting Office (GAO) submit a report to
Congress not later than 3 years after the
date of enactment of the FACT Act on the
effectiveness of the Commission. and con-
duct a separate study to assess the extent of
consumers" knowledge and awareness of
credit reports. credit scores, and the dispute
resolution process. and on methods for im-
proving financial literacy. The GAO is re-
quired to report the findings and conclusions
of this study to Congress within a year of the
date of enactment.
Section 518. The national public service multi-
media campaign to enhance the state of fi-
nancial literacy
This section directs the Secretary of the
Treasury. after review of the recommenda-
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tions of the Financial Literacy and Edu-
cation Commission. to develop. in consulta-
tion with nonprofit. public. or private orga-
nizations, a pilot national public service
multimedia campaign to enhance the state
of financial literacy and education in the
U.S. The campaign is reqUired to be con-
sistent with the national strategy developed
pursuant to section 514, and to promote the
toll-free telephone and the website reqUired
by that section.
The Secretary shall develop measures to
evaluate the performance of the public serv-
ice campaign for each fiscal year for which
there are appropriations, and shall submit a
report to the Committee on Banking. Hous-
ing. and Urban Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate and the Com-
mittee on Financial Services and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives. describing the status and
implementation of the provisions of this sec-
tion and the state of financial literacy and
education in the United States. Appropria-
tions of $3 million are authorized for fiscal
years 2004, 2005. and 2006. for the develop-
ment, production. and distribution of the
pilot national public service multimedia
campaign.
Section 519. Authorization ofappropriations
This section authorizes appropriations to
the Commission of such sums as may be nec-
essary to carry out this title. including ad-
ministrative expenses.
TITLE VI- PROTECTING EMPLOYEE
MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS
Section 611. Certain employee investigation com-
munications excluded from definition of
consumer report
This title amends section 603 of the FCRA
to prOVide that communications to an. em-
ployer by an outside third party retained to
investigate suspected workplace misconduct
or compliance with legal requirements or
with the employer's preexisting written poli-
cies do not constitute a'"consumer report"
for purposes· of the FCRA. This provision is
intended to address the ill effects of certain
regulatory guidance issued by the FTC staff
in 1999 that had the unintended consequence
of deterring employers from using outside
firms to investigate alleged employee mis-
conduct, including racial discrimination and
sexual harassment claims. Employers that
take an adverse action based on the commu-
nication by the outside investigative agency,
however. continue to be reqUired to disclose
to the employee a summary of the nature
and substance of the communication, al-
though certain sources of information are
protected from disclosure. In particular, the
disclosure duty is not intended to require
violation of any confidentiality obligations,
such as confidentiality requirements regard-
ing an individual's medical or other private
information (social security number, home
residence. etc.). or privileges, such as doctor-
patient. attorney-client, or state secrets.
TITLE VII- RELATION TO STATE LAWS
Section 711. Relation to state laws
Section 711 eliminates the January 1, 2004
sunset of the uniform national consumer
protection standards contained in current
law and makes those preemptions perma-
nent. It also clarifies that all of the new con-
sumer protections added by the FACT Act
are intended to be uniform national stand-
ards. by enumerating as additional preemp-
tions the 11 new provisions of the FACT Act
that do not contain· specific preemptions in
those sections. S~ifically" the section es-
tablishes national uniform standards and
preempts State law with respect to the trun-
cation of credit card and debit card numbers
(113). establishing fraud alerts (112), blocking
information resulting from identity theft
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(152), truncating social security numbers. on
consumer reports given to consumers (115),
providing free annual disclosures (211) (in ad-
dition to the preemption for disclosures pro-
vided under section 212). any consumer pro-
tections addressed under the red flag guide-
lines (114). prohibiting the transfer of debt
caused by identity theft (154), notice by debt
collectors with respect to fraudulent infor-
mation (155), coordination of identity theft
complaints by consumer reporting agencies
(153). duties of furnishers to prevent refur-
nishing of blocked information (154). and the
disposal of consumer report information
(216). Under this new preemption provision,
no state or local jurisdiction may add to.
alter, or affect the rules established by the
statute or regulations thereunder in any of
these areas. All of the statutory and regu-
latory provisions establishing rules and re-
quirements governing the conduct of any
person in these specified areas are governed
solely by federal law and any State action
that attempts to impose requirements or
prohibitions in these areas would be pre-
empted. This section also clarifies that with
respect to any State laws for the prevention
or mitigation of identity theft that address
conduct other than those for which a na-
tional uniform standard is created under
FCRA, those laws are not preempted to the
extent they are not inconsistent with FCRA.
TITLE VIII- MISCELLANEOUS
Section 811. Clerical amendments
Section 811 makes a number of technical
and clerical amendments.
HONORING THE MEMORY OF THE
HON. DEVON WIGGINS
HON. JO BONNER
OF ALABAMA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, December 8, 2003
Mr. BONNER. Mr. Speaker, Escambia
County, AL, and indeed the entire First Con-
gressional District, recently lost a dear friend,
and I rise today to honor him and pay tribute
to his memory.
Judge Devon Wiggins was a devoted family
man and dedicated public servant throughout
his entire life. Following a lengthy tenure on
the Escambia County Commission, twelve
years of which he spent as the commission
chairman, Judge Wiggins was elected to the
position of Judge of Probate, a position he
held until his retirement three years ago.
Throughout his professional career, he was
dedicated to bringing better opportunities to all
the residents of Escambia County and was a
tireless advocate for local business and indus-
try. He also was dedicated to making himself
and other county offices as accessible as pos-
sible to the general pUblic and, through his ef-
forts, garnered the respect and admiration of
many individuals in both the public and private
sectors.
As a small business owner in Brewton, Ala-
bama, JUdge Wiggins was extremely familiar
with the challenges and goals of running a
successful business and providing employ-
ment opportunities for hardworking men and
women. It was this background and his tre-
mendous work ethic which became hallmarks
of his career in public office and which marked
his efforts on behalf of all residents of
Escambia County.
Judge Wiggins was also actively involved in
his community, participating in church-related
organizations and taking a leadership role in
the activities of the Brewton Lions Club. His
devotion to his fellow man was unmatched,
and I do not think there will ever be a full ac-
counting of the many people he helped over
the course of his lifetime.
Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to join me
in remembering a dedicated public servant
and long-time advocate for Escambia County,
Alabama. Judge Wiggins will be deeply
missed by his family-his wife, Nell Wiggins,
his daughters, Dawn Wiggins Hare, Donna
Wiggins Schlager, and Daphne. Wiggins Mar-
tin, his son, Maxwell Devon Wiggins, and his
six grandchildren-as well as the countless
friends he leaves behind. Our thoughts and
prayers are with them all at this difficult time.
TRIBUTE TO ROSS FISCHER
HON. STEVE BUYER
OF INDIANA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, December 8, 2003
Mr. BUYER. Mr: Speaker, one of the most
rewarding aspects of representing Indiana's
Fourth District is to have the opportunity to
honor outstanding Hoosiers for his or her con-
tributions to the community, State, and Nation.
For over fifty years, Ross Fischer has been
the owner and President of McCord Auto Sup-
ply in Monticello, Indiana. McCord is the larg-
est distributor of flotation tires in the world-a
device of which Ross was instrumental. in its
design and development.
Ross Fischer was born in 1931 and grew up
on a farm in Cissna Park, Illinois. He attended
Possum Trot, a one-room schoolhouse.
He served in the United States Army, from
1952-1955 as the Squad Leader in the Alas-
kan Recoiless Rifle Regiment.
Throughout his over 40 years in Monticello,
he has never forgotten his beginnings and it
shows everyday in his treatment and compas-
sion of others. Ross has made enormous con-
tributions to the city, including providing free
tire repairs to the community after a 1974 tor-
nado. He is a member and supporter of the
American Legion, the John Purdue Club, and
the Monticello Jaycees and also sits on the
Board of the White County Airport.
He and his wife Beverly are the parents of
three daughters-Jo Anna, De Anna, Anna
Lyn, as well as grandparents to seven gra.nd-
children.
On the eve of his retirement from McCord;
as well as his 49th wedding anniversary, I sa-
lute Ross Fischer for his dedication to family,
community and the State of Indiana.
HONORING RANDY STRUCKOFF OF
GRINNELL, KANSAS
HON. JERRY MORAN
OF KANSAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, December 8. 2003
Mr. MORAN of Kansas. Mr. Speaker, I rise
today to honor a devoted member of the
Grinnell, Kansas community, Randy Struckoff.
Coach Randy, as he is affectionately called,
has become one of the most well known
sports fans in Northwest Kansas. At every
game in the Grinnell high school gymnasium,
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Coach Randy always sits at the end of the
score table, right next to the home team's
bench. On December 19th, USD 291, the
Grinnell Public School District, will honor
Coach Randy by dedicating the high school's
brand new score table to him.
A life-long resident of Grinnell, Coach
Randy has touched the lives of all who have
had the opportunity to know him. Although
born with a mental handicap, he has never let
that challenge get him down. Randy has a
smile on his face year-round, and his bright
spirit helps to carry Grinnell sports teams
through hard times and add to their joy during
the good times.
Coach Randy's love for his community, its
schools, and its youth is visible to everyone
around him. Whether he is helping to coach,
officiate, lead cheers, or do all three at once,
Coach Randy gives his heart and soul in sup-
porting the coaches, students, and entire com-
munity. During the playing of the national an-
them at any sporting event in Grinnell, Coach
Randy stands at rapt attention, singing along
with every word. He is present during every
sports season, through summer league base-
ball and softball, football and volleyball in the
fall, basketball in winter, and track in the
spring.
I join Grinnell, Kansas in thanking Coach
Randy for all" of his encouragement and his
dedication to the community.
HONORING THE LIFE OF BARBER
B. CONABLE~ JR.
HON. mOMAS M. REYNOlDS
OF NEWYORl<
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, December 8,. 2003
Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I· rise before
the House of Representatives today in remem-
brance of a great man who once served in
Congress-former Representative Barber B.
Conable, Jr. During his twenty years in Con-
gress he represented both his constituents
and this institution with grace and integrity.
Regardless of where his service led him, Bar-
ber always remained true to his Western New
York roots.
While he distingUished himself as a Member
of Congress and earned the respect of col-
leagues on both sides of the aisle, Barber was
also notable for his esteemed academic ca-
reer, his professional knowledge on a wide va-
riety of issues from taxes to Social Security,
and his willingness to tackle any problem head
on. Always lending a helping hand was a sig-
nature trait of Barber's; he never let partisan-
ship get in the way of progress.
Barber Conable was the best example of
what a pUblic servant ought to be. He loved
his country, his community and his family,
never straying from the strong values he was
raised on. His genuine sophistication as a leg-
islator came so effortlessly, revealing the com-
passion and unselfishness that was a hallmark
of his public service.
In devoting his life to serving others, Barber
exemplified loyalty to his country as a veteran
of both World War II and the Korean War.
With a thirst for knowledge, Barber shared his
experiences when he taught at the University
of Rochester and later went onto become
President of the World Bank. Though no mat-
ter what natio,nal or global stage he was on,
ATTACHMENT II
Regulatory Effective Dates for Various Provisions of FACT Act
12/13/2003 Effective dates for FCRA preemption provisions:
Section
151(a)(2)
212(e)
214(c)
311(b)
711
03/31/2004 Effective dates for "self-effectuating" provisions without a specific
effective date:
Section
111
156
312(d)
312(e)
312(f)
313(a)
611
811
Provision
Definitions
Statute of limitations
Furnisher liability exemption
Liability and enforcement
Rule of construction
. Action concerning complaints
Communications for certain employee
investigations
Clerical amendments
12/31/2004 Effective dates for provisions requiring changes to systems, disclosure
forms or practices, or regulations:
Section
112
114
115
151(a)(1)
152
153
Provision
Fraud alerts and active duty alerts
Procedures for identification ofpossible instances
of identity theft
Truncation of social security number in consutrler
report
Summary of rights of ill theft victims
Blocking information resulting from identity theft
Coordination of ill theft complaint investigations
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Section
154
155
211(c)
212(a)-(d)
213(c)
217(a)
311(a)
314
315
316
317
Provision
Repollution of consumer reports
Notice by debt collectors with respect to
fraudulent information
Summary of rights of consumers
Disclosure of credit scores by CRA's
Enhanced disclosures ofmeans to opt-out ofpre-
screened lists
Duty to provide notice to consumer (of report to
CRA of adverse information)
Risked-based pricing notice
Improved disclosure of results of reinvestigations
Reconciling addresses
Notice of dispute through reseller
Duty to conduct reasonable reinvestigations
Sections that become effective upon effective date of implementing rules
Section
211(a)
214
216
Provision
Free consumer reports.
(Comments due on proposed regulation by April
16)
Affiliate sharing for marketing purposes.
Rules must be issued by September 4, 2004 to
become effective no later than 6 months after
(March 4, 2005).
Disposal of consumer report information and
records.
(Regs. by December 4, 2004).
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TAX AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES FOR BANKS
AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:
A LAUNDRY LIST OF ISSUES AND CONCEPTS
Walter R. Byrne, Jr.
Stites & Harbison PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
L INTRODUCTION. At the time of preparing this presentation, the Kentucky legislature
has not passed legislation to minimize or eliminate the adverse tax consequences to Kentucky
holding companies by the decision rendered in a case brought by Illinois Tool Works, Inc., styled
Illinois Took Works, Inc. Individually, and on Behalf of all Other Similarly Situated Taxpayers
Denied the Benefits ofKRS 136.071 Because Their Commercial Domiciles are Outside
Kentucky v. Revenue Cabinet, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Civil Action No. 00-CI-00623 (Jan.
2003) ("ITW Case"). While there is general support for such a bill, there is no agreement at the
time of preparing this outline to pass this legislation during the current session. As a result of the
ITW Case (which essentially eliminated the exemption contained in KRS 136.071) and without
statutory relief, a bank holding company in Kentucky would be required after December 31,
2003 to pay a state license tax on its capital assessed in the amount of $2.10 per $1,000 of
capital. Thomas J. Luber, Esq. of Wyatt Tarrant & Combs, LLP has provided a separate
presentation on the tax implications of the ITW Case for a bank holding company. Assuming
that the legislature does not cure the taxation problem for bank holding companies created by the
outcome of the ITW Case, this outline briefly reviews various structural options available to
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bank holding companies in Kentucky who desire to mitigate the effect of the ITW Case and
briefly reviews other structural changes for banks and bank holding companies as a result of
other recent regulatory changes.
II. POTENTIAL STRUCTURAL CHANGES TO ALLEVIATE THE KENTUCKY
CORPORATE LICENSE TAX IF KENTUCKY LAW IS NOT CHANGED. Absent a
legislative solution to the inequities caused by the ITW Case, there appears to be no simple
structural change that would universally pennit Kentucky bank holding companies to avoid the
corporate license tax. Because of the various differences in size and degree of complexity
involved in bank holding companies located in Kentucky, any advice must be ultimately based
upon the specific facts associated with each bank holding company after considering future plans
and likely future needs of that entity and general advice involving a reorganization must be
carefully presented and considered. Most potential solutions to mitigate the ITW Case have
advantages and disadvantages and may not be available in all situations. The Kentucky Bankers
Association has previously circulated the below listed potential strategies that may, in some
instances, be undertaken by bank holding companies domiciled in Kentucky because of the ITW
Case:
1. Do nothing.
2. Convert existing bank holding company that is a general business
corporation to a limited liability company ("LLC").
3. Relocate the bank holding company outside of Kentucky..
4. Eliminate the bank holding company and return the shareholders to direct
ownership of bank stock.
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5. Undertake non-structural creative changes as suggested by Crowe Chizek
& Company, LI./P, and as suggested by King & Company, PSC which are available to their
respective clients.
If the legislature fails this legislative session to provide an acceptable solution to the ITW
Case, most financial institutions will want to first hear what, if anything, will likely be
forthcoming in the future from the legislature about this issue and the likely timing any solution
may take before any final decisions are made to undertake a structural change. Management and
the board of directors for each bank holding company located in Kentucky must ultimately make
their own business decision as to how to proceed if the Kentucky legislature fails this session to
provide an acceptable solution to the ITW Case. This will undoubtedly be undertaken after a
careful review of the facts and the goals, both short and long term, of the bank holding company
and the costs associated with a reorganization. Most alternative structures that have been
proposed have both advantages and disadvantages beyond taxation consideration and because the
world we live in is dynamic there may be future issues which may develop that may require
additional changes.
In considering which course of action, if any, to pursue, the board of directors of a bank
holding company must consider many factors beyond the potential tax savings, including but not
limited to the following:
1. What would be the corporate form of the alternative transaction and the
cost and time involved to be successful? What are the advantages and disadvantages of this
proposal? Is shareholder approval required? Are dissenters' rights available to your
shareholders?
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2. What bank regulatory approvals or notices may be required to undertake
the change and the likely time requirements for each?
3. Whether the undertaking would involve the sale of securities and
compliance with federal and blue-sky securities laws?
4. Whether any corporate or contractual rights are affected and whether third
party consents are required to be obtained? What about charter and bylaw provisions,
shareholder agreements., and third party contracts?
5. If a LLC is proposed, the laws and regulations, as well as the operating
agreement may be very different from the laws and regulations, as well as a corporate
governance of a general business corporation.
6. Whether future goals and plans for the institution can be accommodated
after a change in structure.
7. If redomestication is proposed, what are the differences in laws and
regulations of the new state with those of Kentucky? What is the likelihood for the relocated
company (whose principal subsidiaries continue to do business in Kentucky) to be taxed in
Kentucky after the move? Is there any likelihood that litigation may be possible with the taxing
authority?
III. OTHER STRUCTURAL ISSUES. Several recent structural changes by bank regulators
are noted:
A. Amendment to KRS 287.920. HB319, attached as Exhibit A to this outline, was
approved by the legislature and signed by the governor, and pertains to establishing bank
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branches in Kentucky by an interstate merger and, provides for reciprocity with the laws of the
home state of the out-of-state bank when permitting out-of-state banks to branch in Kentucky.
B. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") has issued a final rule
allowing nation banks to make organization changes more efficiently. Attached as Exhibit B to
this outline is a copy of the acc final rule which in part permits the following:
1. National banks may reorganize directly to be controlled by a holding
company.
2. National Banks may increase maximum term of service for national bank
directors and permits to OCC to adopt regulations allowing for staggered terms for directors.
3. National Banks may apply for permission to have more than 25 directors.
4. National Banks may merge with one or more non-bank affiliates after
obtaining the OCC"s approval.
c. The OCC has issued a proposed rule involving national banks making major asset
moves or change in business focus and may require prior written approval from the acc. The
proposed rule is found in the Federal Register, VoL 69, No.4, pg. 892-895, January 7, 2004 and
attached hereto as Exhibit C.
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EXHIBIT A
.. ~.~_ KENTUCKY LEGISLATURE
HB319
WWWVersion
NOTE: The hyperlink to a bill draft that precedes a summary contains the .most recent
version (Introduced/GA/Enacted) of the bitt. If the session has ended, the hyperlink contains
ttle latest version of the bill at the time of sine die adjournment. Note that the summary
pertains to the bill as introduced 1 which is often different from the most recent version.
HB 319 (BR 1205) - T. Thompson, R. Damron, B. Buckingham
AN ACT relating to establishing bank branches.
Amend KRS 287.920, pertaining to establishing bank branches by an interstate
merger, to provide that if the laws of the home state of the out-of-sta,te bank place more
restrictive terms or conditions on Kentucky banks seeking to acquire or merge with a
bank in the home state of the out-of-state bank, the interstate merger may be allowed in
Kentucky only under substantially the same terms and conditions as applicable to
Kentucky state banks in the home state of the out-at-state bank.
Jan 20-introduced In House
Jan 21-to Banking and Insurance (H)
Jan 22-posted in committee
Jan 27-posting waived
Jan 28-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Calendar
Jan 29-2nd reading, to Rules: posted for passage in the Regular Orders of the Day
for Friday, January 30, 2004
Feb 2-3rd reading, passed 92-0
Feb 3-received in Senate
Feb 6-to Banking and Insurance (S)
Feb 25-reparted favorably, 1st reading, to Consent Calendar
Feb 26-2nd reading, to Rules
Mar 4-posted for passage in the Consent Orders of the Day for Tuesday, March 9,
2004
Mar 9-3rd reading, passed 37-0; received in House
Mar 10-enrolled, signed by each presiding officer; delivered to Governor
Mar 22-signed by Governor (Acts ch. 13)
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AN ACT relating to establishing bank branches.
Be it enllcted by the General Assembly oJthe Commonwealtlt ofKentucky:
Section 1. KRS 287.920 is aluended to read as follows:
(1 ) As used in this section, unless the context requires otherwise:
(a) "Interstate merger transaction" means the. merger or consolidation of banks
with different home states, and the conversion of branches of any bank
involved in the merger or consolidation into branches of the resulting bank;
and
(b) "Resulting bank" means a bank that has resulted from an interstate merger
transaction under this section.
(2) A Kentucky state bank may establish, maintain, and operate one (1) or mbre
branches in a state other than Kentucky in accordance with an interstate merger
transaction in which the Kentucky state bank is the resulting bank, or if the other
state permits, by acquisition of a branch or branches in the other state. Not later than
the date on which the required application for the interstate merger transaction or
branch acquisition is filed with the responsible federal bank supervisory agency, the
applicant shall file an application on a form prescribed by the commissioner and pay
the fee prescribed by KRS 287.480. The applicant shall also comply with the
applicable provisions of KRS 287.180(2) and the commissioner shall base his or her
approval or disapproval in the same manner as prescribed in KRS 287.180(2).
(3) An out-of-state state bank may establish, maintain, and operate one (1) or more
branches in Kentucky in accordance with an interstate merger transaction in which
the out-of-state state bank is the resulting bank in accordance with the
requirements of KentuckV laws and administrative regulations. If the laws of the
home state of the out-or-state hank place more restrictive terms or requirements
on Kentuck~ state hanks seeking to acquire and merge with a bank in that state,
the interstare merger of the out-or-state hank may be allowed only under
Page 1 of3
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substantiallv ti,e same terms and conditions as applicable to Kentuckv state banks
in that state. Not later than the date on which the required application for the
interstate merger transaction is filed with the responsible federal bank supervisory
agency, the applicant shall file an application on a form prescribed by the
commissioner, pay the fee prescribed by KRS 287.480, and agree in writing to
comply with the laws of this state applicable to its operation of branches in
Kentucky. The applicant shall also comply with the applicable provisions of KRS
287.180(2) and the commissioner shall base his or her approval or disapproval in
the same manner as prescribed in KRS 287.180(2).
(4) No interstate merger transaction under subsection (2) or (3) of this section shall be
approved if the transaction would result in a bank holding company having control
of banks or branches in this state holding more than fifteen percent (15%) of the
total deposits and member accounts in the offices of all federally insured depository
institutions in this state as reported in the most recent June 30 quarterly report made
by the institutions to their respective supervisory authorities which are available at
the time of the transaction.
(5) An individual or bank holding company that controls two (2) or more banks may,
from time to time, combine any or all of the commonly controlled banks in this
Commonwealth into and with anyone (1) of the banks, and thereafter the surviving
bank shall continue to operate its principal office and may operate the other
authorized offices of the banks so combined as branches of the surviving bank.
(6) A branch of an out-of-state state bank may conduct any activities that are authorized
under the laws of this state for state banks. Additionally, the branch of an out-of-
state state bank is authorized to conduct any activities relating to the administration
of trusts that are authorized under the laws of its home state, if the activities are
conducted in conformity with the laws of its home state.
(7) A branch of a Kentucky state bank located in a host state may conduct any activities
Page 2 of3
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that are:
(a) Authorized under the laws of the host state for banks chartered by the host
state; or
(b) Authorized for branches of national banks located in the host state, but whose
principal location is in a state other than the host state.
Page 3 of3
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Explorer, the text for the same procedure will be
"Save Target As." After clicking on one of these OIr
tions, you will get a "Save As" pop-up window. Choose
where you want to save the document (on your
desktop or in another file folder), and click "Save."
Take careful note of where you save the presentation
so you can find it easily later. Once the document is
downloaded and saved to your PC, you can easily
open it later for viewing, printing or editing.
11 93-732 FDIC Warns of Deceptive Claims of FDIC Insurance Coverage.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. SA-79-2003, December 12, 2003. Alert in full text.
See 11 8154.
[SA -79-2003]
TO: CHIEF EXEClITlVE OFFICER (also may be of
interest to Security Officer)
SUBJECf: Deceptive Claims of FDIC Insurance
Coverage
Summary: An entity - Banco Athlantic, Madrid, Spain
- is falsely representing to potential customers on its
Web site that it is a member ofthe FDIC.
Please be advised that the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) was recently notified an
entity is unlawfully advertising FDIC membership on
its Internet Web site. The Web site is reportedly
operated by Banco Athlantic. The Web site indicates
that the main office of this institution· is located in
Madrid, Spain. Specifically, the \Veb site includes the
phrase "Member FDIC." The FDIC does not insure
this entity, or any products or services that it may
offer.
Any infonnation about this entity may be forwarded
to the FDIC's Special Activities Section, 550 17th
Street, N.W., Room F-4040, Washington, D.C. 20429,
or forwarded electronically to alerl@fdic.gov.
For your reference, FDIC Special Alerts may be
accessed from the FDIC's Web site at www.jdic.gov/
news/news/SpeciaIAlert/2003/index.html. To learn
how to automatically receive FDIC Special Alerts,
Financial Institution Letters and other announce-
ments through e-mail, please visit www.fdic.gov/news/
news/announcements/index.html.
Michael J. Zamorski
Director
Distribution: FDIC-Supervised Banks (Commercial
and Savings)
1193-733 acc Rule Allows National Banks to Make Organizational Changes More Efficiently
(12 CFR 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 28, 34).
Department of the Treasury, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. 68 Federal Register 70122,
December 17,2003. Docket No. 03-24. RIN 1557-AB97. Notice in full text.
See ~ 10-151; 10-270; 10-282; 10-283; 10-284; 10-354; 10-408; 10416; 10474; 10-668; 10-670; 11-416; 11-803.
[DeC Notice) tact Mark Ginsberg, Senior Ilcensing Analyst, Ilcens-
ACfION: Final rule. ing Policy and Systems Division, (202) 874-5060; or
Andra Shuster, Counsel, Legislative and Regulatory
SUMMARY: The Office of the Comptroller of the Activities Division, (202)874-5090. For questions con-
Currency (OCC) is publishing a final rule implement- ceming 12 CFR 5.33, contact Crystal Maddo~ Senior
. ing authority provided to national banks by sections licensing Analyst, licensing Policy and Systems Divi-
1204, 1205, and 1206 of the American Homeowner- sion, (202) 874-5060; Richard Cleva, Senior Counsel,
ship and Economic Opportunity Act of 2000 Bank Activities and Structure Division, (202)
(AHEOA). Section 1204 pennits national·banks to 874-5300; or Andra Shuster, Counsel, Legislative and
reorganize directly to be controlled by a holding com- Regulatory Activities Division, (202) 874-5090. For
pany. Section 1205 increases the maximum tenn of questions concerning 12 CFR 7.2024, contact Andra
service for national. bank directors, pennits the acc Shuster, Counsel, Legislative and Regulatory Activi-
to adopt regulations allowing for staggered tenus for ties Division, (202) 874-5090. For questions concern-
directors, and pennits national banks to apply for ing 12 CFR 34.3, contact Mark Tenhundfeld,
pennission to have more than 25 directors. Section Assistant Director, or Andra Shuster, Counsel, I..egis-
1206 pennitsnational banks to merge with one or lative and Regulatory Activities Division, (202)
more of their nonbank affiliates, subject to acc aIr 874-5090. For questions concerning 12 CFR 9.18, con-
proval. In addition, the rule amends parts 5, 7, 9, and tact Beth Kirby, Special Counsel, Securities and Cor-
34~ for other purposes and makes several technical porate Practices Division, (202) 874-5210.
corrections.
EFFECfIVE DATE: January 16,2004.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACf: For
questions concerning 12 CFR 5.20, contact Richard
Cleva, Senior Counsel, Bank Activities and Structure
Division, (202) 874-5300; or Andra Shuster, Counsel,
Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division, (202)
874-5090. For questions concerning 12 CFR5.32, con-
Federal Banking Law Reports
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SUPPlEMENTARY INFORMATION: On Febru-
ary 7, 2003, the acc published a notice of proposed
rulemaking in the Federal Register (68 FR 6363) to
implement the AHEOA and clarify our visitorial pow-
ers regulations (NPRM). In addition, we proposed to
amend (1) 12 CFR part 5 concerning limited-purpose
banks, factors to be considered in business combina-
tions, and operating subsidiary activities eligible for
1193-733
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after-the-fact notice requirements; (2) 12 CFR part 7
concerning national. banks' ability to provide tax ad-
vice; (3) 12 CFR part 9 concerning the valuation of
collective investment funds; and (4) 12 CFR part 34 to
update regulatory text to conform to a statutory
change. Various technical changes to correct citations
or footnote numbering were also part of the NPRM.
The OCC received a total of 55 comments on the
NPRM. Of this number, 34 addressed the parts of the
proposal that implemented the AHEOA provisions
and amended 12 CFR parts 5, 7, 9, and 34. These
comments included two from bank holding compa-
nies, four from banking trade associations, one from a
conununity trade association, one from a non-profit
consumer group, one from a bank superviso~s' trade
association, and 25 from state bank supetvisor~' of-
fices. While many of the conunenters supported the
proposed changes, many offered suggestions for
changes. For the reasons discussed below, we have
adopted the provisions of the NPRM with a number
of changes in response to the comments received to
clarify certain provisions.
Many of the comments we received on the proposal
also addressed the revision to our visitorial powers
regulation. A number of these comments contained
thoughtful and detailed arguments that we will ad-
dress in a rulemaking to be published separately in
the Federal Register.
I. Amendments Implementing the AlIEOA
A Background
The National Bank Consolidation and Merger Act
(12 U.S.C. 215 et seq.) (Merger Act) permits consoli-
dations and mergers involving national banks. Pursu-
ant to 12 U.S.C. 215 and 215a, national banks or state
banks1 may, with OCC approval, merge or consoli-
date with a national bank located in the same state,
resulting in a national bank. National banks also may
merge or consolidate with Federal thrifts under 12
U.S.C. 2I5c, resulting in either a national bank or
Federal thrift Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 215a-l, an in-
sured national bank may merge or consolidate with
an insured bank located in a different state.
Prior to the enactment of the AREOA on Decem-
ber 27, 2000,2 the Merger Act did not address merg-
ers or consolidations involving a national bank and its
nonbank affiliates. However, section 12063 of the
AHEOA amended the Merger Act to pennit national
banks to merge with one or· more of their nonbank
affiliates with the approval of the oee (Section 1206
Merger).
Other provisions of the AlIEOA liberalize statutory
reorganization and corporate governance require-
ments for national banks. Section 12044 amends the
Merger Act to expedite the procedures that a national
bank may use when it reorganizes to become a sub-
sidiary of a holding company. Section 12055 of the
1 The term "state bank" is defined by the statute-to include stat~ ...
chartered banks, banking associations, trust companies, savings
banks (other than mutual savings banks), and other banking insti-
tutions engaged in the business of receiving deposits. 12 U.S.C.
215b.1his section also contains other definitions_
2 Pub.·L 106-569, 114 Stat 2944,
f(93-733·
AHEOA liberalizes the requirements governing the
number and length of service of national bank
directors.
This final rule contains amendments to 12 CFR
parts 5 and 7 to implement these changes made by
theAHEOA.
B. Description ofthe Proposal, Comments Received,
and Final Rule
1. Reorganization into a Holding C·ompany
Subsidiary-New § 5.32
Pursuant to section 1204 of the AREOA, a national
bank, with the Gee's .approval and the affinnative
vote of shareholders holding at least two-thirds of the
bank's outstanding capital stock, may reorganize to
become a subsidiary of a bank holding company or a
company that will become a bank holding company
through the reorganization.
Proposed new § 5.32 implemented this provision.
Paragraph (a) stated the authority for engaging in
section 1204 transactions. Paragraph (b) repeated the
scope of the statute and provided that .§ 5.32 applies to
a reorganization of a national bank into a subsidiary of
-a bank holding company or of a company that will
become a bank holding company through the. reor-
ganization. In order to clarify the types.of entities that
would be covered under this section, we have added a
sentence at the end of paragraph (b) that states that,
for purposes of § 5.32, "bank holding company"
means any company that owns or controls a national
bank, or will own or control one as a result of the
reorganization. Thus, the tenn "bank holding com-
pany" is not limited to companies that would be bank
holding companies under the definition of the term in
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA).
Pursuant to proposed § 5.32(c), a national bank
must submit an application to, and obtain approval
from, the Gce prior to participating in a section 1204
reorganization. Paragraph (d) described the procedu-
ral requirements for this type of transaction. In accor-
. dance with proposed § 5.32(d)(I) , the application is
deemed approved by the ace as of the 30th day after
the oce receives it, unless the oce otherwise noti-
fies the applicant national bank. Approval of applica-
tions under §5.32 is subject to the condition that the
bank give the ace 60 days' prior notice of any mate-
rial change in .its business plan or any material
change from the proposed changes described in the
bank's plan of reorganization. A few commenters rec-
ommended that the ace give national banks notice
that an application has been received and is complete
to verify that the application is in process and to
ensure that all parties know when the 3o-day time
period starts to run. We have not revised the proposal
in response to this suggestion, however, because our
standard application procedure includes sending out
an acknowledgment letter that will provide the infor-
mation the commenters requested.
3 Pub. L. 106-569, § 1206, 114 Stat 2944, 3034 (codified at 12
U.S.C.215a-3).
4 Pub. L. 106-569, § 1204, 114 Stat 2944, 3033 (codified at 12
U.S.C.215a-2).
5 Pub. L. ·106-569, sec 1205, 114 Stat. 2944, 3033-3034 (amending
12 U.S.C. 71 and 71a).
©2003,CCHINCORPORATED
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These same commenters also suggested that the
OCC provide banks with guidance regarding the type
of changes to the business plan· that would be mate-
rial The acc has developed a policy addressing the
circumstances that constitute a "significant deviation"
from a national bank's existing business plan or oper-
ations and circumstances under which we will impose
a.written condition requiring a bank to provide notice
of any significant deviation. This "occ Significant
Deviation Policy" is posted on our website as a sam-
ple to the Charters Booklet of the Comptroller's li-
censing Manua1.6 vVe expect that this policy will
provide the guidance commenters are seeking with
respect to the changes we think should prompt the
notice required by § 5.32. In order to make the final
rule consistent with this Policy, we have changed the
references to "material change" in the proposal to
"significant deviation."
Paragraph (d)(2) of proposed § 5.32 implemented
the statutory requirements that apply to the content
of the reorganization plan. The plan must (1) Specify
how the reorganization is to be carried out; (2) be
approved by a majority of the national bank's board of
directors; (3) specify the amount and type of consid-
eration that the bank holding company will provide
for the stock of the bank, the date on which the
shareholders' rights to participate in the exchange
are to be detennined, and the procedure for carrying
out the exchange; (4) be submitted to the sharehold-
ers of the reorganizing bank at a meeting called in
accordance with the procedures outlined in section 3
of the Merger Act:,7 and (5) where applicable, de-
scribe any changes to the bank's business plan result-
ing from the reorganization. Consistent with section 3
of the Merger Act, the proposal also required that at
least two-thirds of the bank's shareholders approve a
reorganization.
Paragraph (d)(3) of proposed § 5.32 provided that
the ace will review the financial and managerial
resources and future prospects· of the national bank
when considering a section 1204 reorganization.
Proposed § 5.32(e) provided dissenters' rights pro-
tections .for section 1204 reorganizations. As provided
in the Merger Act, this paragraph would pennit any
shareholder who has voted against the reorganization
at a meeting or given notice in writing at or prior to
the meeting to receive the value of his or her shares
by providing a written request to the bank within 30
days after the consummation of the reorganization.
Section 5.3~(f) of the proposal stated that § 5.32
does not affect the applicability of the BHCA to a
6 nus policy can be found on the OCC's Web site at http://
www.occ.treas.gov/corpbook/forms/SigDevPolicy8-03.pdf. The
policy defines a significant deviation from a bank;s business plan or
operations to include, but not be limited to, a material deviation or
material change in the hanlCs: (1) Projected growth, such as plan-
ning significant growth in a· product or service; (2) strategy or
philosophy, such as significantly reducing the emphasis of its
targeted niche (for example, small business lending) in favor of
significant expansion of another area (for example, funding large
commercial real estate projects); (3) lines of business, such as
intlating a new program for sulrprime lending; (4) funding sources
such as shifting from core deposits to brokered deposits; (5)'scope
of activities, such as establishing transactional Internet banking or
entering new~ untested markets; (6) stock benefit plans for de novo
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transaction covered under § 5.32(b); applicants must
indicate in their § 5.32 applications the status of any
BHCA application they are required to file with the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Proposed paragraph (g) of § 5.32 stated that the
ace's approval of a § 5.32 application will expire if a
national bank has not completed the reorganization
within one year of the date of such approval. A com-
menter suggested that the ace incorporate flexibility
into this provision for complicated transactions that
may take longer than one year to complete by pennit-
ting banks to apply for a waiver of this restriction. We
do not think it is necessary to amend the regulation to
establish a formal waiver process, but we will evaluate
the need for an extension of the standard time frame
on a case-by-ease basis in accordance with 5.13(g).8
Finally, proposed paragraph (h)(1) stated that appli-
cants shall infonn shareholders of all material aspects
of a reorganization and comply with applicable re-
quirements in the Federal. securities laws and the
acc's securities regulations in 12 CFR part 11. Pro··
posed paragraph (h)(2) stated that applicants that are
not subject to registration requirements under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 shall submit proxy
materials or infomlation statements used in connec-
tion with a reorganization to the appropriate aee
district office no later than when such materials are
sent to shareholders.
We received no comments regarding proposed
§ 5.32 other than those we have discussed. Accord-
ingly, we are adopting this provision as proposed with
the changes just described.
2. Section 1206 Mergers-Revised § 5.33
Section 1206 of the AIfEOA provided new authority
for a national bank to merge with one or more of its
nonbank affiliates, subject to the ace's approval.
Current § 5.33 sets forth application and notice proce-
dures for natiorial banks entering into business com-
billations, such as mergers or consolidations, with
other national banks or state-ehartered banks, as well
as oce review and approval standards for such trans-
actions. The proposal contained amendments to
§ 5.33 to include Section 1206 Mergers within its
scope.
The proposal added new application and prior ace
approval requirements for Section 1206 Mergers at
the end of redesignated §5.33(c). These require-
ments are similar to those for mergers of a national
bank or state bank into a national bank under 12
U.S4C. 215a.
banks, including the introduction of plans that were not previously
reviewed during the chartering process with no objection by the
oce; and (7) relationships with a parent company or affiliate. such
as a shift to signficant reliance on a parent or affiliate as a funding
source or provider of back office support.
7 Section 3 of the Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. 215a(a)(2), provides
generally that a shareholders' meeting will be called by the bank's
directors after publishing notice of the time, place, and object of the
meeting for four consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation where the bank is located and after sending notice to
each shareholder of record by certified or registered mail at least
10 days prior to the meeting.
8 This section provides that the oec generally does not grant
extensions unless the delay is beyond the control of the applicant
'jJ93-733
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A number of, new definitions were ·added to
§ 5.33(d) in. order to implementsection 1206. Current
§ 5.33(d) defines only the tenus "business combina-
tion," "business reorganization," "home state," and
"interim bank." The proposal amended the definition
of "business combination" to include -Section 1206
Mergers, but left the definitions of the other three
terms unchanged.
Proposed § 5.33 (d) (1) added a definition of "bank"
and defined it as any national bank or state bank. This
definition was added because the tenn is used in the
definition for "nonbank affiliate."
Proposed § 5.33(d)(4) defined the term "company"
to mean a corporation, limited liability company, part-
nership, business trus~ association, or similar organi-
zation. This tenn was proposed to be added because
it is used in the definition of "nonbank affiliate" and
"controt"
Proposed § 5.33(d)(5) defined "control," which is
used in the definition of "nonbank affiliate." Under
the proposal, for business combinations under
§ 5.33(g)(4) and (5), a company or shareholder would
be deemed to control another company if (1) the
company or shareholder directly or indirectly, or act-
ing through one or more other- persons, owns, con-
trols, or has power to vote 25 per cent or more of any
class of voting securities of the other company; or (2)
the company or shareholder controls in any manner
the election of a majority of the directors or trustees
of the other company.
Because section 1206 provides merger authority for
entities previously not included within the scope of.
§ 5.33, the proposal added the definition of "nonbank
affiliate" to describe the entities that are covered by
section 1206. Proposed §5.33(d)(8) defined "nonbank
affiliate"of a national bank as any company that con-
trols, is controlled by, or is under common control
with the national bank. Banks and Federal savings
associations were not included as "affiliates" because
mergers with such entities are governed by statutes
other than section 1206. Nonbank subsidiaries would
be considered to be nonbank affiliates for purposes of
§5.33.
Section 5.33(e)(3)(ii)currelltly requires that, if as a
result of a business combination, a national bank
obtains control of a new subsidiary, the bank must
provide the same infonnation regarding the new sub-
sidiary's activities that would be required if the appli-
cant were establishing a new subsidiary under either
12 CFR 5.34 (which addresses operating subsidiaries)
or 12 CFR 5.39 (which addresses financial subsidiar-
ies). The current rule contains an exception if the
subsidiary was a subsidiary of a national bank. The
proposal modified this provision to take into account
the fact that the bank may now merge with a nonbank
affiliate that has a subsidiary.
Section 5.33(t) sets forth exceptions to the rules
that generally govern the acc's application proce-
dures, such as requirements for the publication of
notice or for hearings. Pursuant to § 5.33(t) (1), a na-
tional bank applicant that is subject to specific statu-
tory notice requirements for business combinations is
not subject to §5.8(a), (b), or (c), which requires, and
-9
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prescribes the timing and contents of, public notice.
Instead, a national bank applicant must follow the
notice requirements in the applicable statute.
A national bank applicant in a Section 1206 Merger
resulting in a national bank would be required to
follow the notice requirements of 12 U.S.C. 215a. A
national bank applicant in a Section 1206 Merger
resulting in a nonbank affiliate would be required to
follow the notice requirements of 12 U.S.C. 214a. Vale
proposed to amend § 5~33 (f) (1) by adding references
to the special procedures to be followed in Section
1206 Mergers. \Ve did not receive any comments on
the foregoing provisions and, therefore, we adopt
them as proposed.
In addition, we proposed to state in § 5.33(f)(1) that
§ §5.10 (regarding public comments) and 5.11 (re-
garding requests for hearings) are not applicable as a
general rule to Section 1206 l\1ergers. However, we
also reselVed the discretion to detennine that some
or aU of the provisions in § 5.10 and §5.11 apply in a
Section 1206 Merger if an application presents signifi-
cant and novel policy, supervisory, or legal issues.
A few conunenters urged the acc to make the
provisions in § § 5.10 and 5.11 applicable to all Section
1206 Mergers either because this type of merger is
unprecedented and likely to raise many important
issues or because these mergers would result in arbi-
trary or uneven application of the Community Rein-
vestment Act (CRA)9 and fair lending laws. For
several reasons we decline to adopt the commenters'
suggestion to impose a notice requirement in every
Section 1206 Merger. First, if an insured national
bank is involved in the merger, FDIC approval is
required under the Bank Merger Act.10 That approval
requires publication of notice and provides for public
comment Second, where the national bank involved
in the merger is uninsured, such as a trust bank, the
acc may detennine on a case-by-ease basis that an
application presents significant and novel policy, su-
pervisory, or legal issues and that public notice is,
therefore, warranted. This standard covers the situa-
tions identified by conunenters as appropriate for
notice and hearings. Evaluating the need for public
notice, or a hearing, on a case-by-ease basis also
avoids unnecessary burdens. In addition, we note that
CRA is not applicable to transactions where no de-
posit facility is being acquired. Therefore, we decline
the commenters' suggestion to impose a notice re-
quirement in every Section 1206 ~erger.
Finally, we proposed to make two technical
changes to paragraph (f) (1). The reference to para-
graph (g) for mergers or consolidations with a Fed-
eral savi.ngs association would be amended to refer
more specifically to paragraph (g)(2) and the refer-
ence to a resulting state bank in the parenthetical
followiIig this reference would be corrected to refer to
a national bank. No comments were received on
these provisions. For t~e reasons discussed above,
we adopt §5.33(f) as proposed.
The proposal also added a new § 5.33(g)(4) to ad-
dress Section 1206 Mergers of national banks with
their nonbank affiliates when the resulting entity is a
national bank. Section 5.33(g)(4)(i) stated that a na-
10 12 U.S.C. 1828(c).
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tional bank may enter into this type of Section 1206
Merger when the law of the state or other jurisdiction
under which the nonbank affiliate is organized allows
the nonbank affiliate to engage in such mergers. This
section also required a national bank to obtain the
acc's approvaL
One commenter suggested that we modify the reg-
ulation to specify that a merger benveen an insured
national bank and its nonbank affiliate must' receive
prior approval by the FDIC. As noted above, if the
national bank involved is insured, the transaction is
also subject to approval by the FDIC under the Bank
Merger Act For purposes of clarification, we have
added this language to the final rule. In addition, we
have also added language stating that in determining
whether to approve a merger under this section, the
acc will consider the purpose of the transaction, its
impact on the safety and soundness of the bank, and
any effect on the bank's customers. The ace may
deny the merger if it would have a negative effect on
any of these factors.
A few commenters questioned the acc's decision
to condition the merger of a nonbank affiliate on
whether the law of the state or other jurisdiction
under which the affiliate is organized pennits the
affiliate to participate in such a merger. These com-
menters contended that there is no such requirement
in the statute and that this condition encourages
states to discriminate against national banks by enact-
ing laws that prohibit this type of merger. One COIIl-
menter suggested that this requirement be revised to
permit the merger where the state's law pennits a
merger between the nonbank affiliate and any other
body corporate. We believe the language of the pro-
posal as drafted already achieves this result. The
proposal required only that the state statute permit
such a merger. As long as this is the case, the state
statute providing merger authority need not specifi-
cally mention national banks. For these reasons, the
state law provision is retained in the final rule.
Proposed § 5.33(g) (4)(ii) stated that a national bank
entering into such a merger must follow the proce-
dures and requirements contained in 12 U.S.C. 215a
(which addresses the merger of state banks into na-
tional banks), as if the nonbank entity were a state
bank. The proposal applied the procedures and re-
quirements in 12 U.S.C. 215a because section 215a
addresses the same issues that arise in a Section 1206
Merger and its requirements are familiar to national
banks. In addition, we believe that these procedures
and requirements impose the least amount of burden
on the participants consistent with our supervisory
objectives in reviewing the proposed transactions. We
received no comments on this provision and, there-
fore, adopt it as proposed.
Proposed § 5.33(g) (4)(iii) stated that a nonbank af-
filiate entering into such a merger is to follow .the
procedures in the law of the state or other jurisdiction
under which the nonbank entity is organized. Two
commenters disagreed with the use of state law pro-
cedures for mergers of a nonbank affiliate into a
national bank. One commenter contended that there
is no such requirement in the statute and that it has
the effect of requiring the national bank to follow both
state and Federal law, which may be in conflict. We
note~ however, that in a merger of a state bank into a
national bank, the state bank follows the procedures
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for mergers in state law. Proposed § 5.33(g)(4) (ili)
simply treats nonbank affiliates .the same as state
banks by requiring thern to follow the procedures
contained in the law of the state in which they are
incorporated. We believe that this similarity of treat-
ment is appropriate and, therefore, have adopted this
provision as proposed.
Proposed § 5.33{g)(4)(iv) stated that the rights of
dissenting shareholders and appraisal of dissenters'
shares of stock 'in the nonbank entity shall be deter-
mined in accordance with .the laws of the state or
other jurisdiction under which the nonbank entity is
organized. We received no comments suggesting
changes to this section of the proposed rule and have,
therefore, adopted it as proposed.
Proposed § 5.33(g)(4) (v) of the proposal stated that
the corporate existence of each institution participat-
ing in the merger shall be continued in the resulting
national bank, and all the rights, franchises, property,
appointments, liabilities, and other interests of the
participating institutions shall be transferred to the
resulting national bank in the same manner and to
the same extent as in a merger between a national
bank and a state bank under 12 U.S.C. 215a, as if the
nonbank affiliate were a state bank. A few com-
menters suggested that this provision state that a
national bank resulting from a merger with a nonbank
affiliate may not exercise any power or engage in any
activity that would not be pennissible for a national
bank under applicable provisions of Federalla\v other
than section 215a-3. We note that this lang-l1age is
already set forth specifically in the statute at 12 U.S.c.
215a-3(b)(2). In addition, current § 5.33(e)(5) states
that the ace generally requires a national bank to
discontinue nonconforming activities within a reason-
able time following a business combination. This pro-
vision would be applicable to transactions under
§ 5.33(g) (4). Because the statute and our rules al-
ready address this point, we believe no further clarifi-
cation is required, and we have adopted the provision
as proposed.
The proposal also added a new § 5.33(g) (5) , which
addressed section 1206 Mergers of uninsured na~
tional banks with their nonbank affiliates when the
resulting entity is a nonbank affiliate. The proposal
limited this· type of section 1206 Merger to national
banks that are not insured banks (as defined in 12
U.S.C. 1813(h». Prior to the enactment of section
1206, there was no efficient way for a national bank to
cease its deposit-taking business, surrender its char-
ter, and combine its business with that of an affiliate
because no statutory provisions addressed this type
of transaction. The section 1206 authority allows this
transaction to take place in a merger and therefore
allows the ace to establish the procedures necessary
when an uninsured national bank wishes to surrender
its national charter but continue conducting lines of
business that are authorized for the nonbank affiliate.
Proposed § 5.33 (g)(5)(i) stated that this type of ~ec­
tion 1206 Merger may be entered into when the law
of the .state or other jurisdiction under which the
nonbank affiliate is organized allows such mergers. It
also provided that an uninsured national bank must
obtain the aee's approval for the transaction. As was
done in §5.33(g)(4)(i), we have added language to the
final rule in §5.33 (g)(5)(i) stating that the acc will
consider the purpose of the transaction, its impact on
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the safety and soundness of the bank, and any effect
on the bank's customers. The acc may deny the
merger if it would have a negative effect on any of
these factors.
Proposed § 5.33(g)(5)(ii) stated that a national bank
entering into such a merger shall follow the proce-
dures and requirements contained in 12 U.S.C. 214a
(which addresses the merger of national banks into
state banks), as if the nonbank entity were a state
bank. Section 5.33{g)(5)(iii) stated that a nonbank
affiliate entering into such a merger shall follow the
procedures and requirements in the law of the state
or other jurisdiction under which the nonbank entity
is organized. Section 5.33{g)(5)(iv) of the proposal
stated that dissenting national. bank shareholders
may receive in cash the value of their national bank
shares if they conlply with the requirements of 12
U.S.C. 214a as if the nonbank affiliate were a state
bank. That section also stated that the ace may
conduct an appraisal or reappraisal of dissenters'
shares of stock in a national bank involved in a
merger with a nonbank affiliate that results in a non-
bank affiliate if all parties agree that the determina-
tion is final and binding on each party and agree on
how the oce's expenses relating to the appraisal will
be divided among the parties and paid to the ace.
The proposal provided that rights of dissenting share-
holders and appraisal of dissenters' shares of stock in
the nonbank entity shall be detennined in accordance
with the laws of the state or other jurisdiction under
which the nonbank entity is organized. We received
no comments on these provisions and adopt them as
proposed.
Proposed § 5.33(g) (5) (v) stated that the corporate
existence of each entity participating in the merger
shall be continued in the resulting nonbank affiliate,
and all the rights, franchises, property, appointments,
liabilities, and other interests of the par1icipating na-
tional bank shall be transferred to the resulting non-
bank affiliate as set forth in 12 U.S.C. 214b, in the
sanle manner and to the same extent as in a merger
between a national bank and a state bank under 12
U.S.C. 214a, as if the nonbank affiliate were a state
bank. A number of commenters suggested that we
clarify that where the surviving entity is a nonbank
affiliate, it does not succeed to any of the powers of
the national bank, and that the national bank and its
powers cease to exist We agree that a national bank
ceases to exist following consummation of a section
1206 Merger and that a surviving nonbank affiliate
will not be pennitted to exercise powers of the fonner
national bank except to the extent pennitted under
state law or other law applicable to the resulting
nonbank affiliate. The wording of the regulation does
not say otherwise, however and in our view it is
important to be clear that the surviving nonbank affili-
ate does enjoy corporate succession to the corporate
rights, franchises, property, appointments, liabilities,
and other interests of the former national bank. This
is the same result as when a national bank merges
into a state bank under 12 U.S.C. 214a and 214b. We
do not believe that any change to the regulation is
necessary by virtue of these comments and adopt this
provision as proposed.
Finally, the proposal added a new paragraph
(j)(1)(iv) to §5.33 thatpermits applications for certain
transactions under § 5.33(g)(4) to receive streamlined
1193-733
treatment In order to qualify for such treatment, the
acquiring bank must be an eligible bank, the result-
ing national bank must be well capitalized immedi-
ately following consummation of the transaction, the
applicants in a prefiling communication must request
and obtain approval from the appropriate district of-
fice to use the streamlined application, and the total
assets acquired in the transaction must not exceed 10
percent of the total assets of the acquiring national
bank, as reported in the bank's Consolidated Report
of Condition and Income filed for the quarter immedi-
ately preceding the filing of the application. We re-
ceived no comments on this provision and adopt it as
proposed.
3. National Bank Directors-§ 7.2024 (new)
Section 1205 of the AREOA amended section 5145
of the Revised Statutes of the United States (12 U.S.C.
71) and section 31 of the Banking Act of 1933 (12
U.S.C. 7ta) regarding national bank directors. Section
1205 increases the maximum term a director may
serve from one to not more than three years and
pennits a national bank to adopt bylaws that provide
for staggering the terms of its directors in accordance
with the acc's regulations. In addition, this section
pennits the OCC to exempt a national bank from the
otherwise applicable requirement that it have no
more than 25 directors.
The proposal added a new § 7.2024 conforming the
DCC's rules to these provisions. Pursuant to pro-
posed § 7.2024(a) , national banks may adopt bylaws
that provide for staggering the tenus of their direc-
tors. Proposed § 7.2024(b) increased the pennissible
maximum term of national bank directors from one
year to three years. Finally, paragraph (c) provided
that a national bank may increase the size of its board
of directors above the statutory limit of 25 provided
that the bank satisfies the notice requirements set out
in that section. We received two comments on this
provision, both of which supported the proposal. Ac-
cordingly, we adopt it as proposed.
II. Additional Changes to Parts 5, 7, 9, and 34
A. Part 5 Amendl1tents
The final rule also revised three other provisions in
part 5 of our regulations. Section 5.20 of our regula-
tions contains the requirements that govern the or-
ganization of a national bank. The proposal amended
§5.20(e)(1) to provide that the newly organized bank
may be a special purpose national bank that limits its
activities to fiduciary activities or to any other activi-
ties within the business of banking. The purpose of
this proposed change was to clarify that a limited
purpose national bank may exist with respect to activ-
ities other than fiduciary activities, provided the activ-
ities in question are part of the business of banking.
Some conunenters expressed concern that this provi-
sion was too broad and that the expansion of the
limited purpose charter had the potential to exclude
from state oversight entities conduGting activities
only loosely related to banking. We agree that it is
appropriate to provide further clarification of the
scope of activities permissible for a limited purpose
national bank, and we have amended this provision to
require limited purpose national banks to conduct at
least one of the following core banking functions: (1)
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Receiving deposits; (2) paying checks; or (3) .lending
money. These functions are based on 12 U.S.C. 36,
which identifies activities that cause a facility to be
considered a bank branch.
Section 5.33(e) of our regulations contains a listing
of factors the DCC considers in evaluating applica-
tions for business combinations. These factors are
based upon the factors set forth in the Bank Merger
Act and the CRA. As part of the USA PATRIOT Act, 11
Congress amended the Bank Merger Act by adding a
factor to be considered in evaluating merger transac-
tions. This factor requires the responsible agencies to
consider the effectiveness of any insured depository
institution involved in a proposed merger in combat-
ing money laundering activities.12 The proposal con-
fOffiled our regulations with the statute by adding the
factor at §5.33(e)(1)(v).
Finally, current § 5.34(e)(5) (iv) permits certain na-
tional banks to acquire or establish an operating sub-
sidiary or perform a new activity in an existing
operating subsidiary by providing after-the-fact notice
to the acc if the operating subsidiary conducts cer-
tain activities listed in § 5.34(e)(5)(v). That list cur-
rently includes the underwriting of credit-related
insurance consistent with section 302 of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act Since the list was last revised, the
OCC has detennined, in Corporate Decision 2001-10
(April 23, 2001) and Corporate Decision 2000-16 (Au-
gust 29, 2000), that credit-related reinsurance prod-
ucts satisfy GLBA section 302's statutory
requirements and are "authorized products." The pro-
posal therefore amended 12 CFR 5.34(e)(5)(v)(L) to
add reinsuring of credit-related insurance to the list of
activities eligible for after-the-fact notice
requirements.
We received no comments on these proposed
changes to §§ 5.33(e) or 5.34(e) and therefore adopt
these changes as proposed.
B. Part 7Amendment
As corporate transactions have become more so-
phisticated, an integral part of financial and transac-
tional advice with respect to mergers and other
corporate restructurings inevitably involves providing
advice on the tax. implications of those transactions.
Recently amended § 5.34(e) (5)(v)Q) and (K) permit
national banks to provide tax planning services and to
provide financial and transactional advice on structur-
ing, arranging, and executing financial transactions,
including mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures. Pro-
viding tax planning services encompasses tax consult-
ing in order for a bank to be able to 0 fier
comprehensive semces in this area. Accordingly, the
proposal deleted as outdated the prohibitio~ against
serving as an expert tax consultant that cUITently
appears at.§7.1008.l3 We received no comments re-
11 Pub. L. 107-56~ 115 Stat 272 (Oct. 26, 2(01).
12 The FDIC recently updated its Statement of Policy on Bank
Merger Transactions to include this new factor at 67 FR 48178
Guly 23~ 20(2). This update only provides the new provision. The
complete Policy Statement as it existed before this update may be
found at 63 FR 44761 (August 20, 1998).
13 National hanks engaged in providing the services pennitted
by 12 CFR 5.34(e)(5)(v)(J) and (K) -must comply with applicable
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garding this change, and therefore adopt it as
proposed.
c. Part 9 Amendment
Currently, 12 CFR 9.18(b)(4) (i) requires valuation
of collective investment funds at least every three
months. However, certain funds are only required to
be valued once a year. Those funds must be "(a)(2)
funds" (i.e., funds that may be held pursuant to 12
CFR 9.18(a)(2) that are primarily invested in real
estate or other assets that are not readily marketa-
ble). A growing number of collective investment
funds, including (a)(1) funds, however, are comprised
of a mix of assets that are readily marketable and
assets that are not readily marketable. Those funds
do not qualify for the one-year valuation because they
are not (a)(2) funds primarily invested in. real estate
or other assets that are not readily marketable. How-
ever, a one-year valuation may be appropriate for
assets in those funds that are not readily marketable.
Thus, we proposed to amend the regulation to re-
quire quarterly valuation of readily marketable assets
in all collective investment funds, including (a)(1)
funds. Assets that are not readily marketable must be
valued at least once a year regardless of whether the
assets are in (a)(l) or (a)(2) funds or whether the
funds' assets are primarily invested in· real estate or
other assets that are not readily marketable. For pur-
poses of an admission or withdrawal date, this provi-
sion does not negate the need to provide a current
value at the time of such admission or withdrawal. We
received no comments regarding .. this change, and
therefore adopt it as proposed.
D. Part 34 Amendment
Section 34.3 restates the comprehensive authority
vested in the ace by 12 U.S.C. 371 to regulate real
estate lending by national banks. Section 371 autho-
rizes national banks to engage in real estate lending
subject to 12 U.S.C. 1828(0) (real estate lending
safety and soundness standards) and "such restric-
tions and requirements as the Comptroller of the
Currency may prescribe by regulation or order." The
cross-reference to 12 U.S.C. 1828(0) was added to the
statute in 1991, but the text of the regulation was
never revised to reflect it. Thus, the proposal updated
the regulation to reflect that change to the· underlying
statute. Other portions of the regulation remain un-
changed.14 We received no comments regarding this
change, and therefore adopt it as proposed.
III. Technical Amendments
The proposal contained the foHowing technical
amendments:
• 12 CFR part 3, appendix A section 3(a)(2)(ix)
currently cross-references a definition of "Gen··
eral obligation of a State or political subdivision"
regulations of the Internal Revenue Service ORS) governing the
provision of such services. Infonnation about the IRS regulations
may be obtained athttp://www.irs.treas.gov.
14 We have proposed additional changes to part 34 in a separate
rulemaking that invites comment on changes to the provisions
governing preemption. See 68 FR 46119 (Aug. 5, 2(03). The com-
ment period for that rulemaking dosed October 6, 2003.
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but contains the wrong regulatory citation ior
that definition. The definition in question has
been moved from 12 CFR 1.3 (g) to 12 CFR
L2(b). The proposed revision corrected the cita-
tion. Also in part 3 appendix A, section
4(a)(11)(ii), the references to section 4(a) (8) (i)
and (ii) were corrected to refer to section
4(a) (9) (i) and (ii) , respectively.
• The citations to FDIC regulations in current 12
CFR 6.4(c)(1)(i) and (ii) are incorrect The propo-
sal amended the citations to correct them.
• Current 12 CFR 7.1016(a) contains a footnote
reference and accompanying footnote text. The
footnote reference number is 30, but should be 1.
The proposal made this change.
• Current 12 CFR 9.20(b) contains a reference to
SEC rules 17 CFR 240.17Ad-1 through
240.17Ad-16. A new rule, at 17 CFR 240.17Ad-17,
has been added, so the proposal changed the
reference to 240.17Ad-16 to reflect the addition.
• Current 12 CFR 28.16(e) , dealing with uninsured
deposit notices, makes a reference to an FDIC
regulation, 12 CFR 346.7, which was removed in
1998. The proposal corrected this citation to refer
to the current rule for uninsured deposit notices,
which can now be found at 12 CFR 347.207.
We received no comments regarding these
changes, and therefore adopt them as proposed.
IV. Regulatory Analysis
CDRIAct Delayed Effective Date
This final rule takes effect 30 days after the date of
its publication in the Federal Register, consistent
with the delayed effective date requirement of the
Administrative Procedure Act See 5 U.S.C. 553(d).
Section 302 of the Riegle Community Development
and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 (CDRI Act),
12 U.S.C. 4802(b), provides that regulations that im-
pose additional reporting, disclosure, or other re-
quirements on insured depository institutions may
not take effect before the first day of the quarter
following publication unless the agency finds that
there is good cause to make the rule effective at an
earlier date. The regulations in this final rule provide
procedures to be used by national banks wishing to
take advantage of the new transactions or corporate
governance options pennitted by the AHEOA The
regulations make it easier for national banks to exer-
cise this new statutory authority. Accordingly, the
ace finds that there is good cause to dispense with
the requirements of the CDRI Act
Regulatory Flexibility Act
Pursuant to section 605(b) of the Regulatory Flexi-
bility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b) (RFA), the regulatory flexi-
bility analysis otherwise required under section 604
of the RFA is not required if the agency certifies that
the rule will not have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small entities and pub-
lishes its certification and a short, explanatory state-
ment in the Federal Register along with its rule.
Pursuant to section 605(b) of the RFA, the acc
hereby certifies that this final .rule will not have a
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significant economic impact on a substantial number
of small entities. Accordingly, a regulatory flexibility
analysis is not needed. The amendments to the
OCC's regulations relating to the AHOEA are permis-
sive provisions that will be used only by banks that
wish to take advantage of the new transactions, proce-
dures, or corporate governance options pennitted by
the statute as implemented by the regulations. 12
CFR 5.33(g)(5) reduces burden by implementing a
simpler way to accomplish a merger of a national
bank into one of its nonbank' affiliates. The amend-
ments simply provide the OCC's implementation of
the .AHEOA or make other technical changes to the
rules to correct existing errors or clarify various
points. They do not impose any new requirements or
burdens. As such, they will not result in any adverse
economic impact
Executive Order 12866
The OCC has determined that this final rule is not
a significant regulatory action under Executive Order
12866.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of1995
Section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Refonn Act
of 1995, Public Law 104-4 (2 U.S.C. 1532) (Unfunded
Mandates Act), requires that an agency prepare a
budgetary impact statement before promulgating any
rule likely to result in a Federal mandate that may
result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sec-
tor of $100 million or more in anyone year. If a
budgetary impact statement is required, section 205
of the Unfunded Mandates Act also requires an
agency to identify and consider a reasonable number
of regulatory alternatives before pronlulgating a rule.
The OCC has detennined that this final rule will not
result in expenditures by State, local, and tribal gov-
ernments, or by the private sector, of $100 million or
more in anyone year. Accordingly, this rulemaking is
not subject to section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates
Act.
Paperwork Reduction Act
The acc may not conduct or sponsor, and a re-
spondent is not required to respond to, an informa-
tion collection unless it displays a currently valid
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control
number.
The infonnation collection requirements in this fi-
nal rule are contained in § § 5.32, 5.33, and 7.2024.
OMB has reviewed and approved the infonnation
collection requirements under OMB Control Number
1557-0014, in accordance with the Paperwork Reduc-
tion Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).
The Comptroller's Corporate Manual (Manual) ex-
plains the acc's policies and procedures for the
fonnation of a new national ban~ entry into the na-
tional banking system by other institutions, and cor-
porate expansion and structural changes by existing
national banks. The Manual embodies all required
procedures, forms, and regulations regarding oce
corporate decisions.
The infonnation collection requirements imposed
by § § 5.32 and 5.33 are contained in the Business
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Combinations booklet in the Manual and are part of
the total requirement
·The respondents are national banks.
Estiraated number ofrespondents: 270.
Estimated number ofresponses: 270.
Average hours per response: 24.
Estimated total burden hours: 5,580.
The infonnation collection requirements imposed
by § 7.2024 are included in the Corporate Organiza-
tion booklet in the Manual, along with several other
corporate requirenlents.
The respondents are national banks.
Estimated number ofrespondents: 1,000.
Estimated number ofresponses: 1,000.
Average hours per response: .5 hour.
Estitnated total burden hours: 500 hours.
The burden estimates represent total burden for
national banks' compliance Vtith the infonnation col-
lection requirements associated with corporate organ-
ization matters and business combination activities.
Executive Order 131.12 .
Executive Order 13132 (Order) requires Federal
agencies, including the acc, to certify their compli-
ance with that Order when they transmit to the Office
of Management and Budget any draft final regulation
that has Federalism implications. Under the Order, a
regulation has Federalism implications if it has "sub-
stantial direct effects on the States, on the relation-
ship between the national government and the States,
or on the distribution of power and responsibilities
among the various levels of government." In the case
of a regulation that has Federalism implications and
that preempts state law, the Order imposes certain
consultation requirements with state and local offi-
cials; requires publication in the preamble of a Feder-
alism summary impact statement; and requires the
acc to make available to the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget any written communica-
tions submitted by state and local officials. By the
terms of the Order, these requirements apply to the
extent that they are practicable and pennitted bylaw
and, to that extent, must be satisfied before the acc
promulgates a final regulation. In the opinion of the
GCC, this final rule does not have Federalism
implications.
listofSubjects
12CFR Part 3
Administrative practice and procedure, National
banks, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
12CFR PartS
Administrative practice and procedure, National
banks, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Securities.
12CFRParl6
National hanks.
Federal Banking law Reports
12CFR Part 7
Credit, Insurance, Investments, National banks, Re-
porting and recordkeeping requirements, Securities,
Surety bonds.
12CFR Part 9
Estates, Investments, National banks, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements, Trusts and
trustees.
12 CFR Part 28
Foreign banking, National banks, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
12 CFR Part 34
Mortgages, National banks, Reporting and record-
keeping requirements.
Authority and Issuance
• For the reasons set forth in the preamble~ the
OCC amends parts 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 28, and 34 of chapter I
of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations as
follows:
PART 3-MINIMUM CAPITAL RATIOS;
ISSUANCE OF DIRECfIVES
• 1. The authority citation for part 3 continues to
read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 93a, 161, 1818, 1828(n), 1828
note, 1831n note, 1835, 3907, and 3909.
Appendix A to Part 3-(Amendedl
• 2. In appendix A to part 3:
• a. In section 3, amend paragraph (a)(2)(ix) by
removing "12 CFR 1.3(g)" and adding in its place "12
CFR L2(bY"; and
• b. In section 4, amend paragraph (a)(11)(ii) by
removing, ~section (4)(a)(8)(i) and (iif' and adding in
its place "section (4)(a)(9)(i) and (ii)".
* * * * *
PARI' 5-RULES, POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES
FOR CORPORATE ACTIVITIES
• 3. The authority citation for partS is revised to
read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., 93a; 215a-2; 215a-3;
and section 5136A of the Revised Statutes (12 U.S.C.
24a).
Subpart B-lnitial Activities
4. In §5.20, add new second and third sentences to
paragraph (e)(1) to rea~ as follows:
§ 5.20 Organizing a bank.
* * * * *
(e) Statutory requirements-(l) General. * * * The
bank may be a special purpose bank that limits its
activities to fiduciary activities or to any other activi-
ties within the business of banking. A special purpose
bank that conducts activities other than fiduciary ac-
tivities must conduct at least one of the following
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three core banking functions: receiving deposits; pay-
ing checks; or lending money. * * *
* * * * *
Subpart C-Expansion ofActivities
• 5. Add a new § 5.32 to Subpart C to read as
follows:
§ 5.32 Expedited procedures for certain
reorganizations.
(a) Authority. 12 U.S.C. 93a and 215a-2.
(b) Scope. This section prescribes the procedures
for acc review and approval of. a national bank's
reorganization to become a subsidiary of a ban.1.<: hold-
ing company or a company that will, upon consumma-
tion of such reorganization, become a bank holding
company. For purposes of this section, a "bank hold-
ing company" means any company that owns or con-
trols a national bank, or will own or control one as a
result of the reorganization.
(c) Licensing requirements. A national bank shall
submit an application to, and obtain approval from,
the acc prior to participating in a reorganization
described in paragraph (b) of this section.
(d) Procedures-(1) General. An application filed in
accordance with this section shall be deemed ap-
proved on the 30th day after the acc receives the
application, unless the acc notifies the bank other-
wise. Approval is subject to the condition that the
bank provide the acc with 60 days' prior notice of
any significant deviation from the bank's business
plan or any significant deviation from the proposed
changes to the bank's business plan described in the
bank's plan of reorganization.
(2) Reorganization plan. The application must in-
clude a reorganization plan that
(i) Specifies the manner in which the reorganiza-
tion shall be carried out;
(ii) Is approved by a majority of the entire board of
directors of the national bank;
(iii) Specifies:
(A) The amount and type of consideration that the
bank holding company will provide to the sharehold-
ers of the reorganizing bank for their shares of stock
of the bank;
(B) The date as of which the rights of each share-
holder to participate in that exchange will be deter-
mined; and
(C) The manner in which the exchange will be
carried out;
(iv) [s submitted to the shareholders of the reorga-
nizing bank at a meeting to be held at the call of the
directors in accordance with the procedures pre-
scribed in connection with a merger of a national
bank under section 3 of the National Bank Consolida-
tion and Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. 215a(a)(2); and
(v) Describes any changes to the bank's business
plan resulting fro.m the reorganization.
(3) Financial and managerial resources and future
.prospects. In reviewing an application under this sec-
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tion, the acc will consider the impact of the pro-
posed affiliation on the financial and managerial
resources and future prospects of the national bank.
(e) Rights of dissenting shareholders. Any share-
holder of a bank who has voted against an approved
reorganization at the meeting referred to in para-
graph (d)(2)(iv) of this section, or who has given
notice of dissent in writing to the presiding officer at
or prior to that meeting, is entitled to receive the
value of his or her shares by· providing a written
request to the bank within 30 days after the consum-
mation of the reorganization, as provided by section 3
of the National Bank Consolidation and Merger Act,
12 U.S.C. 215a(b) and (c), for the merger of a national
bank.
(f) Approval under the Bank Holding Company Act.
This section does not affect the applicability of the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. Applicants shall
indicate in their application the status of any applica-
tion required to be filed with the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.
(g) Expiration 0/ approval. Approval expires if a
national bank has not completed the reorganization
within one year of the date of approvaL
(h) Adequacy of disclosure. (1) An applicant shall
infonn shareholders of all material aspects of a reor-
ganization and comply with applicable requirements
of the Federal securities laws, including the OCC's
securities regulations at 12 CFR part 11.
(2) Any applicant not subject to the registration
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
shall submit the proxy materials or infonnation state-
ments it uses in connection with the reorganization to
the appropriate district office no later than when the
materials are sent to the shareholders.
• 6. In § 5.33:
• a. revise paragraph (a);
• b. paragraph (b) is redesignated as paragraph
(c), paragraph (c) is redesignated as paragraph (b),
newly redesignated paragraph (b) is revised and a
sentence is added at the end of newly redesignated
paragraph (c);
• c. paragraphs (d)(1) , (d) (2) , (d) (3), and (d)(4)
are redesignated as paragraphs (d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(6),
and (d) (7), respectively; revise newly designated para-
graph (d)(2); and add new paragraphs (d)(1), (d)(4) ,
(d) (5) , and (d)(8) ;
• d. add new paragraph (e)(l)(v);
• e. revise paragraph (e)(3)(ii);
• f. revise the second sentence of paragraph (f)(1)
and add two new sentences at the end of the
paragraph;
• g. add new paragraphs (g)(4) and (g)(5);
• h. at the end of paragraph fj)(l)(ii), remove the
tenn "or";
• i. at the end of paragraph (j)(1)(iii) , remove "."
and add "; or"; and
• j. add new paragraph (j)(l)(iv) to read as follows:
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§ 5.33 Business combinations.
(a) Authority. 12 U.S.C. 24(Seventh), 93a, 181, 214~
214b, 215, 215a, 215a-1, 215a-3, 21Sc, 1815(d) (3) ,
1828(c), 1831u, and 2903.
(b) Scope. This section sets forth the provisions
governing business combinations and the standards
for:
(1) GCC review and approval of an application for a
business combination between a national bank and
another depository institution resulting in a national
bank or between a national bank and one of its non-
bank affiliates; and
(2) Requirements of notices ·and other procedures
for national banks involved in other combinations
with depository institutions.
(c) Licensing requirements. * * * A national bank
shall submit an application and obtain prior GCC
approval for any merger between the national bank
and one or more of its nonbank affiliates.
(d) Definitions. (1) Bank means any national bank
or any state bank.
(2) Business combination means any merger or con-
solidation between a national bank and one or more
depository institutions in which the resulting institu-
tion is a national bank, the acquisition by a national
bank of all, or substantially all, of the assets of an-
other depository institution, the assumption by a na-
tional bank of deposit liabilities of another depository
institution, or a merger between a national bank and
one or more of its nonbank affiliates.
* * * * *
(4) Company means a corporation, limited liability
company; partnership, business trust, association, or
similar organization.
(5) For business combinations under § 5.33 (g) (4)
and (5), a company or shareholder is deemed to
control another company if:
(i) Such company or shareholder, directly or indi-
rectly, or acting through one or more other persons
owns, controls, or has po\\rer to vote 25 percent or
more of any class of voting securities of the other
company, or
(ii) Such company or shareholder controls in any
manner the election of a majority of the directors or
trustees of the other company. No company shall be
deemed to own or control another company by virtue
of its ownership or control of shares in a fiduciary
capacity.
* * * * *
(8) Nonbank affiliate ofa national bank means any
company (other than a bank or Federal savings asso-
ciation) that controls, is controlled by, or is under"
common control ~ith the national bank.
(e) * * *
(1) * * *
(v) Money laundering. The GCC considers the ef-
fectiveness of any insured depository institution in-
volved in the business combination in combating
money laundering activities, including in overseas
branches.
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* * * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) An applicant proposing to acquire, through a
business combination, a subsidiary of any entity other
than a national bank must provide the same infonna-
tion and analysis of the subsidiary's activities that
would be required if the applicant were establishing
the subsidiary pursuant to §§ 5.34 or 5.39.
* * * * *
(f) Exceptions to rules of general applicability-(1)
National bank aPPlicant. * * * A national bank appli-
cant shall follow, as applicable, the public notice re-
quirements contained in 12 U.S.C. 1828(c) (3)
(business combinations)~ 12 U.S.C. 215(a) (consolida-
tion under a national bank charter), 12 U.S.C.
215a(a)(2) (merger under a national bank charter),
paragraph (g) (2) of this section (merger or consolida-
tion with a Federal savings association resulting in a
national bank), paragraph (g) (4) of this section
(merger with a nonbank affiliate under a national
bank charter), and paragraph (g) (5) of this section
(merger with nonbank affiliate not under national
bank charter). Sections 5.10 and 5.11 do not apply to
mergers of a national bank with its nonbank affiliate.
However, if the acc concludes that an application
presents significant and novel policy, supervisory, or
legal issues, the ace may detennine that some or all
provisions in §§ 5.10 and 5.11 apply.
* * * * *
(g) * * *
(4) Mergers of a national bank with its nonbank
affiliates under 12 US. C. 215a-3 resulting in a na-
tional bank. (i) With the approval of the GCC, a
national bank may merge with one or more of its
nonbank affiliates, with the national bank as the re-
sulting institution, in accordance with the provisions
of this paragraph, provided that the law of the state or
other jurisdiction under which the nonbank affiliate is
organized allows the nonbank affiliate to engage in
such mergers. The transaction is also subject to ap-
proval by the FDIC under the Bank Merger Act, 12
U.S.C. 1828(c). In determining whether to approve
the merger, the acc shall consider the purpose of
the transaction, its impact on the safety and sound-
ness of the bank, and any effect on the bank's custom-
ers, and may deny the merger if it would have a
negative effect in any such respect
(ii) A national bank entering into the merger shall
follow the procedures of 12 U.S.C. 215a as if the
nonbank affiJiate were a state bank, except as other-
wise provided herein.
(iii) A nonbank affiliate entering into the· merger
shall follow the procedures for. such mergers set out
in the law of the state or other jurisdiction under
which the nonbank affiliate is organized.
(iv) The rights of·dissenting shareholders and a~
praisal of dissenters' shares of stock in the nonbank
affiliate entering into the merger shall be deteffilined
in the manner prescribed by the law of the state or
other jurisdiction under which the nonbank affiliate is
organized.
(v) The corporate existence of each institution par-
ticipating in the merger shall be continued in the
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* * * * *
* * * * *
* * * * *
* * * * *
* * * * *
* *(e) *
PART 7-BANKACTIVITIES AND
OPERATIONS
• 10. Revise the authority citation for part 7 to read
as follows;
(c) * * *
(1) * * *
(i) Maintains the pledge of assets required under
12 CFR347.210; and
(ii) Maintains the eligible assets prescribed under
12 CFR 347.211 at 108 percent or more of the preced-
ing quarter's average book value of the insured
branch's third-party liabilities; and
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., 71, 71a, 92, 92a, 93,
93a, 481, 484, 1818.
• 8. The authority citation for part 6 continues to
read as follows:
i\uthority: 12 U.S.C. 93a, 18310.
SubpartA-CapitaI Categories
• 9. In § 6.4, revise paragraphs (c)(l)(i) and (li) to
read as follows:
• 7. In 5.34, revise paragraph (e)(5)(v)(L) to read
as follows:
PART 6-PROMPT CORRECfIVEACfION
§ 5.34 Operating subsidiaries.
(iv) In the case of a transaction under paragraph
(g)(4) of this section, the acquiring bank is an eligible
bank, the resulting national bank will be well capital-
ized immediately following consummation of the
transaction, the applicants in a prefiling communica-
tion request and obtain approval from the appropriate
district office to use the streamlined application, and
the total assets acquired do not exceed 10 percent of
the total assets of the acquiring national bank, as
reported in the. bank's Consolidated Report of Condi-
tion and Income filed for the quarter immediately
preceding the filing of the application.
{5} * * *
(v) * * *
(L) Underwriting and reinsuring credit related in-
surance to the extent pennitted under section 302 of
the GLBi\ (15 U.S.C. 6712);
§ 6.4 Capital measures and <.'-apital category
.definitions.
* * * * *
resulting national bank, and all the rights, franchises,
property, appointments, liabilities, and other interests
of the participating institutions shall be transferred to
the resulting national bank, as set forth in 12 U.S.C.
215a(a), (e), and (f) in the same manner and to the
same extent as in a merger between a national bank
and a state bank under 12 U.S.C. 215a(a), as if the
nonbank affiliate were a state bank.
(5) Mergers of an uninsured national bank witlt its
nonbank affiliates under 12 U.S. C. 215a-3 resulting in
a nonbank affiliate. (i) With the approval of the OCC,
a national bank that is not an insured bank as defined
in 12 U.S.C. 1813(h) may merge with one or more of
its nonbank affiliates, with the nonbank affiliate as the
resulting entity, in accordance with the provisions of
this paragraph, provided that the law of the state or
otherjurisdiction under which the nonbank affiliate is
organized allows the nonbank affiliate to engage in
such mergers. In detennining whether to approve the
merger, the GCC shall consider the purpose of the
transaction, its impact on the safety and soundness 'of
the bank, and any effect on the bank's customers, and
may deny the merger if it would have a negative
effect in any such respect
(ii) A national bank entering into the merger shall
follow the procedures of 12 U.S.C. 214a, as if the
nonbank affiliate were a state bank, except as other-
'Arise provided in this section.
(iii) A nonbank affiliate entering into the nlerger
shall follow the procedures for such mergers set out
in the law of the state or other jurisdiction under
which the nonbank affiliate is organized.
(iv) (A) National bank shareholders who dissent
from an approved plan to merge may receive in cash
the value of their national bank shares if they comply
with the requirements of 12 U.S.C. 214a as if the
nonbank affiliate were a state bank. The acc may
conduct an appraisal or reappraisal of dissenters'
shares of stock in a national bank involved in the
merger if all parties agree that the detennination is
final and binding on each party and agree on how the
total expenses of the acc in making the appraisal
will be divided among the parties and paid to the
DCC.
(B) The rights of dissenting shareholders and ap-
praisal of dissenters' shares of stock in the nonbank
affiliate involved in the merger shall be detennined in
the manner prescribed by the law of the state or other
jurisdiction under which the nonbank affiliate is
organized.
(v) The corporate existence of each entity partici-
pating in the merger shall be continued in the result-
ing nonbank affiliate, and all the rights, franchises,
property, appointments, liabilities, and other interests
of the participating national bank shall be transferred
to the resulting nonbank affiliate as set forth in 12
U.S.C. 214b, in the same manner and to th~ same
extent as in a merger between a na90nal bank and a
state bank under 12 U.S.C. 214a, as if the nonbank
affiliate were a state bank. .
(j) * .. *
(1) * * *
SubpartA~Bank Powers
• 11. Revise § 7.1008 to read as follows:
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§ 7.1008 Preparing income tax returns for
customers or public.
A national bank may assist its customers in prepar-
ing their tax returns, either gratuitously or for a fee.
§7.1016 [Amended)
• 12. In § 7.1016(a), redesignate footnote 30 as
footnote 1.
Subpart B-Corporate Practices
• 13. Add a new § 7.2024 to read as follows:
§ 7.2024 Staggered terms for national bank
directors and size ofbank board.
(a) Staggered terms. Any national bank may adopt
bylaws that provide for staggering the tenns of its
directors. National banks shall provide the GCC with
copies of any bylaws so amended.
(b) Maximum term. Ally national bank director may
hold office for a teon that does not exceed three
years.
(c) Number ofdirectors. A national bank's board of
directors shall consist of no fewer than 5 and no more
than 25 members. A national bank may, after notice to
the GCC, increase the size of its board of directors
above the 25 member limit A national bank seeking
to increase the number of its directors must notify the
GCe any time the proposed size would exceed 25
directors. The bank's notice shall specify the rea-
son(s) for the increase in the size of the board of
directors beyond the statutory limit.
PART 9-FIDUCIARYACTIVITIES OF
NATIONAL BANKS
• 15. The authority citation for part 9 continues to
read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 24 (Seventh), 92a, and 93a; 15
U.S.C. 78q, 78q-1, and 78w.
• 16. In § 9.18, revise paragraph (b)(4)(i) to read as
follows:
§ 9.18 CoUective investment funds.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(4) Valuation-(i) Frequency of valuation. A bank
administering a collective investment fund shall de-
termine the value of the fund's readily marketable
assets at least once every three months. A bank shall
determine the value of the fund's assets that are not
readily marketable at least once a year.
* * * * *
• 17. In §9.20, amend paragraph (b), by removing
the term "240.17Ad-16" and adding in its place the
tenn "240.17Ad-17."
PART 28-INTERNATIONAL BANKING
ACfIVITIES
• 18. The authority citation for part 28 continues to
read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., 24 (Seventh), 93a,
161,602, 1818,3101 et seq., and 3901 et seq.
Subpart B-Federal Branches and Agencies of
Foreign Banks
• 19. In § 28.16, amend paragraph (e), by remov-
ing the tenn "12··CFR 346.7" and adding in its place
the tenn "12 CFR347.207."
PART 34-REAL ESTATE LENDING AND
APPRAISALS
SubpartA-General
• 20. The authority citation for part 34 continues to
read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., 29, 93a, 371, 1701j-3,
1828(0), and 3331 et seq.
• 21. Revise § 34.3 to read as follows:
§ 34.3 General role.
A national bank may make, arrange, purchase, or
sell loans or extensions of credit, ·or interests therein,
that are secured by liens on, or interests in, real
estate (real estate loans), subject to 12 U.S.C. 1828(0)
and such restrictions and requirements as the Comp-
troller of the Currency may prescribe by regulation or
order.
Dated: October 17,2003.
John D. Hawke, Jr.,
Comptroller ofthe Currency.
1193-734 FDIC Warns of Deceptive Claims of FDIC Insurance Coverage.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. SA-8o-2003, December 16, 2003. Alert in full text.
See~ 8154.
[SA -80-2003)
TO: CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (also may be of
interest to Security Officer)
SUBJECf: Deceptive Claims of FDIC Insurance
Coverage
Summary:
An entity is falsely representing on its Web site that it
is a member of the FDIC. The entity, located in New
Federal Banking Law Reports
York, New York, may be referred to by multiple names,
including Ejfex Bank, NA; Effex Bank lid; Effexbank
Bank, lid; or Effexbank International Bank Limited.
Please be advised that the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) was recently notified an
entity may be operating a banking business without
authorization and is unlawfully advertising FDIC
membership on its Internet Web site. The entity may
be referred to by multiple names, including Effex
Bank, NA; Effex Bank Ltd; Effexbank Bank, tid; or
Effexbank International Bank limited. According to
1}93-734
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency
12 CFR Part 5
[Docket No. 04-02]
RIN 1557-AC11
Fundamental Change in Asset
Composition of a Bank
AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Treasury.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
SUMMARY: The Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (DCC) is proposing to
amend its regulations to require a
national bank to obtain the approval of
the acc before two types of
fundamental changes in the
composition of the bank's assets: (1)
Changing the composition of all, or
substantially all, of its assets through
sales or other dispositions or, (2) after
having sold or disposed of all or
substantially all of its assets,
subsequently purchasing or otherwise
acquiring assets. The proposal also
provides that, in the second case, the
acc will apply, among other factors,
K(a) - 25
Federal Register / Vol. 69, No.4 / Wednesday, January 7, 2004/ Proposed Rules 893
the same factors as it applies to the
establishment of a de no\-'o bank. This
ne\lv approval requirement will enable
the OCC to better assess the bank's
conlpliance vvith applicable law and
safe and sound banking practices.
DATES: Comments must be received by
March 8, 2004.
ADDRESSES: Please send your comments
to: Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Public Information Room, 250
E Street, SW., Mail Stop 1-5,
Washington, DC 20219, Attention:
Docket No. 04-02. Due to delays in
paper mail delivery in the Washington,
DC area, commenters are encouraged to
submit their comments by fax or e-maiL
You may fax your comments to (202)
874-4448 or electronic nlail them to
regs.comments@occ.treas.gov.
Comments may be inspected and
photocopied at the acc's Public
Information Room, 250 E Street. and
SW., Washington, DC. You can make an
appointment to inspect and photocopy
comments by calling (202)-874-5043.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Heidi M. Thomas, Special Counsel,
Legislative and Regulatory Activities, at
(202) 874-5090; or Jan Kalmus, NBE/
Licensing Expert, Licensing Policy and
Systems, at (202) 874-5060.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
A national bank that divests itself of
assets through sale or other disposition
to become a "stripped" or "dormant"
bank charter, or, having "stripped
down," subsequently takes on new
assets through purchases or
acquisitions, raises significant
supervisory concerns. These concerns
include increased operations risk,
increased concentration risk (especially
where asset composition changes as a
result of divestiture), and the ability of
bank managelnent to implement the
new strategy successfully. In addition,
the dormant bank being revived may
propose to engage in activities that
significantly deviate or are a change
from the bank's original business plan
or operations. 1 Ill-conceived, poorly
I The ace defines a significant deviation from a
bank's business plan or operations to include a
material deviation or material change in the bank's:
(1) Projected growth, such as planning significant
growth in a product or service; (2) strategy or
philosophy, such as significantly reducing the
emphasis of its targeted niche (for example, small
business lending) in favor of significant expansion
of another area (for example. funding large
commerciall'eal estate projects); (3) lines of
business. such as initiating a new program for
subprime lending; (4) funding sources. such as
shifting from core deposits to brokered deposits; (5)
scope of activities, such as establishing
transactional Internet banking or entering new,
untested markets; (5) stock benefit plans for de novo
planned, or inadequately executed
changes in a national bank's business
can expose the bank to imprudent levels
of risk, with the potential for adverse
consequences for the bank's financial
condition and, in the extreme situation,
for its viability.2 Even entry into lines of
business that are traditional for national
banks may present elevated levels of
risk to a particular bank if the bank
expands too quickly from a dormant
status, misjudges its markets, or fails to
ensure that bank management and
internal control systems keep pace with
the change. Moreover, the acquisition of
a dormant charter by a third party raises
concerns about the need to thoroughly
review the nature of the services and
products that might be initiated by an
acquiring entity.
Our current regulations do not require
the approval of the acc before a bank
"strips down" to a dormant bank
charter, nor do they require our
approval when a dormant bank
increases its asset size to engage again
in the business of banking. To better
assess the bank's compliance with
applicable law and safe and sound
banking practices, we are proposing to
amend our regulations to require prior
acc approval for two types of
fundamental changes in the
composition of a national bank's assets:
(1) A change in composition of all or
substantially all of a bank's assets
resulting from a sale or other disposition
of the bank's assets, or (2) an increase
in the asset size of a national bank that
had previously "stripped down" in a
transaction described in item (1),
regardless of existing or new ownership.
In addition, because a "stripped" or
dormant charter that subsequently
increases in asset size fundamentally
resembles a new entrant obtaining a
new charter, transactions described in
item (2) will be evaluated under the
same standards that the acc applies to
a de novo national bank charter
proposaL
banks, including the introduction of plans that were
not previously reviewed during the chartering
process with no objection by the acc; and (7)
relationships with a parent company or affiliate,
such as a shift to significant reliance on a parent
or affiliate as a funding source or provider of back
office support. See acc's Significant Deviation
Policy. as posted as a supplemental policy
document to the Charters Booklet of the
Comptroller's Licensing ManuaL http://
www.occ.treas.gov/corpbook/forms/SigDevPolicy8-
03.pdf
2 In the past few years, for example, some
national banks have materially changed the general
character of their business by shifting to a
concentration of subprime loans or relying on
technology-based product and service delivery
systems. In some cases, the safety and soundness
of these banks was adversely affected because bank
management did not fully understand or effectively
control the risks associated with the changes.
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[I. Description of the Proposal
Approval requirements. This proposal
would add a new § 5.53 to subpart D of
12 CFR part 5. Proposed § 5.53(c)
requires that a national bank obtain the
acc's prior written approval before
changing the composition of all, or
substantially all, of its assets through (1)
sales or other disposition or, (2) after
having sold or disposed of all or
substantially all of its assets, through
purchases or other acquisitions. A bank
that has disposed of all or substantially
all of its assets before the effective date
of this regulation must comply with the
prior approval requirement if it
purchases or otherwise acquires or takes
on new assets after the regulation takes
effect. Proposed § 5.53(d) specifies that
this approval requirement does not
apply to a change in composition of all,
or substantially all, of a bank's assets
that the bank undertakes in response to
direction from the acc (e.g., in an
enforcement action pursuant to 12
U.S.C. 1818) or pursuant to a statute or
regulation that requires acc review or
approval (e.g., a voluntary liquidation
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 181 and 12 CFR
5.48).
We note that the acquisition of
deposits by a dormant bank raises the
presumption that the bank intends to
use the deposits to fund an increase in
assets I which would trigger this
proposal's ap.plication requirement A
dormant bank should not gather
deposits to fund its asset acquisition
without first seeking the approval of the
acc pursuant to this proposal.
In reviewing applications filed under
§ 5.53, we will consider the purpose of
the transaction, its impact on the safety
and soundness of the bank, and any
effect on the bank's customers. Relevant
to our consideration of an application to
dispose of all or substantially all of the
bank's assets will be the reasons for the
proposed decrease in asset size and
future plans for the bank charter
(including any plans for liquidation),
future asset growth, future plans to
market or sell the charter, and future
business plans, as applicable.
Depending on the circumstances
presented in the bank's application, our
approval of the bank's disposition of all
or substantially all of its assets will
address how long the dormant charter
may continue, and could include a
requirement that the bank submit a plan
of liquidation.
In reviewing an application in
connection with an increase in the
assets of a stripped charter, we will
consider the bank's future business plan
and whether this plan involves
activities that significantly deviate from
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the bank's original business plan or
operations prior to its stripped status.
VVe also will consider the applicant's
staffing plans, plans for oversight of the
activity within the bank, and
accountability to the board of directors,
along with the applicant's plans to
acquire, develop, or modify internal
control systems adequate to monitor the
new activity.
This proposal also provides that,
where a national bank has sold or
othervvise disposed of its assets in a
transaction requiring approval pursuant
this ne\1\' § 5.53. our review of any
subsequent growth in assets pursuant to
this proposal will include. among other
things. the factors governing the
organization of a de novo bank under 12
CFR 5.20. In evaluating an application
to establish a de novo bank. we consider
whether the proposed bank: (1) Has
organizers who are familiar with
national banking laws and regulations;
(2) has competent management,
including a board of directors, with
ability and experience relevant to the
types of services to be provided; (3) Has
capital that is sufficient to support the
projected volume and type of business;
(4) Can reasonably be expected to
achieve and maintain profitability; and
(5) Will be operated in a safe and sound
lllanner. In addition, § 5.20(f} provides
that we also may consider additional
factors listed in section 6 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. 1816,
including the risk to the Federal deposit
insurance fund, and whether the
proposed bank's corporate powers are
consistent with the purposes of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act and the
National Bank Act.
Reference to ubusiness plan. 1f This
proposal makes a conforming change" to
§ 5.20 to provide that any use of the
term "operating plan" or "operating
plans" will be changed to "business
plan or operating plan" or "business
plans or operating plans," as
appropriate. Currently, § 5.20 only uses
the term "operating plan" when
referring to the document that describes
a national bank's management goals,
earnings objectives, and lines of
business. However, the banking
industry, as well as the acc and the
other Federal financial institution
agencies in policy statements,
applications, and internal documents,
more commonly use the term "busines~
plan." The OCC has made this change
to avoid any confusion about whether a
substantive di fference between the two
terms is intended. Thus, the OCC
intends that both terms may be used
interchangeably.
III. Comment Solicitation
The acc requests comment on all
aspects of this proposal, including the
specific issues that follow.
Community Bank Comment Request
The OCC seeks comment on the
impact of this proposal on community
banks. The acc recognizes that
community banks operate with more
limited resources than larger
institutions and may present a different
risk profile. Thus, the OCC specifically
requests comment on the impact of the
proposal on community banks' current
resources and available personnel with
the requisite expertise, and whether the
goals of the proposal could be achieved,
for community banks, through an
alternative approach.
Solicitation of COlnments on Use of
Plain Language
Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, Public Law 106-102, section
722. 113 Stat. 1338, 1471 (Nov. 12,
1999), requires the Federal banking
agencies to use plain language in all
proposed and final rules published after
January 1, 2000. We invite your
comments on how to make this proposal
easier to understand. For example:
• Have we organized the material to
suit your needs? If not, how could this
material be better organized?
• Are the requirements in the
proposed regulation clearly stated? If
not, how could the regulation be more
clearly stated?
• Does the proposed regulation
contain language or jargon that is not
clear? If so, which language requires
clarification?
• Would a different format (grouping
and order of sections, use of headings,
paragraphing) make the regulation
easier to understand? If so, what
changes to the format would make the
regulation easier to understand?
• What else could we do to make the
regulation easier to understand?
(v. Regulatory Analysis
A. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Pursuant to section 605(b) of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, the
Comptroller of the Currency certifies
that this proposal will not have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
B. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995
Section 202 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Public
Law 104-4 (Unfunded Mandates Act)
requires that an agency prepare a
budgetary impact statement before
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promulgating a rule that includes a
Federal mandate that may result in
expenditure by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $100 million or more
in anyone year. If a budgetary impact
statement is required, section 205 of the
Unfunded Mandates Act also requires
an agency to identify and consider a
reasonable number of regulatory
alternatives before promulgating a rule.
The ace has determined that this
proposal will not result in expenditures
by State, local, or tribal governments or
by the private sector of $100 million or
more. Accordingly. the OCC has not
prepared a budgetary impact statement
or specifically addressed the regulatory
alternatives considered.
C. Executive Order 12866
The Comptroller of the Currency has
determined that this rule does not
constitute a "significant regulatory
action" for the purposes of Executive
Order 12866.
D. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
In accordance with the requirements
of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.
the OCC may not conduct or sponsor,
and a respondent is not required to
respond to, an information collection
unless it displays a currently valid
Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) control number. The information
collection requirements contained in
this notice of proposed rulemaking have
been submitted to OMB for review and
approval under OMB Control Number
1557-0014.
This proposal is expected to increase
annual paperwork burden for
respondents by adding certain
application requirements. The
information coHection requirements are
contained in § 5.53. Section 5.53
requires a national bank to submit an
application to the ace before changing
the composition of all, or substantially
all, of its assets through sales or other
dispositions or, having sold or disposed
of all or substantially all of its assets,
through subsequent purchases or other
acquisitions. The time per response to
complete an application is estimated to
be five hours and the number of
respondents is estimated to be five
national banks. The likely respondents
are national banks.
Estimated number of respondents: 5.
Estimated number of responses: 5.
Estimated total burden hours per
response: 5 hours.
Estimated total annual burden hours:
25 hours.
The OCC invites comments on: {l}
Whether the collection of information
contained in the proposed rulemaking is
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necessary for the proper performance of
the acc's functions, including whether
the information has practical utility;
(2) The accuracy of the acc's
estimate of the burden of the
information collection, including the
validity of the methodology and
assumptions used;
(3) Ways to enhance the quality,
utility, and clarity of the information to
be collected;
(4) Ways to minimize the burden of
the information collection on
respondents; including the use of
automated collection techniques or
other forms of information technology;
and
(5) Estimates of.capital or start-up
costs and costs of operation,
olaintenance, and purchase of services
to provide information.
COlnments should be sent to: John
Ference, Clearance Officer, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Legislative
and Regulatory Activities Division,
Attention: 1557-0194, 250 E Street,
SW., Mailstop 8-4, Washington, DC
20219. Due to delays in paper mail in
the Washington area, commenters are
encouraged to submit their comments
by fax to (202) 874-4889 or bye-mail to
camille.dixon@occ.treas.gov. Joseph F.
Lackey, Jr., Desk Officer, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Attention: 1557-0014, Office of
Management and Budget, Room 10235,
Washington, DC 20503. Comments may
also be sent bye-mail to
jlackeyj@omb.eop.gov.
List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 5
Administrative practice and
procedure, National banks, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
Authority and Issuance
For reasons set ·forth in the preamble,
the acc proposes to amend part 5 of
chapter I of title 12 of the Code of
Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 5-RULES, POLICIES, AND
PROCEDURES FOR CORPORATE
ACTIVITIES
1. The authority citation for part 5 is
revised to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., 24a,
24(Seventh), 93a, 1818, and 3101 et seq.
2. In § 5.20, revise all references to
"operating plan" or "operating plans" to
read "business plan or operating plan"
or "business plans or operating plans,"
as appropriate.
3. In Subpart D-Other Changes in
Activities and Operations, a new § 5.53
is added to read as follows:
§ 5.53 Change in asset composition.
(a) Authority. 12 U.S.C. 93a, 1818.
(b) Scope. This section requires a
national bank to obtain the approval of
the acc before changing the
composition of all, or substantially all,
of its assets through sales or other
dispositions or, having sold or disposed
of all or substantially all of its assets,
through subsequent purchases or other
acquisitions.
(c) Approval requirement. (1) A
national bank must file an application
and obtain the prior written approval of
the acc before changing the
composition of all,· or substantially all,
of its assets (i) through sales or other
dispositions or, (ii) having sold or
disposed of all or substantially all of its
assets, through subsequent purchases or
other acquisitions.
(2) In determining whether to approve
an application under paragraph (c)(l) of
this section, the acc will consider the
purpose of the transaction, its impact on
the safety and soundness of the bank,
and any effect on the bank's customers,
and may deny the application if the
transaction would have a negative effect
in any such respect. Where a national
bank has sold or otherwise disposed of
all or substantially all of its assets in a
transaction requiring approval under
paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section, the
OCC's review of any subsequent change
in asset composition through purchase
or other acquisition will include, in
addition to the foregoing factors, the
factors governing the organization of a
bank under § 5.20.
(d) Exception. This section does not
apply to a change in composition of all,
or substantially all, of a bank's assets
that the bank undertakes in response to
direction from the acc (e.g., in an
enforcement action pursuant to 12
U.S.C. 1818) or pursuant to a statute or
regulation that requires acc review or
approval (e.g., a voluntary liquidation
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 181 and 12 CFR
5.48).
Dated: December 30,2003.
John D. Hawke, Jr.,
Comptroller of the Currency.
(FR Doc. 04-247 Filed 1-6-04; 8:45 am]
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SECTION K(b)
I. ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS, ET AL. V. REVENUE CABINET.
A. The Case. The Illinois Tool Works ("ITW") decision was handed down by
Franklin Circuit Court on December 5, 2002. KRS 136.071 allowed for reductions to the
capital employed in Kentucky of certain Kentucky commercially domiciled corporations
for purposes of computing the corporate license tax under KRS 136.070. Non-domiciled
companies were not afforded the same benefit. A group of non-Kentucky domiciled
companies brought the case challenging the constitutionality of the statute under the
equal protection and commerce clauses of the United States Constitution. The Court held
that KRS 136.071 was unconstitutional in its entirety as discriminatory against interstate
commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The
arguments requesting that the seven words involving "domiciled" be struck from the
statute were rejected. Arguments that both KRS 136.070 and 136.071 should be struck
were also rejected.
B. Timing of the Opinion. The impact of the opInIon was originally set to
apply to "any and all years ending after the date of the opinion and order" (December 5,
2002). On motion for reconsideration, the court subsequently amended its order to "any
and all tax years for which a corporation lice~se tax return is due (before extension) on or
after April 15, 2004. These returns would cover the corporate operations for
calendar/fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2003." The impact of the change
was to generally postpone the effect of the original order from December 31, 2002 to
December 31,2003 to give the Kentucky Legislature the opportunity to address the issue
during its regular legislative session in calendar year 2003.
II. THE IMPACT OF THE CORPORATE LICENSE TAX ON CORPORATE
GROUPS WITHOUT KRS 136.071
A. Overview. The reason that KRS 136.071 was in the Kentucky law was to
eliminate the application of the Kentucky license tax at each level of a multi-level
corporate structure.
KRS 136.071 States:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, a
corporation whose commercial domicile is in this state and
holds directly or indirectly stock or securities in other
corporations equal to or greater than fifty percent (50%) of
its total assets may, at the option of the taxpayer, be
considered as one (1) corporation for purposes of
determining and apportioning total "capital," or compute its
"capital" under KRS 136.070(2) as follows:
(a) Determine the corporation's total capital as
provided in KRS 136.070(2).
(b) Deduct from the amount determined in subsection
(a) of this section, the book value of its investment
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in the stock and securities of any corporation in
which it owns more than fifty percent (50%) of the
outstanding stock of such corporation.
(2) For purposes of determining the ratio of stock and
securities to total assets, the value shall be the value of the
accounts as reflected on financial statements prepared for
book purposes as of the last day of the calendar or fiscal
year. The term "stock and securities" as used in this
section means shares of stock in any corporation,
certificates of stock or interest in any corporation, notes,
bonds, debentures, and evidences of indebtedness. The
term "book value" means the value as shown on financial
statements prepared for book purposes as of the last day of
the calendar or fiscal year.
The denial of the right to file a consolidated return or to eliminate investments in
subsidiary stock causes the corporate group to pay tax on capital that does not exist.
B. The Following Examples Illustrate the Workings of KRS 136.070 Without
KRS 136.071. These examples were used to explain the need for a legislative solution to
both the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet and the Kentucky Legislature.
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III. PLANNING TO AVOID THE KENTUCKY LICENSE TAX ON BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES
A. Eliminate the Bank Holding Company.
1) In certain instances it may make sense to eliminate the bank holding
company structure. By doing so, the bank becomes the top tier entity whose
shares are held by the ultimate shareholders. Since banks are not subject to the
corporate license tax by statute, eliminating the bank holding company would
avoid the adverse impact of the Illinois Tool Works case.
2) A variation on this theme would be to separate the bank from the holding
company and leave the holding company and any non-banking operations held by
the holding company as a separate entity subject to the corporate license tax. The
shareholders would then own shares in two organizations -- the bank and the non-
bank holding company. This structure eliminates the double tax impact caused by
owning a bank and places the holding company in the same position as other non-
banking entities waiting for a legislative fix by reenacting KRS 136.071 or
repealing KRS 136.070.
B. Convert the Bank Holding Company to a Limited Liability Company, Taxed
as a Corporation for Federal Tax Purposes. Currently under Kentucky law,
limited liability companies are not subject to the corporate license tax. If the bank
holding company was to convert from a Kentucky corporation to a Kentucky limited
liability company which is taxed as a corporation for Federal tax purposes, by merging
into the limited liability company, the merger transaction would be exempt for Federal
income tax purposes and under current Kentucky law, the limited liability company
would not be subject to Kentucky's corporate license tax. This option may be a good one
for a bank whose bank holding company has a small number of shareholders, wants to
keep a holding company structure .and wants to have more certainty that it will not incur
the corporate license tax in 2004 than is provided in the option of relying solely on the
ability and willingness of the Kentucky legislature to enact corrective legislation in 2004,
2005 or 2006.
C. Move the Bank Holding Company to a Tax Friendly State.
1) Overview. A new bank holding company could incorporate in another
"tax-friendly" state in order to avoid Kentucky state taxation entirely at the
holding company level. Two contiguous jurisdictions that we have identified as
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having favorable state taxing structures1 are Indiana and Virginia.2 States to also
consider are Delaware, Florida and Nevada.
2) Indiana. Indiana imposes a financial institutions franchise tax for the
privilege of exercising the franchise or the corporate privilege of transacting
business of a financial institution in Indiana. The franchise tax rate is eight and
one half percent (8.5%) of the financial institution's adjusted gross income.3 A
holding company carrying on the business of a financial institution is exempt
from Indiana's corporation adjusted gross income tax. Additionally, the Indiana
intangible property tax has been repealed. Indiana does not have a corporate
license tax like Kentucky.
3) Virginia. Virginia imposes a corporation income tax at a rate of six
percent (6%) of Virginia taxable income. It does not have a state corporation
license tax. There is a state and local bank franchise tax on net capital, but a bank
holding company is not subject to this tax. Virginia does not tax intangible
personal property.
4) Establishing Sufficient Nexus. If the bank holding company chooses
to reincorporate in another jurisdiction, the bank holding company must establish
sufficient activity in that jurisdiction to establish legal nexus. This is important to
ensure that the activities of the bank holding company will not be taxed in
Kentucky. Kentucky could assert that the bank holding company is just a sham
corporation organized to avoid Kentucky taxes and as such that its income and
capital should be taxed in Kentucky. Additionally, if the bank holding company
does not relinquish all of its presence and activities in Kentucky, Kentucky could
assert that the bank holding company has retained a physical and/or economic
presence in the state which provides sufficient nexus with Kentucky to tax the
bank holding company. To establish sufficient nexus activity in another
jurisdiction a bank holding company should lease office space, maintain a bank
account and incur operating expenses in the jurisdiction. The bank holding
company should have employees in the jurisdiction. This can be accomplished by
hiring at least one employee there, to the extent existing officers and employees in
the banking group do not want to "relocate" there. The bank holding company
should respect normal corporate formalities such as holding meetings of the board
of directors within the jurisdiction. It is important that the bank holding company
lOur analysis of the states' taxing structures focused primarily on (1) corporate income taxes;
(2) corporate franchise/license taxes; and (3) intangible property taxes, as being the most relevant
for a bank holding company.
2 We analyzed the tax structure of all of the states that are contiguous to Kentucky and
determined that Indiana and Virginia were the most "tax friendly".
3 Indiana adjusted gross income is defined as federal taxable income under §63 under the IRe.
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has economic substance and therefore as many of the above activities as practical
should take place within the new jurisdiction. If the bank holding company is
considered a sham corporation, lacking economic substance, its income and
capital are likely taxable in Kentucky.
D. Waiting for a Legislative Fix.
1) Tax Modernization contains a fix for the ITW decision.
2) The 2003 (90/10) legislative fix vetoed by Governor Patton is still being
reviewed by the courts. It is possible that the Governor's veto may be overturned.
IV. TAX MODERNIZATION
A. The ITW Provisions.
1) The 2003 tax year. The budget bill contains provisions that make KRS
136.071 apply to tax year 2003.
2) The Future Years. The budget bill provides that the corporate license
tax is repealed effective December 31, 2004.
B. House Bill 352. The KBA had legislation introduced that would have
removed from the computation of capital the holding company's interests in financial
institution stock.
v. OTHER ISSUES ARISING FROM THE TAX MODERNIZATION PROPOSAL
THAT IMPACT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.
A. Taxation of LLC's and Other Entities. The proposal contains a new
definition of corporations subject to Kentucky corporate tax. The following entities are
now defined as "corporations" in Kentucky:
1) "Corporations" as defined in Section 7701(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code;
2) S corporations as defined in Section 1361(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code;
3) A foreign limited liability company as defined in KRS 275.015(6);
4) A limited liability company as defined in KRS 275.015(8);
5) A professional limited liability company as defined in KRS 275.015(19);
6) A foreign limited partnership as defined in KRS 362.401(4);
7) A limited partnership as defined in KRS 362.401(7);
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8) A registered limited liability partnership as defined in KRS 362.155(7);
9) A real estate investment trust as defined in Section 856 of the Internal
Revenue Code;
10) A regulated investment company as defined in Section 851 of the Internal
Revenue Code;
11) A real estate mortgage investment conduit as defined in Section 860D of
the Internal Revenue Code; and
12) A financial asset securitization investment trust as defined in Section 860L
of the Internal Revenue Code.
B. Nexus. The proposal contains the following definition of "Doing Business" in
Kentucky:
1) "Doing business in this state" includes, but is not limited to:
a. Being organized under the laws of this state;
b. Having a commercial domicile in this state;
c. Owning or leasing property in this state;
d. Having one (1) or more individuals performing services in this
state;
e. Maintaining an interest in a general partnership doing business in
this state;
f. Deriving income from or attributable to sources within this state,
including deriving income directly or indirectly from a trust doing
business in this state; or
g. Directing activities at Kentucky customers for the purpose of
selling them goods or services that are not otherwise protected by
Pub. L. No. 86-272.
c. Mandatory Consolidation of Entities Within the Corporate Group. The
proposal contains the following provisions relating to consolidations:
1) Affiliated Group. One (1) or more chains of includible corporations
connected through stock ownership, membership interest, or partnership interest
with a common parent corporation if:
a. The common parent owns directly an ownership interest meeting
the requirements of subparagraph (c) below in at least one (1) other
includible corporation; and
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b. An ownership interest meeting the requirements of subparagraph
(c) below in each of the includible corporations, excluding the
common parent, is owned directly by one (1) or more of the other
corporations.
c. The ownership interest of any corporation meets the requirements
of this paragraph if the ownership interest encompasses at least
eighty percent (80%) of the voting power of all classes of
ownership interests and has a value equal to at least eighty percent
(80%) of the total value of all ownership interests.
2) Common Parent Corporation. The member of an affiliated group that
meets the ownership requirement of subparagraphs (a) and (b) above.
3) Includible Corporation.
state except:
Any corporation that is doing business in this
a. Corporations exempt from corporation income tax under
paragraphs (a) to (h) of subsection (1) of Section 6 of the Act;
b. Foreign corporations;
c. Corporations with respect to which an election under Section 936
of the Internal Revenue Code is in effect for the taxable year;
d. Real estate investment trusts as defined in Section 856 of the
Internal Revenue Code;
e. Regulated investment companies as defined in Section 851 of the
Internal Revenue Code;
f. A domestic international sales company as defined In Section
992(a)(I) of the Internal Revenue Code;
g. An S corporation as defined in Section 1361(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code;
h. Any corporation that realizes a net operating loss whose Kentucky
property, payroll, and sales factors pursuant to subsection (8) of
Section 10 of the Act are de minimis; and
1. Any corporation for which the sum of the property, payroll and
sales factors described in subsection (8) of Section 9 of the Act is
zero.
4) Ownership Interest. Means stock, a membership interest in a limited
liability company, or a partnership interest in a limited partnership or limited
liability partnership;
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5) Consolidated Return Filing. The proposal contains the following
language:
a. An affiliated group, whether or not filing a federal consolidated
return, shall file a consolidated return which includes all includible
corporations.
b. An affiliated group required to file a consolidated return under this
subsection shall be treated for all purposes as a single corporation
under the provisions of this chapter. All transactions between
corporations included in the consolidated return shall be eliminated
in computing net income in accordance with subsection (13) of
Section 2 of the Act, and in determining the property, payroll, and
sales factors in accordance with Section 9 of the Act.
D. Reduction of the Corporate Tax Rate. The Tax Modernization proposal
includes a reduction in the corporate tax rate from 8.25% to 6% for tax years beginning
on or after January 1, 2005.
E. Application of a Minimum Tax Computation. The proposal contains the
following language imposing an alternative gross receipts computation.
1) An alternative minimum calculation of nine and one-half cents ($0.095)
per one hundred dollars ($100) of the corporation's gross receipts. For purposes
of this paragraph, gross receipts means the numerator of the sales factor under the
provisions ofparagraph (c) of subsection (8) of Section 9 of the Act.
2) A minimum of two hundred fifty dollars ($250) shall be due for the
taxable year from each corporation subject to the tax imposed by this section,
regardless of the application of any tax credits provided under this chapter or any
other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes for which the business entity
may qualify.
3) Sales under Paragraph (c) of Subsection (8) of Section 9 of the Act.
a. Sales of tangible personal property...
b. Sales, other than sales of tangible personal property, are in this
state if the income-producing activity is performed in this state; or
the income-producing activity is performed both in and outside this
state and a greater proportion of the income-producing activity is
performed in this state than in any other state, based on costs of
performance.
F. Application of the Entity Tax Credit. The proposal contains the following
language allowing a credit for the new entity level tax:
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1) Resident and nonresident individuals who are partners in a partnership,
members in a limited liability company electing partnership tax treatment for
federal income tax purposes, shareholders in an S corporation, or owners of a
single member limited liability company shall be entitled to a nonrefundable
credit against the tax imposed under Section 4 of the Act for their proportionate
share of income tax due as determined under Section 6 of the Act before the
application of any credits identified in subsection (4) of Section 5 of the Act and
reduced by the required minimum imposed by subsection (6) of Section 6 of the
Act. The credit determined under this subsection shall not operate to reduce the
tax due to an amount that is less than what would have been payable were the
income attributable to doing business in this state by the partnership, limited
liability company, or S corporation ignored.
G. Taxation of LLC Distributions. The proposal contains the following
language concerning the taxation ofdistributions:
1) For partnerships, limited liability companies electing partnership tax
treatment for federal income tax purposes, single member limited liability
companies whose member is an individual, and S corporation subject to tax under
the provisions of Section 6 of the Act, the individual partner, member, or
shareholder's distributive share shall be computed as nearly as practicable in a
manner identical to that required for federal income tax purposes except to the
extent required by differences between this chapter and the federal income tax law
and regulations.
2) Resident individuals who are partners in a partnership, members in a
limited liability company electing partnership tax treatment for federal income tax
purposes, owners of a single member limited liability company, or shareholders in
an S corporation subject to the tax imposed by Section 6 of the Act must report
and pay tax on the distributive share of net income, gain, loss, deduction, or
credit, as determined in paragraph (a) above.
3) A limited liability company shall file a Kentucky corporate income tax
return and determine its Kentucky income tax liability as provided in Section 6 of
the Act regardless of the tax treatment elected for federal income tax purposes.
All other income tax issues not expressly addressed by the provisions of this
chapter shall be treated in the same manner as the issues are treated for federal
income tax purposes.
Since the entities are defined for Kentucky law as corporations, it is less than clear that
the distribution from LLCs taxed as partnerships are not dividends for Kentucky law purposes.
This issue should be clarified by the Department ofRevenue.
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VI. MAKING THE S ELECTION AT THE HOLDING COMPANY LEVEL.
A. Who can qualify As is true for any other business considering an S election, a
closely held bank or bank holding company must satisfy certain eligibility requirements
to be able to take advantage of the opportunity to be treated as a flow-through entity for
federal income tax purposes. Meeting these .eligibility requirements may require
restructuring in certain cases. Any taxpayer making an S election must satisfy the
various eligibility requirements for each day of every tax year for which the election is in
effect. The eligibility requirements for banks and bank holding companies are as follows:
1) The bank or holding company may not use the reserve method of accounting
for bad debts.
2) The bank or holding company must be a domestic corporation that is not an
insurance company subject to tax under Subchapter L, a DISC or former DISC, or
a corporation to which §936 applies.
3) The bank or holding company must have 75 or fewer shareholders.
4) All the bank's or holding company's shareholders must be individuals, estates,
or certain kinds of trusts (for tax years beginning after 1997, ESOPs, pension
plans, and certain charities will be eligible shareholders).
5) The bank or holding company must not have any nonresident aliens as
shareholders (i.e., its individual shareholders must be U.S. citizens or residents).
6) The bank or holding company can only have one class of stock.
7) The bank or holding company must have a permitted tax year.
8) An election must be properly filed with the IRS no later than 2 ~ months after
the first day of the first tax year for which the election is made.
B. Electing for an LLC In order for an LLC to be treated as an S corporation, the
LLC needs to make an election to be classified as an association by filing Form 8832,
Entity Classification Election, and an election to be an S corporation by filing Form 2553,
Election by a Small Business Corporation. Under Treas. Reg. 301.7701-3, generally a
domestic eligible entity with two or more members is classified as a partnership unless
the entity elects otherwise. The ability of an LLC to make an S election was recognized
in PLR 9853045.
C. § 1374 Issues Although S corporations are pass-through entities and as such are
not subject to tax at the corporate level, a corporation that converts from a C corporation
to an S corporation is subject to a corporate level tax on the disposition of any assets held
on the date of conversion to the extent that there were "built-in gains" on the conversion
date. That is to the extent that any assets with built-in gains on the date of conversion are
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disposed of by the S corporation within 10 years following the date of conversion, the S
corporation is subject to capital gains tax at the highest corporate rate on the built-in gain.
The shareholders of the S corporation also must include the gain on their individual
returns, although a credit is provided for taxes paid at the corporate level. The built-in
gain for a year can be offset by both built-in losses and C corporation net operating loss
carryovers. In addition, the amount of taxable built-in gain for the year is limited to the
lesser of; (1) an amount determined by taking into account only recognized built-in gains
and losses; (2) the corporation's taxable income for the year; and (3) the amount by
which net unrealized gains on the date of conversion exceeds all previously recognized
built-in gains.
A bank that makes an S election and changes from the reserve method to the specific
charge-off method of accounting for bad debts may be subject to the built-in gain tax on
the §481(a) adjustment resulting from the change.
If an LLC elects to be taxed as a C corporation and immediately elects S corporation
status, there should be no built-in gains which would be subject to §1374. But if an LLC
is taxed as a C corporation, operated in this capacity for a period of time and then elects S
corporation status, there may be built-in gain and §1374 would apply upon the
converSIon.
D. The Advantages Under Federal Law
1) One level of tax on earnings with an increase In shareholder basis for
undistributed earnings.
2) Avoidance of double tax upon sale or liquidation of business (except §1374
issues discussed above).
3) Alternative Minimum Tax not applicable to S Corporations.
4) Pass-Through of Losses.
5) Social Security tax considerations.
6) Avoidance ofAccumulated Earnings Tax.
7) Avoidance ofpersonal holding tax.
8) Deductibility of interest on debt incurred to purchase S Corporation stock.
E. The Advantage Under Kentucky Law Under current Kentucky law, S
corporations are subject to the Kentucky corporation income tax only when capital gains
are in excess of $25,000 and comprise more than 50% of their taxable income for the
year (which must exceed $25,000). S corporations subject to the Kentucky corporation
income tax are not taxed to the extent that their capital gains would be exempt from
federal income tax on built-in gains imposed under IRC §1374. (KRS 141.040(5)).
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The taxable income of an S corporation is determined in the same manner as for
individual taxpayers, subject to the adjustment required under IRC §1363(b), however,
individuals or corporations carrying on a business as an S corporation are liable only in
their individual or corporate capacities, and no income tax is assessed upon the income of
any S corporation (KRS §141.206(2) & (3)). The taxable income ofS corporations must
be computed, as nearly as practicable, in the same manner as for federal income tax
purposes, except to the extent that a different treatment is required due to differences in
the federal and state income tax laws. (KRS 141.206(3)(a).).
Resident individuals who are S corporation shareholders are taxed on their distributive
share of the net income, gain, loss, deduction or credit of the S corporation. The
Kentucky Revenue Cabinet may, by regulation, require the S corporation to withhold
Kentucky income tax on the distributive shares of the entity's shareholders. The
distributive share of the S corporation's shareholders is to be computed, as nearly as
practicable, in the same manner as for federal income tax purposes, except to the extent
that a different treatment is required due to differences in the federal and state income tax
laws.
The distributive share of a resident S corporation shareholder's net income from an S
corporation subject to the Kentucky bank franchise or savings and loan institution capital
stock tax, as well as the portion of the distributive share of a resident S corporation
shareholder's net income from an S corporation related to a qualified subchapter S
subsidiary subject to the state's bank franchise or savings and loan institution capital
stock tax, may be excluded when calculating the resident shareholder's adjusted gross
income. (KRS §141.010(lO)G)(1)(a) ; KRS §141.010(lO)G)(1)(b)).
Under tax modernization, the use of an S Corporation will eliminate any issues regarding
the character of distributions.
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